Ontology or the Theory of Being Part 2

Inasmuch, however, as being is not merely attributed to these modes extrinsically, but belongs to all of them intrinsically, it is also predicated of them by _a.n.a.logy of proportion_. This latter sort of a.n.a.logy is based on similarity of relations. For example, the act of understanding bears a relation to the mind similar to that which the act of seeing bears to the eye, and hence we say of the mind that it "sees" things when it understands them. Or, again, we speak of a verdant valley in the sunshine as "smiling," because its appearance bears a relation to the valley similar to that which a smile bears to the human countenance. Or again, we speak of the parched earth as "thirsting" for the rains, or of the devout soul as "thirsting" for G.o.d, because these relations are recognized as similar to that of a thirsty person towards the drink for which he thirsts. In all such cases the a.n.a.logical concept implies not indeed the same attribute (differently realized) in all the a.n.a.logues (as in univocal predication) but rather a similarity in the relation or proportion in which each a.n.a.logue embodies or realizes some attribute or attributes peculiar to itself. Seeing is to the eye as understanding is to the mind; smiling is to the countenance as the pleasing appearance of its natural features is to the valley. Rain is to the parched earth, and G.o.d is to the devout soul, as drink is to the thirsty person. It will be noted that in all such cases the a.n.a.logical concept is affirmed primarily and properly of some one thing (the _a.n.a.logum princeps_), and of the other only secondarily, and relatively to the former.

Now, if we reflect on the manner in which being is affirmed of its various modes (_e.g._ of the infinite and the finite; or of substance and accident; or of spiritual and corporeal substances; or of quant.i.ties, or qualities, or causes, etc.) we can see _firstly_ that although these differ from one another _by all that each of them is, by the whole being of each_, yet there is an all-pervading similarity between the relations which these modes bear each to its own existence. All have, or can have, actual existence: each according to the grade of perfection of its own reality. If we conceive infinite being as the cause of all finite beings, then the former exists in a manner appropriate to its all-perfect reality, and finite beings in a manner proportionate to their limited realities; and so of the various modes of finite being among themselves. Moreover, we can see _secondly_, as will be explained more fully below,(54) that being is affirmed of the finite by virtue of its dependence on the infinite, and of accident by virtue of its dependence on substance.(55) Being or reality is therefore predicated of its modes by _a.n.a.logy of proportion_.(56)

Is a concept, when applied in this way, one, or is it really manifold? It is not simply one, for this would yield univocal predication; nor is it simply manifold, for this would give equivocal predication. Being, considered in its vague, imperfect, inadequate sense, as involving some common or similar proportion or relation to existence in all its a.n.a.logues, is one; considered as representing clearly and adequately what is thus similarly related to each of the a.n.a.logues, it is manifold.

a.n.a.logy of proportion is the basis of the figure of speech known as metaphor. It would be a mistake, however, to infer from this that what is thus a.n.a.logically predicated of a number of things belongs intrinsically and properly only to one of them, being transferred by a mere extrinsic denomination to the others; and that therefore it does not express any genuine knowledge on our part about the nature of these other things. It does give us real knowledge about them. Metaphor is not equivocation; but perhaps more usually it is understood not to give us real knowledge because it is understood to be based on resemblances that are merely _fanciful_, not real. Still, no matter how slender and remote be the proportional resemblance on which the a.n.a.logical use of language is based, in so far forth as it has such a _real_ basis it gives us real insight into the nature of the a.n.a.logues. And if we hesitate to describe such a use of language as "metaphorical," this is only because "metaphor" perhaps too commonly connotes a certain transferred and improper extension of the meaning of terms, based upon a _purely fanciful_ resemblance.

All our language is primarily and _properly_ expressive of concepts derived from the sensible appearances of material realities. As applied to the suprasensible, intelligible aspects of these realities, such as substance and cause, or to spiritual realities, such as the human soul and G.o.d, it is a.n.a.logical in another sense; not as opposed to univocal, but as opposed to _proper_. That is, it expresses concepts which are not formed directly from the presence of the things which they signify, but are gathered from other things to which the latter are necessarily related in a variety of ways.(57) Considering the origin of our knowledge, the material, the sensible, the phenomenal, comes first in order, and moulds our concepts and language primarily to its own proper representation and expression; while the spiritual, the intelligible, the substantial, comes later, and must make use of the concepts and language thus already moulded.

If we consider, however, not the order in which we get our knowledge, but the order of _reality_ in the objects of our knowledge, being or reality is primarily and more properly predicated of the infinite than of the finite, of the Creator than of the creature, of the spiritual than of the material, of substances than of their accidents and sensible manifestations or phenomena. Yet we do not predicate being or reality of the finite, or of creatures, in a mere transferred, extrinsic, improper sense, as if these were mere manifestations of the infinite, or mere effects of the First Cause, to which alone reality would properly belong.

For creatures, finite things, are in a true and proper sense also real.

Duns Scotus and those who think with him contend that the concept of being, derived as it is from our experience of finite being, if applied only a.n.a.logically to infinite being would give us no genuine knowledge about the latter. They maintain that whenever a universal concept is applied to the objects in which it is _realized intrinsically_, it is affirmed of these objects _univocally_. The notion of being, in its most imperfect, inadequate, indeterminate sense, is, they say, _one and the same_ in so far forth as it is applicable to the infinite and the finite, and to all the modes of the finite; and it is therefore predicated of all univocally.(58) But although they apply the concept of being univocally to the infinite and the finite, _i.e._ to G.o.d and creatures, they admit that the _reality_ corresponding to this univocal concept is _totally different_ in G.o.d and in creatures: that G.o.d differs by _all that He is_ from creatures, and they by _all that they are_ from Him. While, however, Scotists emphasize the formal oneness or ident.i.ty of the indeterminate common concept, followers of St. Thomas emphasize the fact that the various modes of being differ totally, by all that each of them is, from one another; and, from this radical diversity in the modes of being, they infer that the common concept should not be regarded as _simply_ the same, but only as _proportionally_ the same, as expressive of a _similar relation_ of each intrinsically different mode of reality to actual existence.

Thomists lay still greater stress, perhaps, upon the second consideration referred to above, as a reason for regarding being as an a.n.a.logical concept when affirmed of Creator and creature, or of substance and accident: the consideration that the finite is _dependent_ on the infinite, and accident on substance. If being is realized in a true and proper sense, and intrinsically, as it undoubtedly is, in whatever is distinguishable from nothingness, why not say that we should affirm being or reality of all things "either as a genus in the strict sense, or else in some sense not a.n.a.logical but proper, after the manner in which we predicate a genus of its species and individuals?... Since the object of our universal idea of being is admitted to be really in all things, we can evidently abstract from what is proper to substance and to accident, just as we abstract from what is proper to plants and to animals when we affirm of these that they are living things."(59)

"In reply to this difficulty," Father Kleutgen continues,(60) "we say in the first place that the idea of being is in truth less a.n.a.logical and more proper than any belonging to the first sort of a.n.a.logy [_i.e._ of attribution], and that therefore it approaches more closely to generic concepts properly so called. At the same time the difference which separates both from the latter concepts remains. For a name applied to many things is a.n.a.logical if what it signifies is realized _par excellence_ in one, and in the others only subordinately and dependently on that. Hence it is that Aristotle regards predication as a.n.a.logical when something is affirmed of many things (1) either because these have a certain relation to some one thing, (2) or because they depend on some one thing. In the former case the thing signified by the name is really and properly found only in one single thing, and is affirmed of all the others only in virtue of some real relation of these to the former, whether this be (_a_) that these things merely resemble that single thing [metaphor], or (_b_) bear some other relation to it, such as that of effect to cause, etc.

[metonymy]. In the latter case the thing signified by the name is really in each of the things of which it is affirmed; but it is in one alone _par excellence_, and in the others only by depending, for its very existence in them, on that one. Now the object of the term _being_ is found indeed in accidents, _e.g._ in quant.i.ty, colour, shape; but certainly it must be applied primarily to substance, and to accidents only dependently on the latter: for quant.i.ty, colour, shape can have being only because the corporeal substance possesses these determinations. But this is not at all the case with a genus and its species. These differ from the genus, not by any such dependence, but by the addition of some special perfection to the const.i.tuents of the genus; for example, in the brute beast sensibility is added to vegetative life, and in man intelligence is added to sensibility. Here there is no relation of dependence for existence. Even if we considered human life as that of which life is princ.i.p.ally a.s.serted, we could not say that plants and brute beasts so depended for their life on the life of man that we could not affirm life of them except as dependent on the life of man: as we cannot attribute being to accidents except by reason of their dependence on substance. Hence it is that we can consider apart, and in itself, life in general, and attribute this to all living things without relating it to any other being."(61)

"It might still be objected that the one single being of which we may affirm life primarily and princ.i.p.ally, ought to be not human life, but absolute life. And between this divine life and the life of all other beings there is a relation of dependence, which reaches even to the very existence of life in these other beings.

In fact all life depends on the absolute life, not indeed in the way accident depends on substance, but in a manner no less real and far more excellent. This is entirely true; but what are we to conclude from it if not precisely this, which scholasticism teaches: that the perfections found in the various species of creatures can be affirmed of these in the same sense (_univoce_), but that they can be affirmed of G.o.d and creatures only a.n.a.logically?"

"From all of which we can understand why it is that in regard to genera and species the a.n.a.logy is in the things but not in our thoughts, while in regard to substance and accidents it is both in the things and in our thoughts: a difference which rests not solely on our manner of conceiving things, nor _a fortiori_ on mere caprice or fancy, but which has its basis in the very nature of the things themselves. For though in the former case there is a certain a.n.a.logy in the things themselves, inasmuch as the same nature, that of the genus, is realized in the species in different ways, still, as we have seen, that is not sufficient, without the relation of dependence, to yield a basis for a.n.a.logy in our thoughts. For it is precisely because accident, as a determination of substance, presupposes this latter, that being cannot be affirmed of accident except as dependent on substance."

These paragraphs will have shown with sufficient clearness why we should regard being not as an univocal but as an a.n.a.logical concept, when referred to G.o.d and creatures, or to substance and accident. For the rest, the divergence between the Scotist and the Thomist views is not very important, because Scotists also will deny that being is a genus of which the infinite and the finite would be species; finite and infinite are not _differentiae_ superadded to being, inasmuch as each of these differs _by its whole reality_, and not merely by a determining portion, from the other; it is owing to the limitations of our abstractive way of understanding reality that we have to conceive the infinite by first conceiving being in the abstract, and then mentally determining this concept by another, namely, by the concept of "infinite mode of being"(62); the infinite, and whatever perfections we predicate formally of the infinite, transcend all _genera_, _species_ and _differentiae_, because the distinction of being into infinite and finite is prior to the distinction into genera, species and differentiae; this latter distinction applying only to finite, not to infinite being.(63)

The observations we have just been making in regard to the a.n.a.logy of being are of greater importance than the beginner can be expected to realize. A proper appreciation of the way in which being or reality is conceived by the mind to appertain to the data of our experience, is indispensable to the defence of Theism as against Agnosticism and Pantheism.

3. REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING.-We may next ill.u.s.trate the notion of being by approaching it from another standpoint-by examining a fundamental distinction which may be drawn between _real being_ (_ens reale_) and _logical being_ (_ens rationis_).

We derive all our knowledge, through external and internal sense perception, from the domain of actually existing things, these things including our own selves and our own minds. We form, from the data of sense-consciousness, by an intellectual process proper, mental representations of an abstract and universal character, which reveal to us partial aspects and phases of the natures of things. We have no intuitive intellectual insight into these natures. It is only by abstracting their various aspects, by comparing these in judgments, and reaching still further aspects by inferences, that we progress in our knowledge of things-gradually, step by step, _discursive_, _discurrendo_. All this implies reflection on, and comparison of, our own ideas, our mental views of things. It involves the processes of defining and cla.s.sifying, affirming and denying, abstracting and generalizing, a.n.a.lysing and synthesizing, comparing and relating in a variety of ways the objects grasped by our thought. Now in all these complex functions, by which alone the mind can _interpret rationally_ what is given to it, by which alone, in other words, it can know reality, the mind necessarily and inevitably forms for itself (and expresses in intelligible language) a series of concepts which have for their objects only the _modes_ in which, and the _relations_ by means of which, it makes such gradual progress in its interpretation of what is given to it, in its knowledge of the real. These concepts are called _secundae intentiones mentis_-concepts of the second order, so to speak. And their objects, the modes and mutual relations of our _primae intentiones_ or direct concepts, are called _entia rationis_-logical ent.i.ties. For example, _abstractness_ is a mode which affects not the reality which we apprehend intellectually, but the concept by which we apprehend it. So, too, is the _universality_ of a concept, its communicability or applicability to an indefinite mult.i.tude of similar realities-the "_intentio universalitatis_," as it is called-a mode of concept, not of the realities represented by the latter. So, likewise, is the _absence_ of other reality than that represented by the concept, the _relative nothingness or non-being_ by contrast with which the concept is realized as positive; and the _absolute nothingness or non-being_ which is the logical correlative of the concept of being; and the static, unchanging self-ident.i.ty of the object as conceived in the abstract.(64) These are not modes of reality _as it is_ but _as it is conceived_. Again, the manifold logical relations which we establish between our concepts-relations of (extensive or intensive) ident.i.ty or distinction, inclusion or inherence, etc.-are logical ent.i.ties, _entia rationis_: relations of genus, species, differentia, proprium, accidens; the affirmative or negative relation between predicate and subject in judgment;(65) the mutual relations of antecedent and consequent in inference. Now all these logical ent.i.ties, or _objecta secundae intentionis mentis_, are relations established by the mind itself between its own thoughts; they have, no doubt, a foundation in the real objects of those thoughts as well as in the const.i.tution and limitations of the mind itself; but they have themselves, and can have, no other being than that which they have as products of thought. Their sole being consists in _being thought of_. They are necessary creations or products of the thought-process as this goes on in the human mind. We see that it is only by means of these relations we can progress in understanding things. In the thought-process we cannot help bringing them to light-and thinking them after the manner of realities, _per modum entis_. Whatever we think we must think through the concept of "being"; whatever we conceive we must conceive as "being"; but on reflection we easily see that such ent.i.ties as "nothingness," "negation or absence or privation of being,"

"universality," "predicate"-and, in general, all relations established by our own thought between our own ideas representative of reality-can have themselves no reality proper, no actual or possible existence, other than that which they get from the mind in virtue of its making them objects of its own thought. Hence the scholastic definition of a logical ent.i.ty or _ens rationis_ as "that which has objective being merely in the intellect": "_illud quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu, seu ... id quod a ratione excogitatur ut ens, c.u.m tamen in se ent.i.tatem non habeat_".(66) Of course the mental process by which we think such ent.i.ties, the mental state in which they are held in consciousness, is just as real as any other mental process or state. But the ent.i.ty which is thus held in consciousness has and can have no other reality than what it has by being an object of thought. And this precisely is what distinguishes it from _real being_, from _reality_; for the latter, besides the ideal existence it has in the mind which thinks of it, has, or at least can have, a real existence of its own, independently altogether of our thinking about it. We a.s.sume here, of course-what is established elsewhere, as against the subjective idealism of phenomenists and the objective idealism of Berkeley-that the _reality_ of _actual_ things does not consist in their being perceived or thought of, that their "_esse_" is not "_percipi_," that they have a reality other than and independent of their actual presence to the thought of any human mind. And even purely possible things, even the creatures of our own fancy, the fictions of fable and romance, _could_, absolutely speaking and without any contradiction, have an existence in the actual order, in addition to the mental existence they receive from those who fancy them. Such ent.i.ties, therefore, differ from _entia rationis_; they, too, are _real_ beings.

What the reality of purely possible things is we shall discuss later on. Actually existing things at all events we a.s.sume to be _given_ to the knowing mind, not to be _created_ by the latter.

Even in regard to these, however, we must remember that the mind in knowing them, in interpreting them, in seeking to penetrate the nature of them, is not purely pa.s.sive; that reality as known to us-or, in other words, our knowledge of reality-is the product of a twofold factor: the subjective which is the mind, and the objective which is the extramental reality acting on, and thus revealing itself to, the mind. Hence it is that when we come to a.n.a.lyse in detail our knowledge of the nature of things-or, in other words, the natures of things as revealed to our minds-it will not be always easy to distinguish in each particular case the properties, aspects, relations, distinctions, etc., which are _real_ (in the sense of being there in the reality independently of the consideration of the mind) from those that are merely _logical_ (in the sense of being produced and superadded to the reality by the mental process itself).(67) Yet it is obviously a matter of the very first importance to determine, as far as may be possible, to what extent our knowledge of reality is not merely a mental _interpretation_, but a mental _construction_, of the latter; and whether, if there be a constructive or const.i.tutive factor in thought, this should be regarded as interfering with the validity of thought as representative of reality. This problem-of the relation of the _ens rationis_ to the _ens reale_ in the process of cognition-has given rise to discussions which, in modern times, have largely contributed to the formation of that special branch of philosophical enquiry which is called Epistemology. But it must not be imagined that this very problem was not discussed, and very widely discussed, by philosophers long before the problem of the validity of knowledge a.s.sumed the prominent place it has won for itself in modern philosophy. Even a moderate familiarity with scholastic philosophy will enable the student to recognize this problem, in a variety of phases, in the discussions of the medieval schoolmen concerning the concepts of matter and form, the simplicity and composition of beings, and the nature of the various distinctions-whether logical, virtual, formal, or real-which the mind either invents or detects in the realities it endeavours to understand and explain.

4. REAL BEING AND IDEAL BEING.-The latter of these expressions has a multiplicity of kindred meanings. We use it here in the sense of "being _known_," _i.e._ to signify the "esse _intentionale_," the mental presence, which, in the scholastic theory of knowledge, an ent.i.ty of whatsoever kind, whether real or logical, must have in the mind of the knower in order that he be aware of that ent.i.ty. A mere logical ent.i.ty, as we have seen, has and can have no other mode of being than this which consists in being an object of the mind's awareness. All real being, too, when it becomes an object of any kind of human cognition whatsoever-of intellectual thought, whether direct or reflex; of sense perception, whether external or internal-must obtain this sort of mental presence or mental existence: thereby alone can it become an "objectum _cognitum_".

Only by such mental mirroring, or reproduction, or reconstruction, can reality become so related and connected with mind as to reveal itself to mind. Under this peculiar relation which we call cognition, the mind, as we know from psychology and epistemology, is not pa.s.sive: if reality revealed itself immediately, as it is, to a purely pa.s.sive mind (were such conceivable), the existence of error would be unaccountable; but the mind is not pa.s.sive: under the influence of the reality it forms the intellectual concept (the _verb.u.m mentale_), or the sense percept (the _species sensibilis expressa_), in and through which, and by means of which, it attains to its knowledge of the real.

But prior (ontologically) to this _mental_ existence, and as partial cause of the latter, there is the _real_ existence or being, which reality has independently of its being known by any individual human mind. Real being, then, as distinguished here from ideal being, is that which exists or can exist extramentally, whether it is known by the human mind or not, _i.e._ whether it exists also mentally or not.

That there is such real being, apart from the "thought"-being whereby the mind is const.i.tuted formally knowing, is proved elsewhere; as also that this _esse intentionale_ has modes which cannot be attributed to the _esse reale_. We merely note these points here in order to indicate the errors involved in the opposite contentions. Our concepts are characterized by abstractness, by a consequent static immutability, by a plurality often resulting from purely mental distinctions, by a universality which transcends those distinctions and unifies the variety of all subordinate concepts in the widest concept of _being_. Now if, for example, we attribute the unifying mental mode of universality to real being, we must draw the pantheistic conclusion that all real being is one: the logical outcome of extreme realism. If, again, we transfer purely mental distinctions to the unity of the Absolute or Supreme Being, thus making them real, we thereby deny infinite perfection to the most perfect being conceivable: an error of which some catholic philosophers of the later middle ages have been accused with some foundation. If, finally, we identify the _esse reale_ with the _esse intentionale_, and this with the thought-process itself, we find ourselves at the starting-point of Hegelian monism.(68)

5. FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTIONS IN REAL BEING.-Leaving logical and ideal being aside, and fixing our attention exclusively on real being, we may indicate here a few of the most fundamental distinctions which experience enables us to recognize in our study of the universal order of things.

(_a_) _Possible or Potential Being and Actual Being._-The first of these distinctions is that between possibility and actuality, between that which can be and that which actually is. For a proper understanding of this distinction, which will be dealt with presently, it is necessary to note here the following divisions of _actual_ being, which will be studied in detail later on.

(_b_) _Infinite Being and Finite Beings._-All people have a sufficiently clear notion of Infinite Being, or Infinitely Perfect Being: though not all philosophers are agreed as to how precisely we get this notion, or whether there actually exists such a being, or whether if such being does exist we can attain to a certain knowledge of such existence. By infinite being we mean a being possessing all conceivable perfections in the most perfect conceivable manner; and by finite beings all such beings as have actually any conceivable limitation to their perfection. About these nominal definitions there is no dispute; and scholasticism identifies their respective objects with _G.o.d_ and _creatures_.

(_c_) _Necessary Being and Contingent Beings._-Necessary being we conceive as that being which exists of necessity: being which if conceived at all cannot be conceived as non-existent: being in the very concept of which is essentially involved the concept of actual existence: so that the attempt to conceive such being as non-existent would be an attempt to conceive what would be self-contradictory. Contingent being, on the other hand, is being which is conceived not to exist of necessity: being which may be conceived as not actually existent: being in the concept of which is not involved the concept of actual existence. The same observations apply to this distinction as to the preceding one. It is obvious that any being which we regard as actual we must regard either as necessary or as contingent; and, secondly, that necessary being must be considered as absolutely independent, as having its actual existence _from itself_, by its own nature; while contingent being must be considered as dependent for its actual existence on some being _other_ than itself. Hence necessary being is termed _Ens a se_, contingent being _Ens ab alio_.

(_d_) _Absolute Being and Relative Beings._-In modern philosophy the terms "absolute" and "relative," as applied to being, correspond roughly with the terms "G.o.d" and "creatures" in the usage of theistic philosophers. But the former pair of terms is really of wider application than the latter.

The term _absolute_ means, etymologically, that which is loosed, unfettered, disengaged or free from bonds (_absolutum_, _ab-solvere_, _solvo_ = _se-luo_, from ???): that, therefore, which is not bound up with anything else, which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent; while the _relative_ is that which is in some way bound up with something else, and which is so far not self-sufficing or independent. That, therefore, is _ontologically_ absolute which is in some sense self-sufficing, independent of other things, _in its existence_; while the ontologically relative is that which depends in some real way for its existence on something else. Again, that is _logically_ absolute which _can be conceived and known by us without reference to anything else_; while the logically relative is that which we can conceive and know only through our knowledge of something else. And since we usually name things according to the way in which we conceive them, we regard as absolute any being which is _by itself_ and _of itself_ that which we conceive it to be, or that which its name implies; and as relative any being which is what its name implies only _in virtue of some relation_ to something else.(69) Thus, a man is a _man_ absolutely, while he is a _friend_ only relatively to others.

It is obvious that the primary and general meaning of the terms "absolute"

and "relative" can be applied and extended in a variety of ways. For instance, _all_ being may be said to be "relative" _to the knowing mind_, in the sense that all knowledge involves a transcendental relation of the known object to the knowing subject. In this widest and most improper sense even G.o.d Himself is relative, not however as being, but as known.

Again, when we apply the same attribute to a variety of things we may see that it is found in one of them in the most perfect manner conceivable, or at least in a fuller and higher degree than it is found in the others; and that it is found in these others only with some sort of subordination to, and dependence on, the former: we then say that it belongs to this _primarily_ or _absolutely_, and to the others only _secondarily_ or _relatively_. This is a less improper application of the terms than in the preceding case. What we have especially to remember here is that there are many different kinds of dependence or subordination, all alike giving rise to the same usage.

Hence, applying the terms absolute and relative to the predicate "being"

or "real" or "reality," it is obvious in the first place that the _potential_ as such can be called "being," or "reality" only in relation to the _actual_. It is the actual that is being _simpliciter_, _par excellence_; the potential is so only in relation to this.(70) Again, _substances_ may be termed beings absolutely, while _accidents_ are beings only relatively, because of their dependence on substances; though this relation is quite different from the relation of potential to actual being. Finally all finite, contingent realities, actual and possible, are what they are only because of their dependence on the Infinite and Necessary Being: and hence the former are relative and the latter absolute; though here again the relation is different from that of accident to substance, or of potential to actual.

Since the order of being includes all orders, and since a being is _absolutely_ such-or-such in any order only when that being realizes in all its fulness and purity such-or-such reality, it follows that the being which realizes in all its fulness the reality of _being_ is the Absolute Being in the highest possible sense of this term. This concept of Absolute Being is the richest and most comprehensive of all possible concepts: it is the very ant.i.thesis of that other concept of "being in general" which is common to everything and distinguished only from nothingness. It includes in itself all actual and possible modes and grades and perfections of finite things, apart from their limitations, embodying all of them in the one highest and richest concept of that which makes all of them real and actual, _viz._ the concept of Actuality or Actual Reality itself.

Hegel and his followers have involved themselves in a pantheistic philosophy by neglecting to distinguish between those two totally different concepts.(71) A similar error has also resulted from failure to distinguish between the various modes in which being that is relative may be dependent on being that is absolute. G.o.d is the Absolute Being; creatures are relative. So too is substance absolute being, compared with accidents as inhering and existing in substance. But G.o.d is not therefore to be conceived as the one all-pervading substance, of which all finite things, all phenomena, would be only accidental manifestations.

CHAPTER II. BECOMING AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

6. THE STATIC AND THE CHANGING.-The things we see around us, the things which make up the immediate data of our experience, not only _are_ or _exist_; they also _become_, or _come_ into actual existence; they _change_; they pa.s.s out of actual existence. The abstract notion of being represents its object to the mind in a static, permanent, changeless, self-identical condition; but if this condition were an adequate representation of reality change would be unreal, would be only an illusion. This is what the Eleatic philosophers of ancient Greece believed, distinguishing merely between being and nothingness. But they were mistaken; for change in things is too obviously real to be eliminated by calling it an illusion: even if it were an illusion, this illusion at least would have to be accounted for. In order, therefore, to understand reality we must employ not merely the notion of being (something _static_), but also the notion of becoming, change, process, appearing and disappearing (something _kinetic_, and something _dynamic_). In doing so, however, we must not fall into the error of the opposite extreme from the Eleatics-by regarding change as the adequate representation of reality.

This is what Herac.l.i.tus and the later Ionians did: holding that nothing _is_, that all _becomes_ (p??ta ???), that change is all reality, that the stable, the permanent, is non-existent, unreal, an illusion. This too is false; for change would be unintelligible without at least an abiding _law_ of change, a permanent _principle_ of some sort; which, in turn, involves the reality of some sort of abiding, stable, permanent being.

We must then-with Aristotle, as against both of those one-sided conceptions-hold to the reality both of being and of becoming; and proceed to see how the stable and the changing can both be real.

To convince ourselves that they are both real, very little reflection is needed. We have actual experience of both those elements of reality in our consciousness and memory of our own selves. Every human individual in the enjoyment of his mental faculties knows himself as an abiding, self-identical being, yet as constantly undergoing real changes; so that throughout his life he is really the same being, though just as certainly he really changes. In external nature, too, we observe on the one hand innumerable processes of growth and decay, of motion and interaction; and on the other hand a similarly all-pervading element of sameness or ident.i.ty amid all this never-ending change.

7. THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTUAL. (_a_) POSSIBILITY, ABSOLUTE, RELATIVE, AND ADEQUATE.-It is from our experience of actuality and change that we derive not only our notion of temporal duration, but also our notion of _potential being_ or _possibility_, as distinct from that of _actual being_ or _actuality_. It is from our experience of what actually exists that we are able to determine what can, and what cannot exist. We know from experience what gold is, and what a tower is; and that it is intrinsically possible for a golden tower to exist, that such an object of thought involves no contradiction, that therefore its existence is not impossible, even though it may never actually exist as a fact. Similarly, we know from experience what a square is, and what a circle is; and that it is intrinsically impossible for a square circle to exist, that such an object of thought involves a contradiction, that therefore not only is such an object never actually existent in fact, but that it is in no sense real, in no way possible.

Thus, _intrinsic_ (or _objective_, _absolute_, _logical_, _metaphysical_) possibility is the mere non-repugnance of an object of thought to actual existence. Any being or object of thought that is conceivable in this way, that can be conceived as capable of actually existing, is called intrinsically (or objectively, absolutely, logically, metaphysically) possible being. The absence of such intrinsic capability of actual existence gives us the notion of the intrinsically (objectively, absolutely, logically, metaphysically) impossible. We shall return to these notions again. They are necessary here for the understanding of real change in the actual universe.

Fixing our attention now upon the real changes which characterize the data of our experience, let us inquire what conditions are necessary in order that an intrinsically possible object of thought become here and now an actual being. It matters not whether we select an example from the domain of organic nature, of inorganic nature, or of art-whether it be an oak, or an iceberg, or a statue. In order that there be here and now an actual oak-tree, it is necessary not only (1) that such an object be intrinsically possible, but (2) that there have been planted here an actual acorn, _i.e._ an actual being having in it subjectively and really the pa.s.sive potentiality of developing into an actual oak-tree, and (3) that there be in the actual things around the acorn active powers or forces capable of so influencing the latent, pa.s.sive potentiality of the acorn as gradually to evolve the oak-tree therefrom. So, too, for the (1) intrinsically possible iceberg, there are needed (2) water capable of becoming ice, and (3) natural powers or forces capable of forming it into ice and setting this adrift in the ocean. And for the (1) intrinsically possible statue there are needed (2) the block of marble or other material capable of becoming a statue, and (3) the sculptor having the power to mould this material into an actual statue.

In order, therefore, that a thing which is not now actual, but only intrinsically or absolutely possible, become actual, there must actually exist some being or beings endowed with the _active power or potency_ of making this possible thing actual. The latter is then said to be _relatively, extrinsically_ possible-in relation to such being or beings.

And obviously a thing may be possible relatively to the power of one being, and not possible relatively to lesser power of another being: the statue that is intrinsically possible in the block of marble, may be extrinsically possible relatively to the skilled sculptor, but not relatively to the unskilled person who is not a sculptor.

Furthermore, relatively to the same agent or agents, the production of a given effect, the doing of a given thing, is said to be _physically_ possible if it can be brought about by such agents acting according to the ordinary course of nature; if, in other words they have the physical power to do it. Otherwise it is said to be physically impossible, even though metaphysically or intrinsically possible, _e.g._ it is physically impossible for a dead person to come to life again. A thing is said to be _morally_ possible, in reference to free and responsible agents, if they can do it without unreasonable inconvenience; otherwise it is considered as morally impossible, even though it be both physically and metaphysically possible: as often happens in regard to the fulfilment of one's obligations.

That which is _both intrinsically and extrinsically possible_ is said to be _adequately possible_. Whatever is intrinsically possible is also extrinsically possible in relation to G.o.d, who is _Almighty_, _Omnipotent_.