Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 Part 73

[Footnote 19-47: Memo, Under SecNav for President, 23 Jun 53, sub: Segregation in Naval Activities, attached to Ltr, Under SecNav to Sherman Adams, 24 Jun 53, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: SECRETARY ANDERSON _talks to a member of the fleet_.]

Anderson then proceeded to reverse his position. He began by (p. 486) ordering a survey of a group of southern installations to estimate the effect of integration on their civilian programs. He learned segregation could be virtually eliminated at these shipyards and stations within six months, although Under Secretary Charles S.

Thomas, who prepared the report, agreed with the local commanders that an integration directive would be certain to cause trouble. But the formula chosen by the commanders for eliminating segregation, in which Thomas concurred, might well have given Anderson pause. They wanted to remove racial signs from drinking fountains and toilets, certain that the races would continue using separate facilities, and leave the problem of segregated cafeterias till later. It was the unanimous opinion of those involved, Thomas reported, that the situation should not be forced by "agitators," a category in which they all placed Powell.

On 20 August Anderson directed commanders of segregated facilities to proceed steadily toward complete elimination of racial barriers.

Furthermore, each commander was to submit a progress report on 1 November and at sixty-day intervals thereafter.[19-48] Although the secretary was concerned with the possible reaction of the civil rights groups were integration not achieved in the first sixty days, he was determined to give local commanders some leeway in carrying out his order.[19-49] But he made it clear to the press that he did not intend "to put up with inaction."

[Footnote 19-48: ALL NAV, 20 Aug 53; Ltr, Chief, Industrial Relations, to Commandant, 6th Naval District, 21 Aug 53, OIR 200, GenRecsNav. For an example of how the new policy was transmitted to the field, see COMFIVE Instruction 5800, 15 Sep 53, A. (2), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-49: Interv, Nichols with Anderson; Nichols News Release, 23 Sep 53, in Nichols Collection, CMH.]

He need not have worried. Evans reported on 29 October that integration of the Charleston shipyard was almost complete and had occurred so far without incident. In fact, he told a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense John A. Hannah, the reaction of the local press and community had been "surprisingly tolerant and occasionally favorable."[19-50] Evans, however, apparently overlooked an attempt by some white employees to discourage the use of integrated facilities.

Although there was no disorder, the agitators were partly successful; the Chief of Industrial Relations reported that white usage had (p. 487) dropped severely.[19-51] Nevertheless by 14 January 1954 this same officer could tell Secretary Anderson that all racial barriers for civilian employees had been eliminated without incident.[19-52]

[Footnote 19-50: Evans, Weekly Thursday Report to ASD (M&P), 29 Oct 53, SD 291.2. Begun by Evans as a means of informing Rosenberg of activities in his office, the Weekly Thursday Report was adopted by the a.s.sistant secretary for use in all parts of the manpower office.]

[Footnote 19-51: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations, for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of Facilities for Civil Service Employees; see also Ltr, SecNav to President, 9 Nov 53; both in P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

[Footnote 19-52: Memo, Chief, Industrial Relations, for SecNav, 5 Nov 53, sub: Segregation of Facilities for Civil Service Employees, P 8(4), GenRecsNav.]

_Dependent Children and Integrated Schools_

The Department of Defense's effort to integrate schools attended by servicemen's children proved infinitely more complex than integrating naval shipyards. In a period when national attention was focused on the const.i.tutional implications of segregated education, the Eisenhower administration was thrust into a dispute over the intent of federal aid to education and eventually into a reappraisal of the federal role in public education. Confusing to the Department of Defense, the President's personal att.i.tude remained somewhat ambiguous throughout the controversy. He had publicly committed himself to ending segregation in federally financed inst.i.tutions, yet he had declared scruples against federal interference with state laws and customs that would prevent him from acting to keep such a pledge when all its ramifications were revealed.

In fact not one but four separate categories of educational inst.i.tutions came under scrutiny. Only the first category, schools run by the U.S. Office of Education for the Department of Defense overseas and on military reservations in the United States, operated exclusively with federal funds. The next two categories, schools operated by local school districts on military reservations and schools on federal land usually adjacent to a military reservation, were supported by local and state funds with federal subsidies. The fourth and by far the largest group contained the many community schools attended by significant numbers of military dependents. These schools received considerable federal support through the impact aid program.

The federal support program for schools in "federally impacted" areas added yet another dimension to the administration's reappraisal. The impact aid legislation (Public Laws 815 and 874),[19-53] like similar programs during World War II, was based on the premise that a school district derived no tax from land occupied by a federal installation but usually incurred an increase in school enrollment. In many cases the enrollment of military dependents was far greater than that of the communities in the school district. Actually, these programs were not limited to the incursion of military families; the most extreme federal impact in terms of enrollment percentages was found in remote mountain districts where in some cases almost all students were children of U.S. Forest Service or National Park Service employees.

[Footnote 19-53: PL 815, 23 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 967; PL 874, 30 Sep 50, 64 U.S. 1100.]

In recognition of these inequities in the tax system, Congress gave such school systems special "in-lieu of tax" support. Public Law 815 provided for capital projects, land, buildings, and major equipment; Public Law 874 gave operating support in the form of salaries, (p. 488) supplies, and the like. If, for example, a school district could prove at least 3 percent of its enrollment federally connected, it was eligible to receive from the U.S. Office of Education a grant equal to the district's cost of instruction for federally connected students.

If it could show federally connected enrollment necessitated additional cla.s.srooms, the school district was eligible for federally financed buildings. Such schools were usually concentrated in military housing areas, but examples existed of federally financed schools, like federal dependents, scattered throughout the school district.

Students from the community at large attended the federally constructed schools and the school district continued to receive state support for all students. Although Public Law 874 was far more important in terms of general application and fiscal impact, its companion piece, Public Law 815, was more important to integration because it involved the construction of schools. From the beginning Congress sought to prevent these laws from becoming a means by which federal authorities exercised control over the operation of school districts. It stipulated that "no department, officer or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision or control over the personnel, curriculum or program of instruction" of any local school or school system.[19-54] The firmness of this admonition, an indication of congressional opinion on this important issue, later played a decisive part in the integration story.

[Footnote 19-54: Sec. 7a, PL 874, 64 U.S. 1100.]

Attacks on segregation in schools attended by military dependents did not begin until the early fifties when the Army, in answer to complaints concerning segregated schools in Texas, Oklahoma, and Virginia, began using a stock answer to the effect that the schools were operated by state agencies as part of the state school system subject to state law.[19-55] Trying to justify the situation to Clarence Mitch.e.l.l, a.s.sistant Secretary of the Army Fred Korth cited Public Law 874, whose intent, he claimed, was that educating children residing on federal property was the responsibility of "the local educational agency."[19-56]

[Footnote 19-55: DA Office of Legislative Liaison Summary Sheet for ASA, 27 Sep 51, sub: Alleged Segregation Practiced at Fort Bliss, Texas, CS 291.2 Negroes (17 Sep 51); Ltr, CG, The Artillery School, to Parents of School Age Children, 2 Sep 52, sub: School Information, AG 352.9 AKPSIGP. For examples of complaints on segregated schools, see Ltrs, Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Jun 52, and Dir, Washington Bureau, NAACP, to SecDef, 2 Oct 52; both in OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-56: Draft Ltr, ASA (M&P) to Mitch.e.l.l.

Although he never dispatched it, Korth used this letter as a basis for a discussion of the matter with Mitch.e.l.l in an October 1952 meeting.]

Senator Humphrey, for one, was not to be put off by such an interpretation. He reminded a.s.sistant Secretary Rosenberg that President Truman had vetoed an education bill in 1951 because of provisions requiring segregation in schools on federal property. As a member of the subcommittee that guided Public Law 874 through Congress, Humphrey could a.s.sure Rosenberg that at no time did Congress include language requiring segregation in post schools. Thanks to the Army's interpretation, he observed, local community segregation practices were being extended for the first time to federal property under the guise of compliance with federal law. He predicted further incursions by the segregationists if this move was left unchallenged.[19-57]

[Footnote 19-57: Ltr, Humphrey to ASD (M&P), 16 Oct 52, OASD (M&P) 291.2.]

After conferring with both Humphrey and Mitch.e.l.l, Rosenberg took (p. 489) the matter of segregated schools on military posts to the U.S.

Commissioner of Education, Earl J. McGrath. With Secretary of Defense Lovett's approval she put the department on record as opposed to segregated schools on posts because they were "violative not only of the policy of the Department" but also of "the policy set forth by the President."[19-58] Evidently McGrath saw Public Law 874 in the same light, for on 15 January 1953 he informed Rosenberg that if the Department of Defense outlawed segregated dependent schooling and local educational agencies were unable to comply, his office would have to make "other arrangements" for the children.[19-59]

[Footnote 19-58: Ltr, ASD (M&P) to U.S. Commissioner of Educ, 10 Jan 53, SecDef 291.2.]

[Footnote 19-59: Ltr, U.S. Commissioner of Educ to ASD (M&P), 15 Jan 53; Ltr, ASD (M&P) to Humphrey, 10 Jan 53; both in OASD 291.2.]

Commissioner McGrath proposed that his office discuss the integration question further with Defense Department representatives but the change in administrations interrupted these negotiations and Rosenberg's successor, John A. Hannah, made it clear that there would be no speedy change in the racial composition of post schools.

Commenting at Hannah's request on the points raised by McGrath, the Army's princ.i.p.al personnel officer concluded that integration should be considered a departmental goal, but one that should be approached by steps "consistent with favorable local conditions as determined by the installation commander concerned." In his opinion, committing the department to integration of all on-post schools, as the a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense had proposed earlier, would create teacher procurement problems and additional financial burdens.[19-60] This cautious endors.e.m.e.nt of integrated schools was further qualified by the Secretary of the Army. It was a "desirable goal," he told Hannah, but "positive steps to eliminate segregation ... should be preceded by a careful a.n.a.lysis of the impact on each installation concerned."[19-61] Hannah then broke off negotiations with the Office of Education.

[Footnote 19-60: G-1 Summary Sheet for CofS, 13 Feb 53, sub: Segregation of School Children on Military Installations, G-1 291.2 (15 Jan 53).]

[Footnote 19-61: Memo, Exec Off, SA, for ASD (M&P), 20 Feb 53, sub: Proposed Reply to U.S. Commissioner of Education Regarding Segregation in Dependent Schools, copy in G-1 291.2 (15 Jan 53).]

The matter was rescued from bureaucratic limbo when in answer to a question during his 19 March 1953 press conference President Eisenhower promised to investigate the school situation, adding:

I will say this--I repeat it, I have said it again and again: whenever Federal funds are expended for anything, I do not see how any American can justify--legally, or logically, or morally--a discrimination in the expenditure of those funds as among our citizens. All are taxed to provide these funds. If there is any benefit to be derived from them, I think they must all share, regardless of such inconsequential factors as race and religion.[19-62]

[Footnote 19-62: President's News Conference, 19 Mar 53, _Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight D.

Eisenhower, 1953_, p. 108.]

The sweeping changes implied in this declaration soon became apparent.

Statistics compiled as a result of the White House investigation revealed that federal dependents attended thousands of schools, a complex mix of educational inst.i.tutions having little more in common than their mutual dependence in whole or part on federal funds.[19-63] (p. 490) Most were under local government control and the great majority, including the community public schools, were situated a long distance from any military base. The President was no doubt unaware of the ramifications of federal enrollment and impacted aid on the nation's schools when he made his declaration, and, given his philosophy of government and the status of civil rights at the time, it is not surprising that his promise to look into the subject came to nothing.

From the beginning Secretary of Defense Wilson limited the department's campaign against segregated schools to those on federal _property_ rather than those using federal _funds_. And even this limited effort to integrate schools on federal property encountered determined opposition from many local officials and only the halfhearted support of some of the federal officials involved.

[Footnote 19-63: Memo for Rcd, Human Relations and Research Br, G-1 (ca. Mar 53), copy in CMH. See also Memo, Under SecNav for ASD (M&P), 11 Mar 53, sub: Schools Operated by the Department of the Navy Pursuant to Section 6 and 3 of Public Law 874, 81st Congress, A18, GenRecsNav; "List of States and Whether or Not Segregation is Practiced in Schools for Dependents, as Given by Colonel Brody, OPNS Secn, AGO, In Charge of Dependents Schools, 16 Oct 51," OSA 291.2 Negroes.]

The Department of Defense experienced few problems at first as it integrated its own schools. Its overseas schools, especially in Germany and j.a.pan, had always been integrated, and its schools in the United States now quickly followed suit. Eleven in number, they were paid for and operated by the U.S. Commissioner of Education because the states in which they were located prohibited the use of state funds for schools on federal property. With only minimal public attention, all but one of these schools was operating on an integrated basis by 1953. The exception was the elementary school at Fort Benning, Georgia, which at the request of the local school board remained a white-only school. On 20 March 1953 the new Secretary of the Army, Robert T. Stevens, informed the White House that this school had been ordered to commence integrated operations in the fall.[19-64]

[Footnote 19-64: Memo, SA for James Hagerty, White House Press Secretary, 20 Mar 53, sub: Segregation in Army Schools, copy in CMH.]

The integration of schools operated by local school authorities on military posts was not so simple, and before the controversy died down the Department of Defense found itself a.s.suming responsibility for a number of formerly state-operated inst.i.tutions. As of April 1953, twenty-one of these sixty-three schools in the United States were operating on a segregated basis. (_Table 12_)

Table 12--Defense Installations With Segregated Public Schools

State Installation

Alabama (C)[1] Maxwell Air Force Base Craig Air Force Base

Arkansas (S)[2] Pine Bluff a.r.s.enal (Army)

Florida (C) MacDill Air Force Base Eglin Air Force Base Tyndall Air Force Base Naval Air Station, Pensacola Patrick Air Force Base

Maryland (S) Andrews Air Force Base Naval Air Station, Patuxent Naval Powder Factory, Indianhead

Oklahoma (C) Fort Sill (Army)

Texas (C) Fort Bliss (Army) Fort Hood (Army) Fort Sam Houston (Army) Randolph Air Force Base Reese Air Force Base Shepherd Air Force Base Lackland Air Force Base