Finland's War of Choice Part 4

The 3rd Mountain Division resumed its offensive on September 14 with both regiments. While they were able to secure the area around the lakes, the exhausted condition of the troops and the inclement weather (cold, rain, and sleet) took its toll. Both divisions were so worn down that their activities on September 15 and 16 were limited to patrols and minor offensive operations to frustrate Soviet counterattacks.

While the main reasons for stopping offensive operations had to do with determined Soviet resistance, the lateness of the season, and supply difficulties, other problems also had a great impact for the Army of Norway and OKW. Mention has already been made of the loss of two German transports on September 12 and 13. The German Navy then halted all shipping to ports east of North Cape. This coincided with an inventory of supplies on hand in the Mountain Corps Norway. While there were sufficient rations and fuel on hand to last until the end of September, ammunition was critically short.

The realization began to set in at the Army of Norway that the supply difficulties in the Mountain Corps Norway sector would only increase with the arrival of the 6th Mountain Division. The prospects of capturing Murmansk under these circ.u.mstances were very dim. While the Army of Norway proposed to move the 6th Mountain Division to central Finland to take part in the attack on Kandalaksha, Hitler did not agree.

In a conference with General Falkenhorst in Berlin on September 15 Hitler agreed that the effort to reach Murmansk in 1941 should be abandoned. However, in a poor compromise, he insisted that the attacks in progress should be allowed to run their course and that the 6th Mountain Division should be moved up to relieve the 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions. The 6th Mountain Division was expected to hold the line during the winter and prepare to resume the attack against Murmansk in the spring.

After Falkenhorst left Berlin, Hitler decided-with Jodl's support-to use battleships to clear the sealanes in the far north. This view was probably supported by General Falkenhorst, who considered that the threat from the British Navy posed the greatest danger to the shipping route. Actually, the presence of eleven Soviet submarines stationed off the Norwegian coast was a more immediate danger. Falkenhorst may not have known about the deployment of that many submarines in the area around the North Cape or he may have felt that they could be countered by an increase in the number of lighter German naval units.

Admiral Raeder refused to use his battleships in a defensive role as escorts for convoys. He pointed out that the enemy could quickly muster superior forces and that the clearing of the sealanes would only be a temporary measure as the naval threat would quickly reappear.

British naval operations in the far north had a primarily political objective: the demonstration of support for the Soviet Union. Sea operations in the far north to support land operations were basically viewed by the British as a waste of precious resources that promised little payoff. This was their experience in late July when, in response to a Soviet request, the British had sent two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, and six destroyers into the area. Aircraft from the two carriers bombed Pechenga, Liinahamair, and Kirkenes. The damage inflicted was relatively minor and the losses in aircraft high.

A smaller British naval force-two cruisers and two destroyers-was sent into the area on August 19 but its primary mission was to evacuate the residents of Svalbard and destroy the coal mines located there. A third incursion into the Arctic Ocean took place at the end of August. This force consisted of two cruisers, an aircraft carrier, and a freighter loaded with fighter aircraft bound for Archangel. While these British operations were not intended to interdict German sea routes, one German freighter was sunk on the task force's return voyage.

Generals Dietl and Buschenhagen decided to halt the Mountain Corps Norway offensive on September 18. The conditions already described led to this decision, chief among them the critical supply situation. In addition, the Soviets had not only replaced their losses but intelligence reported they had brought forward a unit designated as the Polyarnyy Division. This unit was understrength and composed mostly of prisoners, labor-camp workers, and sailors. Buschenhagen again put forward his earlier idea of transferring the 6th Mountain Division to central Finland but Dietl stated that this unit was needed in the north since his two mountain divisions were worn down and needed to be relieved.

The German attack had meanwhile entered its final phase. The 3rd Mountain Division captured Pranckh and Brandl Hills on September 17. This achievement was short-lived. A fresh Soviet regiment approached the division's southern flank and the following day, September 18, was spent in repelling repeated Soviet attacks. The situation for General Kreysing's troops was reaching a crisis stage as the Soviets brought up two regiments from the Polyarnyy Division. The 3rd Division was soon under heavy attack from two directions. It occupied a long triangle-shaped front from the Litsa River to the lake region and Pranckh and Brandl Hills with the northern part of the salient running back to the Litsa River south of the bridge. Because the front was long, the defensive positions thinly occupied, and casualties continuing to mount, General Kreysing did not believe his division could hold its position. He requested permission to withdraw to the west bank of the Litsa in order to avoid its complete destruction. Dietl approved the request and by September 26, the whole division was again back behind the Litsa.

The Army of Norway cancelled offensive operations in the Mountain Corps Norway sector on September 21 and a directive by Hitler approved the Army of Norway order on September 23. The 2nd Division was allowed to continue operations in order to acquire good defensive positions for the winter.

In his directive canceling the offensive operations of the Mountain Corps Norway Hitler raised the possibility of operations to secure the Rybachiy Peninsula before winter. The Army of Norway and Mountain Corps Norway opposed such an operation as it would lengthen the defensive lines considerably.

Mountain Corps Norway became busy constructing winter positions. The 6th Mountain Division moved into the area in the middle of October. The 2nd Mountain Division was moved back to the area around Pechenga. The 3rd Mountain Division, which had been in the Arctic since it landed at Narvik on April 9, 1940, was moved to southern Finland and from there to Germany.

The transfer of the 3rd Mountain Division was apparently a political decision. The morale in this unit had suffered considerably due to the heavy fighting and setbacks during the summer. Ziemke writes the following about this transfer: One of the current rumors had it that the 3rd Mountain Division was being kept in the Arctic as part of a plot to exterminate the Austrians. (Most of the division personnel were Austrian.) Finally, one of the soldiers who was a n.a.z.i Party member complained to the party authorities; and, since there were at the same time signs of unrest in the Austrian provinces, the matter was taken through party channels to Hitler, who ordered the division transferred.31 End of Operation Platinfuchs.

The Germans did not have much to show for their strenuous efforts on the Arctic front. They began their operations with their objective-Murmansk-at a distance of 90 kilometers. After two-and-a-half months of attacks by some of the most elite troops in the German Army, they were still 66 kilometers from their objective. The corps had suffered 10,290 casualties, a high price for little gain.

In retrospect, it is relatively easy to see where mistakes were made. However, some of the problems should have been foreseen.

Hitler's fixation with the defense of Norway, where no real threat existed, did much to doom Platinfuchs to failure. The force made available for the operation was dictated, not by what was required for its success but by what could be spared from Norway. Faulty planning and preparations led to logistics levels that were barely able to support Dietl's two divisions. A quick logistics fix to support a larger force level from the Kirkenes/Pechenga base area was not possible because the means of transportation over poor and insecure routes were lacking.

The shortage of forces led the Germans, according to Ziemke, to modify their goals for the operation. However, this observation in itself is erroneous since whether Polyarnyy or Murmansk was the goal made little difference. The force required for a drive to Polyarnyy would be essentially the same as that required for a drive to Murmansk. The planners must have realized that the Soviets fully understood that the capture of Polyarnyy would eliminate Murmansk as a gateway to the world, and that they would therefore resist its capture as strenuously as they would a direct attack on Murmansk.

Hitler's preoccupation with the defense of Pechenga also played a role in the failure of Operation Platinfuchs. Again, the problem can be traced back to the faulty planning that failed to factor in security forces for Pechenga at an early date. Stripping forces for that purpose from the attacking divisions was a poor solution.

The Germans underestimated the difficulties posed by the terrain despite having been informed by experts. Dietl had sought out the opinions of knowledgeable Scandinavians, and all had expressed the view that the terrain between Pechenga and Polyarnyy was totally unsuitable for offensive military operations, even in summer. This was reported by Dietl to OKW as early as May 15, 1941. Jodl brushed this aside by stating that the difficulties were well known to OKW and that the accomplishment of anything above the defense of Pechenga should be considered a gift. Such statements reveal doubts about prospects for success from the commander on the ground to the highest level in the German command structure and should have been sufficient to question the wisdom of wasting two of Germany's finest divisions in an operation pre-ordained to fail.

The fact that the Soviets employed much larger forces, including armor, in this area in late 1944 does not change this conclusion. They had a reasonably good road leading up to the Litsa River and they had upgraded that road along with others in the area between 1941 and 1944.

The Germans underestimated the skill and tenacity of the Soviet soldiers in defensive operations. This was undoubtedly influenced by the poor showing of the Soviet Army during the Winter War. They failed to give proper weight to the fact that the Soviets confronted an enemy in the Finns who were ideally suited to fight in the kind of terrain found in their homeland. They undoubtedly also underestimated the interim improvements that had been made in the Soviet military.

German intelligence estimates were faulty. They expected to be confronted by one division of the 14th Soviet Army but they faced two divisions, which had increased to three by the time they made their last effort to pierce the Litsa River line. There was a strong feeling within Mountain Corps Norway that this came about because of the staggered starting time for operations out of Finland. Major General M. Krautler refers to the week from June 22 to June 29 as the neglected or lost seven days (Die versaumten sieben Tage).32 The Soviets were fully aware of the significant buildup of forces in north Norway during the spring and summer of 1941 and that sizeable portions of this force moved into the Pechenga area on June 22. The movement into the Pechenga area signaled the Soviets that they should expect an offensive and gave them a week to increase their force level between Pechenga and Murmansk to thwart the operation.

The faulty interpretation of Soviet map symbols between the Finnish border and the Litsa River at OKW was a grievous error. However, it is unlikely that a correct interpretation would have changed anyone's mind about the operation. It was not surprising that the Soviets decided to make their stand along the Litsa River. They had a relatively good road (Russian Road) leading into that area from Murmansk while a more forward deployment would have presented them with supply problems similar to those of the Germans.

In addition, the Soviets made full use of their naval dominance and amphibious capabilities in Motovskiy Bay to launch threats against the German flanks. This was apparently not antic.i.p.ated by the German planners and the woefully inadequate Luftwaffe resources made available for operations in Finland could not counter this threat.

It can be argued persuasively that the operations of Mountain Corps Norway should have been terminated with the first failure to crack the Litsa River line on July 17. It appears that this was what General Dietl had in mind. Instead of doing so Hitler and the OKW made the capture of Murmansk a stated objective of the continued offensive.

Ziemke concludes that the interdiction of the sea routes around North Cape led to the failure of Operation Platinfuchs.33 While this caused a delay in the arrival of the 6th Mountain Division and decreased the flow of supplies by sea, the addition of another division that needed to be supplied in the roadless tundra may only have exacerbated those difficulties. Dietl had concluded that he would not have been able to break through to Murmansk even with the 6th Mountain Division because the Soviets could mount a defense in depth and keep supplied via the relatively good road from Murmansk and by sea.34

FOUR.

OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL FINLAND.

The Central Finland Operational Area.

While about 350 kilometers south of the Mountain Corps Norway area of operations, Salla is still 50 kilometers above the Arctic Circle. The terrain in this area, while there were patches of tundra, was characterized by vast virgin coniferous forests and rocky hills with elevations up to and over 2,000 feet. The valleys were swampy with numerous rivers, streams, and lakes. Ziemke observes that it was particularly hot in July 1941 with the temperature rising to above 85 Fahrenheit on 12 days, twice reaching 97.1 Swarms of mosquitoes flourished in the hot swampy forests and made it virtually impossible to work except during the cool nights.

A large triangular area running east from Salla was ceded to the Soviet Union after the Winter War. The town of Salla was included in a corner of this triangle. The Kuola River is on its north and flows into the Salla River to the west of that town. To the south of Salla is a range of hills with their highest peak at 2,156 feet. The mountain slopes were bare.

The Soviets had completed a railroad from Kandalaksha to the new Finnish border. By the terms of the treaty in March 1940 the Finns were obligated to construct a connecting line from Kemijarvi. The Finns were in no hurry to complete this line since they viewed it as a threat by which the Soviets could cut across central Finland to the Swedish border. However, as it became clear that it now could be used by German and Finnish forces to regain the lost territory, the Finns became energized and rapidly pushed the project towards completion.

In the period since March 1940 the Soviets had fortified the Salla area and the town had become a defensive strongpoint. The Germans and Finns did not have accurate information on enemy forces. They estimated enemy strength opposite north and central Finland at five infantry divisions and two weak armored units. They had identified one division, the 122nd Rifle Division, in Salla with about 50 tanks and believed there was another division, possibly two, at Kandalaksha.

The Soviet forces in the north operated under the 14th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Valerian Alexandrovich Frolov. Its major combat formations, in addition to artillery and other units, consisted of the 104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions and the 1st Tank Division which came under the XLII Corps as the operation progressed. In addition there were the 14th and 52nd Rifle Divisions in the Murmansk region. The 23rd Murmansk Fortified Region, an artillery regiment, several border guard detachments, and the 1st Mixed Air Division also came under his command.

The 6th Finnish Division, attached to the x.x.xVI German Corps, was located north of Kuusamo and therefore did not have to make a lengthy move in preparation for the offensive. The two German divisions of x.x.xVI Corps, the 169th Infantry Division and the SS Division Nord, moved up close to the border opposite Salla at the end of June.

The III Finnish Corps const.i.tuted the right wing of the Army of Norway front and occupied a 100-kilometer stretch of the FinnishSoviet border between Kuusamo and Suomussalmi. With the 6th Finnish Division attached to the x.x.xVI German Corps, it had only one division-the 3rd-plus some miscellaneous units. This corps was commanded by Major General Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo. He was one of the heroes of the Winter War when, as a colonel commanding the forces at Suomussalmi, he conducted one of the most cla.s.sic shallow encirclement operations in military history, leading to the virtual annihilation of two Soviet divisions.2 General Siilasvuo had reorganized the 3rd Division in antic.i.p.ation of the upcoming operation. The division was divided into two groups-labeled F and J. Each group consisted of one regiment and a.s.sorted attachments, including border guards. One regiment was kept back as a corps reserve. The corps had attached one battalion from the 6th Finnish Division as well as a German tank company.

The command setup in central Finland plagued operations almost from the very beginning. General Falkenhorst3 came under the direct control of OKW. German operations in Finland were begun with inadequate forces and reinforcements had to come from the OKH and OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe-Air Force High Command) not the OKW. OKH and OKL were reluctant to provide substantial reinforcements that would detract from the main effort against the Soviet Union, particularly after it became obvious that the Finns would not a.s.sist the Germans against Leningrad.

Another problem already mentioned in Chapter 2 was the failure to achieve unity of command within the theater. While the Finnish III Corps was under the operational control of Falkenhorst, it had also a direct line to Marshal Mannerheim and this soon caused problems. When you add to this the German failure to firmly designate a main effort within their theater, you had a recipe for failure.

Plans.

The x.x.xVI Corps planned to capture Salla by a double envelopment as the first step in a quick drive to Kandalaksha to cut the Murmansk Rail road. The main attack would be carried out by the 169th Infantry Division making up the northern envelopment. The 169th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar, was organized into three task forces, each approximately one regiment in strength, as follows: The northern or left task force would advance eastward 13 kilometers to the north of Salla. Its primary mission was to screen the corps' northern flank. At the appropriate time it would become the northern pincer in another envelopment the Germans planned in the Kayrala area.

The center task force was also to advance eastward to the north of Salla, but only eight kilometers to the north. It would drive in a southeastern direction to the road between Salla and Kayrala. When reaching that road it would turn southward and become the northern pincer in the Salla envelopment.

The southern or right task force of the 169th Division would jump off from a location just north of the road leading from Salla to Savukoski. It would a.s.sault the border fortifications frontally.

Two regiments from SS Division Nord would start out from positions to the south of the road from Rovaniemi to Salla. They would bypa.s.s Salla on the south and then swing in behind that town and become the southern pincer of the Salla envelopment.

The German x.x.xVI Corps had grave doubts about SS Division Nord. The unit was officially formed on February 24, 1941 as SS Kampfgruppe Nord and commanded by SS Brigadefuhrer Richard Hermann. Both its regiments-6th and 7th SS Infantry Regiments-had been in Norway since April 1940. They were equipped with Czech arms. SS Kampfgruppe Nord was officially renamed SS Division Nord (motorized) on June 17, 1941. At the same time the command was transferred to Major General of the Waffen SS Karl-Maria Demelhuber. The unit strength was 8,150 when it arrived in Finland. Artillery and antiaircraft components from Germany joined the division in Finland. The units of the division had not worked together and were poorly trained. Erfurth writes that the division "consisted of elderly men without combat experience and was an improvised unit over which hovered an unlucky star. During transport 105 casualties had occurred as a result of a fire on board ship."4 Ziemke makes the following observation: The march from northern Norway had been so poorly executed and revealed such a profound ignorance of military procedures that it resulted in the relief of the commanding general and his operations officer. The new commanding general, after looking over his troops, reported on 23 June that he could not a.s.sume responsibility for committing them in battle.5 General der Kavallerie Hans Feige, commander of x.x.xVI Corps, was reluctant to use the SS Division against Salla, particularly after the report by its commander on June 23. Falkenhorst appears to have overruled Feige on this issue. It may be that Falkenhorst and the Army of Norway underestimated the quality of their opponents.

The 6th Finnish Division, attached to x.x.xVI Corps, would cross the FinnishSoviet border about 70 kilometers south of Salla. The division would advance in a northeast direction, making a deep penetration towards the town of Alakurtti while sending part of its force to attack Kayrala from the south. The 6th Finnish Division would thus become the southern pincer in the second planned envelopment.

Group J of III Finnish Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Turtola, a.s.sembled south of Kuusamo in preparation for the attack. Its immediate objective was Kestenga. Group F, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arne Somersalo, a.s.sembled further to the south, just east of Suomussalmi. The final objectives of the groups were Loukhi (Group J) and Kem (Group F), both on the Murmansk Railroad.

Attack on Salla.

The 6th Finnish Division was the first unit to cross the border at 0200 hours on July 1. The 169th Infantry Division and the SS Division did not cross the border until 1600 hours on July 1. It is unclear why the attacks were staggered but it may have had something to do with the scarcity of air support.

The timing of the attacks by the main elements of the x.x.xVI Corps also took into consideration the fact that there were 24 hours of daylight and that in the afternoon the sun was in the face of the defending Soviet troops. July 1 was a hot day with temperatures in the high 80s (Fahrenheit). The air and artillery bombardment started forest fires and the smoke reduced visibility to near zero in some places.

Any doubts that the Germans may have had about the quality of the Soviet troops were soon dispelled. The right flank task force of the 169th Infantry Division, advancing on the fortifications in front of Salla with two battalions, was stopped dead in its tracks 500 meters east of the border. A sharp Soviet counterattack threw the lead German battalions back to the border, briefly creating panic in the rear echelons of the task force.

The other two task forces in the 169th Division, however, made good progress. By the end of the day the northernmost task force had gained over three kilometers. The center task force was even more successful and by the end of July 1 it was closing in on the road between Salla and Kayrala.

The questions about the combat effectiveness of SS Division Nord were answered on the first day of battle. Against determined Soviet defenders the division broke and ran. Panicky SS troops streamed past the Corps headquarters on the road between Rovaniemi and Salla. There was total confusion at the front. The division operations officer could only account for two of the six battalions. Major General Demelhuber declared that his division was not fit for combat operations in the morning of July 2. Losses in the SS Division on July 1 included one regimental commander, one battalion commander, and 600 men.

The enveloping units had made good progress initially but that came to an end on July 2. The Soviets realized that encirclements were in process and threw everything they had at the center task force-whose mission was the northern pincer in the planned encirclement of Salla. The Soviet attack was a.s.sisted by armor and air support. The task force, which had reached the SallaKorya (Korja) road, was forced to fall back. The 169th Division reinforced the center task force with two infantry battalions and a tank company on July 3 but also changed earlier plans. The mission of the left task force under the original plan was to screen the division's north flank and thereafter advance on Kayrala. The Kayrala advance was now cancelled and the left task force was ordered to turn south behind Salla along the SallaKorya road.

The left task force moved south on July 3 and the center task force also regained the SallaKorya road and pushed down along the Tennio River. The Soviets. .h.i.t the German front with no fewer than seven counterattacks. Their main effort was in the area north of Salla. The Germans were able to repel the attacks, but the heavy fighting was beginning to take its toll on the German infantry.

On the following day, while the left task force moved south, the center task force regained the road and pushed down to the Kuola River. The division also committed the third regiment in the river crossing and a.s.sault on Salla. The crossing of the river was set for July 6.

The SS Division was moved into defensive positions behind the Finnish border after its panic on July 1. Now, while the 169th Infantry Division was a.s.sembling its forces for a crossing of the Kuola River and the a.s.sault on Salla, there was another panic in the SS Division. This particular incident, which happened in the morning of July 4, is described by Ziemke but not mentioned by Erfurth. The episode evidently started when General Demelhuber, believing that his division was under an armored attack and having no confidence in his troops, ordered a withdrawal that turned into the panic described by Ziemke: Early on the morning of the 4th the x.x.xVI Corps headquarters staff witnessed an astonishing scene as the motorized SS-Division came streaming down the road toward Rovaniemi swearing Russian tanks were at its heels. For several hours the corps staff, including the chief of staff and Feige himself, was out on the road getting the SS-men headed back toward the front. Some of the vehicles were stopped and turned back at the Army of Norway advanced headquarters halfway down the road toward Kemiyarvi, and a few went the full 50 miles to Kemiyarvi where an SS-man urged the local commandant to blow the bridge across the Kemi River to hold up the Russian tanks which he claimed were in hot pursuit.6 Feige decided to remove the SS Division from the frontline on July 6. He had to abandon this plan when Hitler, very annoyed at the behavior of the SS troops, ordered the division to remain at the front. After the virtual disintegration of the SS Division, the x.x.xVI Corps decided that it no longer had the strength to complete the encirclement of Salla since it also had to hold the front west of Salla. The Army of Norway offered up its reserves-a Finnish battalion, a motorized machinegun battalion, and a battalion of the SS.

The 163rd German Infantry Division was on its way to Finland from Norway, by way of Sweden. It was planned to attach this division to Mannerheim's army as his strategic reserve. General Feige, the x.x.xVI Corps commander, now asked Falkenhorst to request that a regiment from this division be attached to his corps. The last regiment of this division was still at Torino on the SwedishFinnish border. Hitler approved Falkenhorst's request on July 5.

General Erfurth is rather critical of Falkenhorst's request and OKW's acceptance of that request. He notes that the additional regiment was not required since Salla was captured on July 7, before the requested regiment was in place on the Salla front. He goes on to say that the 163rd Division was "torn into two parts" by the decision.7 The virtual disintegration of the SS Division caused plans to be changed that had far-reaching consequences for the Salla offensive. General Feige became concerned about the 6th Finnish Division attached to his corps. That division began its advance from a position about 70 kilometers south of Salla. General Feige's concern was that the 6th Division, moving cross-country, would be exposed to Soviet attacks against its northern flank now that the German drive through Salla was stalled. Feige ordered the 6th Division to abandon its deep penetration to Alakurtti and turn its whole force north towards Kayrala.

The safety of the 6th Division was not Feige's only concern. The 169th Infantry Division was worn down after having fought for Salla almost single-handedly after the collapse of the SS Division. It would need considerable help if it were to carry out the second envelopment.

The 169th Division was meantime ready to cross the Kuola River and a.s.sault Salla from the east. It hoped to trap the Soviet forces in Salla by crossing the terrain behind the town to the hills in the southeast. With dive-bomber and artillery support, the attack made progress against stubborn resistance and at noon the right-flank regiment was within a half-mile of Salla. The northern wing of the attack reached the fork in the road east of Salla where one road leads to Kayrala and the other to Korya.

The Soviets launched fierce counterattacks that were repelled. The Kuola River was crossed in the evening of July 6. The intensity of the fighting is attested to by the fact that 50 destroyed Soviet tanks littered the battlefield by the end of the day. The division's right flank task force entered Salla in the evening but was thrown back in a strong counterattack. The withdrawal threatened to become another panic until the commanding general and two of his regimental commanders personally intervened.

Salla was captured in the evening of July 7. The bulk of the 122nd Rifle Division disengaged on the morning of July 8 and withdrew through the southern part of the planned encirclement. The area through which the Soviets withdrew was supposed to have been closed by the SS Division but it was still not closed.

German-Finnish Drive Stopped at Kayrala.

The pursuit of the Soviets withdrawing from Salla was left to the SS Division, not a particularly good choice in view of its earlier performance. However, the Germans did not have much choice since they were afraid that the Soviets would make a stand in the narrows of the chain of lakes in the Kayrala area; they needed their best unit, the 169th Infantry Division, to try to prevent the Soviets from establishing themselves in these narrows.

The Finnish 6th Division had already reached Apa Lake and was pressing northward along its eastern sh.o.r.e. This division was lacking some of its punch as it had to leave all its artillery behind on its long diagonal trek across the wilderness from the border. The Finns encountered prepared Soviet positions south of Mikkola. General Dietl's need for reinforcements in his attempt to penetrate the Litsa River line now took its toll on the x.x.xVI Corps as it was ordered to detach its motorized machinegun battalion and send it north to be attached to Mountain Corps Norway.

The line of advance of the x.x.xVI Corps was through the lake narrows west of Kayrala, an area that the Soviets had fortified as a fallback position since their takeover of the region in 1940. In the more northern part of this front-around the Maaseljaen Hills-defensive positions were blasted from the rocky hillsides.

The Germans soon learned that a frontal attack would not succeed. The Soviets had brought up a new division that held the Kayrala narrows-the 104th Rifle Division-while the 122nd Rifle Division had withdrawn behind the chain of lakes to regroup. The 1st Soviet Tank Division, which had forward elements in Salla, was in positions between Kayrala and Alakurtti. This division consisted of two tank regiments, a motorized infantry regiment, and artillery. The units holding the Kayrala positions and deployed between Kayrala and Alakurtti were grouped under the command of the XVII Soviet Corps. The drives of the Germans and Finns were stopped. The 6th Finnish Division managed to cut the road and railroad leading east from Kayrala on July 9, but vigorous Soviet counterattacks from the north and east drove it back.

Over the next five or six days the Soviets kept pouring in reinforcements via Kandalaksha that brought the 122nd Division back to full strength. These came primarily by sea from Archangel. The Luftwaffe failed to hinder the sea transport but carried out attacks as Soviet troops moved from Kandalaksha to the front.

After their initial repulses on July 9 and 10, the Germans concluded that they needed to resort to envelopments to have any chance of success. Since the x.x.xVI Corps had only two effective divisions (169th and 6th Finnish) the envelopment had to be limited in both size and scope. To avoid the risk of defeat in detail it was limited to trapping the Soviet forces holding the lake narrows.

The main effort was a.s.signed to the 169th Division. The plan called for sending one regiment north along the SallaKorya road and then for it to turn south and strike the Soviet right flank at a point about 13 kilometers north of Kuola Lake. This operation took some time since the regiment had to traverse the heavily wooded and hilly country between the SallaKorya road and the Soviet positions east of the Kuola Lake. After having eliminated these positions, the regiment was to complete the northern p.r.o.ng of the encirclement. Two battalions from another regiment of the 169th Division were to work north along the western sh.o.r.e of Kuola Lake, around the northern tip of that lake, and strike the Soviet right flank. The Finnish 6th Division const.i.tuted the southern p.r.o.ng of the encirclement.

The northern p.r.o.ng of the German encirclement met stiff resistance as soon as it turned southeast from the SallaKorya road. x.x.xVI Corps added another regiment and two battalions from its reserve-the 324th Infantry Regiment from the 163rd Infantry Division-to the northern encirclement force.

The Army of Norway had wanted a much wider envelopment-extending as far as to the Nurmi River-to ensure that the Soviet divisions in the lake region were trapped and destroyed. The x.x.xVI Corps maintained that such a deep encirclement was beyond its capability. This hotly disputed difference of opinion between the two headquarters led to a compromise involving the strengthening of the northern encircling force.

The troops of the northern p.r.o.ng of the encirclement struggled mightily in the difficult terrain and against repeated Soviet counterattacks. The two regiments were advancing abreast and they had to cut roads through the wilderness as they moved forward.

The Soviet reinforcements were beginning to make themselves felt by launching continuous counterattacks against the northern pincer movement and against the Finns east of Apa Lake. Falkenhorst viewed an immediate attack as the only solution to the x.x.xVI Corps problem. However, General Feige and the commander of the 169th Division were pessimistic since the 169th lacked the strength to cut the KayralaAlakurtti road.

Falkenhorst, running out of patience, visited the left flank of the 169th Division in person on July 23. In a one-sided conversation he had with General Dittmar, the commander of the 169th Division, he angrily castigated the division commander for having allowed two or three Soviet regiments, badly mauled at Salla, time to recover. As far as poor roads were concerned, he observed that they were boulevards compared to those in the Mountain Corps Norway area.8 Back at his headquarters, Falkenhorst composed a pointed message to General Feige describing the negative impressions he gained from his visit to the 169th Division. He stated that the time for debate and a.s.sessments were over and concluded with two directives and a warning: 1) An immediate end to any talk about stationary warfare or he would ask OKW for a more aggressive corps commander and 2) The establishment of a firm date for the resumption of the attack. Feige got the message and set the date and time of the attack for July 26 at 2300 hours.

The x.x.xVI Corps attack began on schedule but bogged down quickly against stubborn Soviet defenses. The 169th Division launched its attack with two regiments forward. The Soviets launched a counterattack against the left flank regiment before it got out of its attack positions. The other regiment gained less than two kilometers before it was also stopped and pinned down. The 6th Finnish Division was given the mission of tying down Soviet forces in the south until the 169th Division had broken through the northern defenses. Initially, the 6th Division made good progress but was then thrown back by a Soviet counterattack.

Feige informed Falkenhorst on July 27 that his attacks could not achieve any decisive results. Colonel Buschenhagen, the Army of Norway chief of staff, told Feige that the attacks had to continue because Hitler wanted to cut the Murmansk Railroad in at least one place. Feige thereupon committed his two reserve battalions to the attack on the northern flank but it failed.

The attacks by the x.x.xVI Corps had come to a complete standstill by July 28. The Army of Norway ordered the corps to conduct only limited offensive actions to keep Soviet forces tied down so that they could not be switched against the III Finnish Corps or against Mountain Corps Norway. The Army of Norway reported to OKW that the offensive could not be resumed unless it was a.s.signed an additional division. Hitler validated the Army of Norway action on July 30 and ordered the termination of the x.x.xVI Corps offensive, an offensive that had started a month earlier with high hopes of success. The results of the hard-fought actions of the x.x.xVI Corps were meager and high in costs. The corps had advanced across the border to a distance of 20 kilometers and had suffered 5,500 casualties, 3,296 of them in the 169th Division.

III Finnish Corps Captures Kestenga.

Fuhrer Directive Number 34 on July 30 ordered that the attack in the direction of Kandalaksha be halted and the switching of the main effort by the Army of Norway to the Finnish III Corps' drive to Loukhi. Only enough forces would be left with x.x.xVI Corps for defense of the terrain it had captured and as deception of future offensive operations. If operations against Loukhi also failed, the German forces with III Finnish Corps were to be withdrawn and transferred to the Karelian front.9 Falkenhorst had been a proponent of the idea that the Murmansk Railroad could be reached and cut most quickly at Loukhi.

Major General Siilasvuo had divided 3rd Division into two groups-F and J. The SS units had not yet been attached to III Corps. Siilasvuo sent Group J, consisting of one reinforced regiment, across the border in the direction of the town of Kestenga. Group F, consisting of two regiments, crossed the border east of Suomussalmi and advanced in the direction of Ukhta. The corps, in accordance with the Army of Norway plan, placed its main effort with Group F. The two regiments crossed the border at different points, about 60 kilometers apart, for a converging attack on the village of Voynitsa. The Soviet forces opposing III Corps, consisting of the 54th Rifle Division, split to meet the drives of both Finnish groups.

Numerically, the attackers and defenders were about equal but the advantage was with the attacker who presented multiple threats over a relatively wide area. The III Corps offensive therefore made good progress against weak and disorganized resistance. Group J reached Makarely, about 27 kilometers from the border, on July 5, and the southern p.r.o.ng of the concentric advance of Group F had reached Ponga Guba, 45 kilometers east of the border. The two regiments of Group F reached Voynitsa on July 10, one from the west and one from the south. Here they encountered a tough center of resistance, which they encircled and destroyed by July 19.

On that day, elements of Group J reached the 13-kilometer long Sofyanga River connecting Pya Lake and Top Lake. The river was a major obstacle and defended in strength by the Soviets. Lieutenant Colonel Turtola was confident that if he could seize the narrows between the two lakes he could then advance on Kestenga without worrying about flank threats. A good road covered the 67 kilometers between Kestenga and Loukhi. It appears that the actual commander of Group J was Major General Vaino Henrik Palojarvi after major elements of SS Division Nord were attached.

Colonel Buschenhagen, the Army of Norway's chief of staff, visited Group J on July 18. He was surprised by the relative rapidity of the Finnish advance. They had covered over 65 kilometers and built a road as they advanced. Finnish expertise in forest warfare had been obvious.10 Colonel Buschenhagen discussed his observations with General Falkenhorst when he returned to headquarters. This discussion led to a decision to reinforce success by sending an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion from SS Division Nord to reinforce Group J. General Siilasvuo also contributed to strengthening Group J by moving two infantry battalions from Group F and attaching them to Group J. This group now had the strength of about three infantry regiments. Further SS reinforcements were provided at the end of July when the Army of Norway became concerned about partisan activities and the exposed northern flank of Group J.

Group F was also making good progress in its advance to Ukhta. After having eliminated the encircled Soviet forces in the Voynitsa area the group continued along the road to Ukhta via Korpijarvi, which was reached on July 23.

The group again split into two major columns. One approached Ukhta on both sides of the KorpijarviUkhta road while the second column advanced southeast and then east along the north sh.o.r.e of Verkhneye Kuyto Lake. This column reached Enonsuu across Stredneye Kuyto Lake from Ukhta on August 2. The northern columns reached the Yeldanka Lake area on July 28. This put them about 19 kilometers northwest of Ukhta. By August 2, at the same time as the southern group reached Enonsuu, the northern group drew up to the Kis-Kis River line, about 10 kilometers from Ukhta.

Group J began its a.s.sault on the Sofyanga River line on July 30. While the main force attacked the river line near the village of Sof-Porog, one battalion crossed the western tip of Top Lake by boat to attack the Soviets in the rear. Group J penetrated the Sofyanga River line after three days of hard fighting. The town of Kestenga fell on August 7. The Finns and Germans believed that the Soviets had thrown their last reserves into the defense of Kestenga.11 On August 11, a Finnish regiment of Group J reached a point about 32 kilometers southwest of Loukhi, in the narrows between Lakes Yelovoye and Lebedevo. The Soviets had rushed the 88th Rifle Division to the Loukhi front from Archangel in order to keep the Murmansk Railroad from being cut. The Finns met heavy resistance in the lake narrows and the resistance became even more determined in the next few days as the 88th Division reached the front.

Group F had become stalled on the Kis-Kis River line. Attempts at envelopments from the north failed against heavy resistance. The front stagnated and the actions boiled down to patrolling and probing attacks. The Army of Norway cancelled the offensive operations of Group F on August 19. An infantry battalion from Group F was ordered to join Group J in order to increase the weight of the attack against Loukhi.

One reason for further increasing the strength of Group J was that there were indications that enemy resistance in that area was weakening. However, the Finnish and German troops were also exhausted after nearly two months of offensive operations. Their losses were also significant. Group J managed to encircle and trap a Soviet regiment south of the Kestenga-Loukhi road but because of exhaustion and lack of strength they were unable to eliminate the trapped troops. General Siilasvuo informed General Falkenhorst on August 25, 1941 that he did not believe it possible for his troops to complete their drive to Loukhi without significant reinforcements. He asked to be a.s.signed another Finnish division used to forest fighting.

General Siilasvuo's a.s.sessment of the situation led to a hurried meeting between Generals Falkenhorst, Buschenhagen, and Siilasvuo at Kuusamo on August 29. Siilasvuo told his guests that both Group F and J were stalled. The six Finnish and three SS battalions in Group J faced 13 Soviet battalions in prepared defensive positions. Two of his SS battalions together had an effective strength of only 280 men. It now appeared possible that the Soviets would be able to strike southward from the Loukhi area to Kestenga. If successful, this could bring about the collapse of Group J. General Siilasvuo stated that it was an error to have stopped Group F before it reached Ukhta since it now found itself in poor defensive positions.12 General Siilasvuo's pessimistic a.s.sessment of the situation in the III Corps area led Falkenhorst to make yet another change in the operational plans. His decision was basically to start up again the attack on Ukhta while Group J held its positions. To bolster the strength of Group J, the last two infantry battalions of the SS were a.s.signed to that group. A motorized machinegun battalion was added in the mix. A regiment from the 6th Finnish Division would be released to increase the striking power in the attack on Ukhta. The exact date for the transfer of this infantry regiment was left undecided. It would be done as soon as conditions in the x.x.xVI sector permitted its detachment. Until that time, Group F was expected to remain on the defensive.

The Kayrala Encirclement.

The attack on the KayralaMikkola line by the x.x.xVI Corps had met initial failure by July 28 and the Germans limited themselves to minor offensive actions to keep the Soviets from switching their forces against III Finnish Corps.

The sharp differences between Generals Falkenhorst and Feige noted earlier continued. At times they became acrimonious. Feige, in accordance with earlier instructions from the Army of Norway (and also in accordance with Hitler's directive of July 30), ordered his two divisions on August 3 to tie down the opposing enemy forces and await a favorable opportunity for resuming the offensive after reinforcements had arrived.

The Army of Norway immediately countermanded Feige's order. It directed x.x.xVI Corps to prepare to resume its offensive with the weight of the attack in the sector of the Finnish 6th Division in the south-without waiting for reinforcements that could not be counted on for some time.

There is no doubt that Falkenhorst ignored the July 30 directive as far as the x.x.xVI Corps is concerned. In his defense it must be pointed out that OKW did not issue an implementing order for that directive and until they did Falkenhorst may have felt free to set x.x.xVI Corps in motion.