Ontology or the Theory of Being Part 19

The domestic society, the family, is not merely an aggregate of individuals any one of whom we may designate indiscriminately husband or wife, father or mother, brother or sister. These relations of order are real; they are obviously not the product of our thought, not produced by it, but only discovered, apprehended by it.

It is a profound truth that not all the reality of the universe which presents itself to the human mind for a.n.a.lysis and interpretation, _not all_ the reality of this universe, is to be found in the mere sum-total of the individual ent.i.ties that const.i.tute it, considering these ent.i.ties each absolutely and in isolation from the others. Nor does _all_ its real perfection consist in the mere sum-total of the absolute perfections intrinsic to, and inherent in, those various individual ent.i.ties. Over and above these individual ent.i.ties and their absolute perfections, there is a domain of reality, and of real perfections, consisting in the real _adaptation_, _interaction_, _interdependence_, _arrangement_, _co-ordination_ and _subordination_, of those absolute ent.i.ties and perfections among themselves. And if we realize this profound truth(403) we shall have no difficulty in recognizing that, while the thought-processes whereby we interpret this universe produce logical relations which we utilize in this interpretation, there is also in this universe itself a system of relations which are real, which are not invented, but are merely detected, by our minds.

According to idealists, relation is a subjective category of the mind. It belongs to phenomena only on the introduction of the latter into the understanding. "Laws no more exist in phenomena," writes Kant,(404) "than phenomena exist in themselves; the former are relative to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, in so far as this subject is endowed with understanding; just as the latter are relative to this same subject in so far as it is endowed with sensibility." This is ambiguous and misleading.

Of course, laws or any other relations do not exist _for us_, are _not known_ by us, are not _brought into relation to our understanding_, as long as we do not consciously grasp the two terms and the foundation on which the law, or any other relation, rests. But there are relations whose terms and foundations are anterior to, and independent of, our thought, and which consequently are not a product of thought.

"Sensations, or other feelings being given," writes J. S. Mill,(405) "succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions to the alternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties." But, as M.

Boirac pertinently asks,(406) "why do we apply in any particular case the one alternative of the two-faced category rather than the other? Is it not because in every case the concrete application made by our faculties is determined by the objects themselves, by an objective and real foundation of the relation?"

91. MUTUAL AND MIXED RELATIONS; TRANSCENDENTAL RELATIONS.-There are, then, relations which are in some true sense real. But in what does the reality of a real relation consist? Before answering this question we must examine the main cla.s.ses of real relations.

We have already referred to the _mutual_ relation as one which has _a real foundation in both_ of the extremes, such as the relation between father and son, or between a greater and a lesser quant.i.ty, or between two equal quant.i.ties, or between two similar people.(407) Such a relation is called a _relatio aequiperantiae_, a relation of _the same denomination_, if it has the same name on both sides, as "_equal-equal_," "_similar-similar_,"

"_friend-friend_," etc. It is called a _relatio disquiperantiae_, of _different denomination_, if it has a different name, indicating a different kind of relation, on either side, as "_father-son_,"

"_cause-effect_," "_master-servant_," etc.

Distinct from this is the _non-mutual_ or _mixed_ relation, which has a real foundation only in one extreme, so that the relation of this to the other extreme is real, while the relation of the latter to the former is only logical.(408) For instance, the relation of every creature to the Creator is a real relation, for the essential dependence of the creature on the Creator is a relation grounded in the very nature of the creature as a contingent being. But the relation of the Creator to the creature is only logical, for the creative act on which it is grounded implies in the Creator no reality distinct from His substance, which substance has no necessary relation to any creature. Similarly, the relation of the (finite) knowing mind to the known object is a real relation, for it is grounded in a new quality, _viz._ knowledge, whereby the mind is perfected. But the relation of the object to the mind is not a real relation, for by becoming actually known the object itself does not undergo any real change or acquire any new reality or perfection. We have seen already (42, 50) that all reality has a _transcendental_ or _essential_ relation to intellect and to will, ontological truth and ontological goodness. These relations of reality to the _Divine_ Intellect and Will are _formally_ or _actually_ verified in all things; whereas the transcendental truth and goodness of any thing in regard to any created intellect and will are formal or actual only when that thing is _actually_ known and willed by such created faculties: the relations of a thing to a mind that does not actually know and desire that thing are only _fundamental_ or _potential_ truth and goodness. This brings us to a second great division of relations, into _essential_ or _transcendental_ and _accidental_ or _predicamental_.

An essential or transcendental relation is _one which is involved in the very essence itself of the related thing_. It enters into and is inseparable from the concept of the latter. Thus in the concept of the _creature_ as such there is involved an _essential_ relation of the latter's dependence on the _Creator_. So, too, every individual reality involves essential relations of _ident.i.ty_ with itself and _distinction_ from other things, and essential relations of _truth_ and _goodness_ to the Divine Mind and created minds. Knowledge involves an essential relation to a known object. _Accidents_ involve the essential relation of an apt.i.tude to inhere in _substances_. _Actio_ involves an essential relation to an _agens_, and _pa.s.sio_ to a _patiens_; matter to form and form to matter. And so on. In general, wherever any subject has an intrinsic and essential exigence or apt.i.tude or inclination, whereby there is established a connexion of this subject with, or a reference to, something else, an ordination or "_ordo_" to something else, there we have an "essential" relation.(409) Such a relation is termed "transcendental"

because it can be verified of a subject in any category; and, since it adds nothing real to its subject it does not of itself const.i.tute any new category of real being. Like the logical relation it is referred to here in order to bring out, by way of contrast, the accidental or predicamental relation which is the proper subject-matter of the present chapter.

92. PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS; THEIR FOUNDATIONS AND DIVISIONS.-An accidental or predicamental relation is one which is _not essential to the related subject, but superadded to, and separable from, the latter_. Such, for instance, are relations of equality or inequality, similarity or dissimilarity. It is not involved in the nature of the subject itself, but is superinduced on the latter by reason of some real foundation really distinct from the nature of this subject. Its sole function is to refer the subject to the term, while the essential or transcendental relation is rather an intrinsic attribute or apt.i.tude of the nature itself as a principle of action, or an effect of action. The real, accidental relation is the one which Aristotle placed in a category apart as one of the ultimate accidental modes of real being. Hence it is called a "predicamental" relation. What are its princ.i.p.al sub-cla.s.ses?

Real relations are divided according to the nature of their foundations.

But some relations are real _ex utraque parte_-mutual relations, while others are real only on the side-mixed relations. Moreover, some real relations are transcendental, others predicamental. Aristotle in a.s.signing three distinct grounds of predicamental relations seems to have included some relations that are transcendental.(410) He distinguishes(411) (_a_) relations grounded in unity and mult.i.tude; (_b_) relations grounded in efficient causality; and (_c_) relations grounded in "commensuration".

(_a_) By "unity and mult.i.tude" he is commonly interpreted to mean ident.i.ty or diversity not merely in _quant.i.ty_, but in any "formal" factor, and therefore also in _quality_, and in _nature_ or _substance_. Things that are one in quant.i.ty we term _equal_; one in quality, _similar_; one in substance, _identical_. And if they are not one in these respects we call them _unequal_, _dissimilar_, _distinct_ or _diverse_, respectively. About quant.i.ty as a foundation for real, predicamental relations there can be no difficulty. Indeed it is in a certain sense implied in all relations-at least as apprehended by the human mind. For we apprehend relations, of whatsoever kind, by mental comparison, and this involves the consciousness of _number_ or _plurality_, of _two_ things compared.(412) And when we compare things on the basis of any _quality_ we do so only by distinguishing and measuring _intensive grades_ in this quality, after the a.n.a.logy of _extensive_ or _quant.i.tative_ measurement (80). Nevertheless just as quality is a distinct accident irreducible to quant.i.ty (77), so are relations based on quality different from those based on quant.i.ty. But what about substance or nature as a foundation of _predicamental_ relations? For these, as distinct from transcendental relations, some accident really distinct from the substance seems to be required. The substantial, individual _ident.i.ty_ of any real being with itself is only a logical relation, for there are not two really distinct extremes. The specific ident.i.ty of John with James in virtue of their common human nature is a real relation but it would appear to be transcendental.(413) The relation of the real John and the real James to our knowledge of them is the transcendental relation of any reality to knowledge, the relation of ontological truth. This relation is _essentially_ actual in regard to the Divine mind, but only potential, and _accidentally_ actual, in regard to any created mind (42). The relation of real distinction between two individual substances is a real but _transcendental_ relation, grounded in the transcendental attribute of _oneness_ which characterizes every real being (26, 27).

(_b_) Efficient causality, _actio et pa.s.sio_, can undoubtedly be the ground of real predicamental relations. If the action is transitive(414) the _patiens_ or recipient of the real change acquires by this latter the basis of a relation of real dependence on the cause or _agens_. Again, if the action provokes reaction, so that there is real interaction, each _agens_ being also _patiens_, there arises a mutual predicamental relation of interdependence between the two agencies. Furthermore, if the agent itself is in any way really perfected by the action there arises a real predicamental relation which is mutual: not merely a real relation of effect to agent but also of agent to effect. This is true in all cases of what scholastics call "univocal" as distinct from "equivocal" causation.

Of the former, in which the agent produces an effect _like in nature to itself_, the propagation of their species by living things is the great example. Here not only is the relation of offspring to parents a real relation, but that of parents to offspring is also a real relation. And this real relation is permanent because it is grounded not merely in the transient generative processes but in some real and abiding result of these processes-either some physical disposition in the parents themselves,(415) or some _specific_ perfection attributed by extrinsic denomination to the _individual_ parents: the parents are in a sense continued in their offspring: "generation really perpetuates the species, the specific nature, and in this sense may be said to perfect the individual parents".(416) In cases of "equivocal" causation-_i.e._ where the effect is different in nature from the cause, as when a man builds a house-the agent does not so clearly benefit by the action, so that in such cases, while the relation of the effect to the cause is real, some authors would regard that of the cause to the effect as logical.(417) When, however, we remember that the efficient activity of all _created_ causes is necessarily dependent on the Divine _Concursus_, and necessarily involves _change in the created cause itself_, we can regard this change as in all cases the ground of a real relation of the created cause to its effect. But the creating and conserving activity of the Divine Being cannot ground a real relation of the latter to creatures because the Divine Being is Pure and Unchangeable Actuality, acquiring no new perfection, and undergoing no real change, by such activity.(418)

(_c_) By commensuration as a basis of real relations Aristotle does not mean quant.i.tative measurement, but the determination of the perfection of one reality by its being essentially conformed to, and regulated by, another: as the perfection of knowledge or science, for instance, is determined by the perfection of its object. This sort of commensuration, or essential ordination of one reality to another, is obviously the basis of _transcendental_ relations. Some authors would consider that besides the transcendental relation of science to its object, a relation which is independent of the actual existence of the latter, there also exists an accidental relation in science to its object as long as this latter is in actual existence. But rather it should be said that just as the transcendental truth-relation of any real object to intellect is fundamental (potential) or formal (actual) according as this intellect merely _can_ know this object or actually _does_ know it, so also the transcendental relation of knowledge to its object is fundamental or formal according as this object is merely possible or actually existing.

We gather from the foregoing a.n.a.lysis that the three main cla.s.ses of predicamental relations are those based on _quant.i.ty_, _quality_, and _causality_, respectively.

93. IN WHAT DOES THE REALITY OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS CONSIST?-We have seen that not all relations are purely logical. There are real relations; and of these some are not merely aspects of the other categories of real being, not merely transcendental attributes virtually distinct from, but really identical with, these other absolute modes of real being which we designate as "substance," "quant.i.ty," "quality," "cause," "effect," etc.

There are real relations which form a distinct accidental mode of real being and so const.i.tute a category apart. The fact, however, that these predicamental relations have been placed by Aristotle and his followers in a category apart does not of itself prove that the predicamental relation is a special reality _sui generis_, really and adequately distinct from the realities which const.i.tute the other categories (60). If the predicamental relation be not a _purely logical ent.i.ty_, if it be an _ens rationis c.u.m fundamento in re_, or, in other words, if the object of our concept of "predicamental relation," has a foundation in reality (_e.g._ like the concepts of "s.p.a.ce" and "time"), then it may reasonably be placed in a category apart, even although it may not be itself formally a reality. We have therefore to see whether or not the predicamental relation is, or embodies, any mode of real being adequately distinct from these modes which const.i.tute the other categories.

The predicamental relation is real in the sense that it implies, in addition to two really distinct extremes, a real foundation in one or both of these extremes, a real accident such as quant.i.ty, quality, or causality. That is to say, considered in its foundation or cause, considered fundamentally or _secundum suum esse in subjecto_, the predicamental relation is real, inasmuch as its foundation is a reality independently of the consideration of the mind. No doubt, if the predicamental relation, adequately considered, implies no other reality than that of its foundation and terms, then the predicamental relation does not contain any special reality _sui generis_, distinct from substances, quality, quant.i.ty, and other such absolute modes of real being. This, however, does not prevent its ranking as a distinct category provided it adds a virtually distinct and altogether peculiar aspect to those absolute realities. Now, considered adequately, the predicamental relation adds to the reality it has in its foundation the _actual reference_ of subject to term. In fact, it is in this reference of subject to term, this "_esse ad_," that the relation _formally_ consists. The question therefore may be stated thus: Is this formal relation of subject to term, this "_esse ad_" a real ent.i.ty _sui generis_, really distinct from the absolute ent.i.ties of subject, term and foundation, and in contradistinction to these and all absolute ent.i.ties a "relative ent.i.ty,"

actually existing in the real universe independently of our thought? Or is it, on the contrary, itself formally a mere product of our thought, a product of the mental act of comparison, an _ens rationis_ an aspect superadded by our minds to the extremes compared, and to the foundation in virtue of which we compare them?

A good many scholastics, and some of them men of great name,(419) have espoused the former alternative, considering that the reality of the predicamental relation cannot be vindicated-against idealists, who would reduce all relations to mere logical ent.i.ties-otherwise than by according to the relation considered _formally_, _i.e._ _secundum suum_ "_esse ad_,"

an ent.i.ty in the actual order of things independent of our thought: adding as an argument that if relation formally as such is anything at all, if all relation be not a mere mental fabrication, it is essentially a "relative" ent.i.ty, and that manifestly a "relative" ent.i.ty cannot be really identical with any "absolute" ent.i.ty. And they claim for this view the authority of St Thomas.(420)

The great majority of scholastics, however, espouse the second alternative: that the relation, considered _formally_, "secundum _esse ad_," is a product of our mental comparison of subject with term. It is not itself a real ent.i.ty or a real mode, superadded to the reality of extremes and foundation.

In the first place there is no need to suppose the reality of such a relative ent.i.ty. _Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem._ It is an abuse of realism to suppose that the _formal_ element of a relation, its "_esse ad_," is a distinct and separate reality. The reality of the praedicamental relation is safeguarded without any such postulate. Since the predicamental relation, considered _adequately_, _i.e._ not merely formally but fundamentally, not merely _secundum esse ad_ but _secundum esse in_, involves as its foundation an absolute accident which is real independently of our thought, the predicamental relation is not a _mere ens rationis_. It has a foundation in reality. It is an _ens rationis c.u.m fundamento in re_. This is a sufficient counter-a.s.sertion to Idealism, and a sufficient reason for treating relation as a distinct category of real being.

That there is no need for such a relative ent.i.ty will be manifest if we consider the simple case of two bars of iron each a yard long. The length of each is an absolute accident of each. The length of either, considered absolutely and in itself, is not formally the _equality_ of this with the other. Nor are both lengths considered separately the formal relation of equality. But both considered together are the adequate foundation of this formal relation; both considered together are this relation _potentially_, _fundamentally_, so that all that is needed for the _actual_, _formal_ relation of _equality_ is the mental apprehension of the two lengths together. The mental process of comparison is the only thing required to make the potential relation actual; and the product of this mental process is the _formality_ or "_esse ad_" of the relation, the actual reference of the extremes to each other. Besides the absolute accidents which const.i.tute the foundation of the relation something more is required for the const.i.tution of the adequate predicamental relation. This "something more," however, is a mind capable of comparing the extremes, and not any real ent.i.ty distinct from extremes and foundation. Antecedently to the act of comparison the formally relative element of the relation, its "_esse ad_," was not anything actual; it was the mere _comparability_ of the extremes in virtue of the foundation. If the "_esse ad_" were a separate real ent.i.ty, a relative ent.i.ty, really distinct from extremes and foundation, what sort of ent.i.ty could it be? Being an accident, it should inhere in, or be a mode of its subject. But if it did it would lose its formally relative character by becoming an inherent mode of an absolute reality. While to conceive it as an ent.i.ty astride on both extremes, and bridging or connecting these together, would be to subst.i.tute the crude imagery of the imagination for intellectual thought.

In the second place, if a subject can acquire a relation, or lose a relation, _without undergoing any real change_, then the relation considered formally as such, or _secundum_ "_esse ad_," cannot be a reality. But a subject can acquire or lose a relation without undergoing any real change. Therefore the relation considered formally, as distinct from its foundation and extremes, is not a reality.

The minor of this argument may be proved by the consideration of a few simple examples. A child already born is neither larger nor smaller than its brother that will be born two years hence.(421) But after the birth of the latter child the former can acquire those relations successively _without any real change in itself_, and merely by the growth of the younger child. Again, one white ball _A_ is similar in colour to another white ball _B_. Paint the latter black, and _eo ipso_ the former loses its relation of resemblance _without any real change in itself_.

And this appears to be the view of St. Thomas. If, he writes, another man becomes equal in size to me by growing while I remain unchanged in size, then although _eo ipso_ I become equal in size to him, thus acquiring a new relation, _nevertheless I gain or acquire nothing new_: "nihil advenit mihi de novo, per hoc quod incipio esse alteri aequalis per ejus mutationem". Relation, he says, is an extramental reality _by reason of its foundation or cause_, whereby one reality is referred to another.(422) Relation itself, considered formally as distinct from its foundation, is not a reality; it is real only inasmuch as its foundation is real.(423) Again, relation is something inherent, but not formally as a relation, and hence it can disappear without any real change in its subject.(424) A real relation may be destroyed in one or other of two ways: either by the destruction or change of the foundation in the subject, or by the destruction of the term, entailing the cessation of the reference, _without any change in the subject_.(425) Hence, too, the reason alleged by St. Thomas why relation, unlike the other categories of real being, can be itself divided into logical ent.i.ty and real ent.i.ty, _ens rationis_ and _ens reale_: because formally it is an _ens rationis_, and only fundamentally, or in virtue of its foundation, is it an _ens reale_.(426) And hence, finally, the reason why St. Thomas, following Aristotle, describes relation as having a "lesser reality," an "esse debilius,"(427) than the other or absolute categories of real being: not as if it were a sort of diminutive ent.i.ty, intermediate between nothingness and the absolute modes of reality, but because being dependent for its formal actuality not merely on a foundation in its subject, but also on a term to which the latter is referred, it can perish not merely by the destruction of its subject like other accidents, but also by the destruction of its term while subject and foundation remain unchanged.

If, then, the real relation, considered formally or "secundum _esse ad_"

is not a reality, the relation under this aspect is a _logical_, not a _real_, accident.

To const.i.tute a mutual real relation there is needed a foundation in _both_ of the extremes. As long as the term of the relation does not actually exist, not only does the relation not exist formally and actually, but it is not even _adequately potential_: the foundation in the subject alone is not an adequate foundation.

To this view, which denies any distinct reality to the predicamental relation considered formally, it has been objected that the predicamental relation is thus confounded with the transcendental relation. But this is not so; for the transcendental relation is always essential to its subject, whatever this subject may be, while the predicamental relation, considered formally, is a logical accident separable from its subject, and considered fundamentally it is some absolute accident really distinct from the substance of the related extremes. For instance, the _action_ which mediates between cause and effect is itself transcendentally related to both; while it is at the same time the adequate foundation whereby cause and effect are predicamentally related to each other.(428)

If what we have called the formal element of a relation be nothing really distinct from the extremes and foundation, it follows that some real relations between creatures are really identical with their substances;(429) and to this it has been objected that no relation _in creatures_ can be, _quoad rem_, substantial: "Nulla relatio," says St.

Thomas,(430) "est substantia secundum rem in creaturis". To this it may be replied that even in these cases the relation itself, considered adequately, is not wholly identical with the substance of either extreme.

It superadds a separable logical accident to these.(431)

Finally it is objected that the view which denies a distinct reality to the formal element of a real relation, to its "_esse ad_," equivalently denies all reality to relations, and is therefore in substance identical with the idealist doctrine already rejected (90). But this is a misconception. According to idealists, relations grounded on quality, quant.i.ty, causality, etc., are exclusively in the intellect, in our mental activity and its mental products, in our concepts alone, and are in no true sense characteristic of reality. This is very different from saying that our concepts of such relations are grounded in the realities compared, and that these realities are really endowed with everything that const.i.tutes such relations, the comparative act of the intellect being required merely to apprehend these characteristics and so to give the relation its formal completeness.(432) There is all the difference that exists between a theory which so exaggerates the const.i.tutive function of thought as to reduce all intellectual knowledge to a knowledge of mere subjective mental appearances, and a theory which, while recognizing this function and its products, will not allow that these cast any cloud or veil between the intellect and a genuine insight into objective reality.

These mental processes are guided by reality; the _entia rationis_ which are their products are grounded in reality; moreover we can quite well distinguish between these _mental_ modes and products of our intellectual activity and the _real_ contents revealed to the mind in these modes and processes. So long, therefore, as we avoid the mistake of ascribing to the objective reality itself any of these mental modes (as, for instance, extreme realists do when they a.s.sert the extramental reality of the _formal_ universal), our recognition of them can in no way jeopardize the objective validity of intellectual knowledge. Perhaps an excessive timidity in this direction is in some degree accountable for the "abuse of realism" which ascribes to the formal element of a relation a distinct extramental,(433) objective reality.

CHAPTER XIII. CAUSALITY; CLa.s.sIFICATION OF CAUSES.

94. TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF CAUSE.-The modes of real being which we have been so far examining-substance, quality, quant.i.ty, relation-are modes of reality considered as _static_. But it was pointed out in an early chapter (ch. ii.) that the universe of our experience is subject to change, that it is ever _becoming_, that it is the scene of a continuous world-process which is apparently regulated by more or less stable principles or laws, these laws and processes const.i.tuting the _universal order_ which it is the duty of the philosopher to study and explain. We must now return to this _kinetic_ and _dynamic_ aspect of reality, and investigate the principles of change in things by a study of _Causes_.

As with the names of the other ultimate categories, so too here, the general sense of the term "cause" (_causa_, a?t???) is familiar to all, while a.n.a.lysis reveals a great variety of modalities of this common signification. We understand by a cause _anything which has a positive influence of any sort on the being or happening of something else_. In philosophy this is the meaning which has been attached traditionally to the term since the days of Aristotle; though in its present-day scientific use the term has almost lost this meaning, mainly through the influence of modern phenomenism.(434) The traditional notion of cause is usually expounded by comparing it with certain kindred notions: _principle_, _condition_, _occasion_, _reason_.

A _principle_ is _that from which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever_.(435) Any sort of intrinsic connexion between two objects of thought is sufficient to const.i.tute the one a "principle" of the other; but a mere extrinsic or time sequence is not sufficient. A _logical_ principle is some _truth_ from which further truths are or may be derived.

A _real_ principle is some _reality_ from which the _being_ or _happening_ of something originates and proceeds.(436) If this procession involves a real and positive influence of the principle on that which proceeds from it, such a real principle is a cause. But there may be a real and intrinsic connexion without any such influence. For instance, in the substantial changes which occur in physical nature the generation of the new substantial formative principle necessarily presupposes the _privation_ of the one which antecedently "informed" the material principle; but this "_privatio formae_" has no positive influence on the generation of the new "form"; it is, however, the necessary and natural antecedent to the generation of the latter; hence although this "_privatio formae_" is a real principle of substantial change (the process or _fieri_) it is not a _cause_ of the latter. The notion of principle, even of real principle, is therefore wider than the notion of cause.(437)

A _condition_, in the proper sense of a necessary condition or _conditio sine qua non_, is something which must be realized or fulfilled before the event or effect in question can happen or be produced. On the side of the latter there is real dependence, but from the side of the former there is no real and positive influence on the happening of the event. The influence of the condition is negative; or, if positive, it is only indirect, consisting in the removal of some obstacle-"_removens probibens_"-to the positive influence of the cause. In this precisely a condition differs from a cause: windows, for instance, are a condition for the lighting of a room in the daylight, but the sun is the cause. The distinction is clear and intelligible, nor may it be ignored in a philosophical a.n.a.lysis of causality. At the same time it is easy to understand that where, as in the inductive sciences, there is question of discovering _all_ the antecedents, positive and negative, of any given kind of phenomenon, in order to bring to light and formulate the law or laws according to which such phenomenon occurs, the distinction between cause and condition is of minor importance.(438)

An _occasion_ is _any circ.u.mstance or combination of circ.u.mstances favourable to the action of a free cause_. For instance, a forced sale is an occasion for buying cheaply; night is an occasion of theft; bad companionship is an occasion of sin. An occasion has no intrinsic connexion with the effect as in the case of a principle, nor is it necessary for the production of the effect as in the case of a condition.

It is spoken of only in connexion with the action of a free cause; and it differs from a cause in having no positive and direct influence on the production of the effect. It has, however, a real though indirect influence on the production of the effect by soliciting and aiding the determination of the free efficient cause to act. In so far as it does exert such an influence it may be regarded as a partial efficient cause, not a physical but a moral cause, of the effect.

To ask for the _reason_ of any event or phenomenon, or of the nature or existence of any reality, is to demand an _explanation_ of the latter; it is to seek what _accounts_ for the latter, what makes this _intelligible_ to our minds. Whatever is a cause is therefore also a reason, but the latter notion is wider than the former. Whatever explains a _truth_ is a _logical_ reason of the latter. But since all truths are concerned with realities they must have ultimately _real_ reasons, _i.e._ explanatory principles inherent in the realities themselves. The knowledge of these real or ontological principles of things is the logical reason of our understanding of the things themselves. But the ontological principles, which are the real reasons of the things, are wider in extent than the causes of these things, for they include principles that are not causes.

Furthermore, the grades of reality which we discover in things by the activity of abstract thought, and whereby we compare, cla.s.sify and define those things, we apprehend as explanatory principles of the latter; and these principles, though really in the things, and therefore real "reasons," are not "causes".

Thus, life is a real reason, though not a cause, of sensibility in the animal organism; the soul's independence of matter in its mode of existence is a real reason, though not a cause, of its spiritual activities. Hence, between a reason and that which it accounts for there may be only a logical distinction, while between a cause and that which it causes there must be a real distinction (38).

To understand all the intrinsic principles which const.i.tute the _essence_ of anything is to know the _sufficient reason_ of its _reality_. To understand all the extrinsic principles which account for its actual _existence_ is to know the sufficient reason of its _existence_; and to understand this latter adequately is to realize that the thing depends ultimately for its actual existence on a Reality or Being which necessarily exists by virtue of its own essence.