Panzer Commander Part 15

Back at my command post I made contact with Feuchtinger. I described the situation as it appeared to me at about midday on 18 July, and ended, "General, I believe that the whole British attack has come to a standstill, thanks to the engagement of all elements of my combat group, and thanks not least to a Luftwaffe 8.8cm battery that I found by chance at Cagny and put to use in the ground fighting. I see a great danger, however, on my right wing. If the British were to move up their infantry things would look pretty bad for my rather thin defensive front. For the moment it's all right still, but reserves ought to arrive in the course of the afternoon."

"Congratulations, Luck, on this successful defense. I can give you good news: the Ist SS Panzer Division has orders to move up to us at once from Falaise and strengthen our defense, especially on the Bourgebus hills. The 12th SS Panzer Division also has orders to support us on our right, hence your flank, and prevent a breakthrough to the southeast.

"The Ist SS will arrive today in the late afternoon, the 12th SS not before midday tomorrow. We must hold till then." In the late afternoon Feuchtinger came through again, "The first elements of the Ist SS have arrived. Together with them we have knocked out a lot of tanks. With, your tally the British have probably lost at least 200 tanks. I am rea.s.sured that you can hold out on the right flank. Convey my appreciation to Kurz commander of II Battalion)." In the afternoon I finally changed and at once felt better. The Tiger battalion sent word that about ten Tigers were again operational, and that they would be mounting an attack on the enemy's left flank.

"Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 199 Lieutenant (as he then was) Freiherr von Rosen, commander of a Panzer VI (Tiger) company, has given' the following account: "The bombardment early in the morning of 18 July was the worst we had ever experienced in the war. Although we were in foxholes under our tanks, we had a lot of casualties. Some of the 62-ton machines lay upside down in bomb craters 30 feet across; they had been spun through the air like playing cards.

Two of my men committed suicide; they weren't up to the psychological effect. Of my 14 Tigers not one was operational.

All had been covered in dust and earth, the guns disadjusted, the cooling systems of the engines out of action. Yet by early afternoon a few of my Tigers were ready for battle. I was to use them to attack westward in the flank of the British tank attack." From captured maps and operational plans we knew that the guards were supposed to attack in a southeasterly direction, the 7th Armored Division in the center southward, and the leading I Ith Armored Division to the southwest.

While the guards=it was their very first enpgement-felt their way forward cautiously and were beaten back time and again with heavy losses in tanks, the 7th Armored Division had not as yet put in an appearance. It was not until the late afternoon of 18 July that it was able to pa.s.s through the small number of gaps in the mine field.

The British offensive, for 18 July, had come to a halt. The gain in territory was not as yet very great; of a breakout or a breakthrough there could be no question. We were certain, however, that the British would be preparing themselves for the next day. The question remained whether, with our depleted forces, we would again be able to stop the attack.

The morning of 19 July remained surprisingly quiet. In the course of individual tank thrusts a number of British tanks were again knocked out. But then, in the early afternoon, Monty took the field with all three tank divisions, supported by infantry and artillery, which had been brought up in the meantime.

While the guards division operated vety cautiously for lack of experience, we discovered to our surprise that the 7th Armored Division was doing the same. It was going through the same experience that we had been through: it was oyer-experienced and for that reason operated with extreme caution. We managed to fight off all attacks on the right wing and in so doing inflicted heavy losses on the two British divisions. For that we had to thank the skillful engagement of my 11 Battalion under Major Kurz, as well as the panzer reconnaissance battalion and Beeker's a.s.sault-guns.

A liaison officer came to me from the reconnaissance battalion.

"Major, I have to report that by our own counterattacks we have forced the enemy to retreat again and again. For a while there was a British field dressing station behind our lines.

"An hour ago a British tank appeared with a white flag and brought back some of our wounded. We thanked them at once." That was true fairness!

From division and from Becker's two batteries now operating alone on my left flank we heard that the Ilth Armored Division, with grenadiers and supported by tanks and heavy artillery, had mounted an attack about four o'clock against two villages on the northern edge of the Bourgebus hills, which were defended by elements of the Ist P anzer Division.

Shortly after came the following report from one of the a.s.saultgun batteries: "Both villages have been taken by the enemy, but further attack halted. Our two batteries have arrived fightingsometimes parallel to the British-without loss on the hills." Now things became critical; but the British attack was not continued and again came to a halt. It was astonishing that the attack in my sector should be so hesitant. The shock from our 8.8cm ant.i.tank guns, the few Tigers, and Becker's a.s.sault-guns seemed to have struck deep among the British. With only about 400 grenadiers left we had to hold the long front in the east.

That was too few to withstand a vigorous attack.

Finally, about five o'clock, the first elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division arrived. A general-staff officer made contact with me, "The division has been through a costly march. We were shot up time and again by British fighters and forced into cover. The bulk of the division will be here in the course of the night. How do things look with you?" I put him in the picture and learned that my combat group was to be relieved by this division. Shortly after came the order from my own division: "in the course of the night von Luck's combat group will disengage from the enemy and hand over to the 12th SS Division. You will take up a defensive position on either side of Troarn on the east bank of the flooded Dives. Rauch's combat group will also be relieved and stationed east of the Dives." The relief went through without difficulty. I hoped to be able to give the thoroughly overtired and battle-weary men a little rest. By "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 201 the late evening of 19 July it was possible to, see what the British had managed or failed to do: The little bridgehead had been extended by about 9 kilometers; Caen had now been fully occupied. But the breakthrough in the direction of Falaise had not been made.

Monty was to maintain later that more was not supposed to have been achieved, that "Operation Goodwood" had had as its objective the tying down of as many German panzer divisions as possible to make it easier for the Americans to break out as planned further West.

Others besides me have had doubts about this version of events and for the following reasons: (I) captured Canadians told us that shortly before the attack Monty had called out to them: "To Falaise, boys, we're going to march on Paris"; (2) anyone who knew Monty and his ambition, and had a.n.a.lyzed his operations in North Africa, would have taken it for granted that he would not have been content with a mere "tying down of German panzer divisions" and an "extension of the bridgehead." Be that as it may, "Cqieration Goodwood" cost the British about 450 tanks. It was a masterpiece of preparation and logistics.

And yet we were able to prevent the enemy from making a breakthrough.

Only now did we hear that on the day before "Operation Goodwood"-the start of the offensivur own Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had been severely wounded in a fighter-bomber attack on his individual car. We could hardly take it in; to us Rommel had always seemed invulnerable.

Nevertheless, the deep defensive front set up by Rommel had held against Montgomery's attack. As late as 15 and 17 July he had checked this defense in the area of our corps. It is probably true to say that with this Rommel had denied his constant adversary the way to Paris, his last military success.

During the night of 19/20 July, torrents of rain set in, which made our relief more difficult. I shall never forget on our night march to the north the stink of the dead cows, lying in the fields. On 20 July, moreover, there was a further heavy thunderstorm, which turned the battlefield into a swamp. The British air force had to stay on the ground.

Late in the evening of 20 July we learned-fir-st through leaflets dropped by the British, then also from our own radio stationf the attempt on Hitler's life. The older ones among us had mixed feelings; the younger were angry, "It's a stab in the back to us here at the front." My own thoughts went back inevitably to my talks with Rommel in North Africa in 1943 and in France in 1944. "An attempt on Hitler's life would create a 'stab-in-the-back' legend. As soon as a second front has been established and the end is in sight, we must force him to abdicate, to avoid further losses and to concentrate on the war in the cast." Next day a war correspondent appeared at my command post.

"Major, what do you say here at the front about the a.s.sa.s.sination attempt on the Fuehrer?" My answer was prompt. "Listen, we've been engaged in heavy defensive fighting here for weeks; we haven't had time to give it a thought. Come back when the situation has calmed down a bit." An offhand, risky answer, but what was the use?

Worth noting is a piece of information that came to me only recently, from a reliable source. When our corps commander, Obergruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich, of Army Group B, was told of the attempt on Hitler's life, his first question was, "Who was it, the SS or the Army?" Although the RAF launched endless attacks and the guards division, with strong patrols, tried to find a gap to the east, the days that followed seemed to us almost like a holiday.

Owing to the heavy downpours of rain the flooded River Dives had become even more impa.s.sable. For me the important thing was to recreate I Battalion, which had been almost wiped out by the bombing on 18 July.

At the division's field replacement section a new battalion, built up from remaining cadres and well-trained replacements from home, with factory-fresh SPWS (armored personnel carriers), was brought to operational level in only a few days. We marveled at the logistics by which, time and again, replacements, ammunition, and vehicles were brought up to the front.

After only a week in our defensive "resting" position the division was pulled out, to be restored to strength. We all hoped for a few days' peace to lick our wounds.

But signs of the next British offensive, which they called "Bluecoat," began to appear and put an end to the respite.

After only two days the division was transferred to the area south of Villers Bocage on the important road No.175 south of Bayeux. Together with the "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 203 brave 21st Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion we managed to hold the front.

The men were tired, our body heavy. We had been in action now for eight weeks without a break, longer, therefore, than any other division. But in spite of that morale was high. The men fought until they dropped. Then, however, on 25 July, after a four-hour aerial bombardment, the Americans managed to break through at the Panzer Lehr Division. We pulled back our front a little and now held a line from Avranches-St. Lb to south of Caen.

Then, on 31 July, came news that General George S. Patton, probably the most flexible of the Allied tank commanders, had broken through at Avranches, near the famous Mont St. Michel With that the way to the French interior, to Paris and Reich territory, seemed to be open. Hitler reacted at once: He threw General Eberbach on Avranches with a hastily a.s.sembled panzer group, in order to cut Patton's lines of communication.

Once again it was the people at Bletchley Park, who were cracking our codes, and the U-.S. air force that nipped our attack in the bud. Worse still, however, was the fact that all our divisions engaged in the west were now threatened with encirclement, since Patton would obviously be able to continue his eastward thrust unchecked.

Then everything happened very quickly. We had to fall back; for our decimated, exhausted divisions would not have been able to withstand another big push.

Retreat to Germany" August-November 1944 It took a further two weekf delaying actions and continual evading movements to the southeastfore we reached the area of Falaise, south of Caen. With that the whole Contentin Peninsula, with its important harbor of Cherbourg, was finally lost.

Montgomery, meanwhile, had also emerged from the bridgehead enlarged by "Operation Goodwood" and with the 4th Canadian Division and a Polish tank division was pressing forward into the area northeast of Falaise. Monty's attack from the northwest and Patton's thrust from the southwest threatened to envelop almost the whole of the German Normandy front in one vast pocket.

On 17 August both the Canadian division and the Polish tank division pushed through and split our division in two: Rauch's combat group, with Regiment 192, Reconnaissance Battalion 21, and the last eight tanks, fell into the pocket that was forming; my combat group and divisional HQ remained just outside.

From now on Allied bombers swooped down without a break on our retreating divisions. The excellent American artillery covered all roads and routes with heavy fire day and night.

Worse off were the infantry divisions, which, with their horsedrawn units, struggled east on foot and blocked all the roads. Appalling scenes took place: the tanks, armored elements, and motorized supply units ruthlessly forced their way through to the east. On and beside every road and track leading east shot-up vehicles had broken down; the cadavers of horses lay around. Even ambulances, packed with wounded, stood burning by the side of the road. Valiant officers tried to bring a little order into the chaos, but usually without success.

With my combat group I received orders to set up a defensive block fronting to the west, to prevent any further advance by the Polish and Canadian divisions. From the heights west of Vimoutiers, where Rommel had been severely wounded on'17 July, I had a wide view into the great valley. There, enemy planes were swooping down uninterruptedly on anything that moved. I could see the mushroom clouds of exploding bombs, burning vehicles, and the wounded, who were picked up by retreating transports.

The scenes Retreat to Germany, August-November 1944 205 that had to be enacted in the pocket were indescribable, and we could do nothing to help.

"Man, horse, and truck by the Lord were struck." This saying, from a poem on the battles of the Crusaders in Pajestine in about 1213, had come to my mind twice before: in December 1941 by Moscow and in 1943 in North Africa. I The jaws of the pocket had not yet quite closed: further south, near the little village of Chambois on the River Dives, there was still a gap, as yet unfilled by the Americans and Montgomery's two divisions. This was probably because, on the one hand, we had managed time and again to hold up the Polish tank division, and on the other, because Patton no longer seemed to be interested in exploiting his advantage, but in pushing on fast to the Seine east of Paris. A certain animosity on Patton's part toward Monty helped us after all to rescue sizable elements from the pocket, though without their materiel.

Colonel Rauch and Major Brandt, commander of the panzer reconnaissance battalion, were to report later under what adventurous circ.u.mstances they had managed to extricate themselves from the encirclement. Together with the remnants of some SS panzer divisions, which forced a breach in the closing pocket, and held open the way to the east, Rauch's combat group was able to ford the River Dives by night under heavy artillery fire.

Corporal Korfluer, commander of one of the last Panzer IVS of No.4 Company, has given the following account. "On 19 August came the order"Every man for himself." With a second Panzer IV we set out on the way to the east. At the sight of naked, half-burned tank-men we promised ourselves that we would not let ourselves be finished off in the pocket. It was a h.e.l.lish journey. In bypa.s.sing a horse-drawn column we skidded so badly that we had to abandon our tanks. We continued on foot. During the 'night we slipped past the enemy, some of whom looked at us in bewilderment.

"In the morning we were through and-for the momentsaved." Lieutenant Hoeller, of No.8 heavy Company of Regiment 192, took part in the breakout. "We received orders to abandon our positions during the night of 19/20 August and break through in the direction of Trun. There was still a gap of 5 kilometers, in which only a few enemy patrols had been detected. For our battle-weary unit the withdrawal by night was almost superhuman.

"The closer we got to the breakout point the more ghastly was 206 PANZER COMMANDER the scene that met our eyes. The roads were blocked by two or three shot-up, b.u.mt-out vehicles standing alongside each other, ammunition was exploding, tanks were burning, and horses lay struggling on their backs until they were eventually released. In the fields far and wide was the same chaos. The enemy artillery fired into the turmoil from all sides; everything was pressing east. We had to pa.s.s through St. Lambert. There, a small operations staff had been set up; Panther and Tiger tanks of the SS divisions took the lead.

"While the enemy fired nonstop into the village with ant.i.tank guns and artillery, we forced our way through regardless.

Shot-up tanks and vehicles were pushed aside; many dead and wounded from previous breakouts lay by the side of the road. As far as room was available we took the wounded with us, or at least cared for them.

"We jumped out of our armored personnel carriers to cover SS tanks that a number of enemy ant.i.tank guns had neutralized.

"Two generals, whose infantry divisions had been wiped out, just shook their heads over our reckless attempt to break out. They marched with us.

"During the night we made a brief stop, so that the men could rest and the wounded be attended. Through the vigorous thrust of the SS tanks the enemy sustained such heavy losses that they were unable to close the pocket even on the following day, 21 August. While the tanks held the gap open, more and more groups, some quite small, filtered through the hole to the east.

We set a course by compa.s.s and marched off; we had escaped the infemo once again." In the afternoon of 21 August it was all over; the pocket was closed. How, if at all, could the men recover from this blood-letting and terrible experience?

Precise figures for the chaos in the Falaise pocket are hardly possible. According to estimates, there were between 90,000 and 100,000 men in the pocket before the last gap was closed on 21 August. Despite urgent requests, Hitler had neglected to pull back our divisions in sufficient time. It is known that about 10,000 men were killed and that between 40,000 and 50,000 were able to break out. Some 40,000 men in the pocket were taken prisoner, including several GHQS and the remains of 15 divisions, mainly infantry. The fact that such a large number of men were able to escape from the pocket, and at once rea.s.semble to offer resistance, showed their high level of training.

The danger was not yet over.

Retreat to Germany, August-November 1944 207 I eventually got through to the divisional commander, who told me, "The situation is completely out of hand. All that is known for certain is that General Patton had already reached Chartres, southwest of Paris, on 18 August, and the Seine near Fontainebleau on 21 August. According to unconfirmed reports he has been able to form two small bridgeheads there over the Seine.

"From Chartres," General Feuchtinger went on, "Patton has turned north with part of his army and is advancing on the Rouen area.

No one seems able to stop him. We are now threatened with a new pocket south and west of the Seine, and all the bridges across it appear to have been destroyed.

"I am authorized to bring Rauch's combat group and the panzer reconnaissance battalion, which lost almost all its materiel in the pocket, over the Seine at once and to move it to an area northeast of Paris, where it can be restored to strength.

Divisional HQ will move even further east, probably to the region west of the Vosges, to establish a defensive position there and a reception line for the units withdrawing from southern France.

"You, Luck," continued Feuchtinger, "will take over all elements of the division that are still operational; these are to a.s.semble northeast of Rouen. I no longer have any tanks, but you will get the last two patrols of the reconnaissance battalion.

"If Montgomery now pushes forward vigorously, I don't give much for your chances of still being able to cross the Seine. In the first place, you will withdraw gradually in the direction of the Seine, where remaining elements of the engineer battalion will wait for you with the last pontoons.

"From now on you are on your own. I can't tell you where you will get fuel, ammunition, and food. Help yourself. As to the route of your march to the east and its destination, where the division is to a.s.semble, you will receive further orders before I move out.

"All the best, Luck. Bring me back lots of men from our division." On that decisive 21 August, my units were disposed for defense.

On 22 August I disengaged from the enetny. Montgomery, thank goodness, did not vigorously follow. Quite the contrary, he operated very cautiously, without risking anything. That gave us a bit of leeway. The Allied air force could no longer intervene so specifically, for it was too difficult to tell friend from foe.

On 23 August, we felt our way forward in the direction of Rouen, still unmolested by Montgomery's divisions. I was con cemed about Feuchtinger's report that on the same day Patton was advancing on Roden practically parallel to us. Who would get there Ifust, and how would we cross the Seine fast enough? Patton, however, according to our own reconnaissance, was not yet in evidence. Instead, we were joined by elements of an SS panzer division. We agreed to cross the river, with the help of the engineers, at one of the loops in the Seine west of Rouen.

Not until after the war did I learn that Montgomery had drawn a new line of demarcation between the British and the Americans, which ran past Mantes on the Seine, west of Paris, far to the northeast via Amiens-Lille as far as Ghent in Belgium. This meant that Patton had to recall his elements advancing on Rouen and use them elsewhere.

We were concerned at the time only with Monty, and he, for whatever reasons, was moving forward very hesitantly.

When we reached the Seine, we covered ourselves to the south with the SS tanks, but all the makeshift Seine crossings were hopelessly overcrowded. Infantry supply units and parties of stragglers were competing there, sometimes with the use of force, for the few ferries.

When we had chosen our crossing point we let no one else through. We intended to save our fighting vehicles and our men.

While the engineers were constructing a pontoon ferry, every possibility was considered and tried for getting over the 400-meter wide river. Captain Krieger, my adjutant at the time, told me a few days later that he and his men had taken doors off their hinges in the neighboring villages and made them buoyant with empty fuel cans. F.ach of these mini-ferries was able to convey about eight men. Our collaboration with the SS tank people went well. I a.s.sured them that they would be carried over on our pontoon ferry last of all. We kept calm; the men waited quietly in the woods near our crossing point, until they were called. There was none of the hectic atmosphere of Rouen, to which the bulk of the troops had withdrawn in order to cross by a railway bridge that had remained intact.

My HQ company had a VW amphibious car, which till then I had never used. I asked if it was serviceable. "It should float," came the answer, "as far as we can tell." Despite all the preceding hardships and the tense situation, I decided to cross in this car, as the last of my combat group.

By 26 August, all elements of the group were over and issued with orders for a.s.sembling.

Retreat to Germany, August-November 1944 209 During the night of 28/29 August we camouflaged the car with tree branches, to avoid being spotted and sunk by Allied fighters. In the morning I took the wheel, beside me my adjutant Liebeskind and behind us the driver and an observer.

We soon found a flat spot and I drove cautiously into the river.

"Watch out for leaks!" It floated. I let myself be carried downstream by the current. Liebeskind looked for a spot where we could land. Carefully I nudged the car to the right to approach the opposite bank.

"Fighters to the left!" cried our observer. I at once switched off the engine and let the "bush" drift downstream. The fighters seemed to take us for what we had intended by our camouflage, a bush. Liebeskind looked desperately for somewhere to land. But we were thwarted everywhere by steep banks and heavy undergrowth.

Finally, after a river trip of almost 15 kilometers, we found a flat spot where we were able to drive ash.o.r.e comfortably and unseen. An hour later we were with my combat group, which by then had almost given us up for lost.

I made contact for the last time with our divisional commander, who briefed me on the situation and our task.

"Luck, I'm glad you have managed to bring virtually the whole of your combat group safely over the Seine. The situation at the moment is completely out of hand. I was summoned to corps, but they had to leave their command post in haste because the Americans were coming. No one knows where our own units are, let alone those of the enemy. I received a clear order two days ago according to which divisional HQ, the hardhit units of Rauch's combat group and all supply elements are to be moved at once to the region of Molsheim, west of Strasbourg, to be restored to strength. The division is to form a prepared position as far west as possible for elements of the weak Ist and 19th Armies withdrawing from southern France via Belfort.

"On 15 August, strong American elements landed in southern France; these are now pressing forward to the north.

"As soon as you've got your group together and organized, you will march east, in order to reach the area west of Strasbourg as quickly as possible. Watch out that you don't fall into the hands of the Americans, who are now advancing over the Seine along a wide front. Where and how you will be able to organize fuel, ammunition, and food, I don't know. You will have to help yourself. All the best.

We had only a little ammunition left, so we couldn't be drawn into any battles. It was a long way to the Strasbourg area; I figured a week at least, a.s.suming we made good progress.

To avoid being taken unawares by the,Americans pressing north, I issued the following orders: The two patrols of the panzer reconnaissance battalion were to reconnoiter south of my planned line of march and report every contact with the enemy by radio.

Every 100 kilometers an officer with a radio set was to be posted at the most important road crossings, to report enemy movements.

A supply party with the last three trucks and two SPWS (armored half-track vehicles) with radio were to search constantly for supply depots, which were bound to be located near large towns.

The bulk of my combat group were to march east at wide intervals, in part along minor roads. I laid down our destination each day.

We then set off, first swinging well north of Rouen and then east, pa.s.sing well north of Paris. For the first two days we made only slow progress. We were marching parallel to the front and across the American line of advance. On the third day fuel became short. The supply party had been told to organize fuel without fail, but if possible also ammunition. In fact, the trucks turned up that evening, loaded with what was wanted; they even brought some food. We were all grateful to these men, who had after all managed to find a depot somewhere or other. The report from the officer responsible made us laugh, but also swear.

"When we found the depot," he told us angrily, "and demanded fuel for our combat group, we received the typical, impudent reply:"We can issue nothing without written authority." When I asked, "And what will you do if the Americans get here tomorrow, which is highly likely?" the answer was:"Then in accordance with orders we would blow the depot up." That made my men so angry that they advanced threateningly on the storekeeper. I had to restrain them.

"Calmly but unmistakably I gave the bureaucratic gentleman Retreat to Germany, August-November 1944 211 my answer, "If I don't have fuel, ammunition, and food within half an hour I can no longer be responsible for anything. So get on with it, get your stuff out.'" While our supply problem, thanks to my excellent search party, would be safe until we arrived in the prescribed concentration area, no danger, thank goodness, emerged on my right, southern flank.

The Americans seemed to have no idea that a combat group was marching east in front of them, across their line of advance.

Even the air force failed to show up. Only once did one of our two patrols report: "Contact with American patrol, which turned away, however, apparently without seeing us." Via Compigne, where four years earlier Hitler had signed the armistice with France, we marched past Verdun in the direction of Metz. We were out of the actual battle area and made more frequent stops, to give the weary drivers a little rest and to a.s.semble our units. Supply was now less of a problem, though the threat of force had to sometimes be used.

While still some way -from Metz, we turned southeast in the direction of Nancy, and on via Baccarat. On 9 September, after an eleven-day march, we reached the prescribed area west of Strasbourg. We were all dead tired.

We had been in action without a break for over three months. We needed rest and, urgently, replacements of men and materiel.

The strength of my grenadier companies was down to 50 men.

Our a.s.sembly area lay between the Vosges and Strasbourg, between the Maginot Line and the Western Wall. I let the men find billets in the surrounding villages and went in search of the divisional command post.

The autumn sun still had some warmth. The Rhine valley lay peacefully below me as I ascended the winding road to the Vosges Highway. For more than four years the war here had been suspended. I met one of the division's supply vehicles. The driver thought divisional HQ must be somewhere on the western fringe of the Vosges. I had been unable to make contapt by radio.

Suddenly a jeep with an army pennant drew up beside me. I saluted and found myself standing in front of General Ha.s.so von Manteuffel, a "colleague" from the 7th Panzer Division, who in Russia in 1941 had commanded a grenadier regiment.

"Luck, how nice to see you again after so long," he greeted me.

"What are you doing here?" I put him briefly in the picture and asked if he knew where our divisional HQ might be and what the situation was in general.