Ontology or the Theory of Being Part 22

In the second place, when we endeavour to conceive, to apprehend intellectually, how _motion_, or indeed any other physical or real ent.i.ty, could actually pa.s.s or be transferred from _agens_ to _patiens_, whether these be spatially in contact or not, we find such a supposition positively unintelligible. Motion is not a substance; and if it is an accident it cannot migrate from subject to subject. The idea that corporeal efficient causality-even mechanical causality-can be explained by such a transference of actual accidental modes of being from _agens_ to _patiens_ is based on a very crude and erroneous conception of what an accidental mode of being really is (65).

The more we reflect on the nature of real change in the universe, and of the efficient causality whereby it is realized, the more convinced we must become that there can be no satisfactory explanation of these facts which does not recognize and take account of this great fundamental fact: that contingent real being is _not all actual_, that it is partly potential and partly actual; that therefore our concepts of "pa.s.sive potentiality" and "active power" are not mere subjective mental motions, with at best a mere regulative or systematizing function (after the manner of Kant's philosophy), but that they are really and objectively valid concepts-concepts which from the time of Aristotle have given philosophers the only insight into the nature of efficient causality which is at any rate satisfactory and intelligible as far as it goes.

Of this great fact the advocates of the mechanical theory of efficient causality have, in the third place, failed to take account. And it is partly because with the revival of atomism at the dawn of modern philosophy this traditional Aristotelian conception of contingent being as potential and actual was lost sight of (64), that such a crude and really unintelligible account of efficient causality, as a "flow of motion," has been able to find such continued and widespread acceptance.

Another reason of the prevalence of this tendency to "explain" all physical efficient causality as a propagation of spatial motions of matter is to be found in the sensist view of the human mind which confounds intellectual thought with mental imagery, which countenances only _picturable_ factors in its "explanations," and denounces as "metaphysical," "occult," and "unverifiable" all explanatory principles such as forces, powers, potentialities, etc., which are not directly picturable in the imagination.(488) And it is a curious fact that it is such philosophers themselves who are really guilty of the charge which they lay at the door of the traditional metaphysics: the charge of offering explanations-of efficient causality, for instance-which are really no explanations. For while they put forward their theory of the "flow of motion" as a real explanation of the _quomodo_ of efficient causality-and the ultimate and only explanation of it within reach of the human mind, if we are to accept their view of the matter-the exponent of the traditional metaphysics more modestly confines himself to setting forth the inevitable implications of the fact of efficient causality, and, without purporting to offer any positive explanation of the real nature of action or efficient influence, he is content to supplement his a.n.a.lysis negatively by pointing out the unintelligible and illusory character of their proffered "explanations".

In the exact methods of the physical sciences, their quant.i.tative evaluation of all corporeal forces whether mechanical, physical, or chemical, in terms of mechanical work, which is measured by the motion of matter through s.p.a.ce, and in the great physical generalization known as the law of the equivalence of energies, or of the equality of action and reaction,-we can detect yet further apparent reasons for the conception of efficient causality as a mere transference or interchange of actual physical and measurable ent.i.ties among bodies. It is an established fact not only that all corporeal agents gradually lose their energy or power of action by actually exercising this power, but that this loss of energy is in direct proportion to the amount of energy gained by the recipients of their action; and this fact would naturally suggest the mental picture of a transference of some actual measurable ent.i.ty from cause to effect. But it does not necessarily imply such transference-even if the latter were intelligible, which, as we have seen, it is not. The fact is quite intelligibly explained by the natural supposition that in proportion as the _agens_ exhausts its active power by exercise the _patiens_ gains in some form of actuality. Similarly, the fact that all forms of corporeal energy can be measured in terms of mechanical energy does not at all imply that they all _really are_ mechanical energy, but only that natural agents can by the use of one form of energy produce another form in equivalent quant.i.ty. And finally, the law of the conservation of corporeal energy in the universe is explained by the law of the equality of action and reaction, and without recourse to the unintelligible supposition that this sum-total of energy is one unchanging and unchangeable _actuality_.

There is just one other consideration which at first sight appears to favour the "transference" theory of causality, but which on a.n.a.lysis shows how illusory the proffered explanation is, and how unintelligible the simplest phenomenon of change must be to those who fail to grasp the profound significance of the principle that all real being which is subject to change must of necessity be _partly potential and partly actual_. We allude to the general a.s.sumption of physical scientists that corporeal action of whatsoever kind takes place _only on contact_, whether mediate or immediate, between the bodies in question.(489) Now it is well to bear in mind that this is not a self-evident truth or principle, but only an hypothesis, a very legitimate hypothesis and one which works admirably, but still only an hypothesis. It implies the a.s.sumption that some sort of substance-called the universal ether-actually exists and fills all s.p.a.ce, serving as a medium for the action of gravitation, light, radiant heat, electricity and magnetism, between the earth and the other planets, the sun and the stars. This whole supposition is the only thinkable alternative to _actio in distans_. If those bodies really act on one another-and the fact that they do is undeniable,-and if there were no such medium between them, then the causal influence of one body should be able to produce an effect in another body spatially distant from, and not physically connected by any material medium with, the former. Hence two questions: Is this alternative, _actio in distans_, imaginable? _i.e._ can we form any _positive imagination image_ of _how_ this would take place? And secondly: Is it _thinkable_, _conceivable_, _intrinsically possible_? We need not hesitate to answer the former question in the negative.

But as to the latter question all we can say is that we have never met any cogent proof of the intrinsic impossibility of _actio in distans_. The efficient action of a finite cause implies that it has active power and is conserved in existence with this power by the Creator or First Cause, that this power is reduced to act by the Divine _concursus_, and that _dependently on this cause so acting_ some change takes place, some potentiality is actualized in some other finite being. Nothing more than this is involved in the general concept of efficient causality. Of course real influence on the one side, and real dependence on the other, imply some _real_ connexion of cause with effect. But is _spatial_ connexion a necessary condition of real connexion? Is a _physical_, _phenomenal_, _imaginable_, _efflux_ of some ent.i.ty out of the cause into the effect, either immediately or through some medium as a channel, a necessary condition for real influence? There is nothing of the kind in spiritual causality; and to demand anything of the kind for causality in general would be to make imagination, not thought, the test and measure of the real. But perhaps _spatial_ connexion is essential to the real connexion involved in _this particular kind_ of causality, _corporeal_ causality? Perhaps. But it has never been proved. Too little is known about the reality of s.p.a.ce, about the ultimate nature of material phenomena and their relation to our minds, to justify anything like dogmatism on such an ultimate question. It may well be that if we had a deeper insight into these things we could p.r.o.nounce _actio in distans_ to be absolutely incompatible with the essences of the things which do as a matter of fact const.i.tute the actual corporeal universe. But in the absence of such insight we cannot p.r.o.nounce _actio in distans_ to be intrinsically impossible. Physical scientists a.s.sume that as a matter of fact bodies do not act _in distans_. Granted the a.s.sumption to be correct, it still remains an open question whether by a miracle they could act _in distans_, _i.e._ whether or not such action would be incompatible with their nature as finite corporeal causes.

Owing to a very natural tendency to rest in imagination images we are inclined not only to p.r.o.nounce as impossible any process the mode of which is not positively imaginable, but also to think that we rightly understand a process once we have provided ourselves with an imagination image of it-when as a matter of fact this image may cover an entirely groundless conception or theory of the process. Hence the fairly prevalent idea that while _actio in distans_ is impossible, _the interaction of bodies on contact_ is perfectly intelligible and presents no difficulties. When a billiard ball in motion strikes another at rest it communicates some or all of its motion to the other, and that is all: nothing simpler! And then all the physical, chemical, and substantial changes in the material universe are reducible to this common denominator! The atomic philosophy, with its two modest postulates of matter and motion, is a delightfully simple philosophy; but unfortunately for its philosophical prestige _it does not explain causality or change_. Nor can these facts be explained by any philosophy which ignores the most elementary implication of all real change: the implication that changing reality involves real pa.s.sive potentialities and real active powers or forces in the phenomena which const.i.tute the changing reality of the universe.

105. THE SUBJECT OF EFFICIENT CAUSALITY. OCCASIONALISM.-We have established the objective validity of the concept of efficient causality and a.n.a.lysed its implications. There have been philosophers who, while admitting the objective validity of the concept, have maintained that no creature, or at least no corporeal creature, can be an efficient cause.

Efficient influence is, in their view, incompatible with the nature of a corporeal substance: only spiritual substances can be efficient causes: corporeal things, conditions, and happenings, are all only the _occasions_ on which spiritual substances act efficiently in and through all created nature. Hence the name of the theory: _Occasionalism_. There are two forms of it: the milder, which admits that created spirits or minds are efficient causes; and the more extreme view, according to which no creature can be an efficient cause, inasmuch as efficient causality is essentially a Divine attribute, a prerogative of the Divinity.

This error was not unknown in the Middle Ages,(490) but it was in the seventeenth century that certain disciples of Descartes,-Geulincx (1625-1669) and Malebranche (1638-1715),-expressly inferred it from the Cartesian ant.i.thesis of matter and spirit and the Cartesian doctrine that matter is essentially inert, or inactive. According to the gratuitous and unproven a.s.sertion laid down by Geulincx as a principle: _Quod nescis quomodo fiat_, _id non facis_,-we do not cause our own sensations or reasoning processes, nor our own bodily movements, inasmuch as we do not know _how_ these take place; nor can bodies cause them, any more than our own created spirits, inasmuch as bodies are essentially inactive.

According to Malebranche the mind can perceive no necessary _nexus_ between effects and any cause other than the Divine Will;(491) moreover reflection convinces us that efficient causality is something essentially Divine and incommunicable to creatures;(492) and finally neither bodies can be causes, for they are essentially inert, nor our minds and wills, for we do not know how a volition could move any organ or member of our bodies.(493) Yet Malebranche, at the cost of inconsistency with his own principles, safeguards free will in man by allowing an exclusively _immanent_ efficiency to spiritual causes.(494)

Such is the teaching of Occasionalism. Our criticism of it will be brief.(495)

(1) Against the doctrine that creatures generally are not, and cannot be, efficient causes, we direct the first argument already outlined (100) against Phenomenism and Positivism,-the argument from the universal belief of mankind, based on the testimony of consciousness as rationally interpreted by human intelligence. Consciousness testifies not merely that processes of thought, imagination, sensation, volition, etc., _take place_ within our minds; not merely that our bodily movements, such as speaking, walking, writing, _occur_; but that _we are the causes of them_.(496) It is idle to say that we do not efficiently move our limbs because we may not be able to understand or explain fully "_how_ an unextended volition can move a material limb".(497) Consciousness testifies to the fact that the volition does move the limb; and that is enough.(498) The fact is one thing, the _quomodo_ of the fact is quite another thing. Nor is there any ground whatever for the a.s.sertion that a cause, in order to produce an effect, must _understand how_ the exercise of its own efficiency brings that effect about. Moreover, Malebranche's concession of at least immanent activity to the will is at all events an admission that there is in the nature of the creature as such nothing incompatible with its being an efficient cause.

(2) Although Malebranche bases his philosophy mainly on deductive, _a priori_ reasonings from a consideration of the Divine attributes, his system is really derogatory to the perfection of the First Cause, and especially to the Divine Wisdom. To say, for instance, that G.o.d created an organ so well adapted to discharge the function of seeing as the human eye, and then to deny that the latter discharges this or any function, is tantamount to accusing G.o.d of folly. There is no reason in this system why any created thing or condition of things would be even the appropriate _occasion_ of the First Cause producing any definite effect. Everything would be an equally appropriate occasion, or rather nothing would be in any intelligible sense an appropriate occasion, for any exercise of the Divine causality. The admirable order of the universe-with its unity in variety, its adaptation of means to ends, its gradation of created perfections-is an intelligible manifestation of the Divine perfections on the a.s.sumption that creatures efficiently co-operate with the First Cause in realizing and maintaining this order. But if they were all inert, inoperative, useless for this purpose, what could be the _raison d'etre_ of their diversified endowments and perfections? So far from manifesting the wisdom, power and goodness of G.o.d they would evidence an aimless and senseless prodigality.

(3) Occasionalism imperils the distinction between creatures and a personal G.o.d. Although Malebranche, fervent catholic that he was, protested against the pantheism of "le miserable Spinoza," his own system contains the undeveloped germ of this pernicious error. For, if creatures are not efficient causes not only are their variety and multiplicity meaningless, as contributing nothing towards the order of the universe, but their very existence _as distinct realities_ seems to have no _raison d'etre_. Malebranche emphasizes the truth that _G.o.d does nothing useless_: _Dieu ne fait rien d'inutile_. Very well. If, then, a being _does nothing_, what purpose is served by its existence? Of what use is it? What is the measure of a creature's reality, if not its action and its power of action? So intimately in fact is this notion of causality bound up with the notion of the very reality of things that the concept of an absolutely inert, inactive reality is scarcely intelligible. It is almost an axiom in scholastic philosophy that every nature has its correlative activity, every being its operation: _Omne ens est propter suam operationem; Omnis natura ordinatur ad propriam operationem_. Hence if what we call creatures had really no proper activity distinct from that of the First Cause, on what grounds could we suppose them to have a real and proper existence of their own distinct from the reality of the Infinite Being? Or who could question the lawfulness of the inference that they are not really creatures, but only so many phases, aspects, manifestations of the one and sole existing reality? Which is Pantheism.

(4) Occasionalism leads to Subjective Idealism by destroying all ground for the objective validity of human science. How do we know the real natures of things? By reasoning from their activities in virtue of the principle, _Operari sequitur esse_.(499) But if things have no activities, no operations, such reasoning is illusory. How, for instance, do we justify by rational demonstration, in opposition to subjectivism, the common-sense interpretation of the data of sense consciousness as revealing to us the real and extramental existence of a material universe?

By arguing, in virtue of the principle of causality, from our consciousness of our own pa.s.sivity in external sense perception, to the real existence of bodies outside our minds, as _excitants_ of our cognitive activity and _partial causes_ of these conscious, perceptive processes. But if occasionalism were true such inference would be illusory, and we should infer, with Berkeley, that only G.o.d and minds exist, but not any material universe. Malebranche admits the possible validity of this inference to immaterialism from his principles, and grounds his own belief in the existence of an external material universe solely on faith in Divine Revelation.(500)

It only remains to answer certain difficulties urged by occasionalists against the possibility of attributing real efficiency to creatures.

(1) They argue that efficient causality is something essentially Divine, and therefore cannot be communicated to creatures.

We reply that while the absolutely independent causality of the First Cause is essentially Divine, another kind or order of causality, dependent on the former, but none the less real, can be and is communicated to creatures. And just as the fact that creatures have real being, real existence, distinct from, but dependent on, the existence of the Infinite Being, does not derogate from the supremacy of the latter, so the fact that creatures have real efficient causality, distinct from, but dependent on, the causality of the First Cause, does not derogate from the latter's supremacy.

(2) They urge that efficient causality is creative, and therefore infinite and incommunicable.

We reply that there is a plain distinction between creative activity and the efficient activity we claim for creatures. Creation is the production of new being from nothingness. G.o.d alone, the Infinite Being, can create; and, furthermore, according to the common view of Theistic philosophers a creature cannot even be an instrument of the First Cause in this production of new being from nothingness. And the main reason for this appears to be that the efficiency of the creature, acting, of course, with the Divine _concursus_, necessarily presupposes some pre-existing being as material on which to operate, and is confined to the _change_ or _determination of new forms or modes_ of this pre-existing reality. Such efficiency, subordinate to the Divine _concursus_ and limited to such an order of effects, is plainly distinct from creative activity.

(3) But the creature, acting with the Divine _concursus_, either contributes something real and positive to the effect or contributes nothing. The former alternative is inadmissible, for G.o.d is the cause of everything real and positive: _omne novum ens est a Deo_. And in the latter alternative, which is the true one, the _concursus_ is superfluous; G.o.d does all; and creatures are not really efficient causes.

We reply that the former alternative, not the latter, is the true one. But the former alternative does not imply that the creature produces any new reality _independently of the First Cause_; nor is it incompatible with the truth that G.o.d is the author and cause of all positive reality: _omne novum ens est a Deo_. No doubt, were we to conceive the co-operation of G.o.d and the creature after the manner of the co-operation of two partial causes of the same order, producing by their joint efficiency some one total effect-like the co-operation of two horses drawing a cart,-it would follow that the creature's share of the joint effect would be independent of the Divine _concursus_ and attributable to the creature alone, that the creature would produce some reality independently of the First Cause. But that is _not_ the way in which the First Cause concurs with created causes. They are not partial causes of the same order. Each is a total cause in its own order. They so co-operate that G.o.d, besides having created and now conserving the second cause, and moving the latter's power to act, produces Himself the whole effect directly and immediately by the efficiency of His _concursus_; while at the same time the second cause, thus reduced to act, and acting with the _concursus_, also directly and immediately produces the whole effect. There is one effect, one change _in facto esse_, one change _in fieri_, and therefore one action as considered in the subject changed, since the action takes place in this latter: _actio fit in pa.s.so_. This change, this action considered thus pa.s.sively, or "_in pa.s.so_," is the total term of each efficiency, the Divine and the created, not partly of the one and partly of the other. It is one and indivisible; it is wholly due to, and wholly attained by, each efficiency; not, however, under the same formal aspect. We may distinguish in it two formalities: it is a _novum ens_, a new actuality, something positive and actual superadded to the existing order of real, contingent being; but it is not "being in general" or "actuality in general," it is some specifically, nay individually, determinate mode of actuality or actual being. We have seen that it is precisely because every real effect has the former aspect that it demands for its adequate explanation, and as its only intelligible source, the presence and influence of a purely actual, unchanging, infinite, inexhaustible productive principle of all actual contingent reality: hence the necessity and efficacy of the Divine _concursus_. And similarly it is because the new actuality involved in every change is an individually definite mode of actuality that we can detect in it the need for, and the efficacy of, the created cause: the nature of this latter, the character and scope and intensity of its active power is what determines the individuality of the total result, to the total production of which it has by the aid of the Divine _concursus_ attained.

(4) But G.o.d can Himself produce the total result _under both formalities_ without any efficiency of the creature. Therefore the difficulty remains that the latter efficiency is superfluous and useless: and _entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem_.

We reply that as a matter of fact the effects produced in the ordinary course of nature are produced by G.o.d under both formalities; but also by the created cause under both formalities: inasmuch as the formalities are but mentally distinct aspects of one real result which is, as regards its extrinsic causes, individual and indivisible. The distinction of these formal aspects only helps us to realize how _de facto_ such an effect is due to the cooperation of the First Cause and created causes. That G.o.d _could_ produce all such effects without any created causes-we must distinguish. Some such effects He could not produce without created causes, for such production would be self-contradictory. He could not produce, for instance, a volition except as the act of a created will, or a thought except as the act of a created intellect, or a vital change except as the act of a living creature. But apart from such cases which would involve an intrinsic impossibility, G.o.d could of course produce, without created agents, the effects which He does produce through their created efficiency. It is, however, not a question of what _could be_, but of what _actually is_. And we think that the arguments already set forth prove conclusively that creatures are not _de facto_ the inert, inactive, aimless and unmeaning things they would be if Occasionalism were the true interpretation of the universe of our actual experience; but that these creatures are in a true sense efficient causes, and that just as by their very co-existence with G.o.d, as contingent beings, they do not derogate from His Infinite Actuality but rather show forth His Infinity, so by their cooperation with Him as subordinate and dependent efficient causes they do not derogate from His supremacy as First Cause, but rather show forth the infinite and inexhaustible riches of His Wisdom and Omnipotence.

CHAPTER XV. FINAL CAUSES; UNIVERSAL ORDER.

106. TWO CONCEPTIONS OF EXPERIENCE, THE MECHANICAL AND THE TELEOLOGICAL.-We have seen that all change in the universe demands for its explanation certain real principles, _viz._ pa.s.sive potentiality, actualization, and active power or efficiency; in other words that it points to material, formal and efficient causes. Do these principles suffice to explain the course of nature to the inquiring mind? Mechanists say, Yes; these principles explain it so far as it is capable of explanation. Teleologists say, No; these principles do not of themselves account for the universe of our experience: this universe reveals itself as a _cosmos_: hence it demands for its explanation real principles or causes of another sort, _final causes_, the existence of which implies purpose, plan or design, and therefore also intelligence.

The problem whether or not the universe manifests the existence and influence of final causes has been sometimes formulated in this striking fashion: Is it that birds have wings in order to fly, or is it merely that they fly because they have wings? Such a graphic statement of the problem is misleading, for it suggests that the alternatives are mutually exclusive, that we must vote either for final causes or for efficient causes. As a matter of fact we accept both. Efficient causes account for the course of nature; but they need to be determined by the influence of final causes. Moreover, the question how far this influence of final causes extends-_finality_ (_finalitas_), as it is technically termed-is a secondary question; nor does the advocate of final causality in the universe undertake to decide its nature and scope in every instance and detail, any more than the physical scientist does to point out all the physical laws embodied in an individual natural event, or the biologist to say whether a doubtful specimen of matter is organic or inorganic, or whether a certain sort of living cell is animal or vegetable. The teleologist's thesis, as against that of mechanism, is simply that _there are final causes in the universe, that the universe does really manifest the presence and influence of final causes_.(501)

There are two ways, however, of conceiving this influence as permeating the universe. The conception of final causality in general is, as we shall see, the conception of acting _for an end_, from a _motive_, with a _purpose_, _plan_ or _design_ for the attainment of something. It implies arrangement, ordination, adaptation of means to ends (55). Now at least there _appears_ to be, pervading the universe everywhere and directing its activities, such an adaptation. The admirable equilibrium of forces which secures the regular motions of the heavenly bodies; the exact mixture of gases which makes our atmosphere suitable for organic life; the distance and relative positions of the sun and the earth, which secure conditions favourable to organic life; the chemical transformations whereby inorganic elements and compounds go to form the living substance of plants and are thus prepared for a.s.similation as food by animal organisms; the wonderfully graded hierarchy of living species in the animate world, and the mutual interdependence of plants and animals; the endless variety of instincts which secure the preservation and well-being of living individuals and species; most notably the adaptability and adaptation of other mundane creatures to human uses by man himself,-innumerable facts such as these convince us that the things of the universe are _useful to one another_, that they are const.i.tuted and disposed in relation to one another _as if they had been deliberately chosen_ to suit one another, to fit in harmoniously together in mutual co-ordination and subordination so that by their interaction and interdependence they work out a plan or design and _subserve as means to definite ends_. This suitability of things _relatively to one another_, this harmony of the nature and activity of each with the nature and activity of every other, we may designate as _extrinsic_ finality. The Creator has willed so to arrange and dispose all creatures in conditions of s.p.a.ce and time that such harmonious but purely extrinsic relations of mutual adaptation do _de facto_ obtain and continue to prevail between them under His guidance.

But are these creatures themselves, in their own individual natures, equally indifferent to any definite mode of action, so that the orderly concurrence of their activities is due to an initial collocation and impulse divinely impressed upon them from without, and not to any purposive principle intrinsic to themselves individually? Descartes, Leibniz and certain supporters of the theory of atomic dynamism regarding the const.i.tution of matter, while recognizing a relative and extrinsic finality in the universe in the sense explained, seem to regard the individual agencies of the universe as mere efficient causes, not of themselves endowed with any immanent, intrinsic directive principle of their activities, and so contributing by mere extrinsic arrangement to the order of the universe. Scholastic philosophers, on the contrary, following the thought of Aristotle,(502) consider that every agency in the universe is endowed with an _intrinsic principle of finality_ which constantly directs its activities towards the realization of a perfection which is proper to it and which const.i.tutes its intrinsic end (45-46). And while each thus tends to its own proper perfection by the natural play of its activities, each is so related to all others that they simultaneously realize the extrinsic purpose which consists in the order and harmony of the whole universe. Thus the extrinsic and relative finality whereby all conspire to const.i.tute the universe a _cosmos_ is secondary and posterior and subordinate to the deeper, intrinsic, immanent and absolute finality whereby each individual created nature moves by a tendency or law of its being towards the realization of a _good_ which _perfects_ it as its natural end.

In order to understand the nature of this intrinsic and extrinsic finality in the universe, and to vindicate its existence against the philosophy of Mechanism, we must next a.n.a.lyse the concept, and investigate the influence, of what are called _final causes_.

107. THE CONCEPT OF FINAL CAUSE; ITS OBJECTIVE VALIDITY IN ALL NATURE.

CLa.s.sIFICATION OF FINAL CAUSES.-When we speak of the _end_ of the year, or the _end_ of a wall, we mean the extreme limit or ultimate point; and the term conveys no notion of a cause. Similarly, were a person to say "I have got to the _end_ of my work," we should understand him to mean simply that he had finished it. But when people act deliberately and as intelligent beings, they usually act for some _conscious purpose_, with some _object in view_, for the achievement or attainment of something; they continue to act until they have attained this object; when they have attained it they cease to act; its attainment synchronizes with the _end_ of their action, taking this term in the sense just ill.u.s.trated. Probably this is the reason why the term _end_ has been extended from its original sense to signify the _object_ for the attainment of which an intelligent agent acts. This object of conscious desire _induces_ the agent to seek it; and because it thus influences the agent to act it verifies the notion of a _cause_: it is a _final cause_, an _end_ in the causal sense. For instance, a young man wishes to become a medical doctor: the _art of healing_ is the _end_ he wishes to secure. For this purpose he pursues a course of studies and pa.s.ses certain examinations; these acts whereby he qualifies himself by obtaining a certain fund of knowledge and skill are _means_ to the end intended by him. He need not desire these preparatory labours _for their own sake_; but he does desire them as _useful for his purpose_, as _means_ to his end: in so far as he wills them as means he wills them not for their own sake but because of the end, _propter finem_.

He _apprehends_ the end as a _good_; he _intends_ its attainment; he _elects_ or _selects_ certain acts or lines of action as means suitable for this purpose. An end or final cause, therefore, may be defined as _something apprehended as a good, and which, because desired as such, influences the will to choose some action or line of action judged necessary or useful for the attainment of this good_. Hence Aristotle's definition of end as t? ?? ??e?a: id cujus gratia aliquid fit: _that for the sake of which an agent acts_.

The end understood in this sense is a _motive_ of action; not only would the action not take place without the agent's intending the end, showing the latter to be a _conditio sine qua non_; but, more than this, the end as a good, apprehended and willed, _has a positive influence_ on the ultimate effect or issue, so that it is really a _cause_.

Man is conscious of this "finality," or influence of final causes on his own deliberate actions. As an intelligent being he acts "for ends," and orders or regulates his actions as means to those ends; so much so that when we see a man's acts, his whole conduct, utterly unrelated to rational ends, wholly at variance and out of joint with the usual ends of intelligent human activity, we take it as an indication of loss of reason, insanity. Furthermore, man is free; he _chooses_ the ends for which he acts; he acts _elective propter fines_.

But in the domain of animal life and activity is there any evidence of the influence of final causes? Most undoubtedly. Watch the movements of animals seeking their prey; observe the wide domain of animal instincts; study the elaborate and intricate lines of action whereby they protect and foster and preserve their lives, and rear their young and propagate their species: could there be clearer or more abundant evidence that in all this conduct they are _influenced_ by objects which they _apprehend_ and seek as _sensible goods_? Not that they can conceive in the abstract the _ratio bonitatis_ in these things, or freely choose them as good, for they are incapable of abstract thought and consequent free choice; but that these sensible objects, apprehended by them in the concrete, do really influence or move their sense appet.i.tes to desire and seek them; and the influence of an object on sense appet.i.te springs from the goodness of this object (44, 45). They tend towards _apprehended_ goods; they act _apprehensive propter fines_.(503)

Finally, even in the domains of unconscious agencies, of plant life and inorganic nature, we have evidence of the influence of final causes. For here too we witness innumerable varied, complex, ever-renewed activities, constantly issuing in results useful to, and good for, the agents which elicit them: operations which contribute to the _development_ and _perfection_ of the natures of these agents (46). Now if similar effects demand similar causes how can we refuse to recognize even in these activities of physical nature the influence of final causes? Whenever and wherever we find a great and complex variety of active powers, forces, energies, issuing invariably in effects which suit and develop and perfect the agents in question,-in a word, which are _good_ for these agents,-whether the latter be conscious or unconscious, does not reason itself dictate to us that all such domains of action must be subject to the influence of final causes? Of course it would be mere unreflecting anthropomorphism to attribute to _unconscious_ agencies a _conscious_ subjection to the attracting and directing influence of such causes. But the recognition of such influence in this domain implies no nave supposition of that sort. It does, however, imply this very reasonable view: that there must be some reason or ground in the nature or const.i.tution of even an inanimate agent for its acting always in a uniform manner, conducive to its own development and perfection; that there must be in the nature of each and every one of the vast mult.i.tude of such agents which make up the whole physical universe a reason or ground for each co-operating constantly and harmoniously with all the others to secure and preserve that general order and regularity which enables us to p.r.o.nounce the universe not a _chaos_ but a _cosmos_. Now that ground or reason in things, whereby they act in such a manner-not indifferently, chaotically, capriciously, aimlessly, _unintelligibly_, but definitely, regularly, reliably, purposively, _intelligibly_-is a real principle of their natures, impressing on their natures a definite tendency, directive of their activities towards results which, as being suited to these natures, bear to these latter the relation of final causes. A directive principle need not itself be conscious; the inner directive principle of inanimate agents towards what is _good_ for them, what _perfects_ them, what is therefore in a true and real sense their end (45, 46), is not conscious. But in virtue of it they act as if they were conscious, nay intelligent, _i.e._ they act _executive propter fines_.

Of course the existence of this principle in inanimate agencies necessarily _implies_ intelligence: this indeed is our very contention against the whole philosophy of mechanism, positivism and agnosticism. But is this intelligence really identical with the agencies of nature, so that all the phenomena of experience, which const.i.tute the _cosmos_ or universe, are but phases in the evolution of One Sole Reality which is continually manifesting itself under the distinct aspects of nature and mind? Or is this intelligence, though _virtually immanent_ in the universe, really distinct from it-_really transcendent_,-a Supreme Intelligence which has created and continues to conserve this universe and govern all its activities? This is a distinct question: it is the question of Monism or Theism as an ultimate interpretation of human experience.

We conclude then that what we call _finality_, or the influence of final causes, pervades the whole universe; that in the domain of conscious agents it is _conscious_, _instinctive_ when it solicits _sense appet.i.te_, _voluntary_ when it solicits _intelligent will_; that in the domain of unconscious agencies it is not conscious but "_natural_" or "_physical_"

soliciting the "_nature_" or "_appet.i.tus naturalis_" of these agencies.

Before inquiring into the nature of final causality we may indicate briefly the main divisions of final causes: some of these concern the domain of human activity and are of importance to Ethics rather than to Ontology.

(_a_) We have already distinguished between _intrinsic_ and _extrinsic_ finality. An intrinsic final cause is an end or object which perfects the nature itself of the agent which tends towards it: nourishment, for instance, is an intrinsic end in relation to the living organism. An extrinsic final cause is not one towards which the nature of the agent immediately tends, but one which, intended by some other agent, is _de facto_ realized by the tendency of the former towards its own intrinsic end. Thus, the general order of the universe is an extrinsic end in relation to each individual agency in the universe: it is an end intended by the Creator and _de facto_ realized by each individual agency acting in accordance with its own particular nature.

(_b_) Very similar to this is the familiar distinction between the _finis operis_ and the _finis operantis_. The former is the end necessarily and _de facto_ realized by the act itself, by its very nature, independently of any other end the agent may have expressly intended to attain by means of it. The latter is the end expressly intended by the agent, and which may vary for one and the same kind of act. For instance, the _finis operis_ of an act of almsgiving is the actual aiding of the mendicant; the _finis operantis_ may be charity, or self-denial, or vanity, or whatever other motive influences the giver.

(_c_) Akin to those also is the distinction between an unconscious, or physical, or "natural" end, and a conscious, or mental, or "intentional"

end. The former is that towards which the nature or "_appet.i.tus naturalis_" of unconscious agencies tends; the latter is an end apprehended by a conscious agent.

(_d_) An end may be either _ultimate_ or _proximate_ or _intermediate_. An ultimate end is one which is sought for its own sake, as contrasted with an intermediate end which is willed rather as a means to the former, and with a proximate end which is intended last and sought first as a means to realizing the others. It should be noted that proximate and intermediate ends, in so far as they are sought for the sake of some ulterior end, are not ends at all but rather means; only in so far as they present some good desirable for its own sake, are they properly ends, or final causes.

Furthermore, an ultimate end may be such absolutely or relatively: absolutely if it cannot possibly be subordinated or referred to any ulterior or higher good; relatively if, though ultimate in a particular order as compared with means leading up to it, it is nevertheless capable of being subordinated to a higher good, though not actually referred to this latter by any explicit volition of the agent that seeks it.

(_e_) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either _objectively_,-_finis_ "_objectivus_,"-or _formally_,-_finis_ "_formalis_". The former is the objective good itself which the agent wishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the agent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective good. Thus, G.o.d Himself is the objective happiness (_beat.i.tudo objectiva_) of man, while man's actual possession of, or union with, G.o.d, by knowledge and love, is man's formal happiness (_beat.i.tudo formalis_).