Panzer Commander Part 14

We took them to the church.

"The British of the 6th Airborne Division put up fierce resistance. When it became light, heavy fire from the navy began to fall on the center of the village and its southern edge. We could make no progress. Then the news reached us that our beloved commander, Major Waldow, had been killed, only a day after coming back from his wife. This was a blow to us all. We couldn't even recover his body at first because of the barrage of fire. It was not until after dark that a patrol of volunteers, whom the British in fairness allowed to pa.s.s, was able to bring Major Waldow back and bury him further to the rear. Later the British transferred him to their military cemetery in Ranville, where he found his last rest among his former enemies." Waldow's death greatly affected me personally. During the course in Paris I had often had talks with him from which I could infer his contempt for Hitler. As I heard later, he had belonged to the wide circle of "the men of 20 July 1944." I had told Waidow of Rommel's prophecy. He too had set his hopes on Rommel. Waldow was an officer of the old Prussian school, highly decorated in Russia, modest and always considerate of the welfare of his men. His sister told me later, for example, that he had once been in a Russian village surrounded by partisans. The inhabitants had had nothing to eat for days. Wdldow thereupon distributed his men's rations among the women and children. During the night a deputation of partisans suddenly appeared, "German, you have given our women and children food: s.p.a.cibo (thank you). For that you may leave the village tonight with your men. We will not attack." A sign of humanity on both sides.

Captain Brandt from the division's reserve of officers took over the reconnaissance battalion in place of Waldow.

For Wemer Kortenhaus, too, at that time a tank commander in No. 4 Company, 9 June became a nightmare. "That day was for us one of the hardest actions ever. We a.s.sembled with about ten tanks under the trees of the avenue south of Escoville. We drove with closed ports, one tank after the other, to the fight past the chateau into a large meadow, which was enclosed by hedges.

There we intended switching to broad wedge formation for attack, the grenadiers behind and alongside us.

"Then everything happened very quickly: within a few minutes we had lost four tanks, knocked out by the naval guns. On my tank a Mk IV with the short barrel) the turret jammed, so that I could only shoot into the hedges with my machine-gun. The fire became more intense, so that on orders from Major von Luck we had to withdraw, as did the grenadiers. I "The artillery fire continued unabated. Some 30 or 40 grenadiers must have been killed by it.

"On the evening of that 9 June we realized that we could no longer drive the British back into the sea.

"In 1960, when the ruins of the chateau were still standing, I went over the action again on the spot.

"Our attack could not have succeeded, for behind the hedge was a solid wall, which we could have broken through with our tanks only at the risk of disadjusting our guns. In front of the wall was a ditch-very convenient for the elements defending themselves there. And in the wall there were holes, made by artillery sh.e.l.ls, through which the defenders could easily retreat.

"For us, therefore, it was an unfavorable sector for a tank attack." From the reports of patrols it appeared that on 8 June the 51st Highland Division had been moved into the bridgehead to relieve the hard-pressed 6th Airborne. With that the likelihood of pushing back the bridgehead was further reduced. I knew the 5 1 st Highland Division from North Africa; it had been regarded even then as an expefienced elite unit.

To my surprise a combat patrol came back one day with a man on a DKW motorcycle. I looked at the machine. It was painted The Start of the Invasion, 6 June 1944 185 khaki and bore the sign of my Reconnaissance Battalion 3 on its mudguard. This machine had been through its own little "safafi." It had been captured by the British in North Africa, shipped to England and from there sent to Normandy, where my men recaptured it and returned it to me intact.

Meanwhile, during the-nights of 7 and 8 June, the two panzer divisions, the Panzer Lehr Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division, having arrived at the invasion front after hard and costly marches from their concentration areas far to the east and south of Caen, had been thrown into counterattacks and defensive fi'ghting west of Caen. But they, too, decimated and unnerved by the constant attacks of the RAF, were no longer able to make any i.mpression on the bridgeheads west of Caen and were stuck.

','Operation Goodwood""" 18/19 July 1944 Hitler now seemed to grasp that this was the invasion and not a diversionary maneuver; but he would still not rule out a further operation in the Pas de Calais.

As Rommel told me on one of his visits to the front, he had begged Hitler orally and in writing to come to the front and form for himself an idea of the situation and the mood of the men. That seemed to us the least one might expect from an "army Fuehrer." Instead, he issued his orders from Obersalzberg.

There we had to give credit to Churchill, who came to the invasion front, showed himself to his men, and gave them heart.

According to one of Hitler's orders, no division might be sent into action without his personal order.

Not only Rommel but all of us were depressed that Hitler viewed the situation far too optimistically and "juggled" with divisions and army corps of which only decimated elements remained.

The morale of the men was still surprisingly good, although all realized that Allied success in the west meant the end. The employment of VIand later V2 rockets, and the announcement of new "miracle-weapons," gave the men some hope of a turn for the bet ter. For 12 June, division issued another order to attack: the village of St. Honorine, lying on a commanding hill, was to be won back, to give us a view over the enemy battlefield and deny the British a view of our own positions. My combat group was to be further reinforced. A brigade of multiple rocket-launchers, "moaning minnies," with over 300 tubes 21 cm and 30cm in caliber, was to support us. These launchers had a particular psychological effect: the projectiles flew over the I battlefield with a loud, nerve-shattering whine and forced the surprised enemy to take cover immediately.

With the two motorcycle companies of the reconnaissance battalion and some grenadiers of I Battalion on foot, supported by the few operational tanks of No.4 Company and Becker's a.s.sault-guns, we moved against St. Honorine shortly before dawn after heavy and concentrated fire by the rocket-launchers.

"Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 187 We took our opponents, elements of a Canadian division, by surprise and they gave up the village at once. I went in close behind the motorcycles and saw the enemy lines for the first time. Hundreds of gliders were lying on the ground. We dug ourselves in at once on the northern edge of the village, to secure the hill for ourselves.

Then began the heaviest naval bombardment we had known so far.

We could see the firing of the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The sh.e.l.ls, of calibers up to 38cm, came whistling over like heavy trunks, to burst and rip vast craters in our lines. British fighter-bombers swooped down on us unhindered; a veritable inferno broke over our heads.

Then, taking advantage of the haze and dust of the explosions, the Canadians came back and after hand-to-hand fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, forced us to give up the village again.

What more could we set against this superiority in naval guns and fighter-bombers?

We now finally gave up hope of making any impression on the British bridgehead, let alone of eliminating it. We realized how important this bridgehead was on our unprotected right flank.

As Lance-Corporal Hammel was later to relate, "The barrage of fire on St. Honorine was the worst that we had experienced so far. We prayed. When we had pulled back to the village of Cuverville, a few kilometers further south, another heavy barrage of fire rained down on that village. Was there absolutely nowhere left here where one could get a breather and some sleep?" One result at least came of our frequent attacks and patroling activities: the British began to mine themselves inside the lines they had reached. This was a sure sign that for the moment they had no intention of launching further attacks.

For a few weeks we had some peace in my sector. Patrols alone were deployed time and again, to put out feelers.

Only once more, on 15 June, with heavy artillery support, did we try to attack Escoville; for this was the key position in order to recapture the Orne bridges. But this attack too was in vain and brought heavy losses to both sides. Nor would the situation change for us all the time we were within range of the naval guns and the enemy had absolute control of the air.

The brave, hard-hit Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 21 was pulled out on 16 June, but up to 29 June still had to ward off enemy attempts on the eastern edge of Caen to take possession of Caen and the Ome bridges there. On 30 June, the battalion was moved to the area south of Caen, to be restored to strength.

On a visit to my command post General Feuchtinger told me that the British and Americans had occupied firm, if sometimes small bases along the whole invasion front.

"There is no doubt that the Allies are bound to try, somewhere and sometime, to break out of the beachheads, if the invasion is not to have been in vain. Our weak point is our right flank, your sector, my dear Luck. South and east of you there are no reserves. The one advantage for you is that the terrain between the Ome and the overflowing Dives is so narrow that one division at most can attack out of the bridgehead. For that, however, we must be prepared, so you will be receiving further reinforcements and will set up a graduated defense in depth.

The terrain is certainly suitable for a tank attack, but with its many villages, hedges, and bits of woodland it's even better 'tank-killing country."

"Your task remains unchanged, to prevent any breakout or breakthrough from the bridgehead to the south or southeast." , June went by. July was particularly hot. We all suffered from the mosquitoes; some people had to receive medical treatment for their swollen eyes. The corn was high and ripe, but the peasants no longer dared to go into the fields for fear of being taken for an enemy and shot.

Almost every day 11 Battalion had to resist the attacks of strong a.s.sault groups and suffered heavy losses in the process.

One hot morning, when I was observing the front with Major Kurz, a sniper's shot went through my cap. A bit of luck.

At the beginning of July, the enemy suddenly attacked: "Operation Epsom" was started. (The British were fond of naming their operations after British race-courses.) The enemy tried to break through just west of the Ome, in the sector of Regiment 192. It was the llth Armored Division under Major-General "Pip" Roberts, probably the youngest but most experienced tank commander. I knew Pip Roberts from North Africa, where he had led the tank brigade of the famous 7th Armored Division. His I lth Armored Division, on the other hand, was newly formed and inexperienced.

As almost always with the British, they carried out their tank attacks without accompanying infantry; as a result, they were unable to eliminate at once any little ant.i.tank nests that were lying well camouflaged in woodland or behind hedges. The main attack broke down under our defensive fire, although on the flank British "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 189 and Canadian infantry were able to force their way into the western part of Caen. Our front still held.

As announced by Feuchtinger, my combat group was considerably strengthened at the beginning of July: Tiger Battalion 503 was transferred to my sector. Because of its dreaded "eighty-eight" and its heavy armor, the Tiger was regarded as invulnerable and superior to all enemy tanks.

Major Becker, with all five companies of his a.s.sault-gun Battalion 200, was attached to me and was to work closely with the grenadiers.

I was given the remaining battalion of our panzer regiment the other battalion had been transferred to Germany to reequip with the Panzer V "Panther").

A detachment of rocket-launchers was attached to me.

A battalion of the Luftwaffe's Field Division No.16 came under my command, to form a weak line in front of my positions.

As Feuchtinger had told me, on and behind the hills at Bourgebus three ant.i.tank sections with 8.8cm guns were being brought into position. Added to these was the division's artillery.

My two Battalions 1/125 and II/125 were posted to the left and right behind the Luftwaffe's field units in so-called "block positions," from which they could either launch a counterattack or set up a defensive front. With them were Major Becker's companies.

We thus set up a graduated defense about 15 kilometers in depth, which would be able, sooner or later, to bring any enemy attack to a standstill.

Despite intensive aerial reconnaissance, the British failed to detect this echeloned defense in depth. As we discovered later, they reckoned on a depth of only 7 kilometers. From captured maps we f,)und that the British had a.s.sumed there were at least two if not three German panzer divisions in the sector of their attack. This overestimate may have been the reason for their cautious advance later.

In spite of strong protests from the corps commander, an infantryman, the two panzer battalions were placed close behind the most forward positions. It would have been better to have held them further back in readiness for counterattacks. This decision was later to prove disastrous.

In the late afternoon of 14 July, I was summoned to the HQ of Obergruppenfuehrer Sepp Dietrich, our recently appointed corps commander. Sepp Dietrich knew me from the time I had asked him for advice about my problem of marriage to Dagmar. He had received the curious answer from Hitter's HQ for his part with sheer disbelief, and so had promised to make direct representations. Owing to the heavy fighting that set in, this remained unfortunately only an intention.

Also at the corps command post, where Sepp Dietrich greeted me, was Feuchtinger.

"Luck," said Dietrich, "in the six weeks since the landing you have led your combat group with distinction and prevented an early breakthrough by the British on our threatened eastern flank. Your commander has put you in for the Knigbt's Cross.

I "I know also that tomorrow is your birthday and that your flanc,6e works in Paris. To give you a few days' rest, I have decided to send you instead of one of my staff officers oh a special mission to Paris.

"You will leave tonight and return early on the 18th. I wish you happy days."

"Obergruppenfuehrer," I cried, "I can't accept this, tempting though it is. I can't leave my men on their own in this critical situation. I reckon the British will try their next breakout, or even breakthrough, in my sector. Thank you for the offer, but let me stay here, please."

"Luck," replied Sepp Dietrich, "according to our information there's little likelihood of a fresh attack for the next ten to fourteen days. After their costly"Epsom' offensive, the British will first have to regroup and build up appropriate supplies, so it's all right to go." I finally let myself be persuaded, after prompting also from Feuchtinger. The prospect of seeing Dagmar again was too enticing.

When I returned to my command post, I went to I Battalion and told its commander to take over leadership of the combat group during my absence.

My Mercedes was brought forward and loaded with the treasures of Normandy. Via the army telephone system I had myself "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 191 I switched into the local civilian network in Paris and told Dagmar and the femme de chambre of my coming.

It was with mixed feelings that I left my command post. For security reasons, and to keep an eye on the air"I took a driver with me. Before me lay three days in Paris!

Alter I had completed my "mission" and paid a short visit to our "Special HQ Paris," I was free for Dagmar and my friends.

Dagmar and I were more in love than ever, even though the fool regulations and racial laws prevented us from marrying. We promised to wait for each other until after the war and then marry.

The foodstuffs I had brought with me, a total of about 50 kilograms, caused great delight all around, but especially the two kilos of coffee, for it was no longer obtainable in Paris.

"We live here on ersatz," said J.B. "We've borrowed that wretched word from you." Despite the pleasure of our reunion, I was uneasy. I telephoned division every day. "All quiet here, pretty normal, no noticeable change in the situation," I was told each time. I talked over again with Dagmar and my friefids what was to be done if Paris should be threatened. Dagmar wanted to stay to the last possible moment, so as to be near me.

In the evening of 17 July we all sat together again over a bottle of champagne. On 18 July, I set off while it was still dark, in order to reach my command post before dawn, before the Spitfires and Hurricanes arrived. The journey took longer than expected, because of the nightly supply traffic. It was not until just before nine that I was on the hills east of my combat sector. Only a few kilometers now separated me from my command post. I stopped and we searched the sky for fighters, It was very hazy over the area of operations. Everything seemed to be in order.

Shortly after nine, I arrived at my command post and was looking forward to a Normandy breakfast, after which I intended changing from my uniform of the day into combat attire.

The commander of I Battalion greeted me briefly. I sensed that something was not right, for all the men at the command post Then came the report that almost took my breath away.

"Since five o'clock this.morning the British have been bombing our sector, especially the area of I Battalion, endlessly with thousands of bombers. This bombing was followed by a creeping barrage from the artillery. The firing stopped barely half an hour ago." seemed nervous.

"How are things with your I Battalion, have you any news?" was my first question.

"Not yet, we've no radio contact," came the answer.

"How about the Tigers and the panzer battalion of our regiment?" Answer: "No radio contact. I don't know how things look there."

"And II Battalion? Major Becker's a.s.sault-guns? Have you told division?" My questions became more and more pressing, but it was clear that nothing had been done.

This was of course the renewed attempt at a breakout. Yet nothing, nothing at all, had been done! My deputy appeared to be in shock. He seemed absolutely helpless. I ordered him to be at my disposal. After a few days I instructed my adjutant to go in person to Army Personnel and demand that the commander be relieved. This was granted at once.

I had become the richer by experience: I had witnessed anew how officers and NCOS, who in peacetime had been outstandin instructors, popular with their superiors and comrades, lost their nerve in an emergency and were unable to cope with reality. General Pip Roberts, as he told me later, had undergone the same experience. For the same reasons as mine with the battalion commander, he had been forced to have the commanders of a brigade and a regiment relieved. The experience had shown, moreover, that the relief had to be made at once, if the unit was not to be affected and demoralized.

So there I was at my command post. No one knew what had happened, lthough it was obvious that the enemy was mounting a decisive attack.

I dismissed all thought of a good breakfast and my combat clothes. I ran to a radio Panzer IV that the panzer regiment had put at my disposal, offered the driver a cigarette and said, "Let's go! Take the main road to Caen." To my adjutant I shouted, "I'll call you as we go along. Make contact with division at once, even if you have to go there in person. Tell them what's happened and ask for reserves so that we can stop the British. Send an officer to the tanks." Slowly and without interference I approached the village of Cagny, which lay exactly in the middle of my sector and was not occupied by us. The eastern part as far as the church was undamaged; the western part had been flattened. When I came to "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 193 western edge of the village, I saw to my dismay about 25 to 30 British tanks, which had already pa.s.sed southward over the main road to Caen, which ran from east to west.

A glance then to the north, to where my I Battalion ought to be, or had been, in combat positions. The whole area was dotted with British tanks, which were slowly rolling south, against no opposition"My G.o.d," I thought, "the bombing and artillery barrage destroyed the battalion." It was quite clear: the British, with a bombing of unprecedented extent, were trying to break through our positions on the narrowest of fronts. How could I plug this gap? Perhaps with an attack by the superior Tiger Mark VIS?

So, back to the command post, to try to organize countermeasures.

As I was driving past the church of Cagny, which lay in the undamaged part of the village, I saw to my surprise a Luftwaffe battery with its four 8.8c in antiaircraft guns, all pointing to the sky.

"What are they doing here?" went through my mind. "I didn't see them on my way here." Under a tree I called a halt, "bailed out," and ran to the battery.

A young captain came up to me. "Major," he said, "can you tell me what's going on here?"

"My G.o.d, what are you doing here? Have you any idea what's happening over there to the left of you?" He answered calmly, "I belong to an air-defense ring to protect the factories and city of Caen against air raids. At the moment I'm waiting for the next raid."

"Man," I replied as calmly as I could, "you've already been bypa.s.sed by enemy tanks. North of here it's absolutely swarming with tanks. You will move into position at once with your four guns on the northern edge of Cagny and attack the advancing tanks. Don't worry about tanks that are already going south.

Hit the enemy from the flank. In that way you'll force bhe advance to a halt." His reply came just as calmly, "Major, my concern is enemy planes, fighting tanks is your job. I'm Luftwaffe." He was about to turn away. At that I went up to him, drew my pistol (which we had to carry for trips to Paris), leveled it at him and said, "Either you're a dead man or you can earn yourself a medal." The young captain realized that I was in earnest. "I bow to force. What must I do?" I took him by the hand and undercover of the hedges and trees ran with him to the northern edge of the village.

"Here, place your four guns in this apple orchard. The corn over there is so high that you will be well protected and just have a field of fire across it. Shoot every tank you see. I'll see if I can send you a platoon of grenadiers to guard you against surprise attacks. Should the situation become critical for you, destroy your guns and withdraw to the south. I hope our Tiger battalion will soon be able to mount a counterattack from the right flank. With them and wit you we should be able to beat back the enemy attack, especially as it's not accompanied by infantry as far as I can tell, Listen, I'll be back in half an hour. All clear?" He still seemed to be undecided, but finally nodded. "Okay, Major." Back at my command post I realized the full extent of the preparatory carpet bombing.

My orderly officer reported that the Tiger battalion had been thoroughly saturated by the heaviest American bombers. He himself had seen some of the 62-ton colossi upside down; craters 30 feet across had made the whole terrain almost impa.s.sable; there could be no question of using the Tigers in the next few hours. The fate of the Panzer IV Battalion had been much the same. my command post, had made Major Becker, who was now at contact with his batteries.

"One battery has been completely knocked out by bombs," he reported. "Two batteries on the left flank are intact and will support the grenadiers of I Battalion, who have gone into action against the British infantry. The other two batteries will be going into action at any minute on the right flank, where Major Kurz, without first waiting for orders, has set up a defensive front with his II Battalion." Captain Liebeskind, my adjutant, came back from division. To stop the gap on my left flank there were no reserves, was the message from Feuchtinger. However, I was to be sent the reconnaissance battalion to secure my weak right flank; Captain Brandt would be reporting to me. My orders were: To prevent without fail any attempt by the enemy to break through to the east on the open right flank.

Captain Brandt reported that same morning. "Major, I am again "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 195 under your command, lying with the reconnaissance battalion about 7 kilometers east of Troarn. Since 6 July we have been lying in reserve south of Caen and have to some extent been replenished with men and materiel. We could see the terrible air attacks early this morning. Has your combat group been badly hit?" I put Brandt briefly in the picture. "On my left wing there's a yawning gap to Caen and Regiment 192, which I can't fill. But three ant.i.tank sections with 8.8cm cannons are in place on the hills of Bourgebus. They should in fact be able to stop any tank advance, so long as the British don't employ infantry. But there's also a very dangerous gap between my command post here and Major Kurz's 11 Battalion. If the British were to push through it, the way to the southeast would be open to them.

This gap is where I'm putting you. Keep contact on your right with Kurz and on your left with me. One of Major Becker's batteries with their 7.5cm ant.i.tank guns (long) will be under your orders to combat enemy tanks. Send a liaison officer to me here. Good luck to you, Brandt, we've got to survive the day." From official reports, messages from my units, and the state,ments of prisoners, a gloomy picture of the situation emerged. Accounts that I have been able to see since the -war have confirmed the situation at the time.

Montgomery had decided to launch a general attack out of the little bridgehead and thrust into the French hinterland in the direction of Faiaise. With matchless logistics and in the greatest secrecy the following were a.s.sembled for the purpose: ne tank corps, with the II th Armored Division, the Guards Armored Division, and the 7th Armored Division, well known to me from North Africa; to protect each flank, one Canadian infantry division (on the right) and one British infantry division (on the left); over 1,000 guns of every caliber, plus naval artillery; the 6th Airborne Division and the 51st Highland Division, who were to remain in the bridgehead to protect it; to prepare the attack, the biggest aerial armada so far a.s.sembled in the war, made up of about 2,500 British and American bombers. Over a width of about 4 kilometers and a depth of 196 PANZER COMMANDER about 7, the strips of attack were to be so saturated that virtually no one would be able to survive the bombardment; the air attack was to be followed by a creeping barrage from the 1,000 guns, plus the naval artillery, behind which the first waves of tanks were to advance in quick succession; the initial goal: the hills at Bourgebus, about 15 kilometers from the starting line.

"No one will survive this inferno. We need only march in with our tanks to open the way to Paris." That was the unanimous opinion of the Allies engaged in the attack. "How very wrong we were was soon to appear," was what I heard after the war from many commanders in the British tank corps.

Since all the units had to squeeze through cleared pa.s.sages in the mine fields, one division followed the other, to advance after the breakout on a wide front toward the hilly terrain near Bourgebus.

My one hope was that the 8.8cm battery at Cagny and the two 7.5cm a.s.sault-gun companies would delay the enemy long enough for reserves to be brought up. These were the lst SS Panzer Division and the 12th SS Panzer Division of "Hitlerjugend." Both had recently been taken out of the front to be restored to strength in the Falaise and Lisieux area, where they now were.

Late in the morning of 18 July, reports came in from two of Becker's batteries, which were in action with I Battalion on the left flank: "Individual companies of I Battalion have taken up the fight against the following infantry. We gave support as far as possible.

"A second wave of British tanks had turned west after the disaster at Cagny and was advancing toward the Bourgebus hills.

We gradually had to disengage, therefore, to avoid being encircled." Major Becker was at my command post. I called him over.

"Listen, Becker, I need your batteries more urgently than ever, since for the moment the two panzer battalions are out of action owing to the bombardment. All the batteries, especially those isolated on the left flank, must operate on their own responsibility, cover the grenadiers for as long as possible and above all attack the advancing British tanks from the flank. We must bring the tank thrust to a halt." Major Bill Close, British, who led one of the tank companies of the regiment in the II th Armored Division that had veered west, "Operation Goodwood," 18/19 July 1944 197 today a good friend of mine. As he was to tell me later, "We had warned the Guards Armored Division coining after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny.

We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In so doing several tanks were again knocked out, this time from woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off to the west and so escape the fire of your d.a.m.ned 'eighty-eights." We pushed forward to the south across the Paris-Caen road. We saw fire$ b.u.ming here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometers to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.

"Unhindered we moved forward in wide formation, my company in the lead.

"Suddenly, when we had got to about 1,000 meters from the villages on the hills, we came under concentrated fire from 'eightyeights." Within seconds about 15 of our tanks were stationary and on fire. All attempts to turn aside to left or right failed. By late afternoon I had only a few tanks left that were still intact. The other company fared no better. We had to break off our advance and withdraw. Shortly after came the order from Brigade to suspend hostilities for the day. New orders followed next day." After the arrival of the reconnaissance battalion I felt I had stabilized my right flank to some extent. I had still not had time to change, let alone have something to eat. For the next few hours everything hung on the flak battery at Cagny. I got into my tank again and rolled cautiously into the village. By the church I stopped the tank and ran to the four guns, where an almost indescribable sight met my eyes: The 8.8cm cannons were firing one salvo after the other. One could see the shots flying through the corn like torpedoes. The men on the guns were proud of their first engagement as an ant.i.tank unit. All four guns were intact and had not been attacked.

In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back.

Becker's a.s.sault-guns had also joined in the battle. From the right flank they shot up any tank that tried to bypa.s.s the village.

The young captain came up to me. I congratulated him. "A platoon from my staff company will be here in a few minutes to protect you from surprise attacks. I repeat my orders of this morning: you will hold your position for as long as you can and oppose the enemy tank attack. As soon as the situation becomes critical, destroy your guns and retreat with the grenadiers to my command post.,, With that I left this battery, which had played such a decisive part on that 18 July.