Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965 Part 57

This policy definition did not end the matter. In the first place the State Department decided not to restrict its list of excepted areas to the six mentioned. While it had no objection to the a.s.signment of individual Negroes or nonsegregated units to Panama, the department informally advised the Army in December 1949, it did interpose grave objections to the a.s.signment of black units.[15-26] Accordingly, only individual Negroes were a.s.signed to temporary units in the Panama Command.[15-27]

[Footnote 15-26: DF, D/PA to D/OT, 1 Mar 50, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower; Ltr, D/PA for Maj Gen Ray E. Porter, CG, USACARIB, 9 Feb 50; both in CSGPA 291.2.]

[Footnote 15-27: G-1 Summary Sheet, 12 Apr 50, sub: Utilization of Negro Manpower, CSGPA 291.2.]

Yet for several reasons, the services were uneasy about the situation.

The Director of Marine Corps Personnel, for example, feared that since in the bulk rea.s.signment of marines enlisted men were transferred by rank and military occupational specialties only, a black marine might be a.s.signed to an excepted area by oversight. Yet the corps was reluctant to change the system.[15-28] An Air Force objection was (p. 387) more pointed. General Edwards worried that the restrictions were becoming public knowledge and would probably cause adverse criticism of the Air Force. He wanted the State Department to negotiate with the countries concerned to lift the restrictions or at least to establish a clear-cut, defensible policy. Secretary Symington discussed the matter with Secretary of Defense Johnson, and Halaby, knowing Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk's particular interest in having men a.s.signed without regard to race, agreed to take the matter up with Rusk.[15-29] Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews reminded Johnson that black servicemen already numbered among the thousands of Navy men a.s.signed to four of the six areas mentioned, and if the system continued these men would periodically and routinely be replaced with other black sailors. Should the Navy, he wanted to know, withdraw these Negroes? Given the "possible unfavorable reaction" to their withdrawal, the Navy wanted to keep Negroes in these areas in approximately their present numbers.[15-30] Both the Fahy Committee and the Personnel Policy Board made it clear that they too wanted black servicemen retained wherever they were currently a.s.signed.[15-31]

[Footnote 15-28: Memo, Dir of Personnel, USMC, for Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 22 Dec 49, Hist Div, HQMC.]

[Footnote 15-29: Memo, Dep CS/Pers for SecAF, 28 Dec 49; Memo, Clarence H. Osthagen, a.s.st to SecAF, for a.s.st SecAF, 6 Jan 50; Rcd of Telecon, Halaby with Zuckert, 10 Jan 50. All in SecAF files.]

[Footnote 15-30: Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 3 Jan 50, sub: Foreign a.s.signment of Negro Personnel, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 15-31: Memo, NEH (Halaby) for Maj Gen J. H.

Burns, 10 Feb 50, attached to Ltr, Burns to Rusk, 13 Feb 50, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Secretary Johnson's a.s.sistant for foreign military affairs, put the matter to the State Department, and James Evans followed up by discussing it with Rusk. Rea.s.sured by these consultations, Secretary Johnson issued a more definitive policy statement for the services on 5 April explaining that "the Department of State endorses the policy of freely a.s.signing Negro personnel or Negro or non-segregated units to any part of the world to which US forces are sent; it is prepared to support the desires of the Department of Defense in this respect."[15-32] Nevertheless, since certain governments had from time to time indicated an unwillingness to accept black servicemen, Johnson directed the services to inform him in advance when black troops were to be dispatched to countries where no blacks were then stationed so that host countries might be consulted. This new statement produced immediate reaction in the services. Citing a change in policy, the Air Force issued directives opening all overseas a.s.signments except Iceland to Negroes. After an extended discussion on the a.s.signment of black troops to the Trieste (TRUST) area, the Army followed suit.[15-33]

[Footnote 15-32: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 5 Apr 50, sub: Foreign a.s.signment of Negro Personnel; Ltr, Dean Rusk to Maj Gen Burns, 1 Mar 50; Memo, Burns for SecDef, 3 Apr 50. All in CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

[Footnote 15-33: DF, ACS, G-1, for CSA, 3 Dec 52, sub: Restricted Distribution of Negro Personnel; ibid., 30 Mar 53, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Personnel to TRUST; both in CS 291.2 Negroes. See also Memo, ACS, G-1, for TAG, 24 Apr 53, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Personnel, AG 291.2 (13 Apr 53); Memo, ASecAF for SecDef, 28 Apr 50, sub: Foreign a.s.signment of Negro Personnel, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]

Yet the problem refused to go away, largely because the services continued to limit foreign a.s.signment of black personnel, particularly in attache offices, military a.s.sistance advisory groups, and military missions. The Army's G-3, for example, concluded in 1949 that, (p. 388) while the race of an individual was not a factor in determining eligibility for a mission a.s.signment, the att.i.tude of certain countries (he was referring to certain Latin American countries) made it advisable to inform the host country of the race of the prospective applicant. For a host country to reject a Negro was undesirable, he concluded, but for a Negro to be a.s.signed to a country that did not welcome him would be embarra.s.sing to both countries.[15-34] When the chief of the military mission in Turkey asked the Army staff in 1951 to reconsider a.s.signing black soldiers to Turkey because of the att.i.tude of the Turks, the Army canceled the a.s.signment.[15-35]

[Footnote 15-34: G-3 Summary Sheet, 15 Nov 49, sub: a.s.signment of Negro Personnel, G-3 291.2.]

[Footnote 15-35: Msg, Chief, JAMMAT, Ankara, Turkey, to DA, personal for the G-1, 14 Apr 51; Ltr, Brig Gen W. E. Dunkelberg to Maj Gen William H. Arnold, Chief, JAMMAT, 24 Apr 51; idem to Brig Gen John B.

Murphy, G-1 Sec, EUCOM, 24 April 51. All in G-1 291.2.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: 25TH DIVISION TROOPS UNLOAD TRUCKS AND EQUIPMENT _at Sasebo Railway Station, j.a.pan, for transport to Korea, 1950_.]

Undoubtedly certain countries objected to the a.s.signment of American servicemen on grounds of race or religion, but there were also indications that racial restrictions were not always made at the behest of the host country.[15-36] In 1957 Congressman Adam Clayton Powell protested that Negroes were not being a.s.signed to the (p. 389) offices of attaches, military a.s.sistance advisory groups, and military missions.[15-37] In particular he was concerned with Ethiopia, whose emperor had personally a.s.sured him that his government had no race restrictions. The Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of the Army admitted that Negroes were barred from Ethiopia, and although doc.u.mentary evidence could not be produced, the ban was thought to have been imposed at the request of the United Nations. The State Department claimed it was unaware of any such ban, nor could it find doc.u.mentation to support the Army's contention. It objected neither to the a.s.signment of individual Negroes to attache and advisory offices in Ethiopia nor to "most" other countries.[15-38] Having received these a.s.surances, the Department of Defense informed the services that "it was considered appropriate" to a.s.sign black servicemen to the posts discussed by Congressman Powell.[15-39] For some time, however, the notion persisted in the Department of Defense that black troops should not be a.s.signed to Ethiopia.[15-40] In fact, restrictions and reports of restrictions against the a.s.signment of Americans to a number of overseas posts on grounds of race or religion persisted into the 1970's.[15-41]

[Footnote 15-36: Jack Greenberg, _Race Relations and American Law_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 359-60.]

[Footnote 15-37: Memo, Dep ASA for ASD/ISA, 6 Feb 57, sub: Racial a.s.signment Restrictions, OSA 291.2 Ethiopia.]

[Footnote 15-38: Ltr, Dep a.s.st Secy of State for Personnel to Dep ASD (MP&R), 24 May 57, OASD (MP&R) 291.2.]

[Footnote 15-39: Memo, Dep ASD for ASA (MP&R) et al., 24 Jun 57, ASD (MP&R) 291.2.]

[Footnote 15-40: Memo, James C. Evans for Paul Hopper, ISA, 29 Oct 58; Memo for Rcd, Exec to Civilian a.s.st, OSD, 21 Jan 60, sub: MAAG's and Missions, copies of both in CMH.]

[Footnote 15-41: See AFM 35-11L, Appendix M, 14 Dec 60, sub: a.s.signment Restrictions; Memo, USMC IG for Dir of Pers, MC, 31 Aug 62, sub: Problem Area at Marine Barracks, Argentia, Hist Div, HQMC. See also New York _Times_, December 5, 1959 and November 16, 17, and 18, 1971.]

_Congressional Concerns_

Congress was slow to see that changes were gradually transforming the armed services. In its special preelection session, the Eightieth Congress ignored the recently issued Truman order on racial equality just as it ignored the President's admonition to enact a general civil rights program. But when the new Eighty-first Congress met in January 1949 the subjects of armed forces integration, the Truman order, and the Fahy Committee all began to receive attention. Debate on race in the services occurred frequently in both houses. Each side appealed to const.i.tutional and legal principles to support its case, but the discussions might well have remained a philosophical debate if the draft law had not come up for renewal in 1950. The debate focused mostly on an amendment proposed by Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia that would allow inductees and enlistees, upon their written declaration of intent, to serve in a unit manned exclusively by members of their own race. Russell had made this proposal once before, but because it seemed of little consequence to the still largely segregated services of 1948 it was ignored. Now in the wake of the executive order and the Fahy Committee Report, the amendment came to sudden prominence. And when Russell succeeded in discharging the draft bill with his amendment from the Senate Armed Forces Committee with the members' unanimous approval, civil rights supporters quickly (p. 390) jumped to the attack. Even before the bill was formally introduced on the floor, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon told his colleagues that the Russell amendment conflicted with the stated policy of the administration as well as with sound Republican principles. He cited the waste of manpower the amendment would bring about and reminded his colleagues of the international criticism the armed forces had endured in the past because of undemocratic social practices.[15-42]

[Footnote 15-42: _Congressional Record_, 81st Cong., 2d sess., vol. 96, p. 8412.]

When debate began on the amendment, Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Ma.s.sachusetts was one of the first to rise in opposition. While confessing sympathy for the states' rights philosophy that recognized the different customs of various sections of the nation, he branded the Russell amendment unnecessary, provocative, and unworkable, and suggested Congress leave the services alone in this matter. To support his views he read into the record portions of the Fahy Committee Report, which represented, he emphasized, the judgment of impartial civilians appointed by the President, another civilian.[15-43]

[Footnote 15-43: Ibid., pp. 8973, 9073.]

Discussion of the Russell amendment continued with opponents and defenders raising the issues of military efficiency, legality, and principles of equality and states' rights. In the end the amendment was defeated 45 to 27 with 24 not voting, a close vote if one considers that the abstentions could have changed the outcome.[15-44]

A similar amendment, this time introduced by Congressman Arthur Winstead of Mississippi, was also defeated in 1951.

[Footnote 15-44: Ibid., p. 9074; see also Memo, Rear Adm H. A. Houser, OSD Legis Liaison, for ASD Rosenberg, 17 Mar 51, sub: Winstead Anti-nonsegregation Amendment, SD 291.2.]

The Russell amendment was the high point of the congressional fight against armed forces integration. During the next year the integrationists took their turn, their barrage of questions and demands aimed at obtaining from the Secretary of Defense additional reforms in the services. On balance, these congressmen were no more effective than the segregationists. Secretary Johnson had obviously adopted a hands-off policy on integration.[15-45] Certainly he openly discouraged further public and congressional investigations of the department's racial practices. When the Committee Against Jim Crow sought to investigate racial conditions in the Seventh Army in December 1949, Johnson told A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds that he could not provide them with military transport, and he closed the discussion by referring the civil rights leaders to the Army's new special regulation on equal opportunity published in January 1950.[15-46]

[Footnote 15-45: See Ltrs, Rep. Kenneth B. Keating to Johnson, 19 Dec 49; SecDef to Keating, 20 Jan 50; idem to Hubert H. Humphrey, 24 Mar 50; Humphrey to SecDef, 28 Feb 50; Rep. Jacob Javits to Johnson, 22 Dec 49; Draft Ltr, SecDef to Javits, 16 Jan 50 (not sent); Memos, Leva for Johnson, 12 and 17 Jan 50.

All in SD 291.2 Negroes.]

[Footnote 15-46: Ltrs, Johnson to Reynolds, 23 Dec 49; Reynolds to Johnson, 13 Jan 50; Reynolds and Randolph to Johnson, 15 Jan 50; Johnson to Reynolds and Randolph, 6 Feb 50. The Committee Against Jim Crow was particularly upset with Johnson's a.s.sistants, Leva and Evans; see Ltrs, Reynolds to Johnson, 19 Dec 49; Leva to Niles, 7 Feb 50; Reynolds to Evans, 13 Jan 50. All in SD 291.2.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: a.s.sISTANT SECRETARY ROSENBERG _talks with men of the 140th Medium Tank Battalion during a Far East tour_.]

Johnson employed much the same technique when Congressman Jacob (p. 391) K. Javits of New York, who with several other legislators had become interested in the joint congressional-citizen commission proposed by the Committee Against Jim Crow, introduced a resolution in the House calling for a complete investigation into the racial practices and policies of the services by a select House committee.[15-47] Johnson tried to convince Chairman Adolph J. Sabath of the House Committee on Rules that the new service policies promised equal treatment and opportunity, again using the new Army regulation to demonstrate how these policies were being implemented.[15-48] Once more he succeeded in diverting the integrationists. The Javits resolution came to naught, and although that congressman still harbored some reservations on racial progress in the Army, he nevertheless reprinted an article from _Our World_ magazine in the _Congressional Record_ in April 1950 that outlined "the very good progress" being made by the Secretary (p. 392) of Defense in the racial field.[15-49] Javits would have no reason to suspect, but the "very good progress" he spoke of had not issued from the secretary's office. For all practical purposes, Johnson's involvement in civil rights in the armed forces ended with his battle with the Fahy Committee. Certainly in the months after the committee was disbanded he did nothing to push for integration and allowed the subject of civil rights to languish.

[Footnote 15-47: Ltr, Javits to Johnson, 22 Dec 49; Press Release, Jacob K. Javits, 12 Jan 50; Ltr, Javits to Johnson, 24 Jan 50. Other legislators expressed interest in the joint commission idea; see Ltrs, Saltonstall to Johnson, 11 Jan 50; Sen.

William Langer to Johnson, 29 Oct 49; Henry C.

Lodge to Johnson, 30 Nov 49. All in SD 291.2. See also Ltr, Javits to author, with attachments, 28 Oct 71, CMH files.]

[Footnote 15-48: Ltr, SecDef to Chmn, Cmte on Rules, 21 Mar 50, SD 291.2 (21 Mar 50).]

[Footnote 15-49: _Congressional Record_, 81st Cong., 2d sess., pp. A3267-68; Memo, Leva for Johnson, 9 May 50; Ltr, Johnson to Javits, 18 May 50; both in SecDef files. See also Ltr, Javits to author, 28 Oct 71.]

Departmental interest in racial affairs quickened noticeably when General Marshall, Johnson's successor, appointed the brilliant labor relations and manpower expert Anna M. Rosenberg as the first a.s.sistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel.[15-50] Rosenberg had served on both the Manpower Consulting Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and the War Manpower Commission and toward the end of the war in the European theater as a consultant to General Eisenhower, who recommended her to Marshall for the new position.[15-51] She was encouraged by the secretary to take independent control of the department's manpower affairs, including racial matters.[15-52] That she was well acquainted with integration leaders and sympathetic to their objectives is attested by her correspondence with them. "Dear Anna," Senator Hubert H. Humphrey wrote in March 1951, voicing confidence in her att.i.tude toward segregation, "I know I speak for many in the Senate when I say that your presence with the Department of Defense is most rea.s.suring."[15-53]

[Footnote 15-50: Carl W. Borklund, _Men of the Pentagon_ (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 121-24; Ltr, Anna Rosenberg Hoffman to author, 23 Sep 71; Interv, author with James C. Evans, 13 Sep 71; both in CMH files.]

[Footnote 15-51: Immediately before her appointment as the manpower a.s.sistant, Rosenberg was a public member of the Committee on Mobilization Policy of the National Security Resources Board and a special consultant on manpower problems to the chairman of the board, Stuart Symington.]

[Footnote 15-52: Interv, author with Davenport, 17 Oct 71.]

[Footnote 15-53: Ltr, Humphrey to Rosenberg, 7 Mar 51, SD 291.2.]

Still, to bring about effective integration of the services would take more than a positive att.i.tude, and Rosenberg faced a delicate situation. She had to rea.s.sure integrationists that the new racial policy would be enforced by urging the sometimes reluctant services to take further steps toward eliminating discrimination. At the same time she had to promote integration and avoid provoking the segregationists in Congress to retaliate by blocking other defense legislation. The bill for universal military training was especially important to the department and to push for its pa.s.sage was her primary a.s.signment. It is not surprising, therefore, that she accomplished little in the way of specific racial reform during the first year of the Korean War.

Secretary Rosenberg took it upon herself to meet with legislators interested in civil rights to outline the department's current progress and future plans for guaranteeing equal treatment for black servicemen. She also arranged for her a.s.sistants and Brig. Gen. B. M.

McFayden, the Army's Deputy G-1, to brief officials of the various civil rights organizations on the same subject.[15-54] She had congressional complaints and proposals speedily investigated, and (p. 393) demanded from the services periodic progress reports which she issued to legislators who backed civil rights.[15-55]

[Footnote 15-54: See Memo for Rcd, Maj M. O. Becker, G-1, 13 Mar 51, G-1 291.2; Ltrs, Granger to Leva, 25 Jan 51, Leva to Granger, 13 Feb 51, Clarence Mitch.e.l.l, NAACP, to Rosenberg, 26 Mar 51, last three in SD 291.2. Legislators attending these briefings included Senators Lehman, William Benton of Connecticut, Humphrey, John Pastore of Rhode Island, and Kilgore.]