A Historical Geography of the British Colonies Part 36

For, while nature had given to Canada, in her rivers and lakes, the best of roads, away from those rivers and lakes the land was difficult to penetrate. Thus Canada was colonized only by the water side, and what settlement there was, was characterized by length without breadth; while, beyond the point where continuous settlement ended, the very easiness of movement carried forward enterprising French officers, priests, and traders, until there was a skeleton outline of French dominion, which was never filled in, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico.

[Sidenote: _Settlement held close to the water side._]

[Sidenote: _Two distinct kinds of colonists in Canada._]

Geography, too, had this effect upon the population. The rivers were so entirely all in all, that they made the settled portion of the French Canadians very settled, and the fluid portion very fluid.

Those who wished to stay in one place stayed by the river bank, which was the roadside, because it was the roadside, and because behind and away from the river there was not open ground but dense forest.

Those, on the other hand, who were inclined to roam, were carried by the waters wheresoever they wished, with the backwoods at hand, should hiding-places be required. Thus Canada bred two distinct species of colonists, the _habitans_ of the central St. Lawrence, and the _voyageurs_ or _coureurs de bois_. As in their old home, so still more in their new, the French race comprised contradictory elements.

[Sidenote: _Effect of the Canadian climate on colonization._]

[Sidenote: _It made against continuity_]

Climate counts for much in the formation of a people, and in determining its history. The climate of Eastern {333} Canada inclines to extremes. It favours quickness but not continuity of action. The summer is short, but very hot and bright; the winter is long and severe, but again not unfavourable to movement over the frozen surface of water and ground. Eastern Canada is not by nature a land open all the year round to steady work, but one in which settlers have a limited time wherein to till the ground, followed by a long, close season; while wanderers can in summer and winter alike indulge their vagrant instincts. The tendency therefore of the Canadian climate, as regards its influence on an incoming race, with a restless and impatient element in its character, was to stimulate the restlessness, and to discourage colonization in the sense of attachment to the soil.

[Sidenote: _and against the policy of the French Government._]

In winter, the St. Lawrence is closed to shipping. Consequently New France was for several months in each year cut off from all communication with the mother country. Here again the effect of climate was to break continuity of colonization; and, moreover, the forces of nature were employed against the policy of the French Government, for the effect of long breaks in communication must have been to develop a separate life in New France, evidence of which is to be found in the jealousy existing, in Vaudreuil's and Montcalm's time, between natives of France and natives of Canada; whereas the unaltering aim of French Kings and ministers was simply to reproduce France in America, and to keep the colony under constant and rigid control from home. The effects of the summer, therefore, on Canada were counteracted by winter isolation; and one more element of contradiction was introduced into French history in North America.

[Sidenote: _Canada had no minerals._]

[Sidenote: _This was one cause of the small population._]

The natural products of a country are an important factor in making its people. Canada, as compared with most other fields of colonization, with Spanish America for instance, or the East Indies, was a poor land. It had practically no mineral wealth, though traces of iron and copper were found {334} in the region of Lake Superior.

In the earlier part of the eighteenth century Charlevoix wrote: 'The first source of the ill fortune of this country, which is honoured with the name of New France, was the report which was at first spread through the kingdom that it had no mines; and they did not enough consider that the greatest advantage that can be drawn from a colony is the increase of trade. And to accomplish this, it requires people, and these peoplings must be made by degrees, so that it will not appear in such a kingdom as France.'[1] The great weakness of Canada was the paucity of the white population. Had mines been discovered, the colony would no doubt have been much stronger, for a far greater number of colonists would have come out from France; and, while the character of the people would have been, in a sense, at least as restless as it actually was, the restlessness would have been localized in the mining areas, which would have become large centres of population.

[Footnote 1: Charlevoix's _Letters to the d.u.c.h.ess of Lesdiguieres_, giving an account of a voyage to Canada (Eng. translation, 1763, p.

31). The letters began in 1720.]

[Sidenote: _Agriculture, fisheries, and fur-trading._]

In the absence of minerals Canada depended on agriculture, fisheries, and fur-trading. Of these three industries, agriculture alone conduced to permanent settlement. The fisheries did not directly much concern the life of the colony up the St. Lawrence river, for the fishing-grounds were mainly in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and on the coasts of Newfoundland and Acadia; nor did fishing, when the fishermen found their princ.i.p.al market in Europe, and were in great measure domiciled in Europe, contribute much to the colonization of North America. Fur-trading again, the great speciality of Canada, made for movement and for wandering life, not for colonization. This is pointed out by Charlevoix, who dwells upon the evil results of giving licences to trade, as encouraging vagabondism, and notes as {335} the second cause of the ill fortune of Canada, the want of resolution in its people, and their constant moving from place to place, instead of carefully selecting a place for settlement and staying there.[2]

[Footnote 2: Charlevoix (as above), pp. 31-5.]

The real wealth of Eastern Canada was, as it still is, agricultural; but the history of colonization proves that agricultural colonies, while very sound and sure, progress very slowly; and to the impatient, enterprising Frenchman, who was inclined to seek fortune over the seas, farming in Canada, with a Canadian winter to face, offered little attraction. It is true that the English North American colonies were also agricultural colonies; but they had a great advantage over New France, in that their coasts were open all the year round, resulting in a maritime trade, which could never be enjoyed by Canada. Moreover New England, at any rate, was peopled by colonists who went out, not to make their fortunes, and not to build up a dominion for their King, but to make their homes, and their children's homes, on the agricultural pattern, in as kindly a soil as, and in a kindlier climate than, that of Canada.

[Sidenote: _Canada better suited for war than peace._]

New France then was a country where movement was easy, and where the incentives to settlement were not great; and in its white population, or at any rate in a large proportion of that population, there was a strong element of restlessness, added to great power of conciliating and a.s.similating savages; while the religious and political policy of its rulers was, in the main, a forward policy. The result was that the Canadians were more successful in motion than at rest, in making war than in keeping peace. 'The English Americans,' writes Charlevoix, 'are entirely averse to war because they have much to lose; they do not regard the savages, because they think they have no occasion for them. The youth of the French, for the contrary reasons, hate {336} peace, and live well with the savages, whose esteem they gain during a war and have their friendship at all times.[3]

[Footnote 3: Charlevoix (as above), p. 27.]

[Sidenote: _The Canadians as fighters._]

The Canadians were to the English settlers in New England or New York, very much what the Highlanders of Scotland, in past centuries, were to the dwellers in the Lowlands. Their forte was in raiding their English rivals; and, as they were better qualified to excel in war than in peace, so in war they were more capable of quick, spasmodic action, than of bearing continuous and steady strain. 'They seem not to be masters of a certain impetuosity, which makes them fitter for a _coup de main_, or a sudden expedition, than for the regular and settled operations of a campaign. It has also been remarked, that amongst a great number of brave men, who have distinguished themselves in the late war, there have been few found who had talents to command. This was perhaps because they had not sufficiently learnt how to obey.'[4] On the other hand, it must be remembered that Canada also contained a stationary population on the banks of the St. Lawrence, who more and more, as years went on, learnt what war meant and preferred peace; and that the colony was not devoid of trading centres, the largest of which were Quebec and Montreal, and all of which, including for instance, Niagara, Detroit, and Michillimackinac, were inland ports.

[Footnote 4: Charlevoix (as above), p. 104.]

[Sidenote: _The English had the better position in North America, larger numbers, and command of the sea._]

If the above was the effect of geography on the history of France in North America, it is not difficult to answer the question, Why did the French lose Canada? They lost it because the English had the better position in North America; because the English population in North America largely outnumbered the French; because, when the crisis came, the English made their main effort in North America, whereas the French devoted their resources and their energies primarily to continental war in Europe; and lastly, because {337} the English secured command of the sea, and in consequence command of the St. Lawrence also. But then the further question arises: What produced this balance of advantage on the English side?

[Sidenote: _There is no valid reason why the English originally secured the better geographical position in North America._]

It is not easy to determine why the better lot in North America, as regards geography, fell to Great Britain and not to France. It was hardly a question of prior discovery. The first pioneer for England, Cabot, struck the New World at Newfoundland or Cape Breton, far north of what became the main sphere of British colonization. The first authenticated pioneer on behalf of France, Verrazano, found his way to the present sh.o.r.es of the United States. The French connexion with the St. Lawrence dated from Cartier's voyages; but those voyages, though they gave the right of discovery, did not result at the time in effective occupation. It was little more than an accident that the English settled in Virginia and New England, and the French in Acadia and on the St. Lawrence; though the fact of having found the St.

Lawrence, and the attraction of a great river, which might be the long-wished-for, and long-dreamt-of, highroad to the far East, may well have dictated to French instincts where New France should be. At any rate, the English gained the great initial advantage of a far larger seaboard, open at all times of the year, and a climate which was more favourable to European colonization. 'Along the continent of America which we possess,' wrote Wolfe from Louisbourg in 1758, 'there is a variety of climate, and, for the most part, healthy and pleasant.... Such is our extent of territory upon this fine continent, that an inhabitant may enjoy the kind influence of moderate warmth all the year round.'[5]

[Footnote 5: Wolfe to his mother, Aug. 11, 1758 (Wright, p. 454).]

[Sidenote: _English superiority in numbers mainly due to French policy towards the Huguenots._]

With this advantage, it was natural that there should be greater immigration into the English colonies than into Canada. But this was not the only, or the main, cause of the superior numbers in the English colonies. The main {338} cause was the policy of the French Government, and especially its religious policy. The most fatal mistake made by the French in regard to North America was the exclusion of the Huguenots. The men who wished to leave England went to the present United States. The men who wished to leave France were not allowed to go to Canada, and went in considerable numbers to England and her colonies. The effect, therefore, of Roman Catholic exclusiveness was that, though France had a far greater population than England, the greatest French colony failed for want of colonists. Nor was it only a matter of quant.i.ty, but a matter of quality also. The Huguenots were the type of men who would make homes, create business, and build up communities beyond the seas.

They were of the same strong fibre as the New England Puritans. In the compet.i.tion of the coming time, New France was doomed in consequence of being closed to the French Protestants.

[Sidenote: _Numerical superiority of the English forces in North America in the Seven Years' War._]

[Sidenote: _Canada was conquered by Great Britain, not by the English colonies._]

When the Seven Years' War came, the English colonists in North America outnumbered the French by thirteen to one; but, at the moment, superiority in numbers was largely counterbalanced by the want of union in the English colonies, whereas Canada was one.

Therefore the issue largely depended on the forces and the leaders sent out by the two mother countries respectively. England, inspired by Pitt, sent out abundant troops. France, inspired by Madame de Pompadour, kept nearly all her troops to fight Frederick of Prussia, with his few English and Hanoverian allies. The result was the defeat of the French in North America, and the British conquest of Canada.

Whatever might have been the result if the crisis had been postponed, it was not the British colonists but the troops from England, who, in 1758-60, decided the fate of North America. It is customary, in writing accounts of the colonial wars of Great Britain, to emphasize the merits of the colonial soldiers, who have the advantage of knowing the country and the mode of {339} fighting appropriate to it; and to depreciate the regulars sent from home. Reverses, like that of Braddock, are written and read from a colonial point of view; and in America, more especially, the colonists' side has been emphasized in consequence of the results of the subsequent War of Independence.

But, as a matter of fact, excellent as were some of the colonial troops, such as Robert Rogers' Rangers, Canada was conquered by soldiers from England under able English generals like Wolfe and Amherst; and similarly the burden of the defence of Canada fell mainly on Montcalm and the few regiments which had been spared to him from France.

[Sidenote: _The English command of the water._]

As the French kept for war on the continent of Europe the troops which should have been sent to North America, so they allowed the English to gain control of the water, over which alone troops and supplies could be sent to New France. 'The possession of Canada,'

writes Captain Mahan, 'depended upon sea power.'[6] After the victory of Hawke in Quiberon Bay, and other English successes on sea, Burke, in the _Annual Register_ for 1760,[7] wrote that France 'was obliged to sit, the impotent spectator of the ruin of her colonies, without being able to send them the slightest succour. It was then she found what it was to be inferior at sea.' Especially important was the command of the water to those who would hold Canada, for two reasons; because Canada, poor and undeveloped, was dependent on supplies from Europe, to a greater extent than the English colonies[8] in North America; and because she could and must be attacked by the St.

Lawrence.

[Footnote 6: _Influence of Sea Power upon History_ (6th ed.), p.

294.]

[Footnote 7: p. 9.]

[Footnote 8: Thus Charlevoix (as above, p. 38) says Canada 'has always had more from France than it could pay.']

The command of the sea meant the command of the St. Lawrence; and the command of the St. Lawrence was indispensable for the reduction of Quebec and Montreal. The downfall of New France began when the Treaty of {340} Utrecht took from her, in Acadia, the best part of her scanty seaboard; the downward process was arrested when Louisbourg, taken by Ma.s.sachusetts, was restored to the French; it began again with the second capture of Louisbourg. The seaport was taken in one year; in the next the river port, Quebec, was lost also. This would not have happened had the French not divided their energies so completely as to give Great Britain superiority on the water. They attempted too much at home, and the same fault, if we turn to consider their system and policy in North America, was carried into the New World.

[Sidenote: _French and English systems and policies in North America compared._]

It is roughly true to say that in North America the French had a definite policy and a definite system; but the policy, though brilliant in conception, was quite impracticable, and the system was radically unsound. The English in North America, on the other hand, had rarely any policy and never any system.

[Sidenote: _Hopelessness of the French scheme for dominion in North America._]

The French policy was an imperial policy. It was clear, consistent, and far-reaching. The object aimed at was a French dominion in North America, the lines of communication being the two great rivers, the St. Lawrence and the Mississippi. Canada and Louisiana were to be joined; the English were to be kept between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic; the French King was to be lord of all; the French religion was to be supreme; the Indians were to be converted and made French in sympathies and interests. The scheme was brilliant, but it was impossible; and it is difficult to understand why it is considered by historians to have been so dangerous to the future of the British colonies. White men of one race, spa.r.s.ely scattered over two sides of a gigantic triangle, were to control white men of another but equally masculine race, thirteen times as numerous, who held the base of the triangle, the base being the seaboard. The attempt became more impracticable every year, for every year the actual preponderance of numbers on the English {341} side increased, and every year the white men gained on the red men, who alone could make the realization of the French dream even conceivably possible.

[Sidenote: _French native policy._]