Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 12

Yet the "Doctor of Grace" expressly teaches: "G.o.d is good, G.o.d is just. He can deliver some without merits because He is good; but He cannot d.a.m.n any one without demerits, because He is just."(664) St. Prosper re-echoes this teaching when he says of the reprobates: "Of their own will they went out; of their own will they fell; and because their fall was foreknown, they were not predestined. They would, however, be predestined if they were to return and persevere in holiness; hence G.o.d's predestination is for many the cause of perseverance, for none the cause of falling away."(665) St.

Fulgentius expresses himself in similar language.(666)

2. THE THEORY OF "NEGATIVE REPROBATION."-Negative reprobation is defined by its defenders as an eternal decree by which G.o.d excludes from Heaven those not absolutely predestined, in other words, determines not to save them.

a) Gonet explains the difference between negative and positive reprobation in Scholastic terminology as follows: "_... quod haec [i.e. positiva]

habet non solum terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria, sed etiam terminum ad quem, scil. poenam sive d.a.m.ni sive sensus; illa vero [i.e.

negativa] solum habet terminum a quo, nempe exclusionem a gloria ut beneficio indebito, non vero terminum ad quem, quia ex vi exclusionis ut sic praecise et ut habet rationem purae negationis, non intelligitur reprobus esse d.a.m.nandus aut ulli poenae sive d.a.m.ni sive sensus deputandus._"(667)

The general principle laid down in this quotation is variously developed by Thomist theologians.

The rigorists (Alvarez, John a S. Thoma, Estius, Sylvius) a.s.sign as the motive of reprobation the sovereign will of G.o.d. G.o.d, they say, without taking into account possible sins and demerits, determined _a priori_ to exclude from Heaven those who are not predestined. De Lemos, Gotti, Gonet, Gazzaniga, and others condemn this view as incompatible with the teaching of St. Thomas, and, appealing to St. Augustine's doctrine of the _ma.s.sa d.a.m.nata_, find the ultimate reason for the exclusion of the reprobates from heaven in original sin, in which G.o.d, without being unjust, could leave as many as He saw fit. Goudin, Graveson, Billuart, and others a.s.sume that the reprobates are not directly excluded from eternal glory but merely from "effective election" thereunto, G.o.d simply having decreed _ante praevisa merita_ to leave them to their weakness.(668)

While the Thomists found no difficulty in harmonizing this view with their theory of physical premotion, the few Molinists who espoused it were hard put in trying to square it with the _scientia media_.(669) On the whole these Molinists endorse the third and mildest of the above-quoted opinions, which differs only theoretically from the rigoristic view described in the first place. Practically it makes no difference whether G.o.d directly excludes a man from heaven or refuses to give him the graces necessary to attain it.

Surveying all three of the theories under consideration we cannot but regard the first and third as heartless and cruel, because they attribute eternal reprobation to a positive decree that takes effect independently of sin; the second, (which ascribes reprobation to original sin), is open to the serious dogmatic objection that it contradicts the teaching of St.

Paul and the Tridentine declaration that "there is no condemnation (_nihil d.a.m.nationis_) in those who are truly buried together with Christ by baptism into death."(670)

b) Negative reprobation is rightly regarded as the logical counterpart of absolute predestination.(671) If Almighty G.o.d, by an absolute decree, without regard to any possible merits, merely to reveal His divine attributes and to "embellish the universe," had determined that only those could enter the "Heavenly Jerusalem" who were antecedently predestined thereto, it would inevitably follow that the unfortunate remainder of humanity by the very same decree were "pa.s.sed over," "omitted,"

"overlooked," "not elected," or, as Gonet honestly admits, "excluded from Heaven," which is the same thing as being negatively condemned to h.e.l.l.

The logical distinction between positive and negative reprobation, therefore, consists mainly in this, that the former signifies absolute d.a.m.nation to h.e.l.l, the latter (equally absolute) non-election to Heaven.

To protect the Catholic champions of negative reprobation against unjust aspersions, however, it is necessary to point out certain fundamental differences between their theory and the heresy of Calvin.

Calvin and the Jansenists openly deny the universality both of G.o.d's saving will and of the atonement; they refuse to admit the actual bestowal of sufficient grace upon those fore-ordained to eternal d.a.m.nation; and claim that the human will loses its freedom under the predominance of efficacious grace or concupiscence. The Catholic defenders of negative reprobation indignantly reject the charge that their position logically leads to any such heretical implications.

c) The theory of negative reprobation can be sufficiently refuted by showing that it is incompatible with the universality of G.o.d's will to save all men. For if G.o.d willed absolutely and antecedently to "exclude some men from Heaven," as Gonet a.s.serts, or "not to elect them to eternal glory," as Suarez contends, then it would be His absolute will that they perish.

a) For one thus negatively reprobated it is metaphysically impossible to attain eternal salvation. To hold otherwise would be tantamount to a.s.suming that an essentially absolute decree of G.o.d can be frustrated.

This consideration led certain Thomists(672) to describe the divine _voluntas salvifica_ as rather an ineffectual _velleitas_.(673) But this conflicts with the obvious teaching of Revelation.(674) Suarez labors in vain to reconcile the sincerity of G.o.d's salvific will with the theory of negative reprobation. The two are absolutely irreconcilable. How could G.o.d sincerely will the salvation of all men if it were true, as Suarez says, that "it is not in man's power to work out his eternal salvation in case he falls under non-election, non-predestination, or, which amounts to the same thing, negative reprobation"?(675)

) The cruel absurdity of the theory of negative reprobation becomes fully apparent when we consider the att.i.tude it ascribes to G.o.d. Gonet writes: "Foreseeing that the whole human race would be depraved by original sin, G.o.d, in view of the merits of Christ who was to come, elected some men to glory and, in punishment of original sin and to show His justice towards them and His greater mercy towards the elect, permitted others to miss the attainment of beat.i.tude, in other words, He positively willed that they should not attain it.... In virtue of this efficacious intention He devised appropriate means for the attainment of His purpose, and seeing that some would miss beat.i.tude by simply being left in the state of original sin, and others by being permitted to fall into actual sins and to persevere therein, He formally decreed this permission, and finally ...

by a command of His intellect ordained these means towards the attainment of the aforesaid end."(676) Translated into plain every-day language this can only mean that G.o.d tries with all His might to prevent the reprobate from attaining eternal salvation and sees to it that they die in the state of sin. Suarez is perfectly right in characterizing Gonet's teaching as "incompatible with sound doctrine."(677) But his own teaching is equally unsound and cruel. For he, too, is compelled to a.s.sert: "Predestination to glory is the motive for which efficacious or infallible means towards attaining that end are bestowed. Hence to refuse to predestine a man for glory is to deny him the means which are recognized as fit and certain to attain that end."(678)

Holy Scripture fortunately speaks a different language. It describes G.o.d as a loving Father, who "wills not that any should perish, but that all should return to penance."(679)

?) Practically it makes no difference whether a man is positively condemned to eternal d.a.m.nation, as Calvin and the Jansenists a.s.sert, or negatively excluded from Heaven, as held by the orthodox theologians whom we have just quoted. The alleged distinction between positive and negative reprobation is "a distinction without a difference." For an adult to be excluded from Heaven simply means that he is d.a.m.ned. There is no such thing as a middle state or a purely natural beat.i.tude. Lessius justly says that to one reprobated by G.o.d it would be all the same whether his reprobation was positive or negative, because in either case he would be inevitably lost.(680)

READINGS:-*Ruiz, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, Lyons 1628.-Ramirez, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_, 2 vols., Alcala 1702.-*Lessius, _De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis_, XIV, 2.-*IDEM, _De Praedestinatione et Reprobatione_ (_Opusc._, Vol. II, Paris 1878).-Tournely, _De Deo_, qu. 22 sqq.-Schrader, _Commentarii_, I-II, _De Praedestinatione_, Vienna 1865.-J. P.

Baltzer, _Des hl. Augustinus Lehre uber Pradestination und Reprobation_, Vienna 1871.-Mannens, _De Voluntate Dei Salvifica et Praedestinatione_, Louvain 1883.-O. Rottmanner, O. S. B., _Der Augustinismus_, Munchen 1892.-O. Pfulf, S. J., "_Zur Pradestinationslehre des hl. Augustinus_," in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift fur kath. Theologie_, 1893, pp. 483 sqq.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. I, St. Louis 1917, pp. 281, 378, 382 sqq.

Chapter III. Grace In Its Relation To Free-Will

When we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious grace; merely sufficient grace, as such, does not involve consent.

The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the human will under the influence of efficacious grace.

Catholic theologians have always staunchly upheld both the freedom of the will and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual relations between grace and free-will.

Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists

1. THE HERETICAL ERRORS OF LUTHER, CALVIN, AND JANSENIUS CONTRASTED WITH THE ORTHODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.-Luther and Calvin a.s.serted that the freedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius taught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same way as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against both these heresies the Church has always maintained that the will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace.

a) Luther taught(681) that original sin has so completely annihilated man's free-will that he resembles a horse compelled to go in whatever direction it is driven (according as "G.o.d or the devil rides him"),(682) and that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man's liberty, compels him to act with intestine necessity.

Calvin(683) carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by a.s.serting: (1) that the will of our first parents was free in Paradise, but lost its freedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery of Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will under the influence of grace is pa.s.sive, and must needs follow the impulse to which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous.(684)

Against these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of free-will both in the state of original sin(685) and under the influence of efficacious grace: "If any one saith that man's free-will, moved and excited by G.o.d, by a.s.senting to G.o.d exciting and calling, ... cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely pa.s.sive: let him be anathema."(686)

b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper distinction between freedom from external constraint (_libertas a coactione_) and freedom from internal compulsion (_libertas a necessitate_), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of grace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from interior compulsion, and that the _libertas a coactione_ is entirely sufficient to gain merit or demerit in the fallen state.(687)

The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows: (1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation-_delectatio coelestis victrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger always defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance, is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4) In each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the _delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes _efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_ sin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the _delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is called by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a definite decision.

This false teaching inspired the famous "five propositions" of Jansenius, to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of G.o.d's commandments for want of grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in a.s.suming the existence of a grace which man may either obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the predestined.

These propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his dogmatic Bull "_c.u.m occasione_," of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly contained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace. "If it is true that fallen man never resists interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who violates a commandment of G.o.d has not had the grace to observe it, that he therefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative, merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the just whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ a.s.sured to every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth proposition)."(689)

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED FROM REVELATION.-Far from favoring the determinism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition positively contradict the contention that free-will is overpowered by grace.

a) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in Sacred Scripture as mutually exclusive, but invariably as cooperating factors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other, according to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view.

The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this:(690) "When it is said in the sacred writings, 'Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,'(691) we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: 'Convert us, O G.o.d, to thee, and we shall be converted,'(692) we confess that we are forestalled by the grace of G.o.d."

St. Paul, it is true, asks: "Who resisteth his [G.o.d's] will?"(693) But he also admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: "Exercise thyself unto G.o.dliness."(694) St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost does not compel the will. "You always resist the Holy Ghost," he tells the Jews; "as your fathers did, so do you also."(695) Our Lord Himself teaches that grace exerts no interior compulsion but invites free cooperation: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments."(696) The exhortations, promises, and threats uttered in various portions of Holy Writ would be meaningless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.(697)

b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine defended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian and Semipelagian errors.(698) Calvin himself admits that with but one exception the Fathers are unanimously opposed to his teaching.(699)

The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that the point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace, not its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the latter, he shows by the manner in which he formulates his sentences that he regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in which Alexander the Great cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything, free-will is nothing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.(700) Possibly St.

Augustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in language open to misinterpretation, as when he said: "Therefore aid was brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace."(701) But this and similar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the context shows, Augustine merely wished to a.s.sert the hegemony of grace in all things pertaining to salvation, and to emphasize the fact that free-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous temptations.(702) At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of many available pa.s.sages in proof of this statement. "To yield consent or to withhold it, whenever G.o.d calls, is the function of one's own will."(703) "For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will is aided; but it is aided precisely for the reason that it remains free."(704) St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own ingenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: "Take away free will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and there will be no means left of salvation."(705)

READINGS:-*Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_ (_Opera Omnia_, ed. Fevre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873).-*Dechamps, S. J., _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.-F. Worter, _Die christliche Lehre uber das Verhaltnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustinus_, Freiburg 1856.-*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.-S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp.

357 sqq., 377 sqq., Freiburg 1901.-B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 sqq.

Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of Grace And Free-Will

The relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to ascertain how free-will is affected by grace.

The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related theological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.