Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 8

c) From the theological point of view the inefficacy of purely natural prayer in matters pertaining to salvation can be demonstrated thus: Revelation tells us that the work of salvation requires for its beginning an initial supernatural grace. Now prayer, that is to say, efficacious prayer, is in itself a salutary act. Consequently, there can be no efficacious prayer without prevenient grace, and purely natural prayer is inefficacious for salvation.

Ripalda holds that, in an economy different from the present, natural prayer would have a claim to be heard. This opinion can be defended without prejudice to the dogma of the gratuity of grace. No doubt G.o.d might condescend to hear such pet.i.tions if He would, though, of course, He is not bound to do so by any intrinsic power inherent in natural prayer.

Unlike merit, prayer appeals to the mercy of G.o.d, not to His justice.

Ripalda's theory, however, rests upon an unprovable a.s.sumption, namely, that man in the state of pure nature would be able to know of the existence, or at least the possibility, of a supernatural order and to strive for the beatific vision as his final end.(450)

*Thesis IV: Man cannot move G.o.d to the bestowal of supernatural grace by any positive disposition or preparation on his part.*

This thesis may be qualified as _propositio certa_.

Proof. Positive preparation or disposition for grace (_capacitas sive praeparatio positiva_) is practically on a level with natural prayer. The positive disposition for a natural good sometimes includes a certain demand to satisfaction, as _e.g._ thirst demands to be quenched. This is still more the case when the disposition has been acquired by a positive preparation for the good in question. Thus a student, by conscientiously preparing himself for examination, acquires a claim to be admitted to it sooner or later. Can this also be said of grace? Does there exist in man a positive disposition for grace in the sense that the withholding of it would grievously injure and disappoint the soul? Can man, without supernatural aid, positively dispose himself for the reception of supernatural grace, confident that G.o.d will reward his efforts by bestowing it on him? Both these questions must be answered in the negative.

a) If there were something in the natural make-up of man which would move the Almighty to give him grace, the bestowal of grace would no longer be a free act of G.o.d. But to a.s.sert the consequent would be Semipelagian, hence the antecedent must be false.

b) This truth can easily be deduced from the teaching of the Fathers in the Semipelagian controversy. They declare, in perfect conformity with St.

Paul, that grace is bestowed gratuitously because G.o.d can give or withhold it as He pleases. St. Augustine says(451) that the grace of Baptism is granted freely, that is, without regard to any positive disposition on the part of the baptized infant. It should be remembered, moreover, that nature never existed in its pure form, and is now tainted by original sin.(452) Surely a nature tainted by sin cannot possibly possess the power of meriting divine grace.

c) The contention of the so-called Augustinians, that pure nature needs actual grace to save itself, and consequently has a claim to such grace at least _ex decentia Creatoris_ and _ex lege iustissimae providentiae_, perilously resembles Baius' condemned proposition that the state of pure nature is impossible.(453)

*Thesis V: Man may prepare himself negatively for the reception of supernatural grace by not putting any obstacles in its way.*

This proposition is held by a majority of Catholic theologians (_sententia communior_).

Proof. The solution of this question is intimately connected with the famous Scholastic axiom: "_Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_," that is, to the man who does what he can, G.o.d does not refuse grace. This axiom is susceptible of three different interpretations.

a) It may mean: _Facienti quod est in se c.u.m auxilio gratiae Deus confert ulteriorem gratiam_, _i.e._, to him who does what he can with the help of supernatural grace, G.o.d grants further and more powerful graces up to justification. This is merely another way of stating the indisputable truth that, by faithfully cooperating with the grace of G.o.d, man is able to merit additional graces, and it holds true even of infidels and sinners. The first freely performed salutary act establishes a _meritum de congruo_ towards other acts disposing a man for justification. And since the first as well as all subsequent salutary acts, in this hypothesis, are pure graces, this interpretation of our axiom is entirely compatible with the dogma of the gratuity of grace.(454)

b) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturalibus Deus non denegat gratiam_ (to him who does what he can with his natural moral strength, G.o.d does not refuse grace.) This does not mean that, in consequence of the efforts of the natural will, G.o.d may not withhold from anyone the first grace of vocation. In this sense the axiom would be Semipelagian, and has been rejected by a majority of the Schoolmen. It is said of Molina that he tried to render it acceptable by the hypothesis that G.o.d bound Himself by a contract with Christ to give His grace to all men who would make good use of their natural faculties. But how could the existence of this imaginary contract be proved? In matter of fact Molina taught, with a large number of other divines,(455) that G.o.d in the bestowal of His graces freely bound Himself to a definite rule, which coincides with His universal will to save all mankind. In the application of this law He pays no regard to any positive disposition or preparation, but merely to the presence or absence of obstacles which would prove impediments to grace.

In other words, G.o.d, generally speaking, is more inclined to offer His grace to one who puts no obstacles in its way than to one who wallows in sin and neglects to do his share.(456)

c) _Facienti quod est in se ex viribus naturae negative se disponendo [i.e. obicem non ponendo] Deus non denegat gratiam_ (to the man who does what he can with his natural moral strength, disposing himself negatively [_i.e._, by not placing any obstacle] G.o.d does not deny grace. In this form the axiom is identical with our thesis. The question arises: Can it be made to square with the dogma of the absolute gratuity of grace?

Vasquez,(457) Glossner,(458) and some others answer this question in the negative, whereas the great majority of Catholic theologians hold with Suarez(459) and Lessius,(460) that there is no contradiction between the two. Though Lessius did not succeed in proving his famous contention that the axiom _Facienti quod est in se Deus non denegat gratiam_, was for three full centuries understood in this sense by the schools,(461) there is no doubt that many authorities can be cited in favor of his interpretation.(462)

The theological argument for our thesis may be formulated thus: The gratuity of grace does not imply that the recipient must have no sort of disposition. It merely means that man is positively unworthy of divine favor. Otherwise the Church could not teach, as she does, that the grace bestowed on the angels and on our first parents in Paradise was absolutely gratuitous, nor could she hold that the Hypostatic Union of the two natures in Christ, which is the pattern and exemplar of all true grace,(463) was a pure grace in respect of the humanity of our Lord. The dogma of the gratuity of grace is in no danger whatever so long as the relation between negative disposition and supernatural grace is conceived as actual (_facienti=qui facit_), not causal (_facienti=quia facit_). The motive for the distribution of grace is to be sought not in the dignity of human nature, but in G.o.d's will to save all men. We must, however, guard against the erroneous notion that grace is bestowed according to a fixed law or an infallible norm regulating the amount of grace in accordance with the condition of the recipient. Sometimes great sinners are miraculously converted, while others of fairly good antecedents perish.

Yet, again, who could say that to the omniscient and all-wise G.o.d the great sinner did not appear better fitted to receive grace than the "decent" but self-sufficient pharisee?

READINGS:-Hurter, _Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae_, Vol. III, thes. 187.-Oswald, _Lehre von der Heiligung_, -- 8, Paderborn 1885.-*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, c. 3, Gulpen 1885.-Heinrich-Gutberlet, _Dogmatische Theologie_, Vol. VIII, -- 417-420, Mainz 1897.-Chr. Pesch, _Praelectiones Dogmaticae_, Vol.

V, 3rd ed., pp. 105 sqq., Freiburg 1908.-Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 468 sqq., Freiburg 1901.

Section 3. The Universality Of Actual Grace

The gratuity of grace does not conflict with its universality. Though G.o.d distributes His graces freely, He grants them to all men without exception, because He wills all to be saved.

This divine "will to save" (_voluntas Dei salvifica_) may be regarded in relation either to the wayfaring state or to the _status termini_.

Regarded from the first-mentioned point of view it is a merciful will (_voluntas misericordiae_) and is generally called first or antecedent will (_voluntas prima s. antecedens_) or G.o.d's salvific will (_voluntas Dei salvifica_) in the strict sense of the word. Considered in relation to the _status termini_, it is a just will, as G.o.d rewards or punishes each creature according to its deserts. This second or consequent will (_voluntas secunda s. consequens_) is called "predestination" in so far as it rewards the just, and "reprobation" in so far as it punishes the wicked.

G.o.d's "will to save" may therefore be defined as an earnest and sincere desire to justify all men and make them supernaturally happy. As _voluntas antecedens_ it is conditional, depending on the free co-operation of man; as _voluntas consequens_, on the other hand, it is absolute, because G.o.d owes it to His justice to reward or punish every man according to his deserts.(464)

Hence we shall treat in four distinct articles, (1) Of the universality of G.o.d's will to save; (2) Of the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as the will to give sufficient graces to all adult human beings without exception; (3) Of predestination, and (4) Of reprobation.

Article 1. The Universality Of G.o.d's Will To Save

Although G.o.d's will to save all men is practically identical with His will to redeem all,(465) a formal distinction must be drawn between the two, (a) because there is a difference in the Scriptural proofs by which either is supported, and (b) because the latter involves the fate of the fallen angels, while the former suggests a question peculiar to itself, _viz._ the fate of unbaptized children.

*Thesis I: G.o.d sincerely wills the salvation, not only of the predestined, but of all the faithful without exception.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. Its chief opponents are the Calvinists and the Jansenists, who heretically maintain that G.o.d wills to save none but the predestined.

Against Calvin the Tridentine Council defined: "If any one saith that the grace of justification is attained only by those who are predestined unto life, but that all others who are called, are called indeed, but receive not grace, as being, by the divine power, predestined unto evil; let him be anathema."(466)

The teaching of Jansenius that Christ died exclusively for the predestined,(467) was censured as "heretical" by Pope Innocent X. Hence it is of faith that Christ died for others besides the predestined. Who are these "others"? As the Church obliges all her children to pray: "[Christ]

descended from heaven for us men and for our salvation,"(468) it is certain that at least all the faithful are included in the saving will of G.o.d. We say, "at least all the faithful," because in matter of fact the divine _voluntas salvifica_ extends to all the descendants of Adam, as we shall show further on.(469)

a) Holy Scripture positively declares in a number of pa.s.sages that G.o.d wills the salvation of all believers, whether predestined or not. Jesus Himself says in regard to the Jews: Matth. XXIII, 37: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I (_volui_) have gathered together thy children, as the hen doth gather her chickens under her wings, and thou wouldst not (_noluisti_)." Two facts are stated in this text: (1) Our Lord's earnest desire to save the Jewish people, anciently through the instrumentality of the prophets, and now in His own person; (2) the refusal of the Jews to be saved. Of those who believe in Christ under the New Covenant we read in the Gospel of St. John (III, 16): "G.o.d so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in him(470) may not perish, but may have life everlasting." However, since many who believe in Christ do actually perish,(471) the divine _voluntas salvifica_, in principle, extends not only to the predestined, but to all the faithful, _i.e._ to all who have received the sacrament of Baptism.

b) The teaching of the Fathers can be gathered from the quotations given under Thesis II, _infra_.

c) The theological argument may be briefly summarized as follows: G.o.d's will to save is co-extensive with the grace of adoptive sonship (_filiatio adoptiva_), which is imparted either by Baptism or by perfect charity.

Now, some who were once in the state of grace are eternally lost.

Consequently, G.o.d also wills the salvation of those among the faithful who do not actually attain to salvation and who are, therefore, not predestined.

*Thesis II: G.o.d wills to save every human being.*

This proposition is _fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. The existence of original sin is no reason why G.o.d should exclude some men from the benefits of the atonement, as was alleged by the Calvinistic "Infralapsarians." Our thesis is so solidly grounded on Scripture and Tradition that some theologians unhesitatingly call it an article of faith.

a) We shall confine the Scriptural demonstration to two cla.s.sical pa.s.sages, Wisd. XI, 24 sq. and 1 Tim. II, 1 sqq.

a) The Book of Wisdom, after extolling G.o.d's omnipotence, says of His mercy: "But thou hast mercy upon all, because thou canst do all things, and overlookest the sins of men for the sake of repentance. For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made.... Thou sparest all, because they are thine, O Lord, who lovest souls."(472)

In this text the mercy of G.o.d is described as universal. _Misereris omnium, parcis omnibus_. This universality is based (1) on His omnipotence (_quia omnia potes_), which is unlimited. His mercy, being equally boundless, must therefore include all men without exception. The universality of G.o.d's mercy is based (2) on His universal over-lordship and dominion (_quoniam tua sunt; diligis omnia quae fecisti_). As there is no creature that does not belong to G.o.d, so there is no man whom He does not love and to whom He does not show mercy. The universality of G.o.d's mercy in the pa.s.sage quoted is based (3) on His love for souls (_qui amas animas_). Wherever there is an immortal soul (be it in child or adult, Christian, pagan or Jew), G.o.d is at work to save it. Consequently the divine _voluntas salvifica_ is universal, not only in a moral, but in the physical sense of the term, that is, it embraces all the descendants of Adam.

) 1 Tim. II, 2 sqq.: "I desire therefore, first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings be made for all men.... For this is good and acceptable in the sight of G.o.d our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. For there is one G.o.d, and one mediator of G.o.d and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself a redemption for all."(473)

The Apostle commands us to pray "for all men," because this practice is "good and acceptable in the sight of G.o.d." Why is it good and acceptable?

Because G.o.d "will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth." In other words, G.o.d's will to save is universal.

The question arises: Is the universality of the divine _voluntas salvifica_, as inculcated by St. Paul, merely moral, or is it physical, admitting of no exceptions? The answer may be found in the threefold reason given by the Apostle: the oneness of G.o.d, the mediatorship of Christ, and the universality of the Redemption. (1) "For there is [but]

one G.o.d."(474) As truly, therefore, as G.o.d is the G.o.d of all men without exception, is each and every man included in the divine _voluntas salvifica_. (2) "There is [but] ... one mediator of G.o.d and men, the man Christ Jesus." The human nature which Christ a.s.sumed in the Incarnation is common to all men. Hence, whoever is a man, has Jesus Christ for his mediator.(475) (3) Christ "gave himself a redemption [_i.e._ died] for all." That is to say, G.o.d's will to save is co-extensive with His will to redeem. The latter is universal,(476) consequently also the former.(477)

b) The Fathers and early ecclesiastical writers were wont to base their teaching in this matter on the above-quoted texts, and clearly intimated that they regarded the truth therein set forth as divinely revealed.