German Problems and Personalities Part 12

CHAPTER XI

A SLUMP IN GERMAN THEOLOGY

I.

In the universal readjustment-or, to use the favourite expression of Nietzsche, in the "transvaluation"-of political and spiritual values which must follow the war, we may confidently expect a general slump in all German values. There will be a slump in German education and in German erudition, in German music and in German watering-places. There will be a slump in that "exclusive morality" for which Lord Haldane could not find an equivalent in the English language, and for which, in his famous Montreal address, he could only find an equivalent in the German word _Sittlichkeit_. But, most important of all, there will be a lamentable slump in the most highly prized of all German values-German theology.

Germany may still retain a monopoly of toys; Germany may still continue to supply Princes to the vacant thrones of Europe; but it is eminently probable that G.o.d Almighty will cease to be made in the Vaterland.

II.

No one who has not been brought up in a Scottish Presbyterian University atmosphere realizes the mystical prestige hitherto enjoyed by German theology. The education of a Scottish divine was thought incomplete, a graduate in divinity, however brilliant and devout, could not get an important charge, if he had not received the hallmark and consecration of a German theological faculty. And what was true of German Universities was equally true of German theological books.

Publishers like Messrs. Clark, of Edinburgh, and Messrs. Williams and Norgate, of London, made considerable fortunes merely from their translations of German works of divinity.

The prejudice in favour of German Universities and against French Universities goes back to the early days of the Reformation. Already in "Hamlet" we find the serious young man going to Wittenberg and the frivolous young man going to Paris in quest of worldly amus.e.m.e.nt. That pro-German and anti-French prejudice has continued until our own day.

In vain have I for twenty years attempted in the Universities of Scotland to send our graduates to French Universities. In vain did I contend that one single year spent in the Sorbonne provided greater intellectual stimulus than a whole decade spent in a German University. The old Puritan feeling against France proved too strong.

Until the year 1914 the stream of our students continued to be directed to Gottingen and Heidelberg, to Bonn and Berlin. Even in our distant colonies, even in Toronto, I found that the majority of teachers were "made in Germany," whilst of American Universities it is hardly too much to say that many of them had actually become German inst.i.tutions.

III.

The prejudice which sent Scottish and English ministers of the Gospel to complete their preparation in Germany was all the more extraordinary because Positive Christianity had almost vanished from the theological faculties of Protestant Germany. Even as Holy Russia has remained on the whole the most Christian nation in Europe, Protestant Prussia was certainly the least Christian. It was aptly said by Huxley of the philosophy of Comte, that Comtism was Catholicism minus Christianity. We might say in the same way of German theology, that it was philosophy and metaphysics and philology minus Christianity. Seventy-five years ago David Frederick Strauss, who would be forgotten but for the pamphlet of Nietzsche, wrote a ponderous treatise of a thousand pages, translated by George Eliot, to prove that Christ was a myth. At the end of his life he strenuously attempted in his "Old and New Faith" to find a subst.i.tute for Christian theology. German Protestantism travelled the road he indicated. The German people have ceased to believe in Christianity; but they have come to believe in the self-styled Anti-Christ Nietzsche. They have ceased to believe in G.o.d; but they still believe in His self-appointed vicegerent, the Kaiser. They have ceased to believe in Providence; but they still believe in a Providential German nation. They have ceased to believe in the Holy Trinity; but they believe all the more fanatically in the New Trinity of the Superman, the Super-race and the Super-State. And it is this new fanatical belief which has brought about the war of the nations.

IV.

The prejudice of our Protestant Churches in favour of German Theological Faculties proceeded on the a.s.sumption that German Protestantism was identical with Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. Surely that strange a.s.sumption does little credit to the spiritual insight of our divines. German Protestantism has absolutely nothing in common with Anglo-Saxon Protestantism. For whatever may have been adduced against British and American Nonconformity, it must be admitted that at least Anglo-Saxon Nonconformity was generally what it professed to be. Anglo-Saxon Nonconformity actually did refuse to conform, Anglo-Saxon Protestantism did actually protest. The separation between Church and State was a fundamental principle of Anglo-Saxon policy, and that separation was no ideal platonic theory. Nonconformists gave up their emoluments, they again and again risked their lives in defence of their principles. In defence of their principles tens of thousands migrated to distant climes.

For that very reason Anglo-Saxon Nonconformity has rendered inestimable service to political liberty. German Protestantism has never rendered a single service to political liberty, for the simple reason that its political practice has been consistently the reverse.

So far from Lutheran Protestantism being based on the separation of Church and State, it was based on the confusion of spiritual and temporal power. That confusion began with the very earliest days of Lutheranism. Lutherans are inclined to depreciate the personality and activity of John Huss, the great Slav reformer, because, judged from worldly standards, John Huss seems to have been a failure. As a matter of fact, the Slav reformer was the ideal spiritual hero. The Teutonic reformer was in many ways a time-server. To Luther must be traced the principle that spiritual allegiance must follow temporal allegiance, that the subjects must follow the creed of their Prince. That belief was expressed in the Protestant motto, _Cujus regio illius religio_, and that motto even to this day accounts for the bewildering religious geography of the German Empire.

That servile att.i.tude of the Protestant Church to the German State has survived to this generation; whereas the Roman Catholic Church made a brave stand against Bismarck in the _Kulturkampf_, the Lutheran Church has remained a docile State Church. This Erastianism is ill.u.s.trated by no one more signally than by the Pontifex Maximus of Prussian Protestantism, His Excellency Wirklicher Geheimrath Adolf von Harnack.

Harnack has earned world-wide fame as a bold interpreter of the Scriptures, but he has refused to countenance those ministers who were discharged merely because they acted on his teachings. In his exegesis, Harnack has been the most uncompromising of critics. In his religious politics, he has been the most tame of courtiers, the most pliable of diplomats. He has taken infinite liberties with the Sacred Texts. He has never taken any liberties with the sacred majesty of the Kaiser.

V.

The confusion of temporal and spiritual power in German Protestantism brought about two great evils-servility in politics and indifference in religion. But it also seemed to bring one great compensating advantage-namely, complete toleration of other creeds. People do not fight for a creed to which they have become indifferent. Frederick the Great gave equal hospitality to the free-thinking Voltaire and to the Jesuits who had been expelled from most Catholic countries.

That compensating advantage of religious toleration seemed to further the higher intellectual life of the Universities, and in one sense it did. But it must not be forgotten that neither religious toleration nor the higher intellectual life ever extended to the province of politics. The freedom of the Prussian Universities was always limited by the necessities of the State and the accidents of politics. With regard to religion and political thought, the Prussian State always acted on the principle implied in the cynical epigram of Gibbon: "All religions are equally true to the believer. They are equally false to the unbeliever, and _they are equally useful to the statesman_." For three hundred years the Prussian statesmen have attempted to utilize the Christian religion, and Prussian Christian divines have in fact proved the most serviceable of tools. Unfortunately, in the process religion has disappeared from Prussian soil, and with the liberating influence of the Christian religion has vanished political liberty.

CHAPTER XII

THE GERMAN ENIGMA[22]

[22] Georges Bourdon, "L'Enigme Allemande," Librairie Plon, Paris.

I.

The present investigation into Franco-German relations conducted on behalf of the _Figaro_ is the work of one of the ablest publicists of modern France. It is the work of a good European who wishes to put an end to the senseless compet.i.tion in armaments, and to the international distrust and nervousness which are the main causes of such armaments. The book is also the work of a good Frenchman who realizes that no settlement can be durable which does not safeguard the sacred rights of the conquered peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, who are the first victims of outraged justice. There lies the originality of the book. It reveals the new direction which public opinion and political thought are taking in contemporary France. The whole question of the relations between France and Germany is lifted to a higher plane. We hear no more of the humiliation of France, of her pride and dignity, of rancour and revenge. We hear less of the balance of military force. The main question which is raised is a question of moral principle and of international right.

II.

The work of Monsieur Bourdon is not only a good book; it is also a brave deed. Too long has it been the fashion for French publicists to entrench themselves behind Gambetta's phrase: "N'en parler jamais, y penser toujours!" Silence may have been the best policy on the morrow of the catastrophe of 1870, when one single indiscretion might have set Europe aflame. But after forty-four years, and under entirely altered conditions, an ostrich policy of reticence, a cowardly policy of mental reservation, cannot be the best means of bringing about a settlement.

Monsieur Bourdon has therefore chosen the bolder course, which happens also to be the wiser course. He has broken down the barrier of fear and distrust. He has taken the first step. He has gone to Germany in a spirit of frankness and conciliation. He has tried to get at her thoughts and afterthoughts. He has cross-examined the German people, and he has cross-examined them with consummate tact and skill. An unofficial amba.s.sador of peace, he has revealed all the qualities of a diplomat, and he has added qualities which the diplomat does not often possess-outspokenness and uprightness, a loyal regard for truth, and that moral preoccupation and that delicate sense of international honour which are generally alien to the official diplomatic mind.

III.

And the result of this searching inquiry is most satisfactory. Quite apart from the value of the opinions expressed, and of the author's own opinion, the inquiry in itself is an historical doc.u.ment of prime importance. Here we have before us at first hand the public opinion of Germany. Nor is it the irresponsible opinion of anonymous scribblers, or the opinion of party politicians; it is the deliberate, reasoned opinion of some of the most distinguished German readers in thought and action. Statesmen and diplomats, captains of industry and army captains, editors and financiers, all the professions except the Church (a significant omission!), are represented in this survey of German opinion. After reading M. Bourdon's book, no politician will henceforth be allowed to plead as an excuse that he does not know what official and unofficial Germany thinks, and what she feels on the vital questions of foreign policy.

IV.

And perhaps the readers may carry away the impression that Germany feels more than she thinks; that she is carried away by prejudice, by currents and cross-currents of emotion, rather than led by general principles and clear and sober thinking. I had asked one of the most eminent British publicists living to write an introduction to the English translation of M. Bourdon's book which is to be published next month by Messrs. Dent. But my friend answered that he would willingly have written such an introduction if he could have agreed with the ideas of the French writer. Unfortunately, he did not see his way to agree with Monsieur Bourdon. No purpose, he argued, could be served by cross-examining German opinion, for there was no German opinion. In vain did Monsieur Bourdon claim to tell us what Germany thinks; the Germans were not educated to think politically. And there was the rub.

There was no organized public opinion, and even if there were, it could only express itself, it could not press its demands upon a despotic Government.

V.

I do not here examine how much truth there may be in my friend's contention. But one fact must certainly strike the readers of M.

Bourdon's book. The present position is as ominous as it is bewildering and unintelligible.

Monsieur Bourdon has proved once more the tremendous power of German militarism. German militarism seems to be bred in the bone of the Prussians, and has been inoculated into the German people. The army is the most popular service in the country. It provides an honourable career to tens of thousands of young men of the middle cla.s.ses and of the aristocracy. At the same time, Monsieur Bourdon points out that from the German point of view it is one thing to be militarist, and another to be warlike and bellicose. The Germans hold that the most confirmed militarist may be a convinced pacifist. The father of Frederick the Great, the greatest militarist of the Hohenzollern Dynasty, the Sergeant-King, was so attached to his army that he never employed it in active warfare, he never allowed it to fight a single battle, for fear of losing or spoiling so perfect an instrument.

But even granting this paradoxical thesis of the pacifism of German militarists, the situation remains sufficiently contradictory and distracting to the ordinary mind. Every representative German consulted by Monsieur Bourdon proclaims that Germany is pacific, that she wishes for peace, and that she needs peace for her industrial and commercial expansion. Yet we see her making gigantic preparations for a possible war. With a restless endeavour, and at tremendous cost, we see her developing her warlike resources. Every representative German insists on making platonic professions. Yet we do not hear of a single statesman daring to take the necessary step or to make the necessary sacrifices. No one seems to understand that peace demands sacrifices quite as heroic as war. No Bismarck of peace seems to be strong enough to-day to put an end to the senseless waste of national resources and misdirected energies.

VI.

The "German Enigma" of Monsieur Bourdon is mainly an objective, impartial, and impersonal study, and the author has been careful not to obtrude his own private views. It is only in the last chapter that he attempts to draw the lesson and point out the conclusion of his own inquiry. And his conclusion is an eloquent though restrained plea for a Franco-German _rapprochement_, and in favour of the only policy which will bring about that reconciliation. France, he argues, does not want a revision of the Treaty of Frankfurt. She does not want compensation or revenge. French history contains a sufficiently brilliant roll of glorious military achievements that the French people may afford to forget the reverses and humiliations of 1870. A French statesman, on the eve of the Treaty of Frankfurt, made the rhetorical statement that France would never surrender one stone of her fortresses nor one inch of her territory. Animated by a very different spirit, modern French statesmen do not claim back to-day one inch of lost territory. All that the French people demand is that the claims of justice shall be heard, that Alsace-Lorraine shall cease to groan under the heel of an arbitrary despot, that Alsace-Lorraine shall be governed according to her own laws, that the Alsatians shall be treated as a free people, and not as conquered subjects.

VII.

And that one sole possibly solution is also the only simple solution.

That solution would involve no sacrifice of pride or dignity to either nation. France would not make any surrender to Germany, and Germany would not make any concession to France. Both would surrender to the demands of international justice.