William Pitt and the Great War Part 22

On 13th April, after receiving news of a Spanish success in Catalonia, Grenville urged Bute to re-awaken Castilian pride by holding out the prospect of gains beyond the Pyrenees, and expressed the hope that Spain might renew her treaty with England, promising also to consider her claims to parts of the north-west of Hayti. These hopes were futile.

Early in that year France and Spain began to draw close together. The more moderate Republicans, Sieyes, Boissy d'Anglas, and Cambaceres, let it be known that France would offer moderate terms. Barthelemy, the able French envoy in Switzerland, furthered these plans, which came near to fulfilment when Prussia signed with France the Treaty of Basle (5th April 1795). Charles IV was only waiting for some excuse to follow suit.

As a relative of Louis XVI, he scrupled to take the lead; but he was ready to follow the lead of Prussia. The sacrifices demanded of him in March 1795 were considerable, viz., the province of Guipuzcoa and San Domingo. But Bourgoing, the special envoy to Madrid, offered a prize which far counterbalanced these losses. He held out to G.o.doy the bait which in the more skilful hands of Napoleon was destined to catch both him and his credulous master. Portugal was to be theirs if they made common cause with France. Acting together, the two Latin nations would overwhelm this "province of England," and together they would chase the British from the Mediterranean. That Portugal had loyally supported Spain in the monarchist cause mattered little. In place of the costly war of principle, G.o.doy sought to subst.i.tute an effort with limited liability, effective partnership, and enormous profits. He knew not that in entering on this broad and easy path, he a.s.sured the ruin of Spain and the ultimate loss of her colonial empire.

In this secret chaffering Pitt and Grenville were worsted as inevitably as in the similar case of the Part.i.tion of Poland. The Power that cries "hands off" to abettors of robbery needs to have overwhelming force at its back; but both here and on the banks of the Vistula England was helpless. There was no Court of Appeal. Christendom had vanished amidst the schemes of the monarchs in the East, and under the stabs of regicides in the West. Thus, while the champions of monarchy were sharing the last spoils of Poland, France succeeded in detaching Spain from the royalist league by inciting her to the plunder of Portugal.

Few moves have been more mean and cowardly; though the conduct of the Court of Madrid in this matter touches far deeper depths of infamy. For its present position was far from hopeless. With the help of the British fleet the progress of the French troops towards Bilbao might have been stayed. Affairs in Catalonia wore a hopeful aspect. England offered to recognize the Spanish conquests in Hayti and to press for further indemnities from France at the general peace. But all representations were in vain. G.o.doy brushed them aside in order to compa.s.s the ruin of the House of Braganza. On this enterprise he concentrated all his faculties. He inveighed against the invasion of Hayti by British troops.

"His Britannic Majesty," he said, "ought to have abstained from any interference with the island of San Domingo, upon the whole of which His Christian Majesty had a well-founded claim; or, if any enterprize was undertaken there by Great Britain, it should have been in the way of auxiliary to Spain in order to restore to her her ancient possessions in the West Indies." On other occasions he moaned over the heavy expenses of the war, the misery of the people, and the impossibility of resisting the superior power of France. But his chief theme was Hayti, and he finally suggested that the British acquisitions in that island should be held in trust for Louis XVII. He was not a little ruffled by the reply that they belonged of right to George III, who would keep them as compensation for the expenses of the war. Another significant fact was the removal of a fine corps of French _emigres_, some 3,300 strong, from the northern provinces to Cadiz, on their way to the West Indies.

At the time of the arrival of Bute at that port (25th May), Fortune vouchsafed a few gleams of hope to the Allies. Spanish pride having kicked against the French demands, especially that of the province of Guipuzcoa, Bourgoing's mission proved fruitless. The diplomatic situation also improved. In February 1795, as we have seen, Catharine II of Russia signed a defensive treaty with Great Britain, to which Austria acceeded on 20th May. Thus did Pitt replace the outworn Triple Alliance with Prussia and Holland by a more powerful confederacy. With these bright prospects in view, and animated by the hope of rousing Western France from Quiberon, Pitt had a right to expect some measure of fort.i.tude even in the Court of Madrid.[386] But G.o.doy remained obdurate.

On 11th June, in his first interview with Bute, he said he had no faith in Russia; the vacillations of Austria were notorious; and Pitt was said to be about to send Eden to Paris to sue for peace. As for Spain, she was hard pressed; French and American emissaries had stirred up strife in her colonies; and affairs were most "ticklish" in San Domingo. His Government had therefore sought for a composition (not a definite peace) with France. In fact, the war as a whole had failed, for whereas the Allies had set themselves to crush French principles, they had succeeded merely in uniting the French people in one common cause. On 11th July he promised to recall the Anglophobe Governor of San Domingo; but he declared the island to be in so distracted a state that both Spaniards and British would probably be expelled. He then complained that somehow England always got the better of Spain; witness Nootka Sound, Hayti, and Corsica. In spite of Bute's a.s.surance that he came to end these jealousies, G.o.doy continued to drift on the tide of events. "No plan is prepared," wrote Bute on 11th July, "no measures are taken. The accident of the day seems to determine everything, and happy do the Ministers feel when the day is pa.s.sed." He therefore advised that G.o.doy should be bribed.

The advice came too late. Already the favourite had instructed Don Domingo d'Yriarte, his envoy to the now extinct Polish Republic, to confer with Barthelemy, the French Amba.s.sador at Basle. The actions of Yriarte, of course, depended on the secret behests of G.o.doy. On 2nd July G.o.doy informed him that peace was the only means of thwarting the efforts of the bad counsellors of the Crown; and four days later he wrote:

Every day makes peace more necessary. There is no hope of restoring affairs in Navarre. Cowardice has unnerved our army and the French will dictate their terms to us.... I fear that their claims will be excessive, and condescension is our only resource if we are to succeed in saving ourselves even in part.

Your Lordship need not take alarm at the rigour of the terms of peace; listen to them, accept them, and forward them to me, saying to yourself that perhaps they will not be so fatal as the results of a delay in the negotiation might be.[387]

Yriarte, a nervous valetudinarian, eagerly accepted this despicable advice. Already one of his secretaries had allowed Barthelemy to see an almost equally base effusion from G.o.doy; so that the French amba.s.sador on 21st July informed the Committee of Public Safety that the game was in their hands. This was the case. Yriarte, after receiving two packets from Madrid, hastily sought a nocturnal interview with Barthelemy by the help of a dark lantern. The French amba.s.sador received him with some surprise, especially on hearing that he came to sign a treaty of peace on terms not yet known at Paris. When the Spaniard insisted on signing at once, Barthelemy examined the conditions, and finding them highly favourable to France, consulted his secretaries, with the result that he finally decided to conclude the affair.

Thus came about the Peace of Basle (22nd July 1795). Spain now waived her former demands, the restoration of religious worship in France, and French aid in the recovery of Gibraltar. The French, however, now agreed to restore all the districts held by their troops in the North of Spain, while the Court of Madrid ceded San Domingo. Spain also made peace with the Dutch or Batavian Republic, and offered to mediate between France and Portugal, Naples, Sardinia, and Parma.[388] Such were the chief clauses of this astonishing compact. It dealt a deadly blow to Pitt. For at the very time when he was building up a formidable league and rousing Brittany against the Republic, Spain seceded from the monarchist cause, and by surrendering San Domingo to France, doomed to failure his costly efforts in Hayti. Further, as will appear in Chapter XI, by setting free large numbers of the French troops at the Pyrenees, she greatly enhanced the difficulties of the expedition of General Doyle to the coast of la Vendee. Worst of all, it soon appeared that G.o.doy was bent on reviving the policy of the Family Compact, making common cause even with the murderers of Louis XVI in order to thwart England's expansion oversea.

Bute therefore warned our Government to prepare to strike a blow at once, before the Spanish fleet should be ready to help the French either in Corsica or Hayti. These precautions proved, for the present at least, to be unnecessary. The degradation of the Court and populace of Madrid may be measured by the joy with which the news of that inglorious peace was received. The Queen, fearful that the failures in the war would lead to the fall of her paramour, procured the speedy ratification of the Treaty of Basle and decorated him with the t.i.tle Prince of the Peace.

On hearing of the defection of Spain, Pitt at once took steps to guard Hayti against a treacherous attack by detaching the greater part of the British force then preparing to help the French Royalists of la Vendee.

The general opinion both in London and Madrid was that war must ensue.

G.o.doy kept a close watch upon Bute, who took a mansion in Madrid on a long lease in order to lull that Court into security. It was of the highest importance to avert or delay a rupture with Spain; for the condition of the British West Indies was most critical. The French, having recovered Guadeloupe and St. Lucia, despatched thence emissaries to fire the slaves in the British islands with the hope of gaining liberty and equality. The peril became acute in Jamaica. There about 500 negroes had escaped to the mountains, especially in Trelawny and Charlestown Counties, and by night carried out murderous raids against the planters and their dependents. So fiendish were the atrocities of these Maroons, that the authorities in that island applied to the Spaniards in Cuba for one hundred bloodhounds and twenty huntsmen in order to track the Maroons to their fastnesses. This device proved successful; the murderers were by degrees hunted down, and were transported to British North America, 25,000 being voted by the Jamaica a.s.sembly for settling them there.

Nevertheless the use of bloodhounds, which placed Britons on a level with the Spanish crusaders, aroused general disgust. Attempts were made in the House of Commons by General Macleod, Sheridan, and Courtenay to represent the Maroons as men worthily struggling for liberty. Dundas, while pruning these sprays of rhetoric, declared that Ministers would thereafter prohibit the use of bloodhounds. These troubles with the slaves prejudiced Parliament against any change in their condition. In vain did Francis, in one of the last speeches of an acrid but not discreditable career, press for the amelioration of their lot. At the outset he showed the bitterness of his enmity to Pitt by charging him with the betrayal of the cause which, in his oration of 2nd April 1792, he had irradiated with the beatific vision of a regenerated and blissful Africa. Why, he asked, did not the Minister resign office after his failure to realize his heart's desire? He then charged him with insincerity on the whole question, and urged the House to be content with alleviating the condition of the slaves by giving them the rudiments of education and some rights of property, above all by securing the sanct.i.ty of their marriages. Fox followed with a speech aimed more against Pitt than the slave-owners. The Prime Minister then replied. Ignoring the charges of his opponents, he pointed out that the proposed improvements were utterly inadequate to remedy the ills of the negroes so long as Parliament allowed shiploads of these unhappy creatures to be cast into the West Indies every year. What was needed, he said, was the abolition of that hateful traffic, indeed of the whole system of slavery. For himself, he still hoped that Parliament would adopt those measures, which alone could be effective. Wilberforce was absent through illness. Francis, having elicited in the main mere personalities, not declarations of principle, withdrew his motion.

The lapse of the question of Abolition in the years 1795-6 was a public misfortune; for the slaves, despairing of justice from England, turned to France. For the good of the cause they murdered men, women, or children, with equal indifference; and, when hunted down, died with the cry _Vive la Republique_. Here was our chief difficulty in the West Indies. Owing to the refusal of Parliament to limit the supply of slaves or to alleviate their condition, we had to deal with myriads of blacks, exasperated by their former hardships, hoping everything from France, and able to support climatic changes which dealt havoc to the raw English levies. In truth, the success of the West India expeditions depended on other factors besides military and medical skill. It turned on political and humanitarian motives that were scouted at Westminster.

The French Jacobins stole many a march on the English governing cla.s.ses; and in declaring the negro to be an equal of the white man they nearly wrecked Britain's possessions in the West Indies.

For a great negro leader had now appeared. Toussaint l'Ouverture, though probably not of pure negro blood, was born at Breda in the north of Hayti in 1746. His mental gifts were formidable; and when sharpened by education and by long contact with whites, they enabled him to play upon the elemental pa.s.sions of his kindred, to organize them, to lead them to the fight, to cure their wounds, and to overawe their discontent. A barbarian in his outbursts of pa.s.sion, and a European in organizing power, he became a zealot in the Republican cause. A quarrel with another masterful negro, Jean Francois, forced him for a time to retire into the Spanish part of San Domingo; but he soon returned, and proved to be our most formidable enemy.

The position in Hayti at the close of 1795 was somewhat as follows. The Republicans and their coloured allies, often helped by the Spaniards, held or ravaged the greater part of the territory which the French Royalists had invited us to possess. Their hopeful forecasts had led Pitt and Dundas to send far too few troops for what proved to be an increasingly difficult enterprise; and at this time British authority extended scarcely beyond the reach of the garrisons. The French Royalists had not given the help which Malouet and Charmilly had led our Ministers to expect.[389] And on the other hand, Victor Hugues, the Republican leader, managed to spread revolt in St. Vincent, Grenada, and Dominica. In this critical state of things, the Cabinet decided to accord to Major-General Williamson, Governor of Hayti, a long furlough, and to place in supreme command a man of great resourcefulness and power of character.

Sir Ralph Abercromby was at this time sixty-one years of age; but in zeal and ardour he excelled nearly all the junior officers. His toughness and energy had invested with dignity even the disastrous retreat from Holland early in the year. He was not a great commander; for he lacked both soundness and firmness of judgement, and he had no grasp of the principles of strategy; but he restored the discipline and prestige of the British army; and in him Moore and Wellesley hailed the dawn of a brighter era. "The best man and the best soldier who has appeared amongst us this war," was Moore's comment after Abercromby's glorious death near Alexandria.[390] Pitt has often been charged with lack of judgement in selecting commanders. Let it be remembered, then, that he sent Abercromby to the post of difficulty and danger.

Unfortunately, delays multiplied at Spithead. Though the Cabinet withdrew the marrow of the Vendean expedition, yet not enough troops were available to complete Abercromby's muster; and when the men were ready, the ordnance and transports were not at hand. What Department and what officials were answerable for this scandalous state of things it is hard to say. Buckingham, who had several correspondents at Portsmouth, suspected Abercromby of shiftlessness. However that may be, the autumn wore away amidst recriminations and growing discontent. When the fleet at last put to sea, it encountered a terrible storm off Portland; several transports were dashed to pieces on that point; while others in the van were flung back on to the Chesil Beach or the sh.o.r.e near Bridport (18th November). The horrors of the scene were heightened by the brutality of the coast population, which rushed on the spoil in utter disregard of the wretches struggling in the waves. The rest of the convoy put back to Spithead; and not till the spring of 1796 did Abercromby reach Jamaica. Dundas had instructed him first to recover St.

Lucia and Guadeloupe, whence Victor Hugues had flung forth the brands of revolt. Ultimately the flames shrivelled up the colonies of France; but, for the present, they were more formidable than her fleets and armies.

It was therefore sound policy to strike at those two islands. In a "secret" despatch of 4th November, Dundas also warned Major-General Forbes closely to watch the Spaniards in San Domingo, and, though not attacking their posts, yet to support the French Royalists with arms and money in case they desired to do so.

Among those who sailed from Portsmouth early in 1796 was Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Moore.[391] He found the West India service most unpopular. Yet the energy of Abercromby and Moore brought about the surrender of that almost impregnable fortress, Morne Fortunee, in St.

Lucia. Moore was left as governor of the island, but with a garrison insufficient to complete the subjection of the fanatical blacks. General Whyte found the conquest of the Dutch settlement of Demerara a far easier task than its retention. Abercromby then relieved St. Vincent and strengthened the defences of Grenada, that island having been recaptured by General Nicols. Abercromby and his comrades thus saved those possessions from the most imminent danger. His services were almost as great in the quarters as on the field. He adapted the c.u.mbrous uniform to the needs of the tropics, and, by abolishing parades and drills in the noontide heats, and improving the sanitary conditions of the camps, sought to stay the ravages of disease, of which the carelessness or stupidity of officials had been the most potent ally. On 21st April 1796 Sheridan moved for a return of the troops who had succ.u.mbed to disease in the West Indies. He a.s.serted that several of them, on landing, were without shoes and stockings, that hospitals crowded with sick were without medicines or bandages, and that in one case a hundred patients had to spend the night on the bare beach. Dundas's reply was virtually an admission of the truth of these charges.

The declaration of war by Spain in the autumn of 1796 brought about a new situation. The Republicans and their black allies regularly took refuge and found their supplies in the central parts of San Domingo now ceded to France; but when the British sought to follow and attack them there, they were a.s.sured that it was neutral territory. The British Government warmly protested against this duplicity. Either the island was Spanish, or it was French. If the former, then Toussaint and his men had no right to retreat thither. If the latter, the British could attack them. In point of fact, plans for the transfer of San Domingo to France were at that time dragging slowly along at Madrid: and when the French General, Rom, failed to bend that Court to his terms, he departed for the island under the convoy of a Spanish squadron. This incident was typical of the recent policy of Madrid. In every possible way it favoured France. Early in 1796 seven French warships underwent extensive repairs in the royal dockyard at Cadiz. Merry, secretary of legation at Madrid, further reported numerous seizures of British merchantmen by French privateers which brought them into Spanish harbours. Twelve ships were thus brought into Alicante in the winter of 1795-6; and English merchants could get no redress for these seizures. French privateers also fitted out at Trinidad to act against Grenada and Tobago.[392]

Provocations were not all on one side. Early in 1796, three Spanish West Indiamen were overhauled by two English frigates and taken to Bermuda, in the belief that war had broken out. They were, however, at once released. G.o.doy protested angrily against this indignity, and early in March hinted that Spain's neutrality would cease on the establishment of a French Government. Two months later Bute found that Spain was seeking to form a Quadruple Alliance, namely, with France, Denmark, and Sweden, a scheme which Ehrenthal, the Swedish envoy, warmly furthered. The news of Bonaparte's victories in Italy and of the financial troubles in England evidently puffed up G.o.doy with the hope of playing the part of an Alberoni for the humiliation of England; and in 1796 Spain had better prospects of worsting the islanders than in 1718 when they had the alliance of France, Austria, and Holland. In truth, no period was more favourable for a revival of the Latin races than the years 1796-7, when England was in dire straits, when Austria succ.u.mbed under the blows of Bonaparte, and the Dutch, Danes, and Swedes opposed the British Power.

With singleness of purpose and honesty in their administrations, France, Spain, and their Allies should have wrecked the lifework of the two Pitts.

The British Ministers felt the gravity of the situation. In view of the collapse of the Austrian Power in Lombardy, Pitt wrote to Grenville on 28th June in unusually despondent terms, that it was hopeless to expect Austria to prolong the war after the present campaign. We should be left alone to confront France and Holland, "probably joined by Spain, and perhaps favoured more or less openly by the Northern Powers."[393]

Accordingly we must see to our home defences, and also consider the possibility of a general peace. Grenville therefore urged Bute to seek by all methods compatible with his dignity "to preserve the good understanding of the two countries." In fact, Pitt and his colleagues now decided to bring about a general pacification; and, as will appear later, they held to that resolve, in spite of the strong opposition of George III. But, on 5th August, while they were discussing details, Bonaparte won a crushing victory over Wurmser at Castiglione, and, eleven days later, G.o.doy definitely sided with France. Pitt feared that the hostile league would include Denmark and Sweden; and, but for his foresight in gaining over Catharine, this would have been the issue of events. Even so, G.o.doy hoped to form a Quadruple Alliance with France, Holland, and Prussia. He therefore took a high tone with Bute, declaring that England would not be allowed to attack San Domingo, as it was still Spanish, and there was a necessary connection between France and Spain; but he would not hear of Bute accepting that statement as a declaration of war.

Clearly, Spain was trying to gain time; for reports from Cadiz showed her fleet to be far from ready, several of the ships being leaky. The repairs to the French ships at that dockyard also went on in the most leisurely manner. But on 4th August all was ready. Admiral Mann with a small blockading force having been called by Jervis into the Mediterranean, the French ships set sail, escorted by twenty Spanish sail-of-the-line. The French squadron made for the Bank of Newfoundland and inflicted great damage. Why it did not proceed along with the Spaniards to the West Indies is hard to say. The impact of twenty-seven sail-of-the-line in that quarter would have been decisive; but probably G.o.doy did not yet feel warranted in throwing down the gauntlet. Pitt and Grenville decided to overlook the gross breach of neutrality at Cadiz, and even now hoped for a change in G.o.doy's mood. On 26th August Grenville informed Bute that, though England had good cause for declaring war, she would await the result of the recent proposals to Spain. On or about that date Las Casas, the Spanish amba.s.sador, pettishly left London on a flimsy pretext; and two days later Dundas warned the commander-in-chief in Hayti of the imminence of war.

Nevertheless, while taking every precaution, he was not to attack the Spaniards until definite news of a rupture arrived. Further, on the 31st (as will appear in the following chapter) Portland despatched orders to Sir Gilbert Elliot, Viceroy of Corsica, to prepare for the immediate evacuation of that island.

It is therefore clear that Pitt and his colleagues used all possible means to avert war with Spain. Bute, acting on orders from London, carried complaisance to lengths derogatory, as he thought, to the honour of Great Britain, and G.o.doy humoured him to the top of his bent. Thus, on 10th September, in the course of a singular interview, G.o.doy a.s.sured him that, even if war broke forth, it would be brief. If (he continued) England had not annoyed Spain by her naval and colonial policy, the latter might have arranged to find some indemnity, either at the expense of Holland, or else "something on the coast of California. You English have a pa.s.sion for California, and the trade is in the most flourishing state." Half amused by these dilatory tactics, Bute sought to find out the real state of the case; and he discovered that the Franco-Spanish compact aimed at the joint conquest of Portugal as well as of Naples, Sicily, and Gibraltar, while England was to be compelled to surrender Honduras and Hayti. On the 5th of October he received from G.o.doy the Spanish declaration of war. It laid stress on the disputes at Toulon, England's seizure of Corsica, Hayti, and Dutch Demerara, besides the founding of British mercantile posts on the River Missouri, which evidently aimed at securing the routes to the Pacific.[394] Of these schemes, the conquest of Portugal lay the nearest to the heart of G.o.doy.

The rupture with Spain is an event of prime importance. Because her fleet was disastrously beaten by Jervis off Cape St. Vincent in February 1797, it has too often been a.s.sumed that she counted for little in the war. An examination of the British Records reveals the error of that a.s.sumption. The evacuation of Corsica and of the Mediterranean by the British forces resulted solely from the Spanish offensive. Though weak in herself, Spain held so strong a position in Europe and the West Indies as to endanger British enterprises at many points, besides threatening the coasts of Ireland. In truth, but for Spanish support in the Mediterranean, Bonaparte could never have ventured upon his Eastern expedition. Thus the defection of the Court of Madrid changed the character of the war. Thenceforth it revolved more and more around colonial questions, to the weakening of the royalist and republican motives which had worked so potently in its early stages. The oriental adventure of the young Corsican was to emphasize the contrast between the years 1793 and 1798; but the scene-shifting began with the intrigues of G.o.doy. In a sense Pitt himself helped on the transformation. He did not regard the struggle against France as one of political principle. He aimed solely at curbing the aggression of the Jacobins upon Holland; and the obvious device of weakening France by expeditions to the West Indies further helped to bring events back into the arena of eighteenth-century strife. Now that Spain, the protagonist of the French Bourbons, deserted their cause and attacked the Power in which they most trusted, all pretence of a war of principle vanished. The importance of the change was not perceived at the time, though signs of it were not wanting. Both in France and England democratic enthusiasm speedily died down, and the discontent, which now and again flared forth in both lands, was but a feeble sputter compared with the devouring flame of 1789.

In the West Indies the effects of the rupture with Spain were speedily felt. On 9th September 1796 Dundas instructed Forbes, commander-in-chief in Hayti, to help the Spanish settlers if they resisted the transfer of their part of the island to France. He also enjoined the utmost possible economy in public expenditure, and urged that the French settlers should have a large share in the conduct of local affairs. This zeal on behalf of local self-government was markedly opportunist. It arose from a suggestion of Colonel Wigglesworth, Commissary-General in Hayti, that the expenses of that colony would not lessen until there was a regular Government. In the midst of the financial strain at home Pitt and his colleagues desired that the French settlers should bear their share of the expense of maintaining bands of native auxiliaries. By one of the unaccountable impulses that sway the negro mind, a considerable force was now available; but it could not be utilized owing to the rigid economy enjoined by the Home Government. As the financial outlook darkened, Portland and Dundas sent urgent warnings to the new Governor of Hayti, Major-General Simcoe, bidding him concentrate the whole of the British force at Cape Nicholas Mole, the probable objective of the French and Spaniards. The military administration must be withdrawn to that fortress, the British cavalry being sent home. Further, as Great Britain could in no case bear a larger financial burden than 300,000 a year for Hayti, expenses were to be reduced on all sides, the residue falling to the share of the colonists. A larger naval force would, however, be sent; and Simcoe was advised to seize the island of Tortuga and to alarm the Spaniards by feints against Havannah.

This was the beginning of the end at Hayti. Ministers, in despair of pacifying that racial cauldron, now looked on the Spanish colonies as an easier prize. Dundas therefore ordered Abercromby to capture Porto Rico or Trinidad; and he even dallied with a fantastic scheme for shipping the Haytian colonists to Porto Rico. Abercromby, however, who again set sail from Portsmouth in November 1796, decided to make for Trinidad, and by a brilliant stroke captured its capital, Port of Spain. The attack on San Juan, in Porto Rico, met with unexpected difficulties, and ended in failure (February and April 1797). Matters now became desperate in Hayti. The rebels captured several posts near Port-au-Prince, largely owing to dissensions among the defenders. Simcoe, despite a serious illness on his way out, worked miracles with his skeleton regiments, but both he and his subordinates failed to cut down expenses as the Cabinet demanded. Accordingly, on 9th June 1797, Portland and Dundas reminded him that no further reinforcements could be sent out, and added this ominous sentence: "It is but too obvious that ... the immense sacrifices this country has made for the protection of the French part of San Domingo have too frequently been diverted from purposes of public utility to answer the worst ends of private peculation and inordinate cupidity."

In a recent debate in the House of Commons St. John a.s.sessed the expenses of Hayti for January 1797 at 700,000; and stated that, for the discharge of judicial duties, a Frenchman was receiving 2,500 a year, which he was now squandering in London. Pitt remained silent. Dundas did not deny these allegations, but begged members to recollect the great difficulties of our officials in Hayti.[395] This was undeniable. It is the curse of a policy of retirement that waverers haste to leave betimes with all the spoils obtainable. The signs of abandonment of Hayti caused a stampede, demoralizing to all concerned. On 1st January 1798, Portland and Dundas penned the order for the evacuation of Hayti, owing to the impossibility of making good the loss of troops or of recruiting in the island. After dwelling on the impossibility of reducing the expenditure to the requisite amount, Ministers explained that they had deferred the evacuation of Hayti "as long as the negotiation which His Majesty had opened with the enemy at Lille, and the disposition of a majority in the two Councils of Legislature in France, left a hope that some immediate arrangement might be made with that country, which in its consequences might operate to relieve England from the intolerable burdens by which the British part of St. Domingo is retained, and to a certain degree to ensure to its inhabitants a continuance of security and protection.... The rupture of the negotiation and the avowed system of the present Government of France appear on the one hand to render the attainment of this desirable end precarious, if not remote, whilst on the other they impose on H.M.'s confidential servants an additional obligation of reducing the heavy burdens of a war, the continuance of which is unavoidable, within the narrowest limits, in order to be able to persevere in it until adequate terms of peace can be obtained; and it is certainly their first and essential duty to appropriate the resources of the country with such management and economy as may ensure the preservation and defence of the essential possessions of the Crown...."

The good faith of Pitt in the Lille negotiation appears clearly in this interesting statement, which further proves that he held on to Hayti in the hope of ceding it to France on terms satisfactory to Great Britain and the colonists. Doubtless it was the perception of this truth which led many of the settlers to decamp after spoiling the Egyptians. The thankless duty of evacuation devolved on Brigadier-General Maitland, who carried it out with skill and patience. Especially admirable is his secret bargain with Toussaint, whereby that able chief agreed not to molest the British either in Hayti or in Jamaica, while in return he was to receive provisions at certain ports under his control. Ministers had not advised any such proceeding, but they cordially approved of it, despite the clamour of the West India planters at a compact with a negro.[396] Thus was laid the basis of that good understanding which subsequently enabled Toussaint to defy Bonaparte.

The success attending this agreement shows what power England might have wielded had not her King, her Princes, and her Parliament insisted on maintaining intact the inst.i.tution of slavery. They thereby aroused an enemy more terrible than yellow fever, the negro. France profited by the blunder; but she rushed blindly forward, using the black man with a recklessness which gave him the mastery. On the other hand, if Pitt and Wilberforce had succeeded in carrying out their programme in the years 1790-2, the incendiary devices of Brissot and Victor Hugues would have come to nought. In that case the transfer of Hayti to England would have placed at her disposal myriads of devoted blacks, ready and able to plant the Union Jack on every fortress in the West Indies, and to conquer the colonies of Spain if she changed sides. It was not to be.

Far from gaining an accession of strength in that quarter, England lost heavily in men and treasure, and at the Peace of Amiens retained only Trinidad in return for all her sacrifices.

In no part does Pitt's war policy appear to more disadvantage than in the West Indies. He entered into those expeditions when the army at home was unable to meet the demands of the service in Flanders, and on the coasts of Brittany and Provence, not to speak of the needs of Ireland and the East Indies. He allowed Dundas to send out levies which were far too raw to withstand the strain of the tropics. This fact, together with the stupidity of the regulations and the inexperience, or worse, of the medical staff, accounts for the waste of life and the barrenness of these tedious campaigns. At no time had England in the West Indies a force sufficient to withstand the ravages of disease and to overcome the Republicans and their black allies. Nevertheless, while the conduct of the West Indian campaigns is open to censure, it is difficult to see what other course could have been adopted towards those important colonies, in view of the resolve of the French Jacobins to revolutionize them. The attempt was made and partly succeeded. Could Pitt and his colleagues stand merely on the defensive, while incendiaries sought to stir up a war of colour? Was it not the natural and inevitable step to endeavour to extirpate those fire-brands? And when so attractive an offer as that of Hayti was made by the royalist settlers, could the British Government hold timidly aloof and allow that rich land to breed revolt? Surely a servile war could be averted only by intervention at the natural centre of influence. If from Guadeloupe, after its recapture by the French, the seeds of rebellion were sown broadcast, would not Hayti have become a volcano of insurrection? Finally, it is unquestionable that the change of front of the Court of Madrid in the years 1795-6 blighted the whole enterprise at the very time when success seemed attainable. On G.o.doy, then, not on Pitt, must rest the responsibility for the lamentable waste of life in the West Indies and the ultimate lapse into barbarism of their most fertile island.

FOOTNOTES:

[384] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Bute to Grenville, 26th June 1795.

[385] "F. O.," Spain, 36. Jackson to Grenville, 2nd January and 11th February 1795.

[386] "F. O.," Spain, 37. Grenville to Bute, 5th, 12th, and 19th June.

[387] Del Cantillo, "Tratados," 660.

[388] "Papiers de Barthelemy," vi, Introd., xv, 71, 77-85.

[389] "W. O.," vi, 6, which contains other despatches of Dundas cited later.

[390] "Diary of Sir John Moore," i, 208, 221, 233, 243; ii, 18, 19.

[391] "Diary of Sir John Moore," 2 vols. Edited by General Maurice.

[392] "F. O.," Spain, 39, 40. Merry to Grenville, 20th and 25th December and 19th January, 10th February, 6th and 29th March.

[393] "Dropmore P.," iii, 214.

[394] "F. O.," Spain, 44. Bute to Grenville, 10th September and 21st October.

[395] For the disgust of Pitt and Dundas, see "Dropmore P.," iii, 390.

[396] Malouet wrote to Pitt on 24th June 1798: "The wisdom of General Maitland's measures, the perfect order in which he has conducted the operations have lessened the disasters attending it, and by means of a truce and convention agreed on with the Republican chiefs, not an inconsiderable number of inhabitants has been induced to remain on their plantations" (Pitt MSS., 146).