With the Judaeans in the Palestine Campaign Part 11

Thinking that a serious attack had begun, the General sprang hastily out of bed and planted his naked foot right on to the tail of a huge black scorpion. For a full half-hour afterwards Australia was heard at her best.

When I saw him a couple of days later he philosophically remarked that there was virtue even in a scorpion sting, for it had completely cured him of ever attempting to get out of bed again in the dark, even if all the Turks in the Ottoman Empire were at his door.

General Ryrie, afterwards promoted to Major-General, was appointed to the command of the Australian Mounted Division, and had the K.C.M.G.

conferred on him.

Towards the end of August General Allenby reviewed the Anzacs at their Headquarters, some four miles to the north of Jericho. The Mounted Division was formed into three sides of a square, and into this General Allenby galloped, followed by his Staff. It was well for the Commander-in-Chief that he was a good horseman, for the spirited animal which he rode gave one or two very hearty bucks, quite enough to have unseated the majority of our Generals.

Later, the Chief decorated a number of the officers and men who had gallantly won distinctions, and at the end of the ceremony made a good soldierly speech to the Division.

I was invited to be present at the review, and on being presented by General Chaytor to the Commander-in-Chief the latter remarked, "Oh, by the way, Patterson, I fear I cannot form your Jewish Brigade, for I have been notified by the War Office that there are no more Jewish troops coming out." I replied that I thought this information must be inaccurate, for I had just had a letter from the officer commanding the 40th Battalion at Plymouth, informing me that he was about to embark with his battalion for service in Palestine. The Commander-in-Chief seemed somewhat surprised on hearing this, but remarked that he considered his information later and better than mine, so of course there was nothing more to be said.

A few days afterwards, on 30th August, General Chaytor had a conference with all his Brigade and Infantry Commanders, and as he had heard General Allenby saying to me that he considered his information with regard to Jewish reinforcements better than mine, he remarked: "Well, Patterson, your information about the coming of the other Jewish Battalions was better than the Chief's after all, for one of my officers has just come from England, and he tells me that a strong Jewish Battalion came out with him in the same ship and landed in Egypt a couple of days ago."

As I considered it only right to let the Commander-in-Chief know that the information he had received was not accurate, I wrote and told him that I understood that another Jewish Battalion, some 1,400 strong, had already arrived in Egypt.

In reply to this I got a memorandum from the Chief of Staff, Major-General Louis Jean Bols, intimating that in future I was only to address the Commander-in-Chief through the ordinary channels of communication.

It was evident from this that the Chief of Staff was not pleased that the Commander-in-Chief should have any sidelight from me on Jewish affairs. Of course this had long been apparent, for anything I had previously written through the ordinary channels--no matter how important to the welfare of the battalion--had invariably been returned to me with the remark that it was not considered necessary to refer the matter further.

Some months after my interview with the Commander-in-Chief yet another thousand men arrived from England, and altogether there were over five thousand Jewish soldiers serving in the Jewish units in Palestine. The formation of a Jewish Brigade had been the definite policy of the War Office, and an intimation to this effect had been sent to General Allenby. The Commander-in-Chief of the E.E.F. had himself written to me to say that a Jewish Brigade would be formed, yet this promise, which meant so much to the comfort and efficiency of the men and to the prestige of Jews the world over, was never fulfilled; instead, we were pushed about from Brigade to Brigade and from Division to Division in the most heart-breaking manner, with the result that we got all the kicks and none of the traditional halfpence!

In the s.p.a.ce of three months we were shunted about like so many cattle trucks and found ourselves, in that brief period, attached to no less than twelve different formations of the British Army!

General Chaytor gave a great lift to the spirit of the battalion when he conferred the Military Medal on Privates Sapieshvili and Gordon for their gallant conduct on the night patrol already mentioned. We had a special parade in "Salt" post redoubt, after Divine Service on the first day of the Jewish New Year (7th September, 1918). Before all their comrades the General recounted their gallant deeds, pinned the coveted ribbons on their b.r.e.a.s.t.s, and then ordered the battalion to march past and salute--not himself, but the two men whom he had just decorated.

From this moment General Chaytor had with him the heartfelt devotion of every man in the unit. A small thing can win the respect, goodwill, and devotion of a Regiment, but it is not every General who has the knack of gaining it.

CHAPTER XV.

CAPTURE OF THE UMM ESH SHERT FORD.

As the date fixed for the great advance of the Army in Palestine drew near, certain parts of the Jordan Valley began to look very comical.

Here and there would be seen a battery of artillery parked, or a cavalry regiment, with its horses tethered in neat and orderly array, in the most approved army style, but on closer inspection both horses and guns were found to be merely dummies! Great camps were pitched, but there was not a soldier in them; fires were lighted all over the place at dusk, as if a mighty army were bivouacked round about, and every conceivable kind of bluff was put up in order to deceive the Turks and make them think that the long expected attack was to be made through Gilead, to effect a junction with the Arab Army of the Hedjaz. The Jewish Battalion was even ordered to march and counter march from Jericho to the Dead Sea by some wight at G.H.Q. who still remembered us, but General Chaytor scotched this stunt, for of course he knew it was quite impossible for us to guard our front throughout the night and march some forty miles by day as well in that terrific heat.

There were really very few troops in the Valley, if one considers the enemy force that could have been concentrated against us. According to General Allenby's despatch, there were some 6,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres, and 74 guns facing us in the Jordan Valley.

General Allenby in his despatch of the 31st October, 1918, writes:--

"By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to a minimum," etc., and "To prevent the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley being discovered by the enemy I ordered Major General Sir Edward Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C., to carry out with the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the 20th Indian (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade, the 38th and 39th Battalions of the Royal Fusiliers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment a series of demonstrations with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack East of the Jordan was intended, either in the direction of Madeba or Amman.

"The enemy was thought to be antic.i.p.ating an attack in these directions and every possible step was taken to strengthen his suspicions."

On the 15th September the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers, under the command of Colonel Margolin, D.S.O., arrived in the Jordan Valley, and took up its position on the Auja in support of the 38th Battalion in the line.

A couple of days before the big offensive which began on the 18th September, General Allenby visited my Headquarters, where I presented to him all the officers not on duty. He took me a little apart and asked me if I was sure I could trust the men to fight, and I a.s.sured him that he need have no anxiety on that score, for the men were all right and would respond to any call when it was made.

He then asked me if there was any other point I should like to bring to his notice: I told him that malaria was daily becoming more prevalent and I was losing 200 men a week from this cause alone: I also pointed out that I did not think that the medical arrangements for the evacuation and care of the men were all that they should be. The General made a note of this in his book.

The only result was that I got an irate letter from the Deputy Adjutant-General asking me for a full report as to why I had misinformed the Commander-in-Chief about my sick, and about medical matters generally, so that on the morning of the 23rd September, the day we were ordered to pursue the enemy, when I should have been solely devoted to the leading of my men and all the problems pertaining thereto, I had to sit down and smooth the ruffled feathers of the Deputy Adjutant-General.

I not only proved my case to the hilt, but emphasized it by giving further evidence which I had not troubled the Commander-in-Chief by recounting.

General Chaytor specially warned us that, during the offensive on our left, we were to increase our patrols and harry the enemy as much as possible, to keep him in his lines and to prevent, if possible, any large force of Turks crossing from the East of the Jordan to reinforce their armies holding the line from the Jordan to the sea.

This is how the official report runs:--"Chaytor's force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patrolling to insure that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The role of this composite force was to secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and take advantage of any withdrawal on their part, but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out."

During the nights of the 18th, 19th, 20th and 21st September we made demonstrations against the Turkish positions along our front. Parties would crawl out into favourable positions, such as a fold in the ground, and open fire all down the line. This always made the Turks nervy, and their trenches would be manned and every individual would blaze away for all he was worth.

On the 19th and 20th they got so "windy" that they called on their artillery to put down a barrage to prevent us from making an a.s.sault.

Each time the barrage was put down our men were well clear, and lay snug and safe until the enemy had uselessly expended hundreds of rounds, when they quietly returned to camp, not a whit the worse for all the cannonading. There was very little sleep on these nights for anyone, and the Jewish Battalion certainly did all that in it lay to further the intentions of the Commander-in-Chief by holding every Turk in the neighbourhood of the Jordan closely to his lines.

On the 20th we pushed well up against the Turkish trenches, found them all manned, and again drew heavy rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire.

We had a few men wounded in this affair. Why we had not a heavy casualty list on these occasions is a mystery to me, for the men had to advance in the open over a stretch of ground as level as a billiard table.

Number 6 Trench Mortar Battery R.A. was under my command in the Mellahah, and I ordered this battery to open fire on the Turkish position round Umm esh Shert, if we should find difficulty in ousting the enemy from this important place.

I had arranged to attack this position on the 22nd September, but at midnight on the 21st my Intelligence Officer sent me news that the enemy's resistance in the trenches opposite Umm esh Shert Ford was weakening.

I immediately ordered out my reserve, and sent them under Lieutenant Cross to reinforce Major Neill, whose duty it was to push in the Turks and take the Ford at the earliest possible moment. I got favourable news by telephone of the steady advance of the men; trench after trench was occupied, and when I left my Headquarters at 4 a.m. for the scene of the fight, I was able to report to General Chaytor's Staff Officer that we were almost in possession of the crossing.

I galloped off as dawn was breaking, scrambled up the cliffs and across the ground from which the Turks had fled, and arrived in time to go down with Major Neill, Captain Julian, and Lieutenants Jabotinsky and Cross, to take possession of this coveted pa.s.sage over the Jordan. I may mention here that Jabotinsky had been attached to G.H.Q. for special work, but, as soon as the battalion went into the line, he requested to be returned to duty in order to share in all our dangers and hardships.

The moment we had secured the Umm esh Shert Ford I signalled the news to General Chaytor, who immediately took advantage of our capture by pushing mounted troops across the Jordan, thus outflanking the Turks who held the foothills of Shunat Nimrin, which barred the way to Es Salt.

The 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade crossed while we covered the Ford with our rifles and machine-guns, and they never drew rein until Es Salt was reached that evening, where a large force of the enemy with guns, etc., was captured by the Anzac Mounted Division.

That same afternoon, two companies of the 39th Battalion Royal Fusiliers moved up to our support and took up position in the posts which we had vacated in the Mellahah.

It is a curious fact that the whole movement of the British Army in Palestine, which swept the Turks out of the country, was actually pivoted on the sons of Israel, who were once again fighting the enemy, not far from the spot where their forefathers had crossed the Jordan under Joshua.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE LOST TRANSPORT WAGONS.

Meanwhile I was ordered to clear away the enemy believed to be still holding the ground to the north of our trenches round Red Hill. I detailed Captain H. H. Harris and his Company for this duty, the remainder of the battalion taking up position in the vacated Turkish trenches overlooking the Jordan. Lieutenant Jabotinsky, with his platoon, took possession of Umm esh Shert and put the captured ford in a state of defence, making machine-gun emplacements, etc., to cover the crossing.

I myself with Captain Julian, Lieutenant Cross, and a platoon reconnoitred up the river, for I had heard that there was a bridge in existence, which had been thrown across by the Turks in the neighbourhood of the ford, and I was anxious to find it if possible.

After going some little way I found it was nearly 8 o'clock a.m., and time to be getting back to my Battalion Headquarters, so I left Julian, Cross, and the patrol to push on and make what discoveries they could along the river. When I got back to my tent I found a telegram awaiting me from General Chaytor which informed me that I had been given command of a body of troops to be known officially as "Patterson's Column." It was composed of the 38th and 39th Battalions Royal Fusiliers, and was ordered to concentrate on the Auja bridgehead.

I handed over command of the 38th to Major Ripley, who was the next Senior Officer, and issued the necessary concentration orders.

Later on I rode out to view the position which we had wrested from the Turks on the Jordan and, on the way, I was surprised to meet Captain Julian being brought in wounded on a camel. He was in considerable pain, but quite cheery and able to give me a full account of what had happened. It seems that soon after I had left them the party was ambushed by the Turks, who caught them, in the neighbourhood of Red Hill, with machine-gun and rifle fire. Julian, Cross, and Private Mildemer fell; the remainder of the patrol melted into a fold of the ground and made their escape. Julian, although severely wounded in the foot, also managed to get away, aided by Corporal Elfman, who gallantly helped him to safety, although under heavy fire from the enemy.

Reinforcements had been sent out as quickly as possible to the scene of the fight by the nearest Company, but by the time they arrived the Turks had gone. No trace could be found of Lieutenant Cross's body, but Private Mildemer was found lying dead where he fell.