Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election Part 20

The question of free trade or protection does not, at the present time, occupy a prominent place in Belgian politics, but should it do so, there is no reason to a.s.sume that opinions either for or against free trade would involve, as here, ostracism from any party. Such conditions admit of a much more genuine discussion of public and of economic questions.

In England, with the system of single-member const.i.tuencies, Unionist Free Traders have had the alternative placed before them of submitting to the opinions of the majority of the party or of retiring from all active partic.i.p.ation in public life. In Belgium, on the other hand, proportional representation has induced parties, while adhering to their fundamental principles, to make their lists of candidates as inclusive as possible. The list presented by the Catholics at Ghent in 1908 contained not only a free trader and a protectionist, but representatives of different cla.s.ses of interests within the const.i.tuency, of agriculture, of landed proprietors, of workmen and of masters of industry. Stress was laid upon the comprehensive character of their list in the election address issued by the Catholics, and each party endeavoured to make its list representative of the forces within the party. Special efforts indeed are taken to accomplish this end; in the preparation of the Liberal list members of the organization took part in the preliminary selection of candidates, the final choice being determined by a formal election. In reporting that the Belgian system of proportional representation "is not favourable to small independent parties, or, what is of greater interest to many observers in this country, to small sections or wings of large parties," the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems misinterpreted the working of the Belgian system. It is true that the Christian Democrats form the only small party in Belgium which has obtained direct representation, but the Belgian system has certainly given representation to the wings of large parties. Count Goblet d'Alviella, who was examined by the Commission, has kindly furnished some observations upon the Commission's statement.

"Whenever there is room," he writes, "that is, where the seats are numerous enough, the leaders take the greatest care to choose representatives of the princ.i.p.al shades of opinion within their party lines. At Brussels in 1910 the Catholics placed on their list not only M. Colfs, who upset their order of precedence in the previous election, but also M. Theodor, who, for the last three times, headed--unsuccessfully--a separate list of the so-called Independent Party. The Liberal list at Brussels has been formed by the joint action of Moderates (Ligue liberale) and Radicals (a.s.sociation liberale), each of these two organizations trying to give satisfaction to their own subdivisions (Flemish and Walloon, rural and urban, &c.). At Antwerp the Liberal list has been formed by five Liberal organizations, each one choosing its own representative." The M. Colfs referred to in Count Goblet d'Alviella's letter strongly opposed the military proposals of the Belgian Government, but he was, nevertheless, placed by the party organization on the official list. Thus, in Belgium wings of parties undoubtedly obtain their legitimate influence, and this renders the formation of independent small parties superfluous. The number of broad general principles on which political parties can be based is strictly limited, and this explains why neither the Belgian nor any other system of proportional representation will produce innumerable parties.

_"Free Questions" in j.a.pan._

The electoral system in j.a.pan, giving as it does great freedom for the expression of political opinion, has resulted, as in Belgium, in the separation of political questions into two types--party and free.

According to Mr. Kametaro Hayashida, the Secretary of the j.a.panese House of Representatives, the measures before parliament are duly considered at party meetings; after deliberation a decision is taken as to whether the measure under discussion should be treated as a party question, or whether freedom of action should be permitted to the individual members of the party, and a communication, embodying the result of the party meeting, is then sent to every member. Here then we get additional evidence of the amelioration of party spirit, which follows the adoption of a more elastic system of representation. Political debate must become in such cases not only more real but infinitely more valuable. The number of questions left to the discretion of the individual member is by no means inconsiderable, as will be seen from the following figures showing the att.i.tude taken by the various parties towards public questions in 1908:--

(1)--Laws

Party . . . . . Const.i.tutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical

Party questions . 105 75 66 -- Free questions. . 2 32 41 107

(2)--Pet.i.tions

Party . . . . . Const.i.tutionalist Progressive Conservative Radical

Party questions . 63 167 68 -- Free questions. . 119 15 114 182

"It should be noted," says Mr. Hayashida, "that the Radicals had no party questions, but made all questions free. On the other hand, the Const.i.tutionalists, who supported the Government, made party questions of practically all laws submitted. On the average, apart from the Radicals, the three other parties treated 23 per cent. of the laws, and 37 per cent. of the pet.i.tions in the twenty-sixth session of the Imperial j.a.panese Diet as free questions."

_The formation of groups._

Such evidence as we possess does not then warrant the a.s.sumption that a proportional system leads to an increase in the number of political parties. It makes them more elastic. On the other hand, it has been demonstrated beyond any doubt that a system of single-member const.i.tuencies has completely failed to maintain the two-party system.

In England the Labour Party forms within the House of Commons a distinct camp by itself, the Nationalist Party still more jealously guards its independence, and at the election of January, 1910, a smaller group of Independent Nationalists was formed. The rise of the Labour Party in Australia was not prevented by a system of single-member const.i.tuencies.

In Germany and France single-member const.i.tuencies have not arrested the development of groups with national, religious, or sectional programmes.

When, therefore, it is contended that proportional representation will lead to the formation of groups, the obvious answer is that it is the present system which is producing groups; and should the representation obtained by these groups, as in France and Germany and in Australia, give no clear indication of public opinion, then the instability which has been a characteristic of French and for a time of Australian parliamentary conditions may become characteristic of the House of Commons.

Nor do those advocates of proportional representation, who desire to maintain the two-party system by artificial means, offer any machinery adequate for the purpose. In an article written before the first elections for the Commonwealth parliament, Mr. Deakin wrote as follows:--

"By the very circ.u.mstances of the case the tariff issue cannot but dominate the first election, and determine the fate of the first ministry of the Commonwealth. There will be no time for second thoughts or for suspension of judgment. The first choice of the people will be final on this head. The first parliament must be either protectionist or anti-protectionist, and its first great work an Australian tariff. That is the clear-cut issue. The risk is that a proportion of the representatives may be returned upon other grounds, as the electors as a whole may not realise all that is at stake or make the necessary sacrifices or opinion and preferences to express themselves emphatically on this point."

In commenting upon this declaration the supporters of so-called two-party proportional representation[11] said:

"The only way to avoid the risk indicated is to take this one definite issue as the basis of proportional representation. Each State should be divided on it, and should elect its proportional number of Free-trade and Protectionist representatives." But how are all the electors to be constrained into accepting the dictates of party leaders as to the lines upon which elections shall be fought? The Labour Party in Australia apparently considered the special principles for which they stood of more importance than either Free Trade or Protection. The English Labour Party would doubtless adopt the same point of view, whilst the Nationalists regard the Tariff question as of little importance as compared with Home Rule. "The rude and crude division," said Mr.

Asquith, "which used to correspond more or less accurately with the facts of a representative a.s.sembly of two parties, had perhaps become everywhere more or less a thing of the past."[12] There are no means available for restoring the earlier conditions, and certainly the existing electoral system of single-member const.i.tuencies affords no guarantee that in the future any one party will obtain a permanent majority strong enough to get its own way. The maintenance in form of the two-party system during the parliament of 1906-10 was merely due to the accident of the phenomenal election of 1906, when the Liberal Party was returned in such numbers as to exceed the combined forces of all other groups. At the General Election of January, 1910, five parties entered the field, and as a result of this election no party obtained an absolute majority. In the important parliamentary debates which arose immediately after the election each of these groups took part, as such, for the purpose of emphasizing their independence, and when, consequent upon the death of King Edward, a conference on the const.i.tutional question was arranged between the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, in commenting upon the conference, made this statement: "He regretted that there was going to be any conference at all, but if there was going to be one he, as a member of the Labour Party, denied the right of the two front benches to settle it. They no longer represented the House of Commons or the opinion of the country. There were other benches."[13] Obviously, if other benches are to be taken into consideration in the solution of const.i.tutional questions, it is a matter of importance to know the true strength that lies behind those occupying them. The difference--an extremely important difference--that a proportional system would produce in the composition of the House of Commons is that the representation obtained by these groups would give a much more accurate clue to public opinion and, as in the long-run the strength of an executive depends upon its capacity to interpret the will of the people, the position of the executive would be rendered much more stable. This is the justification of Mr. Asquith's statement: "Let them have a House of Commons which fully reflected every strain of opinion; that was what made democratic government in the long-run not only safer and more free, but more stable."

But does parliamentary government, as the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems suggests, really depend for its working upon the maintenance of a system of election which admittedly distorts the real wishes of the people? This argument had been antic.i.p.ated and effectively dealt with by M. Ostrogorski in his _Democracy and Political Parties_. "There arises,"

says he, "the old question of the Duke of Wellington, frightened by the prospect of the abolition of the rotten boroughs: How will the King's government be carried out? How will parliamentary government work? In reality the catastrophe will not be more than that which so alarmed the hero of Waterloo; now, as then, it will be nothing more nor less than the destruction of something rotten."[14] The King's government has been improved by the abolition of the rotten boroughs, and will be still further improved if opinion within the House of Commons is brought into more direct relation with opinion outside. The view taken by the Commission was not shared by one of its members, Lord Lochee, who in a note appended to the Report says: "I am not concerned to dispute that the introduction of proportional representation might involve important changes in parliamentary government. That, in my view, is not a question for the Commission. I shall, therefore, only say that I do not believe that the cause of good government is bound up with the maintenance of a distorted representation, or that British statesmanship would be unable to cope with the problems which a better system might bring in its train."

_The formation of an executive_.

Changes will doubtless take place in the method of carrying on the King's government, but they will take place very gradually, and will be evolved out of present conditions. It would be essential, as now, that the government should possess the confidence of the House of Commons and of the country, and, in order to obtain this confidence it would not be sufficient to secure a majority by means of bargainings between groups which involved important sacrifices of principle. Even with such rigid party discipline as now obtains it would be difficult and perhaps impossible to effect an alliance between Unionist Tariff Reformers and Nationalists for the purpose of carrying out a double policy of Tariff Reform and Home Rule. It is certain that under a system of proportional representation such an arrangement would be useless as a basis for a stable executive, for with the lessened rigidity in discipline party leaders would have no means of enforcing the terms of such bargains upon their followers. The composition of the House itself would give a clear indication of the main policies which would meet with the approval of the House and also of the Government which would command its confidence.

It is perhaps unwise to attempt to map out in any detail the probable course of events, but there are some who are unwilling to take this step forward in the perfecting of democratic inst.i.tutions without some clear conception of the way in which a good government might be formed under the new conditions. Professor Nanson of Melbourne has endeavoured to satisfy this anxiety by attempting to forecast the probable effect which a system of proportional representation would have upon the formation of governments in Australia, showing how such a system would enable a really stable executive to be formed.

"To bring the matter vividly before us," says he, "consider the two vital issues now before the Australian public. These are Protection and the Labour platform. Every elector and every candidate at once falls into one of four groups. For every one is either Protectionist or anti-Protectionist, and every one is either Labour or non-Labour. Every person is therefore either Protectionist and Labour, or Protectionist and non-Labour, or anti-Protectionist and Labour, or anti-Protectionist and non-Labour. Using the letters P, A, L, N to denote Protectionist, Anti-protectionist, Labour, Non-labour, we have four groups which we may denote by PL, PN, AL, AN.

"It is clear that if we can find out the number of voters in each group we can at once declare the verdict of the country for or against Protection, and for or against the Labour platform. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the percentage of voters are: Non-labour Protectionist, 32; Non-labour Anti-protectionist, 28; Labour Protectionist, 24; Labour Anti-protectionist, 16; as shown in the following table:--

P A N .... 32 28 60 L .... 24 16 40 _ _ __ 50 44 100

"Then it is clear that there is a majority of 60 per cent, to 40 per cent, against the Labour platform, and a majority of 56 per cent, to 44 per cent, in favour of protection. Under such circ.u.mstances the distribution of members in a House of 75 would be as follows:--

P A N .... 24 21 45 L .... 18 12 30 _ _ _ 42 33 75

"In such a House there would be a majority of 45 to 30 against the Labour platform, and a majority of 42 to 33 in favour of Protection. In such a House the only possible Ministry would be a Non-labour Protectionist. There would be a straight out Ministerial party of 24.

There would be a right Ministerial Labour Protectionist wing of 18 bound to support the Ministry in its Protectionist policy. There would be a left Ministerial Anti-protectionist Non-labour wing of 21 bound to support the Ministry in its Non-labour policy. The straight out Opposition would be 12. Such a House might well be left to elect a Ministry. Every minister would, with a proper method of election, if necessary, be a Non-labour Protectionist. For there would be an absolute majority of the House against every Labour man and against every Anti-protectionist. Every Minister would be heart and soul with the Ministerial policy. There could then be no possibility of dirt eating or of voting against one's convictions, as is alleged to be the case at present."[15] The divisions between English political parties may not be so clearly cut nor the composition of the Executive so h.o.m.ogeneous as outlined in this forecast of Professor Nanson, but a proportional system would certainly yield a true indication of the mind of the nation on at least three, and probably more, of the important matters under discussion in England--Tariff Reform, Home Rule, and the const.i.tutional position of the House of Lords. A clear expression of national opinion on these issues would determine the policy which an executive resting for authority upon the House of Commons would have to pursue, but, in addition, the improved electoral methods would yield unmistakable indications of the att.i.tude of the nation towards those Labour and Social questions which will more and more claim the attention of Parliament. In brief, so far from proportional representation creating conditions unfavourable to the formation of a strong executive, it will furnish the only means by which in the future stable executives can be formed. It will place within the hands of governments a new and more delicate instrument with which to gauge public opinion, and it is on the accurate interpretation of public opinion that the continued existence of a government depends.

_A check on partisan legislation._

But those who, with Professor Jenks, regard the representative principle as being merely a means of getting things done, will perhaps want some indication of the possibility, not only of forming an Executive under a proportional regime but of carrying legislation. There are obviously two aspects to this question. The power of initiating and of controlling legislation is now so largely in the hands of the executive authority that means are required not only of getting things done but of ensuring that the privileged position possessed by the executive authority is not abused. The present system enables a ministry in command of an overwhelming but false majority to impose upon the nation legislation with which the nation is not in accord. It is more than doubtful whether the Education and Licensing measures carried by Mr. Balfour's administration (1902-5) would have been acceptable to a House of Commons which was truly representative, and as Mr. Balfour's government dominated the House of Lords as completely as it controlled the House of Commons, the only check which existed upon the action of the Ministry was the fear of defeat when the time came for the inevitable appeal to the country. Such a check has proved to be inadequate to prevent the pa.s.sage of partisan legislation, and the failure of the House of Commons to protect the nation against legislation of an arbitrary nature has given rise to the demand for checks of another character.

_Unlike the referendum, proportional representation will strengthen the House of Commons._

Thus, it is now urged that the nation should, by means of the referendum, be afforded the opportunity of exercising that control over the executive which the House of Commons has lost. "Formerly," says Professor Dicey, "when the King was the real and effective sovereign of the country, and was responsible for its government, it was right that he should have a veto. The nation is now the sovereign, and what I propose is to place a veto in the hands of the nation.[16] Now, although proportional representation is not inconsistent with the referendum, yet these two reforms endeavour to cure the defects of representative inst.i.tutions in different ways. The referendum, by transferring responsibility and authority from the House of Commons to the nation, will tend to diminish the importance of the representative chamber.

Proportional representation, on the other hand, aims at strengthening the House by making it more fully representative, and in consequence more competent to discharge its true functions. Moreover, there are some practical objections to the referendum. There must always be considerable difficulty in framing the form in which a legislative proposal should be submitted to the country. To be permitted to say 'yes' or 'no' to a complicated measure is not sufficient. It would have been extremely difficult for most of the electors to have stated, without any qualification, whether they approved of Mr. Asquith's Licensing Bill of 1908. This measure was far too comprehensive to submit as a whole, and an unfavourable verdict would have given no clear indication as to the nation's wishes, and would have been open to serious misinterpretation. The new licensing duties and the new land taxes contained in the Finance Bill of 1909 had nothing in common, and it would have been necessary to have submitted a Bill of this nature in sections. Further, every time a measure which had pa.s.sed the House of Commons was rejected by the nation, the prestige of the House would be impaired, and the conclusion is unavoidable that, were the referendum adopted, the House could only retain an authoritative position by introducing a system of proportional representation so as to bring it as closely as possible into agreement with the nation. It is, moreover, generally agreed that Finance Bills should not be the subject of a referendum, but in a modern state these are of as much importance as other legislation. The work of legislation demands special qualifications. When we select a doctor or a lawyer, or any other agent, we wish him to do his special work. The elector desires to have an effective choice in the selection of his representative in parliament, but having chosen a legislator with whom he is in sympathy entrusts the details of legislation to him. Proportional representation would give the elector this effective choice, and by restoring to members of Parliament a greater measure of freedom would enable the House of Commons to resume its proper function of controlling legislation. The need for the referendum would disappear.

_Proportional Representation facilitates legislation desired by the nation._

It may be said, however, that there is here no indication of the means of getting things done, only of a check upon partisan action. But proportional representation, in rendering more difficult the pa.s.sing of legislation conceived in a partisan spirit, will save the time and energy of Parliament for legislation which is more in accordance with the nation's will. The history of the numerous Education and Licensing Bills which have been presented to Parliament during the two decades 1890-1910 furnish an excellent example of the way in which a rigid party system results in the waste of parliamentary time. No wonder that the legislative machine has broken down. Efforts are now being made to increase the working capacity of the House of Commons, but if these are to be permanently successful, there must be such an abatement of partisan feeling as a system of proportional representation encourages.

The changes which have been introduced in recent years into the procedure of the House of Commons are of a far-reaching character.

According to the rules adopted in 1907, all Bills, other than money Bills and Bills for confirming Provisional Orders, are referred, after the pa.s.sing of the second reading, to Standing Committees of the House, unless a resolution to the contrary is moved immediately and carried.

There is a growing opinion in favour of these committees, the value of which is largely due to the greater sincerity in discussion which takes place in them. When Mr. Asquith moved the resolution allocating the time to be allowed for discussion on the Housing and Town Planning Bill, Lord Robert Cecil expressed the opinion that the system of guillotining debate was destructive of the legislative efficiency and the dignity of the House of Commons.[17] "Personally he thought some remedy might possibly be found in an extension of the Grand Committee system. He began with a violent prejudice against them. He had now sat on several of them, and he had come to the belief that, on the whole, they were by far the best instrument they now possessed, inferior though it was to a full and free discussion in the whole House for the consideration of legislation. The most important characteristic of them was that only those decided who heard the arguments. They did not have the disgusting farce that went on in that Chamber of members trooping in from outside who had not the slightest knowledge of the subject which had been discussed, who had not taken the slightest interest in it, and who merely asked the Whips at the door, 'Which side are we to-day?' and voted 'Aye' or 'No' as they were told. The Prime Minister recognized that the independence and dignity of the House were invaluable a.s.sets to the country, and had shown on many occasions a genuine desire to preserve the dignity of members of Parliament, and the self-respect of the House." Mr. Asquith, in reply to this statement, also expressed his opinion that by a larger and more elastic use of the system of Committees it would be possible to avoid some of the evils arising from the growing congestion of parliamentary business. "The Housing and Town Planning Bill was," said he, "a very good ill.u.s.tration of the useful purpose served by the Grand Committee. It was there for twenty-three days; it was discussed under almost ideal conditions; the closure was never moved from beginning to end; the Government Whips never sought to exert their authority in any one of the divisions which took place; and the discussion was conducted by men who were obliged to listen to the arguments of those who were opposed to them. As regards Bills of this character, it was perfectly certain that they got a much more accurate discussion, and decisions were arrived at far less under the stress of party prepossession than when a Bill was discussed in Committee of the whole House."

Thus it seems that a lessening of party discipline and a greater freedom and sincerity in discussion result in an acceleration of the rate of legislation, and as a proportional system favours these conditions it would materially a.s.sist the process of getting things done.

_Proportional Representation in Standing Committees._

But this important change in the procedure of the House of Commons--the discussion of the details of legislation in Grand Committees instead of committees of the whole House--furnishes from another point of view cogent reasons for the adoption of a system of proportional representation. In the composition of these committees strict care is taken to allot representation to the various parties within the House in proportion to their strength. Otherwise these committees would not possess the confidence of the House. But if the composition of committees on a proportionate basis is a condition of their success, would not their work be even more successful if in the first instance the strength of parties within the House corresponded to the number of their supporters in the country? The House of Commons would enjoy the confidence of the nation, and its standing committees would acquire greater authority because they, in turn, would be fully representative.

One of the most important of these committees is the Scottish Grand Committee, to which all Scottish Bills are referred. All Scottish members are appointed to this committee, but in order that its composition should conform to the rule--that committees should reflect the strength of parties within the House--it has been found necessary to add thereto a number of English Conservatives who often, if not usually, have not the special qualifications necessary for dealing with the details of Scottish questions. If the purpose for which the Scottish Grand Committees have been const.i.tuted is to be fulfilled, it will be necessary that the different political forces within each part of the Kingdom should be represented in the House proportionately and that the membership of the committees should be confined to Scottish members. It is quite possible, under the present electoral system, that there might be an overwhelming Conservative majority in England and a large Liberal majority in Scotland. In such conditions the Scottish Grand Committee would fail to work. It would be necessary to add so large a number of English Conservatives that the Committee would lose its distinctively Scottish character. There is often very little difference between Scottish representatives on Scottish questions. A good instance of this was shown in the discussion on the report stage of the House Letting Bill (1909). The measure was opposed by the English Conservative members of the Committee, whilst the Scottish Conservatives voted for it. If the Scottish Conservatives were fully represented in the House of Commons they would obtain adequate representation on the Committee; a large addition of English Conservatives would not be necessary, and an agreement between the members of the Committee would often be much more quickly reached. Not only so, but a system of proportional representation would greatly strengthen the personnel of the Committee.

Both the Scottish Law Officers of Mr. Balfour's Administration were defeated in the General Election of 1906, and in consequence the Scottish Conservatives, in their deliberations in Committee, were deprived of the expert advice which these officers could have afforded.

Obviously, Scottish legislation can be dealt with best in a Scottish Grand Committee, but the successful working of this Committee requires the true representation thereon of the different sections of political opinion in Scotland, and, in addition, the presentation of those opinions by their most capable exponents.

Similarly, all members representing const.i.tuencies in Wales and Monmouth are to be appointed to the Committee dealing with Bills relating exclusively to that part of the country. Such Bills are not so numerous as Bills relating to Scotland, but nevertheless it is most desirable that in the discussion of a Welsh Bill minorities in Wales should be represented not by members sitting for English const.i.tuencies, but by representatives chosen by themselves who would be fully conversant with Welsh conditions. In the absence of such representation there will always remain the feeling that the minority has been unfairly treated, and it is this sense of unfairness that so often calls forth opposition of a partizan character, and such opposition is fatal to progress in legislation.

Perhaps the South African National Convention affords the most striking example of the capacity of a fully representative body to achieve results of a satisfactory character and with little delay. Had this Convention been packed either in the Boer or the British interest the great task of South African Union would never have been accomplished.

The scrupulous care with which the rights of the minorities were respected is the secret of the wonderful rapidity with which the enormous difficulties involved in the task were overcome. Not only were minorities awarded full representation on this Convention, but every facility was afforded them in the choice of their delegates. The sense of justice and the spirit of reasonableness go always hand in hand, and the spirit of reasonableness alone makes possible the smooth and efficient working of the legislative machine.

_Taking off the Whips._

Proportional representation will therefore not only facilitate the formation of a stable executive in the new political conditions, but it will be of very great value in creating the atmosphere in which legislation can most easily be pa.s.sed. Even with the present system of false representation progress might often be more rapid if debate was less partisan in character. The executive might easily refrain from driving so hard the members of the party on which it rests for support.

All political questions are not of the same importance, and a step in the direction of freer and less partizan conditions would be taken if opportunities were more often given to members to vote in accordance with their own judgment. The experiment of taking off the official Whips more frequently might yield valuable results. Sir Courtenay Ilbert says, however, that "open questions are not popular; they compel a member to think for himself, which is always troublesome."[18] But the advantage which would arise from the increase of the spirit of reasonableness would far outweigh such disadvantages as might befall the less politically minded members of the House. Far less importance too need be attached to snap divisions, and, as Sir William Anson has suggested, it should be generally understood that the results of such divisions need not entail the resignation of a government.

_New political conditions._

Must then the practical politician still reject proportional representation? Sir Charles Dilke, in evidence before the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems,[19] attached great importance to the views of political leaders upon the party system, and doubtless practical politicians are guided by their views. The recent utterances, however, of two great party leaders show that the new political conditions and their consequences are fully recognized and appreciated by them. Mr. Balfour, in a speech before the Scottish Conservative Club,[20] emphasized the importance of having every shade of opinion represented in the House of Commons: "There is a section," he said, "an important section of Socialist opinion in the country, and it is quite right that they should find voice in the House of Commons if their numbers in the country render that desirable. We cannot, we do not, lose by having Socialist members in the House of Commons, if there are many Socialists in the country. We do not lose, we gain by it." Does this utterance of a great Conservative leader indicate any belief that the two-party system is the final and unchangeable expression of national feeling. Mr. Asquith has said that "the rude and crude divisions which used to correspond more or less accurately with the fact of a representative a.s.sembly of two parties only, the Whig and the Tory, the Right and the Left, or by whatever other names they may have been called, with strictly drawn lines of demarcation with no debatable or intermediate territory, that perhaps has become everywhere, more or less, a thing of the past." Such opinions so freely expressed must prepare the way for the more serious consideration of proportional representation by the practical politicians. It will in no sense involve the abandonment of party organization, but it will render those organizations, to use Mr. Asquith's words once more, "elastic, flexible, always adapting itself to shifting conditions." Party organization of such a character is undoubtedly a fundamental condition of the smooth working of the parliamentary machine, but another condition equally fundamental is that the strength of parties within the House should bear a direct and true relation to the strength of parties in the country.