A Historical Geography of the British Colonies Part 37

[Sidenote: _Its merits._]

Ample reference has already been made to the dealings of the French with the Indians. There is much to praise and much to blame in what may be called the native policy of France in North America. The object of the French Government was, as Charlevoix points out, to 'frenchify' the savages;[9] and, as an instance of the value of the Indians to the cause of France in America, he cites 'the Abenaquis, who, though few in numbers, were during the two last wars the princ.i.p.al bulwark of New France against New England.'[9] With the exception of the Five Nation Indians, the natives of North America were almost wholly on the side of the French as against the English, in spite of the fact that the English offered them a better market and sold them better wares. The reason was that the French relations to the Indians were more human than those of the English. No doubt, among the English colonists were Quakers and Moravians, whose tenets bade them deal gently with the people of the soil; and on the New York frontier, from Dutch times, there had been friendship, sometimes warmer sometimes cooler, between the Dutch and the English colonists on the one hand, and the Iroquois on the other. But the ordinary English colonist's view of the red man was the Old Testament view--hard, exclusive, and often cruel. The Puritan New Englander took the land of the heathen in possession, and from his standpoint there was not room in it for him and them. Widely different was the French view. The Indians were not to be excluded from, but incorporated in, the French dominion. The King of France, and his representative the Governor of Canada, were to be the fathers, and the Indians were to be the obedient and trusting children. The missions taught the {342} same lesson. The Indians were not to be exterminated, but to be fruitful and multiply as dutiful children of France and of the Roman Catholic Church. On these lines the French acted consistently from first to last; and their unaltering policy contrasted favourably with the halting, uncertain dealings of the English, which changed from year to year, and were different in the different colonies. The way to win a black man's or a red man's affections is to treat him, if not as an equal, at least as a man, and to be constant in the treatment. For this reason, the Indians loved the French better than the English. Very rarely on the English side appeared a man, like Sir William Johnson, who possessed the mixture of firmness and sympathy which attracted and conciliated the Indians, and which was common among the French.

[Footnote 9: Charlevoix (as above), pp. 34, 35.]

[Sidenote: _Its defects._]

But there was a very dark side to the French policy and system in regard to the North American Indians. In the first place, as has been abundantly shown in the preceding pages, the French authorities, temporal and spiritual, kept the savages on their side by sanctioning, or at least not repressing, their savagery; and notably the mission Indians of Canada, the special proteges of the priests, were foremost in barbarous warfare against white Christians of a different shade of religion. In the second place, the political system of Canada, which indirectly created the Canadian vagrants, the _coureurs de bois_, produced, in doing so, indianized Frenchmen, differing little from frenchified Indians. Here again we can take Charlevoix's testimony. He writes that 'some vagabonds, who had taken a liking to independency and a wandering life, had remained among the savages, from whom they could not be distinguished but by their vices.'[10] If the French were more human than the English in their dealings with the Indians, they were more human for evil as well as for good; and, whatever was the result on the Indians, {343} there is no question as to the result on the French and English respectively, of their different lines of action towards the red men. The English race gained greatly in the end in soundness and in progress, from keeping outside the Indian circle and not coming down to the Indian level.

[Footnote 10: Charlevoix (as above), p. 34.]

[Sidenote: _Merits of French settlement in Canada._]

It has been said above that the French system in North America was radically unsound. It was unsound, in that it was based on political and religious exclusiveness. There was the one great fundamental mistake of excluding the Huguenots, and there were various other important defects. But, on the hypothesis that the most independent and most progressive element in France was to have no place in New France, it is open to question whether the system of colonization, which Louis XIV, Colbert, and Talon devised, and which remained the basis of the colony, deserves the somewhat severe criticism which it has received at the hands of historians. It is true that the system was most artificial, that it contained no element of freedom or self-government, and that when, long years after it came into being, many of the restrictions were removed in consequence of the English conquest of Canada, the colonists were deeply sensible of the relief.

It is true, too, that reaction against these restrictions, while still in existence, produced the semi-savage race of _coureurs de bois_, and that, through placing the power in the hands of a few individuals, without providing any check of local representation or local public opinion, an atmosphere of wholesale corruption and intrigue was produced. But none the less there was an undoubted element of soundness and strength in the settlement of New France; and a considerable amount of shrewdness was shown in taking a certain material from the old country and placing it in the New World, under familiar conditions. The military side of the colonization was skilfully handled; and the peasants, who had been in tutelage in France to lord, to King, and to Church, found themselves in their new homes {344} under similar guidance, instead of being turned into strange ways, for which by bringing up they were not fitted. The system, artificial as it was, produced permanent settlement of considerable strength and great tenacity, which, under a more liberal regime, has resulted in the French-speaking Canadian people of the present day.

[Sidenote: _Canada, as compared with the English colonies, was one._]

[Sidenote: _The English colonies were separate from the mother country, and from each other._]

There were divisions in Canada, and various contradictory elements in its history; but, as against foreign rivals and for purposes of offence and defence, the colony was one, under one Government and one Church, and in line with the mother country. Widely different was the case of the English colonies. They were rarely in harmony with the mother country, or with each other. They had little or no instinct of imperialism. They had the instinct of self-preservation, and if seriously attacked were to some extent prepared, unless Quaker influence was dominant, to protect themselves, and to accept aid from the mother country. But their traditions and their inclinations made for peace, not for war; for isolation, not for union. Their forefathers' aim and object had been to create and maintain separate and self-dependent communities, not to be in substance amenable to home control. Here is a French view of the New Englanders given by the anonymous eye-witness of the siege of Louisbourg in 1745: 'These singular people have a system of laws and protection peculiar to themselves, and their Governor carries himself like a monarch.'[11]

If the fault of the Canadian system was too rigid uniformity and too complete subordination to the mother country, the English colonies suffered from the opposite extreme, from utter want of uniformity and complete absence of system. Different const.i.tutions, different shades of religious beliefs, different phases of settlement--all created disunion. Common origin made a bond with the mother country, but the Governors {345} sent from England could tell those who sent them how deficient was the habit of obedience to the British Crown.

[Footnote 11: Professor Wrong's translation, p. 37.]

[Sidenote: _The English colonists alone no match for Canada._]

[Sidenote: _Shortcomings of the home Government._]

Common danger alone produced occasional signs of common action. The New England colonies, whose borders were most within reach of French raids, and whose sh.o.r.es reached to Acadia, showed far the most public spirit, and far the most power of combination. The southern colonies awoke only when the French in the Ohio valley did them active and present hurt; but, with many times the numbers of the Canadian population, the English colonies as a rule showed themselves to be no match for Canada. The first decisive treaty in North America--the Peace of Utrecht, which gave Acadia to Great Britain--was the result of fighting by English, not colonial soldiers, and not in America, but in Flanders under Marlborough. The second decisive treaty, the Peace of Paris in 1763, was the result of fighting in America, but mainly by British not colonial troops, and under British generals.

The 'Bostonnais' alone among the English colonists were objects of apprehension to the French; and, if it were not for the record of Ma.s.sachusetts and her smaller neighbours, the English colonies in North America before the year 1763 would in manhood and public spirit compare poorly with Canada. With equal truth it may be said that, in the matter of having a clear and consistent policy in North America, Great Britain compared very poorly with France; and the apathy of the colonies may fairly be attributed in large measure to their uncertainty as to what on any particular occasion might be the att.i.tude of the King and the ministers in England; whether support would be forthcoming or withheld, and whether, if forthcoming, it would involve some sacrifice in return. It is very noticeable how often a promised force from home either was never sent or sent too late; it is noticeable too how difficult it was for Governors who opposed French claims and pretensions, such as Dongan of New York, in the seventeenth century, and William Shirley {346} of Ma.s.sachusetts, in the eighteenth, to persuade the home Government of the justice of their views. Like her colonies, England was as a rule averse to war; and as her colonies were inclined to keep her at arm's length, so she was inclined to leave them, within limits, to take care of themselves.

[Sidenote: _English compromise._]

In the case of North America, while French and English were competing there, the English through their Government acted as they always have acted, during the whole course of their foreign and colonial history.

They did, they undid, they compromised, until at length in Pitt there came a man who gripped the nettle, and the end was reached which might with infinitely greater ease have been attained many years before. When Quebec was in its infancy, the English under Kirke conquered it; the English King gave it back, and then the French dominion in North America took root. After Marlborough's wars the Peace of Utrecht gave Acadia to England, but gave it in terms so vague that the French continued to claim much or most of it; at the same time it left Cape Breton Island to France, and sowed the seeds of an apparently perennial controversy between Great Britain and France with regard to fishing rights on the coast of Newfoundland.

There was more war, and the colonists took Cape Breton Island. Under the terms of the next treaty the English Government restored it to France. Then came the final war and the final peace; England gained all Canada, but, with that strange liking which Englishmen seem to have for leaving a frayed end in their treaty arrangements, the British Government confirmed the fishing rights of France on the Newfoundland coast, and added thereto possession of the two small islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

It was not policy, it was not system, which gave North America to the English rather than to the French, and yet there was a certain gain even from the utter absence of both policy and system. Natural forces had more play on the English side than on the French, and in a sense it might {347} be said of the English colonies that their strength was to sit still.

[Sidenote: _Was the contest between Great Britain and France in North America inevitable and beneficial?_]

The last question to be asked, and if possible to be answered, is: Was the contest between France and Great Britain in North America, and the victory of one of the two powers, inevitable, and was it beneficial? From the English point of view, the answer to part of this question is a foregone conclusion. If there was to be a contest, it seems evident, if we look back on the past, that the English must have in the end prevailed. It is impossible to imagine that the French colony of Canada, with a population at the time of the conquest of considerably under 100,000, could dominate the English colonies with a million and a quarter inhabitants. Equally certain does it appear that to Canada the British conquest was a blessing in disguise, and the Canadians in a very short time realized what they had gained by the change of administration. In Mr. Parkman's words, 'a happier calamity never befell a people than the conquest of Canada by the British arms.'[12]

[Footnote 12: _The Old Regime in Canada_ (end).]

But the question, whether a decisive war between the two races in North America was inevitable, is one which may well be asked and answered, inasmuch as a similar question has in our own day troubled many minds in regard to other parts of the world where colonizing races have been side by side. Surely, it might be said, and probably was said, there was room enough in the great continent of North America for both French and English to work out their national destinies, without trying to supplant each other. In a sense this was no doubt true; and the truth is not vitiated by the fact that the French scheme of policy was not compatible with the presence of the English race in North America, on the supposition that the latter race would be allowed to extend its bounds by natural increase and progressive settlement _pari pa.s.su_ with the French.

{348} [Sidenote: _No natural frontier between New France and the English colonies._]

The interesting point, however, to notice is that there was no natural frontier between Canada and the English colonies, at the time when they came into serious compet.i.tion; for the line of the Alleghanies, even if recognized, could fully delimit only the more southerly colonies. To use a modern term, two separate spheres of influence in North America had not been marked out by nature. But in new countries, unless there is some strongly defined natural line of division, it is true to say, however paradoxical it may appear, that there is not room for two incoming white races to colonize as equals side by side. It is precisely when the land is thinly populated, and when therefore the population is in a fluid condition, that collisions will and must occur. Given a continent like Europe at the present day, the geography of which is accurately known, the resources of whose soil in every part have been fully gauged, and whose surface has been for many generations parcelled out in effective occupation, one province to one race, another to another; then, when the peoples are crystallized in their respective moulds, war is not inevitable; and when war arises, it is the artificial result of political naughtiness and ambition, unless indeed it be the effect of some inaccuracy in the map, which needs to be adjusted. In new fields of colonization, on the other hand, wars are not artificial; they are natural, and not only natural but sometimes absolutely necessary to future happiness and welfare. Just as Europe was herself once in the melting-pot, so the lands which Europeans have settled and are settling, if they are to be the homes of strong peoples in days to come, must, when rival races are planted there, be the scenes of armed strife.

Colonial wars which end where they began, with indecisive treaties tending to further bloodshed, may well be the subject of national sorrow and regret; but it is otherwise when a great issue has been achieved, and when it has been decided once for all what lines shall be laid down for the {349} future of a great country, not yet peopled as it will be in the coming time. Then the millions of money, which seem to have been wasted, are found to have been invested for the good of men; and the mourners for the lost sorrow not as without hope, inasmuch as those who have gone have died that others may live.

The foundations of peoples are the nameless dead, who have been laid amid North American forests or under the bare veldt of South Africa.

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APPENDIX I

LIST OF FRENCH GOVERNORS OF CANADA

PERIOD Samuel de Champlain . . . . . . . . 1632-1635 Chevalier de Montmagny . . . . . . . 1636-1648 Chevalier d'Ailleboust . . . . . . . 1648-1651 Jean de Lauzon . . . . . . . . . . . 1651-1657 Vicomte d'Argenson . . . . . . . . . 1658-1661 Baron d'Avaugour . . . . . . . . . . 1661-1663 Sieur de Mesy . . . . . . . . . . . 1663-1665 Marquis de Tracy . . . . . . . . . . 1665-1667 Chevalier de Courcelles[1] . . . . . 1665-1672 Comte de Frontenac . . . . . . . . . 1672-1682 Sieur de la Barre . . . . . . . . . 1682-1685 Marquis de Denonville . . . . . . . 1685-1689 Comte de Frontenac . . . . . . . . . 1689-1698 Chevalier de Callieres . . . . . . . 1699-1703 Marquis de Vaudreuil . . . . . . . . 1703-1725 Marquis de Beauharnois . . . . . . . 1726-1747 Comte de la Galissoniere . . . . . . 1747-1749 Marquis de la Jonquiere . . . . . . 1749-1752 Marquis Duquesne . . . . . . . . . . 1752-1755 Marquis de Vaudreuil[2] . . . . . . 1755-1760

[Footnote 1: While Tracy was in Canada he was Governor-General, and Courcelles was Governor.]

[Footnote 2: Son of the previous Governor of that name.]

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APPENDIX II

DATES OF THE PRINc.i.p.aL EVENTS IN THE HISTORY OF CANADA DOWN TO 1763

YEAR

North America discovered by Cabot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1497

Cartier's first voyage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1534

Cartier's second voyage and discovery of the St. Lawrence . . . 1535

Champlain's first voyage to North America . . . . . . . . . . . 1603

Founding of Port Royal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1605

Quebec founded by Champlain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1608

Hudson discovers the Hudson River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1609

Hudson discovers Hudson Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1610

Port Royal destroyed by Argall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1613