Finland's War of Choice Part 5

The Soviets withdrew the 1st Tank Division (minus one regiment) from the Salla front on August 1 and transferred it to the Leningrad front. This led the Army of Norway to order the x.x.xVI Corps to execute a deep envelopment to the road-railroad line just west of the town of Alakurtti. The x.x.xVI Corps viewed this as impossible because of lack of sufficient forces in terrain that did not lend itself to wide and deep envelopments. It insisted that the envelopment should not aim at a point further to the east than Nurmi Lake, halfway to Alakurtti.

The x.x.xVI Corps intended to send the 6th Finnish Division on a thrust to Nurmi Mountains as the southern p.r.o.ng of the envelopment. The Finns-the main effort-would advance with one regiment forward and two in reserve against the Nurmi Mountains and take up blocking positions. One regiment of the division would advance eastward along the Alakurtti road at Vuoriyarvi (Vuorijarvi). A German task force of two infantry battalions and six companies of mixed SS and engineer troops would cross the Nurmi River behind the left wing of the 169th Division and drive towards Nurmi Lake as the northern arm of the envelopment. Other units from the 169th Division would take over the 6th Division's defensive positions to make the Finnish drive possible. Two regiments (one German and one Finnish) const.i.tuted the corps reserve.

The regrouping of forces for the offensive was a major task. It required the construction of a road from Lampela to the southern point of Apa Lake in order to bring artillery into the Finnish sector. This road was completed on August 14. Units of the 169th Division, which were to take over the Finnish defensive positions, were pulled back through Salla and sent south to where the Finnish 6th Division had crossed the border. From here they moved northeast along the route the Finns had followed in early July. While this maneuver may have confused the Soviets, it was a trying experience for the troops in the 169th Division. The straight-line distance from their start point to their new area of operations was only 28 kilometers. Now-because of the lack of lateral roads near the front-they had to make a strenuous move of 175 kilometers to arrive at the same destination.

The Finnish 6th Division began its northward attack in heavy rain and fog on the morning of August 19. The main attack made good progress and reached Lehtokangas, about halfway to Nurmi Lake, the same afternoon. A Russian pocket of resistance northeast of Lehtokangas was destroyed. The right flank regiment, however, met determined resistance and its progress was slow. The German regiment on the left barely managed to get out of its starting positions. The main Finnish force reached the railroad south of Nurmi Lake on August 20. The Finns had five battalions in defensive positions south of Nurmi Lake and across the road and railroad leading east from Kayrala, the route that the trapped forward Soviet forces would have to take in a retreat.

The infantry battalions from the 169th Division which were to drive south along the east sh.o.r.e of the Nurmi River to Nurmi Lake were making slow progress and this left the Soviets an escape route. It was imperative to close the pincer as rapidly as possible and troops in the forward German positions west of Kayrala were reduced to the minimum in order to increase the striking power of the northern pincer. Poor weather conditions kept the Luftwaffe grounded until August 25.

The Finnish 6th Division tried to move forces northward in order to link up with the Germans moving south but in the meantime the Soviets had begun to make their escape via an unknown eastwest road north of Lake Nurmi. The advancing Finns did not reach and cut this road until August 25. The right flank Finnish regiment had captured the village of Vuoriyarvi, about 20 kilometers southwest of Alakurtti on the previous day.

The Soviet defenses north and south of Lakes Kuola and Apa were collapsing and Soviet soldiers from the forward areas were in headlong retreat to the east in order to avoid the trap that was about to close on them in the Lake Nurmi area. While a clear-cut victory was achieved, the failure of the German drive from the north to close the encirclement allowed the bulk of the trapped Soviet soldiers to escape although most of their vehicles and equipment were abandoned in the process.

Even as late as the morning of August 27 the Soviets managed to keep the encirclement from closing in desperate and b.l.o.o.d.y defensive fighting northeast of Nurmi Lake. The x.x.xVI Corps ordered a relentless pursuit of the beaten enemy in the direction of Alakurtti. A major reorganization for the pursuit was undertaken. The units that had earlier been detached from the 169th Division were now reattached. In addition, three SS battalions were attached to the Finnish 6th Division to make sure that unit had sufficient weight to overcome antic.i.p.ated desperate Soviet rearguard actions. The pursuit made good initial progress and reached a point about seven kilometers from Alakurtti by the end of August 27.

The Soviet defenders held a narrow bridgehead on the western banks of the Tuntsa River and this bridgehead, with prepared positions, held the Germans and Finns at bay for several days despite vigorous frontal and flanking attacks. The bridgehead was finally eliminated on August 30 and the Soviets destroyed the road and railroad bridges over this formidable obstacle as they withdrew to the eastern bank of the river.

In their withdrawal to the east bank the Soviets neglected to destroy a footbridge north of the main eastwest road, which a regiment of the 169th Division used to cross the river. There followed a day of hard fighting in town before the Soviets suddenly withdrew in the evening of September 1, 1941. They withdrew to the river running through the village of Voyta 10 kilometers to the east of Alakurtti.

As the Germans and Finns were pressing on east of Alakurtti, the Army of Norway redeployed some units that reduced the strength of the x.x.xVI Corps. Two SS battalions from the 7th SS Infantry Regiment were transferred to the Finnish III Corps while one battalion from the 9th SS Infantry Regiment, which had earlier been transferred to the x.x.xVI Corps from Mountain Corps Norway, was now sent back north to General Dietl.

It was thus a reduced-strength corps that closed on the Voyta River line on September 2. This had been the border between the Soviet Union and Finland prior to March 1940 and the old Finnish border fortifications were now manned by five Soviet regiments. Some of these regiments-from the 104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions-were at a severely reduced strength from the previous two months of fighting. One motorized regiment from the 1st Tank Division had been attached to the 104th Rifle Division. It held the center of the Soviet defensive line. The Soviets were also bringing forward a steady flow of replacements from Kandalaksha.

The x.x.xVI Corps halted along the west bank of the Voyta River for four days with the 169th Division on the left and the 6th Finnish Division on the right. The Germans and Finns began their a.s.sault across the river on September 6. Four regiments made the frontal a.s.sault while one regiment enveloped the enemy's north flank and headed for Hill 366 just southwest of the northernmost of the two Verman lakes. While the frontal attack by the four regiments was repelled, the enveloping regiment made rapid progress towards Hill 366 (elevation in meters). This was one of several places where high ground dominated the road and railroad to Kandalaksha. Faulty intelligence from a reconnaissance two days earlier had made the Germans believe that Hill 366 was unoccupied. They now discovered that it was occupied and strongly fortified. The German regiment found itself in a dangerous position, over eight kilometers behind the Soviet line along the Voyta River. This situation led to heated exchanges between the regiment and corps and ill.u.s.trated the raw nerves symptomatic of exhausted units.13 Much of the recrimination dealt with the lack of artillery and air support, priority for which was still with Mountain Corps Norway.

The attack by the x.x.xVI Corps on September 7 made no progress due to heavy rainstorms. Intercepted Soviet radio traffic indicated that the Soviet troops had orders to hold their positions at all cost, even at the risk of encirclement. The corps decided to abandon the frontal attacks and concentrate on what had started out as a promising northern envelopment. However, as we have seen, the regiment in the north was in trouble. It had managed to take Hill 366 on September 7 and also reported securing Hill 386 to its south. It was learned the following morning that Hill 386 had in fact not been secured. The corps ordered an additional regiment forward on the north flank and sent a Finnish regiment to take up a position northeast of Hill 366 to cover the corps' left flank. Another Finnish regiment was at the northern tip of Tolvand Lake to cover the southern flank.

The German attack bogged down in front of the high ground east of Voyta for two days until Hill 386 was captured on September 10. The corps ordered the new regiment it had sent forward to push east along the road to Verman River. The regiment, which had been in this area since the beginning of the attack, was ordered to move west and attack the Soviet defenses in the Voyta area from behind. The regiment hesitated for almost a day and moved out only after General Feige intervened personally. The 169th Division managed to push a battalion across the Voyta River on September 11 and contact with the regiment approaching from the east was established on September 12. While the road to the east was now open, the Soviet forces to the south of that road clung to their positions and it took the Finnish 6th Division one week of heavy fighting to reduce those positions.14 As the x.x.xVI Corps drew up to the line of the Verman Lakes, they again found themselves facing the same foes as they had since operations began-the 122nd and 104th Soviet Rifle Divisions. Over 8,000 replacements had joined these two units by September 15, bringing them up to 80% of full strength.

These two divisions occupied prepared positions along the Verman River that flows between the two lakes by that name. The Soviet positions were anch.o.r.ed in the north on the North Verman Lake and in the south on Tolvand Lake. The Soviets, who had a much better appreciation of the importance of Murmansk to their war effort-were obviously committed, at all costs, to preventing the Germans and Finns from reaching the Murmansk Railroad. Forced labor had been working for months on three additional fortified defensive lines between the two lakes and Kandalaksha.

As the x.x.xVI Corps drew up to the Verman Lake line the Army of Norway made another change in its strategy that brought relations between Generals Feige and Falkenhorst to breaking point. With the failure of the last attack across the Litsa River in the Mountain Corps Norway's area of operations, the Army of Norway switched the effective main effort in Finland back to the x.x.xVI Corps-just a few days after two battalions of the 7th SS Infantry Regiment were transferred to the Finnish III Corps, and one battalion from the 9th SS Infantry Regiment was sent north to Mountain Corps Norway.

The x.x.xVI Corps had suffered 9,463 German casualties since the campaign was initiated and was hardly in a position to become the main effort. The 169th Division was so worn out and depleted that it was hardly capable of performing defensive missions, much less offensive operations. The Army of Norway proposal elicited some very unusual harsh comments from General Feige. The x.x.xVI Corps characterized the proposal as "grotesque" and "hardly calculated to arouse confidence in the higher leadership."15 General Feige did not limit himself to pointing out the futility of switching the main effort to the x.x.xVI Corps. He leveled-in an appreciation of the situation on September 16-some harsh criticism against the Army of Norway for having missed excellent opportunities in the past. He pointed out that, by the earlier emphasis on the operations of Mountain Corps Norway to the detriment of reinforcing the x.x.xVI Corps, two good opportunities had been missed within a month-one after the Kayrala encirclement and another as the corps drew up to the Verman line. He concluded his a.s.sessment with the statement that the corps could advance no further with the forces it had a.s.signed. While there was still a possibility of reaching Kandalaksha before winter, Feige stated that to do so he needed another Finnish division and a German mountain division. However, time was of the essence since the Soviets were improving their defenses with each pa.s.sing day.

General Feige must surely have been aware of the efforts made by the Army of Norway to obtain additional forces, although those efforts were late. Falkenhorst had requested the two remaining regiments of the 163rd Division on August 25, 1941 and on September 4 General Buschenhagen had requested the use of the 6th Mountain Division. On September 14 Falkenhorst had again requested the remainder of the 163rd Division and the 6th Mountain Division. There was no reply to the August 25 request for the 163rd Division and, as we saw earlier, both Hitler and Dietl were determined to use the 6th Mountain Division in the far north. With respect to the second request for the 163rd Division on September 14, OKW promised a reply as soon as the operations around Leningrad were sorted out.

The request for the 163rd Division on August 25, even if OKW had acted on it, came too late to add much punch to the pursuit after the Kayrala encirclement. It would take some time to withdraw the 163rd Division from East Karelia and move it and its support base several hundred miles. The request for the 6th Mountain Division on September 4 was likewise too late. The division was still on its way from Greece by way of Norway and was not expected to reach the Mountain Corps Norway's area of operations until sometime in October.

The Army of Norway instructed x.x.xVI Corps on September 17 to rest its troops for the time being on the Verman River line. Feige was promised two battalions from an organization referred to as Schutzenverband Oslo. This was a regimental-size unit of two battalions organized in Norway. The unit was not yet available; it was on the way to Finland from Norway and the quality of this makeshift organization was open to question. General Feige predicted that the operations of his corps had come to an end since winter was fast approaching.

Hitler's War Operational Directive Number 36, issued on September 22, still called for the x.x.xVI to continue its offensive against Kandalaksha in October.16 The Army of Norway was told that Mannerheim would be asked to release the 163rd Division in time to take part in the offensive. The directive also called for the release of all German troops from the Finnish III Corps and for them to be reattached to x.x.xVI Corps. Finnish III Corps was to halt all its offensive operations. This was yet another change to German strategy in Finland and the promised additional forces were too little and too late. It was soon learned, for example, that the 163rd Division was not expected to join the x.x.xVI Corps for four to five weeks, after the full fury of winter had set in on the central front in Finland.

This realization led to yet another shift in strategy by the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst disregarded Directive 36 since the premise on which it was based-the timely arrival of the 163rd Division-was no longer realizable. Instead of terminating operations by III Finnish Corps, Falkenhorst began withdrawing troops from the x.x.xVI Corps for use in the Finnish III Corps area. Offensive operations in the x.x.xVI area were delayed until winter.

This was not the end of the back-and-forth about strategy in Finland between the Army of Norway and the OKW. On October 8 the OKW ordered a stop to all operations in the Army of Norway sector. This resulted in a call from the Army of Norway to OKW for an explanation. This was at a time when the great encirclement battles by Army Group Center at Bryansk and Vyazma had been concluded with Soviet losses estimated at 300,000 killed and 700,000 captured.17 With Army Group Center beginning its final drive against Moscow a sense of unwarranted optimism prevailed in Berlin. OKW believed that the military collapse of the Soviet Union was imminent. In view of this, it was felt that it was not necessary to push things in central Finland. This is essentially the explanation given to General Buschenhagen by General Jodl. It was confirmed by Fuhrer Directive Number 37 on October 10, 1941.18 Offensive operations by the Army of Norway were to cease and its mission reverted to protecting the nickel mines and making preparations for seizing the Rybachiy Peninsula and Murmansk. It was planned to give Mannerheim control of the Finnish III Corps as part of his planned reorganization of the Finnish Army and the x.x.xVI Corps was instructed to detach its Finnish units and have them revert to III Corps control and at the same time transfer the SS Division Nord to the control of the x.x.xVI Corps.

Finnish III Corps Operations.

The operations in the Finnish III Corps area had also turned decisively against the Army of Norway. The Soviets had increased their forces confronting both Groups J and F. The 88th Soviet Rifle Division was moved into the Group J area along with an ad hoc unit referred to as Independent Brigade Grivnin. This unit was made up of one regiment from the 54th Rifle Division and a unit referred to as Special Regiment Murmansk. Group F, west of Ukhta, confronted the 54th Rifle Division (short one regiment). Under constant pressure, Group J had to abandon its forward positions and fall back. It ended up in new defensive positions about 13 kilometers east of Kestenga. Group F attempted to resume its offensive but was stopped dead in its tracks by the 54th Rifle Division.

As the situation in the Group J area looked very threatening, possibly necessitating a further withdrawal, the Army of Norway asked for an additional Finnish regiment for this sector on September 9. Ziemke writes that General Erfurth, the chief German liaison officer at Mannerheim's headquarters, refused to relay the request to the Marshal.19 Erfurth does not mention this in his book. He only observes that the difficulties in the Army of Norway area caused Falkenhorst to ask the Finns for help. He also observes that the frequent changes in German plans decreased Finnish willingness to heed the German requests.20 On September 12 the Army of Norway pulled the SS Reconnaissance Battalion out of the x.x.xVI Corps sector in order to provide the Finnish III Corps with a reserve. The transfer of the regimental headquarters and one battalion of the 14th Finnish Regiment from Pechenga to the III Corps area were also ordered. This reshuffling of forces to the III Corps area took place while the main effort was still a.s.signed to the x.x.xVI Corps and while that commander was virtually begging for reinforcements. It underscores the lack of an overall strategy and may well have contributed to a Finnish refusal of a second request from Falkenhorst for a fresh regiment. Mannerheim did promise to provide 2,800 troops as replacements for losses in III Corps.

Relations had soured between Falkenhorst and subordinate Finnish commanders. The transfer of the SS Reconnaissance Battalion to the Finnish III Corps brought virtually all SS Division Nord units into that corps. General Siilasvuo, the III Corps commander, had split the SS Division and a.s.signed its units to his two groups-primarily Group J. This left General Demelhuber, the commander of SS Division Nord, and his staff as mere onlookers. The SS Division had improved since its debacle at Salla but the Finns still considered it an unreliable unit if left on its own. Demelhuber had obviously complained about this state of affairs to Falkenhorst who now insisted to General Siilasvuo that all SS units be placed under the command of General Demelhuber with their own sector of operations. While General Siilasvuo resisted, Falkenhorst was not about to have a German division commanded by a Finnish colonel. Siilasvuo appealed the decision later in the month but Falkenhorst refused to reconsider.

A trip by Falkenhorst to Hitler's headquarters on September 14 resulted in yet another change of plans for the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst was ordered to stop the attack by Group F against Ukhta and have Group J and SS Division Nord take up defensive positions. These orders were later confirmed in Fuhrer Directive 36.

Intelligence from prisoner interrogations convinced III Corps at the end of September that Soviet morale was poor among the forces in the area between Kestenga and Loukhi. III Corps planned to resume its advance against Loukhi and asked the Army of Norway for reinforcements. Falkenhorst agreed with the request despite Hitler's orders on September 14 to halt all offensive operations in the III Corps sector and he offered Siilasvuo the following units: One regiment from the 6th Finnish Division.

The two infantry battalions that const.i.tuted Schutzenverband Oslo.

The 9th SS Infantry Regiment from Mountain Corps Norway.

One regiment of artillery.

The last battalion of the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment, also from the Mountain Corps Norway sector.

The Army of Norway issued orders for the III Corps attack on October 6 but had to cancel the order on October 8 since OKW, in accordance with Hitler's earlier instructions, ordered that all offensive operations cease. The cancellation order came as the troop deployments were underway. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment and the lone battalion from the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment were allowed to move into the III Corps sector but remained under Army of Norway control.

Generals Falkenhorst and Siilasvuo had a meeting on October 11, 1941. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss developments in the left sector of III Corps. It had been learned that one of the major units facing Group J and SS Division Nord-Independent Brigade Grivnin-had been dissolved. One of its regiments was moved south to join the 54th Rifle Division while another regiment had been identified in the x.x.xVI Corps sector. Both generals agreed that the prospects for an attack were good but, in view of Hitler's orders, it was decided to characterize their planned attack as an attempt to improve the defensive positions of Group J and SS Division Nord.

Major General Siilasvuo reported to Falkenhorst on October 23 that he believed the attack discussed on October 11 would prove to be a complete success. Falkenhorst asked if Siilasvuo believed that a drive directly to Loukhi was possible. The Finn gave an affirmative answer. Falkenhorst's question to Siilasvuo is a clear revelation of his intention. He saw a chance to accomplish the Army of Norway's mission of cutting the Murmansk Railroad and grabbed it despite Hitler's instructions on September 14 and the OKW order on October 8. The redeployment of forces that the Army of Norway had ordered on October 6 gave Siilasvuo and Falkenhorst the extra forces they believed necessary for the new offensive.

Major General Siilasvuo set the objectives for the attack. It involved a close encirclement of the Soviet forces along the front and then a quick drive to Loukhi. The SS Division Nord was given the mission of tying down the Soviet forces on their front while three Finnish regiments and the 9th SS Infantry Regiment broke through the Soviet positions along the railroad. The breakthrough forces would then turn north and encircle the Soviet troops tied down by the SS Division Nord. A task force of two Finnish battalions would bypa.s.s the southern Soviet flank and advance to Verkhneye Lake south of Lebedevo Lake.

The attack began on October 30 and by November 1, III Corps had encircled the Soviet regiment holding the front in the SS Division Nord sector. It had been General Siilasvuo's intention to destroy the encirclement as quickly as possible while the bulk of his forces pushed on to seize the narrows between Lakes Lebedevo and Yelovoye on their way to Loukhi. However, there was a sharp change in his intention soon after the encirclement was completed. He insisted to the Army of Norway that he needed time to eliminate the Soviet pocket before he could resume his advance.

A message from OKW on October 9 requested information about Falkenhorst's intentions and reminded him pointedly about Fuhrer Directive Number 37, which had prohibited offensive operations in the III Corps area. In its reply, the Army of Norway pointed to the successes already achieved: the destruction of two regiments of the 88th Soviet Rifle Division and the seizure of the narrows between Yelovoye Lake and Lebedevo Lake. This area provided an excellent starting point for operations against Loukhi.

The Army of Norway also received a message from General Erfurth. The message requested that III Corps cease offensive operations as soon as possible because Mannerheim wanted to proceed with the reorganization of the Finnish Army (to be discussed in Chapter 6). This message elicited the logical question from the Army of Norway-what was meant by as soon as possible? Erfurth replied that the timing was left up to the Army of Norway but Mannerheim wanted to proceed with his reorganization plans quickly.

The cleaning out of pockets of Soviet soldiers was completed by November 13. Over 3,000 dead were reported as well as 2,600 prisoners. While the Soviets had moved reinforcements into the area in form of the 186th Rifle Division, it was not viewed as a serious obstacle since it was less than 3,000 men strong. It was in fact the Polyarnyy Division, which had made an appearance in the Mountain Corps Norway sector in September. It had been renamed and moved south when operations on the Litsa front came to an end.

Despite the successes achieved, General Siilasvuo made no move to exploit them. In fact, he grew downright gloomy in his a.s.sessment. On November 16 he reported that his troops were facing 17 enemy battalions and his conclusion was that further attacks by his corps would produce no results. This was followed by a report on November 18 that his corps was not capable of continuing the operation and that he would instead adopt a defensive posture. His immediate subordinates, the commanders of Group J and SS Division Nord, disagreed openly with Siilasvuo's a.s.sessment and felt that the prospects for a continued offensive were good. The German liaison officer at III Corps reported that the commander of Group J, as late as November 18, considered his unit fully capable of continuing the offensive and his regimental commanders concurred. The drawbacks of coalition warfare were beginning to haunt Falkenhorst's efforts.

Major General Buschenhagen, Falkenhorst's chief of staff, traveled to Helsinki on October 15 to try to sort out various aspects relating to the Army of Norway and to visit Major General Warlimont from OKW. It probably came as no surprise to Buschenhagen that OKW was upset with the activities by the Army of Norway in view of earlier directives not to engage in offensive operations. Warlimont repeated General Erfurth's earlier arguments that Mannerheim wanted control of his troops in order to carry out his reorganization plans. Warlimont told Buschenhagen that the Germans had to start removing their troops from III Corps no later than December 1, 1941. He also told Buschenhagen that Heinrich Himmler wanted the SS Division Nord sent back to Germany with a rather vague promise that he would provide replacement units.

Although the Finns maintained that the reason for halting offensive operations was to facilitate Mannerheim's plans for reorganizing the Finnish Army, it is more likely that the primary reason was political. Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Finland were broken on July 31, 1941. A note from the British government to the Finnish government sent via the Norwegian Emba.s.sy in Helsinki on September 22 demanded that Finland end hostilities and pull its troops back to the 1939 borders. If the Finns continued their advance into Soviet territory the British would treat Finland as a hostile nation. After lengthy discussions within the Finnish government, in which Mannerheim partic.i.p.ated, the Finns politely rejected the British note.21 What may have had a more decisive impact on Finnish behavior as far as III Corps operations were concerned was an intervention by the US (although not a belligerent at this time). The US amba.s.sador to Finland presented a memorandum from the US government to President Ryti on October 27, 1941. The note included the following demands: Insofar as the Finnish government is anxious to preserve the friendship of the United States now and in the future, the United States government must be given satisfactory a.s.surances that the intention of the Finnish government is immediately to cease operations against Russian territory, and that Finnish forces will immediately be withdrawn (in principle) from Russian territory to a line corresponding to the 1939 boundary between Finland and the Soviet Union.

In the event that attacks are made against shipments of military supplies from the United States en route to Russia via the Arctic Ocean, and such attack is presumably made or may be claimed to be made from Finnish-controlled territory, it must be a.s.sumed that in view of the public opinion now prevailing in the United States such an incident must be a.s.sumed to lead to an immediate crisis in FinnishAmerican relations.22 The US warning was elaborated on in another memorandum on October 30 and at a press conference by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 3, 1941. The October 30 memorandum stated that Finnish military operations (presumably against the Murmansk Railroad) "const.i.tuted a definite threat to the security of the United States."23 While the Finnish government rejected the US demands, we may a.s.sume that Finland did not want a Finnish unit (III Corps) under German command posing the only serious danger to the route by which American military equipment and supplies were delivered to the Soviet Union. It was therefore important to stop the offensive operations of III Corps, return the German units under its control to the Army of Norway, and bring III Corps back under Finnish control. This is also what Falkenhorst suspected as the reason for the unusual att.i.tude of Major General Siilasvuo who was probably briefed by Mannerheim.24 Mannerheim, in his memoirs, is silent on this subject.

German Command and Organizational Changes.

Mannerheim was not the only one contemplating organizational changes. Fuhrer Directive Number 37, issued on October 10, ordered the Army of Norway to go over to defensive operations. It is not surprising that Falkenhorst fell by the wayside in the wake of this directive. It was the inevitable price for the failure of the Army of Norway to achieve its main objectives-the capture of Murmansk or its isolation. Falkenhorst was also a demanding officer with rough edges who frequently ruffled feathers of fellow Germans as well as his Finnish "brothers-in-arms."

Falkenhorst did not leave in disgrace-he remained as commander in chief in Norway until December 18, 1944-and he may have been pleased by the change. Up to now he had been saddled with enormous responsibilities, and had to operate two army headquarters more than 1,600 kilometers apart. In Norway he commanded a single army with a very specific defensive mission.

The selection of General der Gebirgstruppe General Eduard Dietl as a replacement for Falkenhorst was also almost pre-ordained. He was an early supporter of Hitler. He and his company stood ready to support Hitler and his followers during the Beer Hall Putsch on November 9, 1923. His stubborn defense of Narvik for two months in 1940 when many, including Hitler, were ready to give up the game gave him an almost legendary status. Dietl was one of the few generals that Hitler had grown to like and trust over the years. He was loved by his troops and had a personality and charm well suited for dealing with the Finns who also admired him.

The instructions issued on November 7, 1941, by the OKW directed an early transfer of command. Falkenhorst and the Headquarters, Army of Norway, would return to Norway. Dietl would a.s.sume command of all German forces in Finland and northern Norway and establish a new headquarters, designated the Army of Lapland.

Everyone appears to have been pleased by the new command arrangement-except Dietl. He was basically a troop commander, not a manager, and was happiest when he was at the front with his troops. A briefing at the Army of Norway headquarters brought home to him the enormity of the job he was about to a.s.sume and he may well have sincerely doubted his own abilities to deal with this managerial task. Dietl wrote a letter to General Jodl on November 24 asking that his a.s.signment as commander, Army of Lapland be withdrawn. This unusual action by an officer who was being promoted resulted in an order for him to report to Hitler's headquarters. In the end, Hitler and Jodl prevailed on him not to give up the command to which he had been appointed.

a.n.a.lysis of Operations in Central Finland.

The OKW and the Army of Norway made a number of serious strategic and tactical mistakes in 1941 that are complex in nature and difficult to understand. Most have their inception in the planning and preparations for operations out of Finland. Ziemke attempts to explain the problems in a different way. He writes: In the first place, the objective of the Army of Norway [with respect to Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad] was political and psychological rather than strategic.... There is some reason for believing that the operation was directed more against Great Britain, to demonstrate its isolation and helplessness, then against the Soviet Union. Under those circ.u.mstances it became worthwhile to disregard sound tactics and attempt to stage a quick march along the arctic coast to Murmansk.25 Hitler's obsession with the defense of Norway-where no real threat existed in 1941-played a large part in his decisions regarding Finland. Hitler's views regarding Murmansk were heavily influenced by his concerns for the security of the nickel mines near Pechenga-and the iron mines in north Sweden-shown by the arguments he used in his meeting with Dietl in April 1941. He viewed Russian troops in Murmansk as a threat to those mines and to northern Norway. Therefore, it is unlikely that a demonstration of Great Britain's helplessness was foremost in Hitler's mind when it came to Murmansk.

Ziemke is definitely right in his observation that the operations in Finland were begun with inadequate forces and that OKH was correct in not providing substantial reinforcements that would detract from the main effort in Russia. Substantial forces could, however, have been provided from those seven divisions that sat idle in Norway but here again we are confronted with Hitler's obsession with the defense of Norway.

When it comes to German operations in Finland in 1941 we are again faced with a complex and confusing picture. One is forced to conclude that there was a great amount of uncertainty in the Army of Norway and at the highest level in Germany, caused by a lack of a coherent strategy. This resulted in constant changes. Some of these changes originated with the Army of Norway but others were caused by OKW meddling in the operations of that army.

Seven divisions (five German and two Finnish) were employed at four different points and the effective main effort kept shifting throughout 1941. Two German divisions and one Finnish regiment were used in the far north. Two German divisions and one Finnish division were used initially on the Salla front. SS Division Nord was subsequently fragmented and eventually sent to the III Corps area. The III Finnish Corps, with one division initially, was employed 140 kilometers to the south of Salla. It was subsequently reinforced in driblets by units from the SS Division Nord. Finally, the badly split 163rd German Infantry Division was used in the far south, in Mannerheim's main offensive.

Although a main effort was designated initially, the force levels in each of the three areas reveal that no main effort existed. In failing to come up with a strategy supported organizationally within the German armed forces, the Germans let a golden opportunity for decisive results slip away in 1941. The Finns, seeing shifting plans and the lack of progress, became increasingly difficult to deal with, a situation aggravated by outside influences on the Finnish government.

The blame for the lack of a coherent strategy cannot be laid at the feet of Falkenhorst alone as Erfurth and Feige appear to do. Much of the fault can be traced back to inadequate planning and preparation and OKW meddling. The shifting of forces from one area to another to exploit opportunities rather than to create opportunities was not wise in view of the enormous transportation and supply difficulties in northern and central Finland.

Falkenhorst had a thankless job. He did not have the complete control of operations that you would expect of an army commander. He did not control air operations in his area of responsibility-the 5th Air Fleet in Norway answered to Goring and if he did not want to cooperate he had the ear of Hitler. Similarly, the SS Division he had a.s.signed had a direct channel to Himmler. The commander of the Finnish III Corps had a direct line to Mannerheim who kept a close eye on the happenings in the Army of Norway area since Finnish troops were heavily involved.

Falkenhorst's force requests were submitted to OKH. That headquarters, completely absorbed with operations in the Soviet Union proper and North Africa, increasingly viewed the operations by the Army of Norway as a drain of valuable resources that were sorely needed elsewhere.

Finally, there was a surprising disregard for the chain of command within the army. Dietl was subordinate to Falkenhorst but in Chapter 3 we saw that he frequently dealt directly with OKW on operational matters. He even took positions opposing those held by the Army of Norway (for example, the use of the 6th Mountain Division).

It has already been noted that Generals Feige and Dietl felt that the real main effort should be in the Kandalaksha sector. Dietl had felt this way since April 1941 and never changed his views. Falkenhorst, on the other hand, was a proponent for cutting the Murmansk Railroad further south at Loukhi, from the III Corps sector. Feige and Dietl were correct from a tactical standpoint and also on strategic grounds. The place to cut the Murmansk Railroad for the most decisive results was at Kandalaksha. Cutting it further south-between Kandalaksha and Belomorsk-would not be as effective since the Soviets could bring supplies and equipment by rail to Kandalaksha and from there across the White Sea to Archangel or Onega by ship. Cutting the line south of Belomorsk would serve no purpose because a recently completed rail line from Belomorsk connected with the line from Archangel, thus avoiding the use of the southern part of the Murmansk Railroad from Belomorsk to Volkhov.26 The Kandalaksha sector was also the only one of the three that had a relative good road and rail network that could logistically support the large forces required to interdict the Murmansk Railroad.

General Erfurth was a strong proponent of achieving relative superiority. In his book, Die uberraschung im Krieg, published in 1938 he writes "To achieve relative superiority somewhere is the main objective of almost all military movements and the essential purpose of generalship."27 It is therefore surprising that he supported the movement of the 163rd Infantry Division to Karelia-where it accomplished virtually nothing-and was very critical of the decision to give one of its regiments to Falkenhorst. Giving the whole division to Falkenhorst might have given him the necessary forces to carry out his mission.

Erfurth argued later that General Siilasvuo would probably have reached Loukhi if he had been given an additional division in a timely manner and that Marshal Mannerheim had expressed the same opinion on several occasions.28 By an additional division they are undoubtedly referring to the 6th Finnish Division attached to x.x.xVI Corps, and they are probably right. However, Falkenhorst had already given Siilasvuo SS Division Nord and, in view of the condition of the 169th Division, he had no further forces to spare based on security requirements in x.x.xVI Corps' sector. The presence of the whole 163rd Division would have allowed him to release the 6th Finnish Division.

In an article published in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau in 1952 and cited by Ziemke, General Erfurth suggested that the Army of Norway failed to follow OKW orders on several occasions. Falkenhorst did deviate from plans and orders several times to seize opportunities. The prerogative and expectation that a commander would do so had been part of German military doctrine since the late 1600s. The concept was referred to as Selbstandigkeit der Unterfuhrer (Independence of Subordinates).

Erfurth also claims in the same article that the orders violated were intended to create a main effort. The orders to which he must be referring are the ones issued on July 7 and 30. It is somewhat misleading to characterize those as establishing a main effort. If anything, they were disruptive.

The July 7 OKW order dealt with the transfer of forces to Mountain Corps Norway after the capture of Salla. Dietl needed reinforcements-he had asked for one regiment. There is no indication that this represented a change in the main effort. The other order to which Erfurth is referring must be the Fuhrer Directive of July 30. It stopped the x.x.xVI Corps offensive and directed increased efforts in the Mountain Corps Norway and III Corps sectors. By this time Falkenhorst had unfortunately already switched his efforts to the Mountain Corps Norway and Finnish III Corps sectors. If the July 30 directive did anything, it appears to have blessed actions already taken by Falkenhorst. The effort in the far north was stopped by atrocious terrain and lack of lines of communication. The effort in the III Corps sector also had poor lines of communication but here the effort collapsed through Finnish refusal-probably on political grounds-to carry it out.

The frequent movement of regiments and battalions from one sector to another during the summer and fall point to uncertainty in German headquarters caused by a lack of cohesive strategy. However, Ziemke's explanation for the shifting of forces should be kept in mind as it was obviously a contributing factor: Falkenhorst maintained consistently and correctly that to relax the pressure at any one point meant giving the Russians an opportunity to exploit the superior maneuverability which the Murmansk Railroad afforded them to pull out troops and shift them to one of the other sectors. With the troops at its disposal the Army of Norway could not create a true main effort anywhere without defeating its own ends in the process and could not shut down any single sector without creating a potential threat elsewhere.29 This observation in turn reveals the fact that the Germans were overcommitted. When overcommitted, the judicious use of available forces is more important than ever. The correct place for judicious offensive action was opposite Kandalaksha. General Erfurth agrees despite his above support for an increase of forces in the III Corps sector.30 The Germans underestimated both the difficulties that the terrain posed for an attacker, and the capabilities and determination of their foe. These were surprises for the Germans and had a devastating effect on some of the poorly trained units that were sent to Finland.

Finally, when it comes to air operations-a factor that cannot be overemphasized in the spectacular string of German victories up to this point-the resources were not up to the demands placed on them. This again supports the observation of overcommitment. They had to support operations of three corps separated by great distances. If the Murmansk Railroad could not be seized, adequate air a.s.sets should have been provided so as to render the railroad and trans-shipment facilities useless for considerable periods of time.

When Dietl a.s.sumed command of the Army of Lapland, his command had been forced into a defensive posture in all sectors and the outlook for the future was bleak. After about 100 days of fighting the Germans had suffered nearly 22,000 casualties and the Finnish forces in the German areas had close to 7,000 casualties. Those who had watched the performance of the German Army in Finland with a sense of disillusionment were hoping that the Hero of Narvik could turn the situation around.

FIVE.

THE FINNISH OFFENSIVES.

Military Situation and Operational Concept.

The Finns were much better prepared for war in 1941 than in 1939. They had an officer and noncommissioned officer corps of proven leaders with solid experience from the Winter War. These men, who had proven themselves in the past, faced the prospect of another encounter with their traditional foe with confidence. Furthermore, they were not alone as they had been in 1939. They were now entering the fight at the side of Germany, the world's leading military power.

The Finnish leaders, realizing that the imposed peace of 1940 was not the end of their troubles with the Soviet Union, had done all that could be done to prepare themselves for a new conflict. The stocks of supplies and equipment, exhausted in March 1940, had been replenished with German a.s.sistance. The increase in automatic weapons for the infantry had significantly improved their firepower. Heavy field artillery batteries, lacking in the Winter War, were now available. Air defenses had been improved and strengthened, however, although the Finnish Air Force was in better shape than during the Winter War, it was still inadequate in size for the tasks that lay ahead.

One of the most important improvements dealt with mobilization. New procedures inst.i.tuted in the short period since the end of the Winter War resulted in the ability to field almost twice as many operational units. By the time the ground war began Finland had about 500,000 men under arms, an amazing feat for a country with a population of four million. When military construction and men and women auxiliaries are included, the number of individuals involved in the military or military-related activities amounted to 630,000 or over 15% of the population.1 Even with such a ma.s.sive mobilization it is highly questionable whether the Finns could have conducted their offensives in the south had it not been for the fact that the Germans had relieved them of the responsibility for defending a 500+ kilometer stretch of frontier in Lapland. In addition, the northward advance of German Army Group North served as a magnet that drew Soviet forces away from the Finnish front.

Such a large military was unsustainable in a prolonged war and it strongly suggests that Mannerheim and other Finnish leaders expected the war to be short. They, like so many others, were highly impressed by the string of spectacular German victories in Scandinavia, western Europe, and the Balkans and probably expected the Soviet armed forces to quickly crumble. When this did not materialize in the first six months of the war the large Finnish military establishment became a serious economic liability that had to be rectified.

The Finns had asked for a few days' delay in the attack by their main army until operations in the far north and around Salla had begun. As related in Chapter 2, Erfurth explains that the Finns wanted to create the impression among the people and members of parliament that Finland was being drawn into the war by events outside its control. This accorded well with the wishes of OKH. That headquarters wanted the Finns to strike from the north at the most effective time, as Army Group North approached the last natural obstacle south of Leningrad-the Dvina River, which was reached on a wide front on July 1, 1941. By July 4 the OKH had sufficient confidence in the continued progress of Army Group North to ask the Finns to launch their attacks on July 10.

The general concept of operations by the main Finnish army had been thrashed out on January 30, and again in the period June 2428. The Finns, despite Mannerheim's disclaimer below, appear to have initially wanted to undertake operations west of Lake Ladoga with the goal of recovering the important territory on the Karelian Isthmus, which they had lost in the Winter War. The Germans, on the other hand, wanted the Finns to attack on both sides of Lake Ladoga, with the main effort in the east. This wish was again expressed by OKH on June 24 and reflected in the Finnish plans submitted on June 28, 1941.

Mannerheim writes that, despite the wishes in some Finnish circles for the immediate reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus, he opposed this idea from the beginning. He explains that by initiating operations on the Karelian Isthmus the Soviets would believe that he was aiming at Leningrad and would marshal strong forces in opposition at a time when Army Group North was still far to the south. Mannerheim writes "It was my firm opinion that such an undertaking was against the interest of the country, and from the beginning I had informed the President of the Republic and the government that under no circ.u.mstances would I lead an offensive against the great city on the Neva."2 Mannerheim describes the development of the concept of operations by the Finnish Army as follows: Instead of attacking on the Karelian Isthmus, I decided to commence an offensive north of Ladoga on either side of Lake Janisjarvi, with the beach of the Ladoga west and east of the town of Sortavala as its first objective, and the next one the frontier. A thrust north of Lake Janisjarvi towards the Suojarvi area formed part of the main operation. The aim was to sever the way of retreat for the Russian forces concentrated west of Sortavala, and to roll up the enemy's position north of Vuoksi, thereby creating a favourable initial situation for a later offensive against Viipuri and the Isthmus3 While-as Lundin points out-the sources are murky, imprecise, and contradictory, there is no doubt that Mannerheim's memoirs imply that the concept of operations was his, not that of the OKH.4 German sources claim that the initial wish of the Finns was for an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and that this issue was thrashed out in the meetings between General Heinrichs, the chief of the Finnish General Staff, and General Halder, the chief of staff of OKH, on January 30 and the results were as expressed by the OKH on June 24.

General Waldemar Erfurth, the chief of the German liaison staff at Mannerheim's headquarters, relates a completely different story from that told by Mannerheim: As the Finns saw it, based on the experience of all former wars against Russia, the main theater of war had to be the Karelian Isthmus.... It was, therefore, quite natural that the thoughts of the Finnish Commander-in-Chief were occupied chiefly with the Karelian Isthmus as the main theater of war of the planned Finnish offensive. The deployment of Finnish forces was carried out mainly in accordance with this idea.5 Erfurth continues:.

The German brothers-in-arms had other plans, however. The greater the success of the German offensive in western Russia, the more pressing became the demands of the German High Command that Marshal Mannerheim should not direct the main thrust of his army by way of the Karelian Isthmus toward Leningrad, but east of Lake Ladoga toward Lodeynoye Pole on the Svir. The German Army High Command desired that the strongest possible Finnish forces advance to the Svir and there unite for a decisive operation with Army Group North, which was proceeding across the Volkhov River.6 General Hermann Holter, who was present in Finland at the time, supports Erfurth's story. He writes: During the first consideration of operations by the Finns, the Karelian Isthmus was instinctively in the foreground of strategic wishes. The wish of the German High Command, however, that the Finns should make their princ.i.p.al thrust east of Lake Ladoga, in order to "join hands" with the German Army Group on the Svir, led to the operations of the "Finnish Karelian Army" under General Heinrichs through Ladogan Karelia to the Svir.7 It is not clear why Mannerheim elected not to conduct simultaneous offensives on both sides of Lake Ladoga and across the Karelian Isthmus, or what the German views were on this issue. Mannerheim may have hoped that the German Army Group North's continued drive towards Leningrad would cause the Soviets, in an effort to halt the German advance, to substantially reduce their forces on the isthmus. A delayed Finnish advance in this area would encounter less opposition. This appears to be what eventually happened. There may also have been logistical reasons for staggering the offensives.

It was important for the Finns to quickly occupy both Ladogan Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet air attacks against Finnish towns presented a serious problem. Enemy bombers usually approached Finland across the Gulf of Finland from their airfields in Estonia. There was not much the Finns could do about this threat since their air force was too weak to prevent the raids. The Finns hoped that the advance of Army Group North would soon eliminate this threat.

The Soviets had expanded old airfields and built new ones in the territory they had conquered in the Winter War on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area east of Lake Ladoga. Soviet aircraft using these fields presented a difficult problem for the Finnish early warning network and their air defense forces. Since the removal of this threat could be accomplished only with Finnish ground offensives, their elimination played a prominent part in Finnish planning.

Order of Battle.

The Finnish forces were deployed generally along a line from Hanko on the Gulf of Finland to an area around Lieksa, southwest of Belomorsk (Sorokka). Along this line the Finns had deployed five army corps as follows: 1. IV Corps, commanded by Major General Karl Lennart Oesch, had its right wing on the Gulf of Finland west of Viipuri and its left wing on the Vuoksi River. It consisted initially of three divisions-8th, 12th and 4th-and the 2nd Coastal Brigade. The 10th Division was apparently in a reserve status to the rear of the boundary between IV Corps and II Corps.8 2. The II Corps, commanded by Major General Taavetti Laatikainen, occupied a front north of the Karelian Isthmus and Lake Ladoga stretching from the left flank of IV Corps to the right flank of VII Corps. It consisted initially of three divisions-the 2nd, 18th, and 15th.

3. The Army of Karelia occupied the front from the left flank of II Corps opposite the narrows between Lakes Pyha and Ladoga in the south to just north of Ilomantsi in the north. Under normal circ.u.mstances Finnish corps were directed by the Finnish High Command without the interposition of an army headquarters. An exception was made in this case as it appeared doubtful that a multi-corps advance into Karelia could be effectively directed from Mannerheim's headquarters. The decision was made to create an army-the Army of Karelia-under the command of Lieutenant General Heinrichs, Mannerheim's chief of staff. He retained his job as chief of staff but the duties were actually performed by deputies, first by Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo, chief of the command section and later by Major General Edvard Fritjof Hanell, chief of fortifications. The major units of the Army of Karelia were two corps, one light corps-size group, and an army reserve.

a. VII Corps, commanded by Major General Johan Woldemar Hagglund, occupied the right wing of the Army of Karelia, from Lake Pyha to the outskirts of Vyartsilya (Vartsila). It consisted initially of two divisions-the 19th and 7th.

b. VI Corps held the center of the Army of Karelia from Vyartsilya to Korpiselkya (Korpiselka). It was commanded by Major General Paavo Juho Talvela and consisted initially of the 11th and 5th Divisions.

c. Task Force Oinonen occupied the left wing of the Army of Karelia, positioned north of the Ilomantsi area. It consisted of the cavalry brigade and the 1st and 2nd Jager Brigades.9 The task force was commanded by Major General Woldemar Oinonen.

d. The 1st Division was in reserve behind the Army of Karelia.

4. The 14th Division covered the left flank of the Finnish Army and filled the gap between that army and the Army of Norway. It was commanded by Colonel Erkki Johannes Raappana and stationed in the Lieksa area. This division was directly subordinated to Marshal Mannerheim.

5. The 17th Division had the mission of sealing off Hanko.

6. The 163rd German Infantry Division (minus one regiment) arrived in early July and Mannerheim stationed it initially at Joensuu behind the Army of Karelia as his reserve.10 The composition of the corps changed frequently during the war as corps headquarters were moved around and divisions and brigades were detached from one corps and attached to another.

The Soviet forces facing the Finnish Army were part of Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov's Northwest Front. The 32nd Soviet Army11 was responsible for the area north of Lake Onega. It consisted of five divisions. In the Army of Karelia sector north and east of Lake Ladoga the Soviet 7th Army had three divisions forward and one in reserve. The Soviet 23rd Army on the Karelian Isthmus had four divisions of stationary troops manning the border fortifications and three divisions in reserve. The Soviet troops at Hanko consisted of two infantry brigades plus a number of specialized units. At the outset of the war the Soviets had the equivalent of 18 divisions at the fronts in Finland and they faced 15 Finnish and four German divisions.12 German pressure from the south forced the Soviets to weaken their forces along the Finnish border in order to make units available to contest the advance of Army Group North. By the time the Finns began their operations, the Soviets had redeployed nearly all their reserve formations. The Finns were thus confronted by only seven divisions plus the two brigades at Hanko, giving them a 4:1 superiority in infantry and a 9:1 superiority in artillery.13 They could also remain relatively a.s.sured that the forces opposing them would not increase markedly in the near future as the Soviets were throwing all they had at the approaching Germans.