War's Brighter Side Part 19

And since you continue to make no secret of your hatred, the same remedy is now in your own hands. But it will be difficult to find a spot where Mr. Englishman is not _en evidence_.

To use Mr. Chamberlain's famous phrase, "There is a point where silence is weakness." That point has been reached. You seem to forget that you simply and generously, of course, gave away your town and State without the faintest shadow of a cause, to the nation who never had the remotest idea of coming near you or troubling you. You were eager to cross arms with the most powerful nation in the world, knowing as you must have done, deep in your sensible mind, that you would lose in the fray.

You hint at our ingrat.i.tude. How about your own? Had it not been for England your land would never have had a place in the existence of South African territory from the days of long ago.

Who has helped to uphold the dignity of your land? Mr. Englishman.

Who has helped to fill your coffers, public and private, with wealth?

Mr. Englishman.

Who has been the chief spirit of commerce within your gates? Mr.

Englishman.

And whom has it been your greatest pride to imitate in manner, in dress, and in speech but Mr. Englishman?

Nay, had he withdrawn his patronage as he might have done, your land would have collapsed like a bubble.

Mr. Englishman is too valuable a factor in the world's history to be easily discarded.

Yours is thus the debt of grat.i.tude.

You speak hastily when you gibe at the "awful and untuneful melodies"

with which Mr. Englishman deigned to soothe your heaving breast; and would lead one to suppose that you had ever been used to the most exquisite of public music, when in truth your town has scarcely ever been privileged to listen to such. Its own band in the days that are past can hardly compare favourably with even the recent melodies which compel you to close your ears with cotton wool, and even your musical ear must have been satisfied had you listened to the band and music at Government House a few nights ago. But doubtless the cotton wool had not been taken out.

I beg leave to contradict your statement that Miss Uitlander would "push" Mr. Englishman out of your land while welcoming your brothers back to their country. Miss Uitlander has discovered too certainly the real truth of your "loving hand" ever to trust in it again. And if you could so joyfully turn Mr. Englishman out of your borders, rest a.s.sured Miss Uitlander would most certainly accompany him. She does not, as so many have done, paint one colour one day and another the next. And if Mr. Englishman only waits a little longer he will win not only the country but yourself as well.

MISS UITLANDER.

(With this final word from the fair Miss Uitlander, who has been discussed, yet has not before spoken for herself, the Editors decide to end this interesting series of letters.)

CAPE MARKETS.

Market slightly weaker this morning. Sales: Bantjes Deeps, 11s. 6d.; Benons, 43s.; Mains, 43s.; Randfonteins, 60s.; Vogel Deeps, 27s. 3d.; Wit Deeps, 45s.

IS THE ART OF WAR REVOLUTIONISED?

BY H. A. GWYNNE.

II.--_Artillery._

"When a battery comes under rifle fire it becomes worse than useless,"

once said a well-known foreign military expert. And if this statement is to be accepted, as we accept Euclid's axioms, then indeed I should be inclined to say that the art of war has become revolutionised completely. But having seen G Battery at Magersfontein practically silence at a range well within 1,500 yards (I believe at one time it was only 1,200 yards) a strong force of the enemy's riflemen firing from good cover on an undulating plain, it becomes apparent that the military expert's dictum is incorrect. I cite the instance of G Battery because, perhaps it is the best known in the operations in the Western Frontier, but I could, if necessary, give twenty cases where both Horse and Field Batteries have worked magnificently and effectively under a galling fire.

At the same time I do not wish, for a moment, to lay it down as one of the rules of modern warfare that guns can be worked with impunity within 1,500 or even 2,000 yards of the enemy's rifle fire, for the danger of being put out is so apparent that it needs no demonstration.

But artillery must have a good "position." Batteries cannot be hidden behind boulders as infantry soldiers can. Gunners must have an open field and more or less a commanding point from which to lay their guns. This necessity--a necessity to which no other arms are so completely subjected--has entailed, during the course of the present war, the risk of whole batteries being under rifle fire. Before the introduction of the long-range rifle, there were but few instances where guns, in order to take up proper positions, were forced to come under effective rifle fire. Now, however, we have to face this risky possibility. And in this respect, and this respect only, can the use of the modern rifle be said to have made any change in the rules of war laid down for the use of artillery.

The present campaign, if viewed from the point of view of the artilleryman, is an abnormal one. Field and horse batteries have had to face what has been practically siege artillery. In Natal we have been outranged by the use, by the Boers, of guns of great calibre and no mobility. We have faced the difficulty--and successfully too--by bringing on to the field naval guns of equal calibre to the enemy's.

And, although we have been surprised at the rapid way in which the Boers have shifted their heavy guns, I still dare to think that we can move our 4.7 guns with greater rapidity. My intention, however, is not to discuss the use of the naval large calibre guns in field operations. Such a discussion would be outside the scope of this article. I prefer to look upon their use in this campaign as an abnormal episode--which, perhaps, may never again occur in civilised warfare, except in case of sieges.

Artillery in operation in the field is represented by Horse and Field (Howitzers and ordinary) guns. Now what lessons have our artillery learnt from the engagements of the present war? That is the most important question, and I propose to answer it to the best of my ability, feeling and hoping that my answer will induce abler answers from other pens.

It is impossible, in discussing the uses and abuses of any particular arm, to dissociate that arm from the whole to which it belongs. A complete modern force should consist of a proper proportion of horse, foot, and artillery. The three form the whole, the perfect machine.

The parts must fit into each other as the cogs of one wheel fit into those of another. In the war of the future infantry will be used for two purposes--to contain the opposing infantry, and to hold positions seized by the mobile portion of the force, be it cavalry or mounted infantry. There will be very little preparation by the artillery for infantry attack, for the simple reason that I am convinced that frontal attacks are things of the past. Not the modernest of modern artillery, lyddite, melinite, or whatever high explosive is used, can by frontal concentration move or weaken infantry sufficiently to destroy their defensive power against an infantry attack.

There will, therefore, be in the next war between European or civilised military Powers grand artillery duels between the opposing artillery, while the mounted force of one is trying to outflank the other. The obvious necessity, therefore, is the highest development of the most mobile portion of the artillery--the R.H.A. Flank movements must necessarily be the tactics of the future. Battles will be, as they always have been, won by strategy, but for modern strategy and modern tactics the great necessity will be the greatest mobility of the greatest force. But the British Army, as it certainly possesses the finest material for infantry in the world, also possesses, I feel sure, as fine an artillery as any. I am not talking now of guns, but of the men who work them. In attempting to outflank an enemy with the mobile portion of his force, the general of the next war will find his flanking movement met by the mobile portion of his opponent's army.

The result is to be either a return to the old cavalry charges against cavalry or an artillery duel. The latter, I believe, will be the case.

The cavalry of the future will be a mixture of the mounted infantry men and the cavalry men, and as such will be able to stop with rifle fire any attempts at the old-fashioned charge, and the verdict will be p.r.o.nounced by the gunners. Then, indeed, will the better-trained, better-equipped, better-handled horse artillery be able either to drive back the attack and so save the whole situation, or to force in the defence and win the whole battle. Wherefore it would appear to me that we should improve and improve our horse artillery until we have the best guns, the best gunners, and the best organisation in the world. I know we have the best material.

Exactly the same thing applies to the Field Artillery, which I, for one, would like to see done away with. That is to say, that the distinctions between Horse and Field Artillery should be removed. I would give a heavier gun and a better gun to the Horse Battery, and make the Field Battery men mobile. This would give us an uniform artillery, in which the mobility of the Field guns would be increased and the range of Horse guns improved. After all, the difference in weight of a Field and a Horse gun is not so great. We must be prepared to provide some means of moving it more rapidly. The advantages of this change appear to be self-evident. The quick and rapid movement of artillery is bound to be the great factor in future battles. We are making our infantry men mobile, every day; why not do the same with the artillery? If we can bring up a gun of equal calibre to that of the enemy, the issue will be to the better-manned, better-handled gun.

To be able to rapidly throw a great force on any given point of the enemy's line is to ensure victory in infantry tactics. The same thing applies, surely, to the artillery. Why have a slow and a rapid moving artillery? Why not make the whole of it capable of rapidity?

This campaign has been the first between two civilised nations where high explosives have been used in the bursting charges. I have made careful inquiries from Boer prisoners as to its effect, and the only conclusion that I have come to is that veracity is not a virtue of the burgher. Some have spoken of the bursting of a lyddite sh.e.l.l as the most terrible experience they have ever had, and have compared its action to that of an earthquake. But I must confess that on pursuing my inquiries further I have generally found that these vivid portrayers of its awful effects have been attached to some hospital in the rear. The prisoners taken at Paardeberg were singularly divided as to its destructive power. Albrecht is said to have declared that it was a pure waste to drop a lyddite sh.e.l.l into soft ground, and to have admitted that on rocky ground it had a most demoralising effect.

On the whole, however, I am inclined to say that the effect of lyddite is certainly not as great as we expected, and I cannot help thinking that time-shrapnel well burst and well aimed is more dreaded by the Boers than lyddite sh.e.l.ls.

And now I am going to tread on delicate ground. We have all our little idiosyncrasies, and gunners are not without theirs. They will have nothing to say to the Vickers-Maxim. "It is a toy and not a gun," I have heard many a gunner declare. But I contend that we have never used it properly. Lord Dundonald's galloping Maxim was intended to accompany cavalry. Why not have a galloping "pom-pom"? It can be brought into action with great speed, it has a great range, and everybody will agree that it is a most accurate gun. It would have been most useful against the Boers when they fled from Poplar Grove, and its effect upon a battery coming into action is not to be despised, as the gallant T Battery will testify from their experiences at Driefontein. Again, its use on kopjes held by cavalry pending the arrival of infantry would surely be beneficial. It has a demoralising effect; even more so than a percussion shrapnel, and our enemy in the present campaign is particularly susceptible to demoralisation when operating in open ground.

One of the difficulties with which the artillery in the present campaign has had to contend has been to find out the extent of our infantry advance for which they are preparing with a bombardment. As the Mauser and Lee-Metford render early cover necessary for infantry, it has come about that our infantry, while seeking to render itself invisible to the enemy, has succeeded in making itself almost entirely invisible to our supporting artillery. On many occasions our artillery has ceased fire long before it was necessary, because it became impossible to tell how far our advance extended, for no artillery officer--and rightly so--will run the risk of inflicting damage on his own infantry. The remedy for this state of things has yet to be discovered.

In making public opinions such as these--the opinions of a mere layman--I should feel inclined to make some kind of apology, knowing as I do that they are liable to be read by men whose whole life is devoted to the practice as well as the theory of the use of artillery in the field, were it not for the fact that I am optimistic enough to believe that my remarks will provoke criticism. I am aware that the British officer is not much given to rushing into print, but I am also convinced that he will not sit tamely by when heresies are propagated.

If, therefore, the views I have enounced are unsound and unpractical, it is his bounden duty to contradict them. And in doing so he will probably contribute his own views, which will undoubtedly receive far greater attention, from the fact that they are set forth by men actually serving in the field, than if they are kept back till the end of the war, when a successful issue will probably bring with it apathy on the part of those in whose hands rest the destinies of the British Army.

THE NEW MACHINE GUN.

Rarely, if ever, in the annals of the Ordnance Survey has the British Government sent out a fully equipped Survey Section, for the purpose of reconnaissance duty, previous to the present war. During the march from Modder River to Bloemfontein, they have had plenty of scope for displaying the special training received, necessary for successful sketching, surveying and reconnoitring an enemy's position.

At Paardeberg a very successful and complete sketch to scale was made of the Boers' laager by Major Jackson, R.E., who, whilst exposed to a hot fire every day and within 800 yards of the enemy's trenches, and where men were falling every minute, nevertheless completed the whole sketch within four days.

This part of the warfare, where you walk well within the enemy's firing line with only a revolver, the Boers continually sniping and potting, no cover, and no chance of a "kick or hit back," makes you feel as though you would like to charge into their midst, get hand to hand, and at least have one shot or hit, in return for the compliments and salutes they pay you. But no, you must stand still in the open, coolly go on with the sketching, and not mind the bullets, even if they take a leg off the plane table or knock the pencil out of your hand. The only thing that is to be feared seriously is the rain, and that may make the ink run, spoil the sketch, and cause a lot of trouble and annoyance.

The Boers may "knock spots off you," but the sketch is the princ.i.p.al thing; another R.E. Surveyor may be obtained, but not another plan, until probably too late for practical use.

Presumably the burghers mistake the tripod and plane table (used for the purpose) for a new kind of machine gun, or some other deadly weapon, from the way in which they bang away when it is erected, and it does, no doubt, surprise them when they find it does not spit fire and lead, and probably they put it down as a "Rooinek" risking a snapshot at close quarter; but they are very restless "sitters" and resent the intrusion of Mausers, although never asked to pay for a proof in advance--proof positive of a neglected education.

ADVICE TO AN OFFICER ON GOING TO THE WARS.

'Twas well remarked by Mack-Praed, In wise and witty lay, "We're known to be extremely brave; So take the sword away."

Aye, let the sword and feather go, Bright belt and glitt'ring braid; a.s.sume a sad and grub-like hue, For battle or for raid.

No more in steel the warrior gleams, In scarlet cuts a dash; The hero now may scarce permit His eagle eye to flash.