Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 Part 69

Integration of the Marine Corps

Even more so than in the Army, the history of racial equality in the Marine Corps demonstrates the effect of the exigencies of war on the integration of the armed forces. The Truman order, the Fahy Committee, even the demands of civil rights leaders and the mandates of the draft law, all exerted pressure for reform and a.s.sured the presence of some black marines. But the Marine Corps was for years able to stave off the logical outcome of such pressures, and in the end it was the manpower demands of the Korean War that finally brought integration.

In the first place the Korean War caused a sudden and dramatic rise in the number of black marines: from 1,525 men, almost half of them stewards, in May 1949, to some 17,000 men, only 500 of them serving in separate stewards duty, in October 1953.[18-1] Whereas the careful designation of a few segregated service units sufficed to handle the token black representation in 1949, no such organization was possible in 1952, when thousands of black marines on active duty const.i.tuted more than 5 percent of the total enlistment. The decision to integrate the new black marines throughout the corps was the natural outcome of the service's early experiences in Korea. Ordered to field a full division, the corps out of necessity turned to the existing black service units, among others, for men to augment the peacetime strength of its combat units. These men were a.s.signed to any unit in the Far East that needed them. As the need for more units and replacements grew during the war, newly enlisted black marines were more and more often pressed into integrated service both in the Far East and at home.

[Footnote 18-1: All statistics from official Marine Corps sources, Hist Div, HQMC.]

Most significantly, the war provided a rising generation of Marine Corps officers with a first combat experience with black marines. The competence of these Negroes and the general absence of racial tension during their integration destroyed long accepted beliefs to the contrary and opened the way for general integration. Although the corps continued to place special restrictions on the employment of Negroes and was still wrestling with the problem of black stewards well into the next decade, its basic policy of segregating marines by race ended with the cancellation of the last all-black unit designation in 1951. Hastily embraced by the corps as a solution to a pressing manpower problem, integration was finally accepted as a permanent manpower policy.

_Impetus for Change_ (p. 461)

This transformation seemed remote in 1949 in view of Commandant Clifton B. Cates's strong defense of segregation. At that time Cates made a careful distinction between allocating men to the services without regard to race, which he supported, and ordering integration of the services themselves. "Changing national policy in this respect through the Armed Forces," he declared, "is a dangerous path to pursue inasmuch as it effects [_sic_] the ability of the National Military Establishment to fulfill its mission."[18-2] Integration of the services had to follow, not precede, integration of American society.

[Footnote 18-2: Memo, CMC for a.s.st SecNav for Air, 17 Mar 49, MC files.]

The commandant's views were spelled out in a series of decisions announced by the corps in the wake of the Secretary of the Navy's call for integration of all elements of the Navy Department in 1949. On 18 November 1949 the corps' Acting Chief of Staff announced a new racial policy: individual black marines would be a.s.signed in accordance with their specialties to vacancies "in any unit where their services can be effectively utilized," but segregated black units would be retained and new ones created when appropriate in the regular and reserve components of the corps. In the case of the reserve component, the decision on the acceptance of an applicant was vested in the unit commander.[18-3] On the same day the commandant made it clear that the policy was not to be interpreted too broadly. Priority for the a.s.signment of individual black marines, Cates informed the commander of the Pacific Department, would be given to the support establishment and black officers would be a.s.signed to black units only.[18-4]

[Footnote 18-3: MC Memo 119-14, 18 Nov 49, sub: Policy Regarding Negro Marines, Hist Div, HQMC, files.

Unless otherwise noted, all doc.u.ments in this section are located in these files.]

[Footnote 18-4: Msg, CMC (signed C. B. Cates) to CG, Dept of Pacific, 18 Nov 49. Aware of the delicate public relations aspects of this subject, the Director of Plans and Policies recommended that this message be cla.s.sified; see Memo, E. A. Pollock for a.s.st CMC, 8 Nov 49.]

Further limiting the chances that black marines would be integrated, Cates approved the creation of four new black units. The Director of Personnel and the Marine Quartermaster had opposed this move on the grounds that the new units would require technical billets, particularly in the supply specialties, which would be nearly impossible to fill with available enlisted black marines. Either school standards would have to be lowered or white marines would have to be a.s.signed to the units. Cates met this objection by agreeing with the Director of Plans and Policies that no prohibition existed against racial mixing in a unit during a period of on-the-job training. The Director of Personnel would decide when a unit was sufficiently trained and properly manned to be officially designated a black organization.[18-5] In keeping with this arrangement, for example, the commanding general of the 2d Marine Division reported in February 1950 that his black marines were sufficiently trained to a.s.sume complete operation of the depot platoon within the division's service command.

Cates then designated the platoon as a unit suitable for general (p. 462) duty black marines, which prompted the Coordinator of Enlisted Personnel to point out that current regulations stipulated "after a unit has been so designated, all white enlisted personnel will be withdrawn and rea.s.signed."[18-6]

[Footnote 18-5: DP&P Study 119-49, 14 Nov 49, sub: Designation of Units for a.s.signment of Negro Marines, approved by CMC, 2 Dec 49.]

[Footnote 18-6: Memo, CG, 2d Marine Div, for CMC, 18 Feb 50, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Enlisted Personnel; Memo, CMC to CG, 2d Marine Div, 28 Mar 50, sub: Designation of the Depot Platoon, Support Company, Second Combat Service Group, Service Command, for a.s.signment of Negro Enlisted Marines; MC Routing Sheet, Enlisted Coordinator, Personnel Department, 27 Mar 50, same sub.]

Nor were there any plans for the general integration of black reservists, although some Negroes were serving in formerly all-white units. The 9th Infantry Battalion, for instance, had a black lieutenant. As the a.s.sistant commandant, Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith, put it on 4 January 1950, black units would be formed "in any area where there is an expressed interest" provided that the black population was large enough to support it.[18-7] When the NAACP objected to the creation of another all-black reserve unit in New York City as being contrary to Defense Department policy, the Marine Corps justified it on the grounds that the choice of integrated or segregated units must be made by the local community "in accord with its cultural values."[18-8] Notwithstanding the Secretary of the Navy's integration order and a.s.signment policies directed toward effective utilization, it appeared that the Marine Corps in early 1950 was determined to retain its system of racially segregated units indefinitely.

[Footnote 18-7: Ltr, Smith to Franklin S. Williams, a.s.st Special Counsel, NAACP, 4 Jan 50, AO-1, MC files.]

[Footnote 18-8: Ltr, Roy Wilkins to SecDef, 27 Feb 50; Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 17 Apr 50, sub: Activation of Negro Reserve Units in the U.S. Marine Corps; both in SecDef 291.2. See also Ltr, a.s.st CMC to Franklin Williams, 7 Feb 50.]

But the corps failed to reckon with the consequences of the war that broke out suddenly in Korea in June. Two factors connected with that conflict caused an abrupt change in Marine race policy. The first was the great influx of Negroes into the corps. Although the commandant insisted that race was not considered in recruitment, and in fact recruitment instructions since 1948 contained no reference to the race of applicants, few Negroes had joined the Marine Corps in the two years preceding the war.[18-9] In its defense the corps pointed to its exceedingly small enlistment quotas during those years and its high enlistment standards, which together allowed recruiters to accept only a few men. The cla.s.sification test average for all recruits enlisted in 1949 was 108, while the average for black enlistees during the same period was 94.7. New black recruits were almost exclusively enlisted for stewards duty.[18-10]

[Footnote 18-9: Ltr, CMC to Walter White, 2 Jul 51.]

[Footnote 18-10: Memo, Div of Plans and Policies for a.s.st Dir of Public Info, 4 Jun 51, sub: Article in Pittsburgh _Courier_ of 26 May 51.]

A revision of Defense Department manpower policy combined with the demands of the war to change all that. The imposition of a qualitative distribution of manpower by the Secretary of Defense in April 1950 meant that among the thousands of recruits enlisted during the Korean War the Marine Corps would have to accept its share of the large percentage of men in lower cla.s.sification test categories. Among these men were a significant number of black enlistees who had failed to qualify under previous standards. They were joined by thousands (p. 463) more who were supplied through the nondiscriminatory process of the Selective Service System when, during the war, the corps began using the draft. The result was a 100 percent jump in the number of black marines in the first year of war, a figure that would be multiplied almost six times before war inductions ran down in 1953. (_Table 11_)

Table 11--black Marines, 1949-1955

Percent Date Officers Enlisted Men of Corps

July 1949 0 1,525 1.6 July 1950 0 1,605 1.6 January 1951 2 2,077 1.2 July 1951 3 3,145 1.6 January 1952 3 8,315 3.7 July 1952 NA 13,858 6.0 January 1953 10 14,479 6.1 July 1953 13 15,729 6.0 November 1953 18 16,906 6.7 June 1954 19 15,682 6.5 January 1955 19 12,456 5.7

A second factor forcing a change in racial policy was the manpower demands imposed upon the corps by the war itself. When General MacArthur called for the deployment of a Marine regimental combat team and supporting air group on 2 July 1950, the Secretary of the Navy responded by sending the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, which included the 5th Marine Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 11th Marines (Artillery), and Marine Air Group 33. By 13 September the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Air Wing at wartime strength had been added. Fielding these forces placed an enormous strain on the corps' manpower, and one result was the a.s.signment of a number of black service units, often combined with white units in composite organizations, to the combat units.

The pressures of battle quickly altered this neat arrangement.

Theoretically, every marine was trained as an infantryman, and when shortages occurred in combat units commanders began a.s.signing black replacements where needed. For example, as the demand for more marines for the battlefield grew, the Marine staff began to pull black marines from routine duties at the Marine Barracks in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Hawaii and send them to Korea to bring the fighting units up to full strength. The first time black servicemen were integrated as individuals in significant numbers under combat conditions was in the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade during the fighting in the Pusan Perimeter in August 1950. The a.s.signment of large numbers of black marines throughout the combat units of the 1st Marine Division, beginning in September, provided the clearest instance of a service abandoning a social policy in response to the demands of the battlefield. The 7th Marines, for example, an organic element of the 1st Marine Division since August 1950, received into its rapidly expanding ranks, along with many recalled white reservists and men from small, miscellaneous Marine units, a 54-man black (p. 464) service unit. The regimental commander immediately broke up the black unit, a.s.signing the men individually throughout his combat battalions.

That the emergency continued to influence the placement of Negroes is apparent from the distribution of black marines in March 1951, when almost half were a.s.signed to combat duty in integrated units.[18-11]

Before the war was over, the 1st Marine Division had several thousand black marines, serving in its ranks in Korea, where they were a.s.signed to infantry and signal units as well as to transportation and food supply organizations. One of the few black reserve officers on active duty found himself serving as an infantry platoon commander in Company B of the division's 7th Marines.

[Footnote 18-11: _Location of Black Marines, 31 March 1951_

Posts and stations inside the United States 938 Posts and stations outside the United States 181 Troop training units 3 Aviation 190 Fleet Marine Force (Ground) 1,327 Ships 3 En route 58 Missing in action 8

Total 2,708

_Source_: Tab 1 to Memo, ACofS, G-1, to a.s.st Dir of Public Info, 6 Jun 51, sub: Queries Concerning Negro Marines.]

The shift to integration in Korea proved uneventful. In the words of the 7th Marines commander: "Never once did any color problem bother us.... It just wasn't any problem. We had one Negro sergeant in command of an all-white squad and there was another--with a graves registration unit--who was one of the finest Marines I've ever seen."[18-12] Serving for the first time in integrated units, Negroes proceeded to perform in a way that not only won many individuals decorations for valor but also won the respect of commanders for Negroes as fighting men. Reminiscing about the performance of black marines in his division, Lt. Gen. Oliver P. Smith remembered "they did everything, and they did a good job because they were integrated, and they were with good people."[18-13] In making his point the division commander contrasted the performance of his integrated men with the Army's segregated 24th Infantry. The observations of field commanders, particularly the growing opinion that a connection existed between good performance and integration, were bound to affect the deliberations of the Division of Plans and Policies when it began to restudy the question of black a.s.signments in the fall of 1951.

[Footnote 18-12: Washington _Post_, February 27, 1951.]

[Footnote 18-13: USMC Oral History Interview, Lt Gen Oliver P. Smith, Jun 69.]

As a result of the division's study, the Commandant of the Marine Corps announced a general policy of racial integration on 13 December 1951, thus abolishing the system first introduced in 1942 of designating certain units in the regular forces and organized reserves as black units.[18-14] He spelled out the new order in some detail (p. 465) on 18 December, and although his comments were addressed to the commanders in the Fleet Marine Force, they were also forwarded to various commands in the support establishment that still retained all-black units. The order indicated that the practices now so commonplace in Korea were about to become the rule in the United States.[18-15] Some six months later the commandant informed the Chief of Naval Personnel that the Marine Corps had no segregated units and while integration had been gradual "it was believed to be an accomplished fact at this time."[18-16]

[Footnote 18-14: MC Policy Memo 109-51, 13 Dec 51, sub: Policy Regarding Negro Marines.]

[Footnote 18-15: Memo, CMC for CG, FMF, Pacific, et al., 18 Dec 51, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Enlisted Personnel.]

[Footnote 18-16: Idem for Chief, NavPers (ca. Jun 51), MC files.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: MARINES ON THE KANSAS LINE, KOREA. _Men of the 1st Marines await word to move out._]

The change was almost immediately apparent in other parts of the corps, for black marines were also integrated in units serving with the fleet. Reporting on a Mediterranean tour of the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Reinforced), from 17 April to 20 October 1952, Capt. Thomas L. Faix, a member of the unit, noted: "We have about fifteen Negro marines in our unit now, out of fifty men. We have but very little trouble and they sleep, eat and go on liberty together. It would be hard for many to believe but the thought is that here in the service all are facing a common call or summons to service regardless of color."[18-17] Finally, in August 1953, Lt. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, (p. 466) who framed the postwar segregation policy, announced that "integration of Negroes in the Corps is here to stay. Colored boys are in almost every military occupation specialty and certainly in every enlisted rank. I believe integration is satisfactory to them, and it is satisfactory to us."[18-18]

[Footnote 18-17: Extract from Thomas L. Faix, "Marines on Tour (An Account of Mediterranean Goodwill Cruise and Naval Occupation Duty), Third Battalion, Sixth Marines (Reinforced), April 17-October 20, 1952," in Essays and Topics of Interest: #4, Race Relations, p. 36.]

[Footnote 18-18: The Chief of Staff was quoted in "Integration of the Armed Forces," _Ebony_ 13 (July 1958):22.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: MARINE REINFORCEMENTS. _A light machine gun squad of 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, arrives during the battle for "Boulder City."_]

_a.s.signments_

The 1951 integration order ushered in a new era in the long history of the Marine Corps, but despite the abolition of segregated units, the new policy did not bring about completely unrestricted employment of Negroes throughout the corps. The commandant had retained the option to employ black marines "where their services can be effectively utilized," and in the years after the Korean War it became apparent that the corps recognized definite limits to the kinds of duty to which black marines could be a.s.signed. Following standard a.s.signment procedures, the Department of Personnel's Detail Branch selected individual staff noncommissioned officers for specific duty billets.

After screening the records of a marine and considering his race, the branch could reject the a.s.signment of a Negro to a billet for any (p. 467) reason "of overriding interest to the Marine Corps."[18-19]

[Footnote 18-19: Memo, Head of Detail Br, Pers Dept, for Dir of Pers, 10 Jun 52, sub: Policy Regarding Negro Marines, MC files. This method of a.s.signing staff noncommissioned officers still prevailed in 1976.]