Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 7

On Semi-Pelagianism cfr. Suarez, _De Gratia_, Prolegom., V, 5 sqq.-Livinus Meyer, _De Pelag. et Semipelag. Erroribus._-Wiggers, _Geschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Hamburg 1835.-A. Hoch, _Lehre des Johannes Ca.s.sia.n.u.s von Natur und Gnade_, Freiburg 1895.-*A.

Koch, _Der hl. Faustus, Bischof von Riez_, Stuttgart 1895.-Fr.

Worter, _Zur Dogmengeschichte des Semipelagianismus_, Munster 1900.-Sublet, _Le Semipelagianisme_, Namur 1897.-Tixeront, _Histoire des Dogmes_, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Paris 1909 (English tr., St. Louis 1914).-Pohle in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. XIII, pp. 703-706.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, pp. 379 sqq.

On Jansenism cfr. *Steph. Dechamps, _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.-Ripalda, _De Ente Supernaturali_, Vol. III: "Contra Baium et Baianos," Cologne 1648.-d.u.c.h.esne, _Histoire du Baianisme_, Douai 1731.-*Linsenmann, _Michael Bajus und die Grundlegung des Jansenismus_, Tubingen 1867.-A. Schill, _Die Konst.i.tution Unigenitus, ihre Veranla.s.sung und ihre Folgen_, Freiburg 1876.-Ingold, _Rome et France: La Seconde Phase du Jansenisme_, Paris 1901.-P. Minges, O. F. M., _Die Gnadenlehre des Duns Scotus auf ihren angeblichen Pelagianismus und Semipelagianismus gepruft_, Munster 1906.-Lafiteau, _Histoire de la Const.i.tution Unigenitus_, 2 vols., Liege 1738.-Van den Peereboom, _Cornelius Jansenius, Septieme eveque d'Ypres_, Bruges 1882.-J. Forget in the _Catholic Encyclopedia_, Vol. VIII, pp. 285-294.-B. J. Otten, S.

J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, pp. 507 sqq.

Section 2. The Gratuity Of Actual Grace

All grace _ex vi termini_ is a free gift.(406) This applies particularly to Christian grace, which is so absolutely gratuitous that its gratuity, together with its necessity, may be called the groundwork of the Catholic religion.

1. STATE OF THE QUESTION.-To show what is meant by "gratuity"

(_gratuitas_) we must first explain the technical term "merit."

a) "Merit" (_meritum_=that which is earned) is that property of a good work which ent.i.tles the performer to receive a reward from him to whose advantage the work redounds.

a) An a.n.a.lysis of this definition shows that (1) merit is found only in such works as are positively good; (2) merit and reward are correlative terms which postulate each other; (3) merit supposes two distinct persons, one who deserves and another who awards; (4) the relation between merit and reward is based on justice, not on benevolence or mercy. The last-mentioned determination is by far the most important of the four.(407)

) Ethics and theology clearly distinguish two kinds of merit: (1) condign merit,(408) which is merit in the strict sense (_meritum adaequatum sive de condigno_), and (2) congruous merit (_meritum inadaequatum sive de congruo_), so called because of the congruity, or fitness, that the claim should be recognized. Condign merit presupposes some proportion between the work done and the reward given in compensation for it (_aequalitas s.

condignitas dati et accepti_). It is measured by commutative justice and thus confers a real claim to a reward. For example, a conscientious workman has a strict claim to his wage. Owing to the lack of intrinsic proportion between service and reward, congruous merit can claim a remuneration only on grounds of fairness.

A distinction between these two kinds of merit was already made by the Fathers, though not in the terms of present-day theology. It was known to the older Scholastics and emphasized anew by Luther's famous adversary Johann Eck.(409)

No relation of strict justice is conceivable between the Creator and His creatures. On the part of G.o.d there can only be question of a gratuitous promise to reward certain good works,-which promise He is bound to keep because He is veracious and faithful.(410)

b) Two other terms must also be clearly defined in order to arrive at a true conception of the gratuity of Christian grace. They are prayer for grace,(411) and a capacity or disposition to receive it.(412) To pray means to incite G.o.d's liberality or mercy by humble supplication.

a) Despite the contrary teaching of Vasquez(413) and a few other theologians, congruous merit and prayer are really distinct because one can exist without the other. As the angels in Heaven are able to pray for us without earning a _meritum de congruo_, so conversely, all salutary works are meritorious even without prayer. Moreover, humble supplication does not involve any positive service ent.i.tled to a reward.

There is another important and obvious distinction, _viz._: between purely natural prayer (_preces naturae_) and supernatural prayer inspired by grace (_oratio supernaturalis_).

) Capacity or disposition, especially when it takes the form of preparation, may be either positive or negative. Positive capacity is defined as "that real mode by which a subject, in itself indifferent, becomes apt to receive a new form." Such a capacity or disposition always entails a claim to its respective form.

Positive capacity or disposition differs from both prayer or quasi-merit (_meritum de congruo_). Quasi-merit is ent.i.tled to a reward on the ground of fairness, whereas the _capacitas s. dispositio positiva_ is at most the fulfilment of an expectation based upon purely teleological considerations. Again, a reward can be bestowed upon some subject other than the one by whom the service was rendered, whereas the introduction of a new form necessarily supposes a subject disposed for or prepared to receive it. Thus only he who is hungry is disposed for the reception of food and ent.i.tled to have his craving satisfied.

Negative capacity consists in the absence or removal of obstacles that impede the reception of a new form, as when green wood is dried to become fit for burning.

c) There arises the important question whether or not divine grace is an object of merit, and if so, to what extent it can be merited by prayer and preparation.

It is of faith that the just man, by the performance of supernaturally good deeds, can merit _de condigno_ an increase in the state of grace and eternal glory, and that the sinner is able to earn justification _de congruo_. On the other hand, it is also an article of faith that divine grace is strictly gratuitous.(414) The two dogmas seem incompatible, but they are not, as will become evident if we consider that the good works of the just and the salutary works of the sinner are entirely rooted in divine grace and consequently the merits which they contain are strictly merits of grace in no wise due to nature.(415) When we speak of the absolute gratuity of grace, therefore, we mean the very first or initial grace (_gratia prima vocans_), by which the work of salvation is begun. Of this initial grace the Church explicitly teaches that it is absolutely incapable of being merited; whence it follows that all subsequent graces, up to and including justification, are also gratuitous,(416) _i.e._ unmerited by nature in strict justice, in so far as they are based on the _gratia prima_.

2. THE GRATUITY OF GRACE PROVED FROM REVELATION.-Keeping the above explanation well in mind we now proceed to demonstrate the gratuity of divine grace in five systematic theses.

*Thesis I: Mere nature cannot, in strict justice (de condigno), merit initial grace (gratia prima), nor, consequently, any of the series of subsequent graces in the order of justification.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith.

Proof. It was one of the fundamental errors of Pelagius that grace can be merited by purely natural acts.(417) When, at the instance of the bishops a.s.sembled at Diospolis (A. D. 415), he retracted his proposition that "the grace of G.o.d is given according to our merits,"(418) he employed the term _gratia Dei_ dishonestly for the grace of creation. The Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529) formally defined that grace cannot be merited, but is purely and strictly gratuitous.(419) And the Council of Trent declared: "In adults the beginning of justification is to be derived from the prevenient grace of G.o.d through Jesus Christ, that is to say, from His vocation, whereby, without any merits existing on their parts, they are called...."(420) The non-existence of merits prior to the bestowal of the _prima gratia vocans,_ so positively a.s.serted in this definition, plainly excludes any and all natural merit _de condigno._

a) St. Paul demonstrates in his Epistle to the Romans that justification does not result from obedience to the law, but is a grace freely bestowed by G.o.d.

The Apostle regards the merciful dispensations of Providence in favor of the Chosen People, and of the entire sinful race of men in general, as so many sheer graces. Rom. IX, 16: "So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of G.o.d that showeth mercy."(421) The gratuity of grace is a.s.serted in terms that almost sound extravagant two verses further down in the same Epistle: "Therefore he hath mercy on whom he will; and whom he will, he hardeneth."(422) The same truth is emphasized in Rom. XI, 6: "And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace."(423) Lest any one should pride himself on having obtained faith, which is the root of justification, by his own merits, St.

Paul declares in his Epistle to the Ephesians: "For by grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of G.o.d; not of works, that no man may glory. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works, which G.o.d hath prepared that we should walk in them."(424) These and many similar pa.s.sages(425) make it plain that grace cannot be merited without supernatural aid.

b) The leading champion of the dogma of the gratuity of grace among the Fathers is St. Augustine, who never tires of repeating that "Grace does not find merits, but causes them,"(426) and substantiates this fundamental principle thus: "Grace has preceded thy merit; not grace by merit, but merit by grace. For if grace is by merit, thou hast bought, not received gratis."(427)

c) The theological argument is based (1) on the disproportion between nature and grace and (2) on the absolute necessity of grace for the performance of salutary works.

There is no proportion between the natural and the supernatural, and it would be a contradiction to say that mere nature can span the chasm separating the two orders. To a.s.sume the existence of a strict _meritum naturae_ for it, would be to deny the gratuity as well as the supernatural character of grace. To deny these would be to deny grace itself and with it the whole supernatural order that forms the groundwork of Christianity.

We know, on the other hand,(428) that grace is absolutely indispensable for the performance of salutary acts. Hence, to deny the gratuity of grace would be to credit nature with the ability to perform salutary acts by its own power, or at least to merit grace by the performance of naturally good deeds. In the first hypothesis grace would no longer be necessary for salvation; in the second, it would be proportionate to natural goodness, and therefore no grace at all. Consequently, the gratuity of grace cannot be consistently denied without at the same time denying its necessity.(429)

*Thesis II: There is no naturally good work by which unaided nature could acquire even so much as an equitable claim to supernatural grace.*

This proposition may be technically qualified as _fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. The Semipelagians held that, though nature cannot merit grace in strict justice, it can merit it at least congruously, _i.e._ as a matter of fitness or equity.(430) This contention was rejected by the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 529), which defined that "G.o.d works many good things in man that man does not work, but man works no good deeds that G.o.d does not give him the strength to do."(431) And again: "[G.o.d] Himself inspires us with faith and charity without any preceding [natural] merits [on our part]."(432) The phrase "without any preceding merits" (_nullis praecedentibus meritis_) excludes both the _meritum de condigno_ and the _meritum de congruo_.

a) The Scriptural argument given above for thesis I also covers this thesis.

The Semipelagians quoted Matth. XXV, 15 in support of their teaching: "To one he gave five talents, and to another two, and to another one, to every one according to his proper ability."(433) But this text is too vague to serve as an argument in such an important matter. Not a few exegetes treat it as a kind of rhetorical figure. Others, following the example of the Fathers, take "talents" to mean purely natural gifts, or _gratiae gratis datae_, while by "ability" (_virtus_) they understand the already existing grace of faith or a certain definite measure of initial grace.(434) But even if _virtus_ meant natural faculty or talent, it cannot be identical with "merit." Considering the common teaching of theologians that the angels were endowed with grace according to the measure of their natural perfection,(435) we may well suppose that man receives grace likewise according to his natural const.i.tution (_gratia sequitur naturam_)-a predisposition or apt.i.tude which G.o.d ordained in His infinite wisdom to be the instrument through which His graces should operate either for personal sanctification or the good of others.

b) St. Augustine and his disciples, in defending the orthodox faith against the Semipelagians, strongly insisted on the gratuity of the grace of faith, and above all of the initial _gratia praeveniens_.

a) St. Augustine comments on 1 Cor. IV, 7 as follows: "Nothing is so opposed to this feeling as for any one to glory concerning his own merits in such a way as if he himself had made them for himself, and not the grace of G.o.d,-a grace, however, which makes the good to differ from the wicked, and is not common to the good and the wicked."(436) And in another place he says: "For it would not in any sense be the grace of G.o.d, were it not in every sense gratuitous."(437)

) Certain of the Greek Fathers have been suspected of Semipelagian leanings because they appear to a.s.sign the chief role in the business of salvation to nature.(438) A careful study of their writings, however, shows that these authors had in mind co-operating, not prevenient grace.

The general teaching of the Orientals on the gratuity of grace is sufficiently indicated by the demand made at the Council of Lydda (A. D.

415), that Pelagius be compelled to retract the proposition: "_Gratiam Dei secundum merita nostra dari._" The Fathers who have been accused of Semipelagian sympathies merely wished to emphasize free-will and to incite the morally indifferent to co-operate heartily with divine grace.

St. Chrysostom, in particular, expressly a.s.serts the absolute gratuity of grace when he says of faith: "That which is a merit of faith, may not be ascribed to us, for it is a free gift of G.o.d,"(439) and directly contradicts Ca.s.sian and the Ma.s.silians when he declares: "Thou hast it not of thyself, thou hast received it from G.o.d. Hence thou hast received whatever thou hast, not only this or that, but all thou hast. For it is not thine own merit, but the grace of G.o.d. Although thou allegest the faith, thou hast received it by vocation."(440)

c) The theological argument for our thesis may be succinctly stated thus: The grace of G.o.d is the cause of our merits, and hence cannot be itself merited. Being the cause, it cannot be an effect.(441)

*Thesis III: Nature cannot merit supernatural grace even by natural prayer.*

This thesis, like the preceding one, may be technically qualified as _fidei proxima saltem_.

Proof. Let us first clearly establish the state of the question. Our thesis refers to that particular kind of prayer (_preces naturae_) which by its intrinsic value, so to speak, obliges Almighty G.o.d to grant what the pet.i.tioner asks for, as is undoubtedly the case with supernatural prayer, according to our Saviour's own promise: "Ask and ye shall receive."(442) The inefficacy of natural prayer a.s.serted in our thesis, is not, as in the case of merit,(443) due to any intrinsic impossibility, but to a positive divine decree to grant supernatural prayer.

The Second Council of Orange defined against the Semipelagians: "If any one says that the grace of G.o.d can be obtained by human [_i.e._ natural]

prayer, and that it is not grace itself which causes us to invoke G.o.d, he contradicts the prophet Isaias and the Apostle who say: I was found by them that did not seek me; I appeared openly to them that asked not after me."(444)

a) Sacred Scripture teaches that, unless we are inspired by the Holy Ghost, we cannot pray efficaciously. It follows that to be efficacious, prayer must be an effect of prevenient grace. We should not even know for what or how to pray, if the Holy Ghost did not inspire us. Cfr. Rom. VIII, 26: "For we know not what we should pray for as we ought; but the Spirit himself asketh for us [inspires us to ask] with unspeakable groanings."(445) 1 Cor. XII, 3: "No man can say: Lord G.o.d, but by the Holy Ghost."(446) Supernatural union with Christ is an indispensable condition of all efficacious prayer. John XV, 7: "If you abide in me, and my words abide in you, you shall ask whatever you will, and it shall be done unto you."(447)

b) This is also the teaching of the Fathers. "Who would truly groan, desiring to receive what he prays for from the Lord," says St.

Augustine,(448) "if he thought that he received it from himself, and not from G.o.d? ... We understand that this is also itself the gift of G.o.d, that with a true heart and spiritually we cry to G.o.d. Let them, therefore, observe how they are mistaken who think that our seeking, asking, knocking is of ourselves, and is not given to us; and say that this is the case because grace is preceded by our merits; that it follows them when we ask and receive, and seek and find, and it is opened to us when we knock."(449)