Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 13

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how grace and free-will cooperate, that the above-mentioned schools differ.

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at stake and the faith is viciously a.s.sailed from without, the ancient controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.

Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism

Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even the existence of such a grace.

1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.-The true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian Banez (1528-1604). His teaching may be summarized as follows:

a) G.o.d is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_) of all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_) derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any creature could act independently of G.o.d, G.o.d would cease to be _causa prima_ and _motor primus_.(706)

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception,-necessary and free, good and bad,-because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion by the _motor primus_.

In influencing His creatures, however, G.o.d adapts himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved.

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which G.o.d exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What G.o.d wills infallibly happens.(708)

Nevertheless, G.o.d is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, G.o.d's concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a _praemotio_,-and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that G.o.d's prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their a.s.sent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by G.o.d before it determines itself.(713)

d) If we a.n.a.lyse G.o.d's physical predeterminations in so far as they are created ent.i.ties, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called _praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the terms are often used synonymously.(714)

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since G.o.d has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical predetermination const.i.tutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia media_. If G.o.d knows His own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge.(715)

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate consequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The will freely a.s.sents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and intrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad unum_.(719)

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which confers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu operari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become efficacious.(720)

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for the deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist, G.o.d would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.-The Thomistic system undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently works out the concept of G.o.d as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in the natural and the supernatural order.

But Thomism also has its weak points.

A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious theological difficulties.

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the dogma of free-will.

Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their system.

a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient to enable a man to perform a salutary act, because _ex vi notionis_ it confers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a substantially new grace (_gratia efficax_). A grace which requires to be ent.i.tatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act.

"To be truly sufficient for something" and "to require to be complemented by something else" are mutually exclusive notions, and hence "sufficient grace" as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.

Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty.

Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied the _gratia efficax_, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the will.(724) But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic teaching that together with the _gratia sufficiens_ there co-exists in the soul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable _praemotio physica_ to the ent.i.ty of sin, with which ent.i.ty formal sin is inseparably bound up.(725) If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so long as G.o.d denies him the _gratia ab intrinseco efficax_?

Speaking in the abstract, the will may a.s.sume one of three distinct att.i.tudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it may remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a predetermining _gratia efficax_, to merit which is beyond its power. If it withstands, it _eo ipso_ renders itself unworthy of the _gratia efficax_.

If it takes a neutral att.i.tude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?

To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does the right use of liberty come in? If cooperation with sufficient grace moves G.o.d to bestow the _gratia per se efficax_, as the Thomists contend, then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the _gratia sufficiens_ and the _gratia efficax per se_. But there is absolutely no place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the purpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or to unaided nature. To a.s.sert that it is the work of unaided nature would lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving in a vicious circle, thus: "Because the will offers no resistance, it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act."(726)

It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the Thomistic system rests, viz.: "_Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad actum]_," that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the latter to the former as of potency to act.

b) The Thomistic _gratia efficax_, conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad unum_, inevitably destroys free-will.

a) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion as such,(727) but the implied connotation of _praevia determinatio ad unum_, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely pa.s.sive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical predetermination, in so far as it is a _determinatio ad unum_, must necessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the Thomists hold that the _gratia per se efficax_ operates in the manner of a supernatural _praedeterminatio ad unum_. If this were true, the will under the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.

To perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in mind the Thomistic definition of _praemotio physica_ as "_actio Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus c.u.m illa praemotione coniungere_."(728) That is to say: As the non-performance of an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the respective _praemotio physica_, so conversely, the performance of an act is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion; the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because this would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the divine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by G.o.d, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.

) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a distinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really necessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion, but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a _determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of the will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_-it is a _necessitas consequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as a created ent.i.ty, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with free-will; not so if regarded as an act of G.o.d, who, being almighty, is able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even G.o.d Himself cannot do what is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a _determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction.

Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio physica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so, replies Alvarez; "for the will remains free so long as the intellect represents to it an object as indifferent."(731) That is to say: Liberty remains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present.

But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the question. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This _indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would it avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit to compulsion from some other quarter?

?) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous distinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The Molinists argue: "_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._" The Thomists reply: "_Distinguo:-non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, concedo._" They explain this distinction by certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says: "_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem c.u.m sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._"(732) As one who sits cannot at the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise (_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.

Is the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_ correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence of the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733) describes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can never under any circ.u.mstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is really no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand; his natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint.

Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia efficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia resistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.

d) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that "man ... while he receives that inspiration [_i.e._ efficacious grace], ... is also able to reject it." And again: "If any one saith that man's free-will, moved and excited by G.o.d, by a.s.senting to G.o.d exciting and calling, does in no wise cooperate towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely pa.s.sive; let him be anathema."(734) To adjust their system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the _gratia sufficiens_, to which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will cooperates by giving its consent (_cooperatur a.s.sentiendo_) and which it can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with the grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will remains inanimate and merely pa.s.sive. This can only be the _gratia efficax_. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious sense of the Tridentine decree, a.s.sert that the Council intentionally chose the term _dissentire_ (_sensus divisus_) rather than _resistere_ (_sensus compositus_), in order to indicate that under the predetermining influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent (_posse dissentire_) but not to offer resistance (_posse resistere_).(735) This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has defined that "Faith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a gift of G.o.d, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by which man yields voluntary obedience to G.o.d Himself, by a.s.senting to and cooperating with His grace, which he is able to resist."(736) If efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that "irresistible" influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.(737)

B. The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which G.o.d foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His relation to sin.

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course, underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of G.o.d's foreknowledge of the free acts of the future.

The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous and weighty that in our treatise on G.o.d(738) we made no attempt to demonstrate the _scientia media_ by stringent arguments, but merely accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the natural and the supernatural order.

b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the Thomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that G.o.d predetermines men to sin.

a) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles G.o.d would have to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the will to justification can take no other form than the _gratia per se efficax_, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the predetermining influence of the _motor primus_.(739) Without this a.s.sumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the absolute will of G.o.d an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future sins. Banez says on this point: "G.o.d knows sin with an intuitive knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe the law."(740) Though the Thomists refuse to admit that G.o.d Himself is the immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises.

And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged _praemotio ad malum_ is as irresistible as the _praemotio ad bonum_; and secondly, because the material element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element; otherwise G.o.d would foreknow sin merely _materialiter_ as an act but not _formaliter_ as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was clearly defined by the Council of Trent: "If any one saith that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil G.o.d worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema."(741)