Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader Part 28

78. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 29, 1990. November 29, 1990.

79. Kim Il-sung, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Kim Il-sung, "On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche Juche in Ideological Work," December 28, 1955, quoted in Baik II, p. 479. According to the scholar who served as Kim's ideology secretary from 1958 to 1965, before the Korean War the in Ideological Work," December 28, 1955, quoted in Baik II, p. 479. According to the scholar who served as Kim's ideology secretary from 1958 to 1965, before the Korean War the 'word juche 'word juche "did not even exist. The North Korean leaders started using that word during the purging of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese people from the party, and 'Juche ideology' became an established phrase only in the 1960s" (Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, "did not even exist. The North Korean leaders started using that word during the purging of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese people from the party, and 'Juche ideology' became an established phrase only in the 1960s" (Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, The Problems of Human Rights [1]). The Problems of Human Rights [1]).

80. Kim Il Sung. Kim Il Sung. Selected Works, Selected Works, vol. 1, p. 36, quoted in Bruce G. c.u.mings, "Kim's Korean Communism," vol. 1, p. 36, quoted in Bruce G. c.u.mings, "Kim's Korean Communism," Problems of Communism Problems of Communism (March-April 1974), p. 36, cited in Foster-Carter, "Development and Self Reliance," p. 75. (March-April 1974), p. 36, cited in Foster-Carter, "Development and Self Reliance," p. 75.

81. "In postwar economic construction we must follow the line of giving priority to the rehabilitation and development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture," as Kim put it (Baik II, p. 431). Baik says (pp. 432433) that it was possible to carry out this "bold and original basic line" because of "the revolutionary ideas and seasoned guidance of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander." "In postwar economic construction we must follow the line of giving priority to the rehabilitation and development of heavy industry, while simultaneously developing light industry and agriculture," as Kim put it (Baik II, p. 431). Baik says (pp. 432433) that it was possible to carry out this "bold and original basic line" because of "the revolutionary ideas and seasoned guidance of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed brilliant commander."

82. Quoted in Baik II, p. 558. Quoted in Baik II, p. 558.

83. Ibid., pp. 554555. Ibid., pp. 554555.

84. I interviewed Shin and Ahn, separately, in Seoul in August 1996. I interviewed Shin and Ahn, separately, in Seoul in August 1996.

85. Baik II, p. 560. Baik II, p. 560.

86. Ibid., pp. 477481, 517523. Ibid., pp. 477481, 517523.

87. Some foreign a.n.a.lysts believed for a time that Kim had made the right choice. For example, Aidan Foster-Carter ("Development and Self Reliance," pp. 7778) praised Kim for "a difficult decision to chart a course not previously mapped out by any other country. In that sense his far-sightedness can be said to be a major cause of the DPRK's subsequent remarkable development." As evidence piled up that Pyongyang's economic policies had become counterproductive, Foster-Carter revised his opinion drastically to become a leading critic of those policies. He acknowledged the error of his former ways far more forth-rightly than was the case with some other a.n.a.lysts who had started out in the same camp. A blurb introducing his contributions to the Web Some foreign a.n.a.lysts believed for a time that Kim had made the right choice. For example, Aidan Foster-Carter ("Development and Self Reliance," pp. 7778) praised Kim for "a difficult decision to chart a course not previously mapped out by any other country. In that sense his far-sightedness can be said to be a major cause of the DPRK's subsequent remarkable development." As evidence piled up that Pyongyang's economic policies had become counterproductive, Foster-Carter revised his opinion drastically to become a leading critic of those policies. He acknowledged the error of his former ways far more forth-rightly than was the case with some other a.n.a.lysts who had started out in the same camp. A blurb introducing his contributions to the Web site site A Asia Times Online (www.atimes.com/atimes/about.html) noted with a touch of self-deprecating humor that Foster-Carter had "followed Korean affairs for over 30 years, starting (embarra.s.singly) as a young fan of Kim Il-sung." noted with a touch of self-deprecating humor that Foster-Carter had "followed Korean affairs for over 30 years, starting (embarra.s.singly) as a young fan of Kim Il-sung."

(Full disclosure: Although I would not by any means have described myself as a fan of Kim's, I acknowledge having been pretty impressed [see chap. 9] by what the Great Leader, to a 1979 first-time North Korea visitor, appeared to have wrought with the economy.) 88. Kim Jong-min, a former high-ranking official of North Korea's .Ministry of Public Security, said when interviewed by a South Korean magazine in 1991 that he still considered it "quite an impressive accomplishment that Kim Il-sung has been able to silence the mouths of the North Korean people, people who ordinarily would have much to say." Emphasizing Kim Jong-min, a former high-ranking official of North Korea's .Ministry of Public Security, said when interviewed by a South Korean magazine in 1991 that he still considered it "quite an impressive accomplishment that Kim Il-sung has been able to silence the mouths of the North Korean people, people who ordinarily would have much to say." Emphasizing juche juche was the key to this, since "even among Orientals the pride of the Korean people is extraordinary " he said. "Kim used this psychology in his politics in creating juche. Kim Il-sung skillfully uses the nationalistic self-reliant consciousness of the Korean people" (Cho Gap-jae, "Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea," was the key to this, since "even among Orientals the pride of the Korean people is extraordinary " he said. "Kim used this psychology in his politics in creating juche. Kim Il-sung skillfully uses the nationalistic self-reliant consciousness of the Korean people" (Cho Gap-jae, "Interview of Former High-level Official of DPRK Ministry of Public Security Who Defected to South Korea," Wolgan Choson Wolgan Choson [July 1991]: pp. 290303; translation courtesy of Sydney A. Seiler). The article referred to the former official using a pseudonym, Choe Sang-kyu. In a later interview with me, Kim Jong-min confirmed that he was "Choe" and said that he had been quoted correctly in the [July 1991]: pp. 290303; translation courtesy of Sydney A. Seiler). The article referred to the former official using a pseudonym, Choe Sang-kyu. In a later interview with me, Kim Jong-min confirmed that he was "Choe" and said that he had been quoted correctly in the Wolgan Choson Wolgan Choson interview. He gave me permission to attribute that material to him using his real name. I also have permission from interview. He gave me permission to attribute that material to him using his real name. I also have permission from Wolgan Choson Wolgan Choson interviewer Cho to identify his interview subject as Kim Jong-min. interviewer Cho to identify his interview subject as Kim Jong-min.

89. "The defeated U.S. imperialists continue to squat in South Korea, sharpening their tusks. But the heroic Korean people under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, will not let them live on. It is complete defeat that is waiting for U.S. imperialism in Korea" (Baik II, p. 417). "The defeated U.S. imperialists continue to squat in South Korea, sharpening their tusks. But the heroic Korean people under the leadership of Comrade Kim Il Sung, the ever-victorious iron-willed brilliant commander, will not let them live on. It is complete defeat that is waiting for U.S. imperialism in Korea" (Baik II, p. 417).

90. It is open to question how much the atomic threat frightened China, in particular. As we have seen, Mao Zedong had already decided it was unlikely the United States would dare to use nuclear weapons against either China or North Korea. Mao's personal physician writes that it was apparent "as early as October 1954, from a meeting with India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that Mao considered the atom bomb a 'paper tiger' and that he was willing that China lose millions of people in order to emerge victorious against the so-called imperialists. 'The atom bomb is nothing to be afraid of,' Mao told Nehru. 'China has many people. They cannot be bombed out of existence' " (Dr. Li Zhisui, It is open to question how much the atomic threat frightened China, in particular. As we have seen, Mao Zedong had already decided it was unlikely the United States would dare to use nuclear weapons against either China or North Korea. Mao's personal physician writes that it was apparent "as early as October 1954, from a meeting with India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that Mao considered the atom bomb a 'paper tiger' and that he was willing that China lose millions of people in order to emerge victorious against the so-called imperialists. 'The atom bomb is nothing to be afraid of,' Mao told Nehru. 'China has many people. They cannot be bombed out of existence' " (Dr. Li Zhisui, Private Life of Chairman Mao, Private Life of Chairman Mao, p. 125). p. 125).

91. "WASHINGTON (AP)-The United States had explicit plans for dropping the atomic bomb on mainland China in 1954 if the Chinese violated the tenuous truce that had brought the Korean War to an inconclusive end, according to a newly decla.s.sified Pentagon doc.u.ment. The April 17, 1954 memo, signed by Brig. Gen. Edwin H. J. Carns, who was secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showed the extent to which the Eisenhower administration was ready to use nuclear weapons in enforcing Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' Cold War policy of 'ma.s.sive retaliation.' "WASHINGTON (AP)-The United States had explicit plans for dropping the atomic bomb on mainland China in 1954 if the Chinese violated the tenuous truce that had brought the Korean War to an inconclusive end, according to a newly decla.s.sified Pentagon doc.u.ment. The April 17, 1954 memo, signed by Brig. Gen. Edwin H. J. Carns, who was secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showed the extent to which the Eisenhower administration was ready to use nuclear weapons in enforcing Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' Cold War policy of 'ma.s.sive retaliation.'

" In light of the enemy capability to launch a ma.s.sive ground offensive, U.S. air support operations, including use of atomic weapons, will be employed to inflict maximum destruction of enemy forces,' the memo said, detailing the U.S. response for the war's resumption with Chinese forces again ma.s.sively involved. The doc.u.ment also showed that the United States planned to blockade China's coasts, seize offsh.o.r.e islands and use Chinese Nationalist forces to stage raids on the mainland in the event of renewed hostilities. The memo-of which only 30 copies were made, each numbered-was among 44 million doc.u.ments from World War II and the postwar years and from the Korean and Vietnam wars that were decla.s.sified in a blanket order signed by President Clinton last month" (from an a.s.sociated Press dispatch, Korea Times, Korea Times, December 14, 1994). December 14, 1994).

92. See James R. Lilley "U.S. Security Policy and the Korean Peninsula," in Christopher J. Sigur, ed., See James R. Lilley "U.S. Security Policy and the Korean Peninsula," in Christopher J. Sigur, ed., Korea's New Challenges and Kim Young Sam Korea's New Challenges and Kim Young Sam (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1993), pp. 129130. (New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, 1993), pp. 129130.

93. Halliday and c.u.mings Halliday and c.u.mings (Korea, (Korea, p. 215) note, "In 1957 the USA announced that it would no longer recognize the authority of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which had been set up to supervise compliance with the armistice, and that it regarded itself as at liberty to bring in new armaments, including nuclear weapons." As of 19871988, they add, there were "approximately 41,000 US military personnel in South Korea, with nuclear weapons. South Korea is the only place in the world where nuclear weapons are used to deter a non-nuclear force. ... There are no ... nuclear weapons in the North." p. 215) note, "In 1957 the USA announced that it would no longer recognize the authority of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which had been set up to supervise compliance with the armistice, and that it regarded itself as at liberty to bring in new armaments, including nuclear weapons." As of 19871988, they add, there were "approximately 41,000 US military personnel in South Korea, with nuclear weapons. South Korea is the only place in the world where nuclear weapons are used to deter a non-nuclear force. ... There are no ... nuclear weapons in the North."

94. See, e.g., items 204209 in U.S. Department of State, See, e.g., items 204209 in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII: vol. XVIII: j.a.pan and Korea j.a.pan and Korea (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 424432. Also see "Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of State, Seoul, April 4, 1958," item 220, for a U.S.South Korean agreement that yields insight into the extent of American attempts to exert budgetary controls over the South Korean military. "Republic of Korea forces construction projects will be limited to essential requirements approved by CINCUNC [commander in chief United Nations Command, an American general]," it states. "The Republic of Korea military budget will be jointly reviewed and a.n.a.lyzed by the Republic of Korea and CINCUNC in order to a.s.sure that the military program will produce the most effective forces at minimum cost. ... No Republic of Korea Force a.s.set shall be expended for any project which is not clearly and directly a military requirement unless specific concurrence for such diversion shall have been granted by CINCUNC." (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 424432. Also see "Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Decker) to the Department of State, Seoul, April 4, 1958," item 220, for a U.S.South Korean agreement that yields insight into the extent of American attempts to exert budgetary controls over the South Korean military. "Republic of Korea forces construction projects will be limited to essential requirements approved by CINCUNC [commander in chief United Nations Command, an American general]," it states. "The Republic of Korea military budget will be jointly reviewed and a.n.a.lyzed by the Republic of Korea and CINCUNC in order to a.s.sure that the military program will produce the most effective forces at minimum cost. ... No Republic of Korea Force a.s.set shall be expended for any project which is not clearly and directly a military requirement unless specific concurrence for such diversion shall have been granted by CINCUNC."

A formerly top secret memorandum of a meeting of the U.S. National Security Council paraphrases the remark of President Eisenhower that "some of those at the meeting apparently did not know Rhee. Difficulties had been experienced for many years with Rhee, who was so emotional he had once proposed sending ROK forces up to the Yalu River. The situation became worse as Rhee became senile. But we must persuade him or lose prestige" ("Memorandum of Discussion at the 375th .Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, August 7, 1958," item 236, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 482). vol. XVIII, p. 482).

It was November of 1958 before the American negotiators finally persuaded Rhee to agree to maintain a maximum eighteen-division army, with total armed forces numbering no more than 630,000 men. See footnote 3, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 507. vol. XVIII, p. 507.

95. See "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones), Washington, February 8, 1958," item 213 in See "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones), Washington, February 8, 1958," item 213 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 436. vol. XVIII, p. 436.

96. "Memorandum from the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, February 28, 1958," item 215 in "Memorandum from the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, February 28, 1958," item 215 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, pp. 440441. vol. XVIII, pp. 440441.

Another U.S. State Department memorandum of 1958, formerly secret, refers to "the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 1949 and the resultant resultant Communist invasion" (italics are mine). See "Memorandum from the Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith), Washington, July 11, 1958," item 231 in Communist invasion" (italics are mine). See "Memorandum from the Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith), Washington, July 11, 1958," item 231 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 472. vol. XVIII, p. 472.

97. Judging partly on the basis of a rosy evaluation of the May 2, 1958, National a.s.sembly elections, a State Department "Progress Report on Korea" claimed, "Gradual but tangible progress has been made in the development of democratic inst.i.tutions and political stability in the ROK." But the report listed a slew of economic problems yet to be solved-and its optimistic prognosis on the political side was to prove premature by decades. See "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, June 4, 1958," item 225 in Judging partly on the basis of a rosy evaluation of the May 2, 1958, National a.s.sembly elections, a State Department "Progress Report on Korea" claimed, "Gradual but tangible progress has been made in the development of democratic inst.i.tutions and political stability in the ROK." But the report listed a slew of economic problems yet to be solved-and its optimistic prognosis on the political side was to prove premature by decades. See "Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson), Washington, June 4, 1958," item 225 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 460. Also see item 215 (n. 96) vol. XVIII, p. 460. Also see item 215 (n. 96) 98. In a conversation with the South Korean vice-president on June 19, 1958, the American amba.s.sador expressed his personal opinion that "the Communist Chinese would have to follow the Soviet Union's policy" regarding Korean unification. "Memorandum for the Record, Seoul, June 27, 1958," item 228, In a conversation with the South Korean vice-president on June 19, 1958, the American amba.s.sador expressed his personal opinion that "the Communist Chinese would have to follow the Soviet Union's policy" regarding Korean unification. "Memorandum for the Record, Seoul, June 27, 1958," item 228, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. vol. XVIII, p. 464. 464.

The image of monolithic communism was to prove, for a time, impervious even to the contortions that some communist countries such as North Korea went through once the Sino-Soviet split became apparent. America's leaders during that period 'were 'were simply unable to understand nationalism's offsetting power against direction of other communist countries from Moscow or Beijing-as the escalation of involvement in Vietnam showed clearly. Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, in a regretful memoir of his involvement in the Vietnam War writes that "the top East Asian and China experts in the State Department-John Paton Davies Jr., John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent-had been purged during the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s. Without men like these to provide sophisticated, nuanced insights, we-certainly I-badly misread China's objectives and mistook its bellicose rhetoric to imply a drive for regional hegemony. We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We saw him first as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist." President Lyndon Johnson was "convinced that the Soviet Union and China simply unable to understand nationalism's offsetting power against direction of other communist countries from Moscow or Beijing-as the escalation of involvement in Vietnam showed clearly. Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, in a regretful memoir of his involvement in the Vietnam War writes that "the top East Asian and China experts in the State Department-John Paton Davies Jr., John Stewart Service and John Carter Vincent-had been purged during the McCarthy hysteria of the 1950s. Without men like these to provide sophisticated, nuanced insights, we-certainly I-badly misread China's objectives and mistook its bellicose rhetoric to imply a drive for regional hegemony. We also totally underestimated the nationalist aspect of Ho Chi Minh's movement. We saw him first as a Communist and only second as a Vietnamese nationalist." President Lyndon Johnson was "convinced that the Soviet Union and China 'were 'were bent on achieving hegemony. He saw the takeover of South Vietnam as a step toward that objective" (Robert S. McNamara, "We Were Wrong, Terribly WRONG," bent on achieving hegemony. He saw the takeover of South Vietnam as a step toward that objective" (Robert S. McNamara, "We Were Wrong, Terribly WRONG," Newsweek, Newsweek, April 17, 1995, pp. 46, 48). (The article is a pre-publication excerpt from McNamara's book, April 17, 1995, pp. 46, 48). (The article is a pre-publication excerpt from McNamara's book, In Retrospect In Retrospect [New York: Times Books, 1995].) [New York: Times Books, 1995].) 99. A once top-secret 1958 U.S. policy statement says, in part, that "U.S. interests are deeply involved in Korea. Unless the United States continues to provide strong political, military and economic support to the Republic of Korea, the Communist bloc probably will ultimately succeed in extending its control over the whole of Korea. Such a development would undermine Free World security in the Northeast Asia area" ("National Security Council Report NSC 5817, Washington, August 11, 1958," A once top-secret 1958 U.S. policy statement says, in part, that "U.S. interests are deeply involved in Korea. Unless the United States continues to provide strong political, military and economic support to the Republic of Korea, the Communist bloc probably will ultimately succeed in extending its control over the whole of Korea. Such a development would undermine Free World security in the Northeast Asia area" ("National Security Council Report NSC 5817, Washington, August 11, 1958," Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 486). vol. XVIII, p. 486).

100. Pyongyang fueled such fears with apocalyptic propaganda. In 1965 North Korea "called upon the Koreans in the South to 'throw their bodies in front of the frenzied drive of the American imperialists, the Pak Chong-hi puppets and the j.a.panese reactionaries.' The treaty between j.a.pan and South Korea was ratified. j.a.panese investment began to flow into Korea, and this development, along with others, stimulated the first sustained high-level growth in the south. From this point on, North Korean spokesmen were to regard the menace of j.a.panese militarism' as second only to 'the threat of American imperialism.' " In an October 1966 major address Kim Il-sung charged that "j.a.pan's Sato government, with the active support of U.S. imperialism, has not only mapped out the plans of war to invade Korea and other Asian nations but has already started stretching its tentacles of aggression into Korea" (Scalapino and Lee, Pyongyang fueled such fears with apocalyptic propaganda. In 1965 North Korea "called upon the Koreans in the South to 'throw their bodies in front of the frenzied drive of the American imperialists, the Pak Chong-hi puppets and the j.a.panese reactionaries.' The treaty between j.a.pan and South Korea was ratified. j.a.panese investment began to flow into Korea, and this development, along with others, stimulated the first sustained high-level growth in the south. From this point on, North Korean spokesmen were to regard the menace of j.a.panese militarism' as second only to 'the threat of American imperialism.' " In an October 1966 major address Kim Il-sung charged that "j.a.pan's Sato government, with the active support of U.S. imperialism, has not only mapped out the plans of war to invade Korea and other Asian nations but has already started stretching its tentacles of aggression into Korea" (Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 536). p. 536).

101. A senior State Department official characterized the j.a.panese unwillingness to take Beijing's and Pyongyang's bait as "a most encouraging development." See "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of StateJoint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 28, 1958," item 216 in A senior State Department official characterized the j.a.panese unwillingness to take Beijing's and Pyongyang's bait as "a most encouraging development." See "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of StateJoint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, February 28, 1958," item 216 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, pp. vol. XVIII, pp. 443444. 443444. The memorandum also quotes Adm. Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, as mentioning "that the Chinese Communist troops The memorandum also quotes Adm. Arleigh Burke, chief of naval operations, as mentioning "that the Chinese Communist troops 'were 'were apparently having difficulties with the local population (marriages, food) which may have been one reason apparently having difficulties with the local population (marriages, food) which may have been one reason 'why 'why it was decided to effect the withdrawal." it was decided to effect the withdrawal."

102. Editorial Note, item 221, Editorial Note, item 221, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, pp. 455456. vol. XVIII, pp. 455456.

103. See "Memorandum from the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, November 18, 1958," item 247 in See "Memorandum from the a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, Washington, November 18, 1958," item 247 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, Foreign Relations of the United States, 19581960, vol. XVIII, p. 504. vol. XVIII, p. 504.

104. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, The Problems of Human Rights in North Korea (2), The Problems of Human Rights in North Korea (2), trans. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (Seoul: NKnet, 2002), http://nknet.org/en/keys/lastkeys/2002/8/04.php. trans. Network for North Korean Democracy and Human Rights (Seoul: NKnet, 2002), http://nknet.org/en/keys/lastkeys/2002/8/04.php.

105. Baik II, p. 449. Baik II, p. 449.

106. Ibid., pp. 457459. Ibid., pp. 457459.

107. Ibid., pp. 460461. Ibid., pp. 460461.

108. Kim, Kim, With the Century, With the Century, vol. 3, pp. 431433. vol. 3, pp. 431433.

7. When He Hugged Us Still Damp from the Sea.

1. "The same Confucian value system held by the two Koreas has produced two fundamentally different outlooks toward development. Korea, generally speaking, has traditionally emphasized the importance of the Confucian belief in scholarship over commerce and material things. The Korean "The same Confucian value system held by the two Koreas has produced two fundamentally different outlooks toward development. Korea, generally speaking, has traditionally emphasized the importance of the Confucian belief in scholarship over commerce and material things. The Korean yangban yangban [n.o.bles, gentry], for example, [n.o.bles, gentry], for example, 'were 'were clearly not commercially minded. Confucian ideology disdains commercial activities, resulting in the economic stagnation of the Yi dynasty. This tradition was easily carried on in North Korea where communism disdained commercial and service activities. People clearly not commercially minded. Confucian ideology disdains commercial activities, resulting in the economic stagnation of the Yi dynasty. This tradition was easily carried on in North Korea where communism disdained commercial and service activities. People 'were 'were mobilized not by material incentives but by moral exhortation. In a mobilized not by material incentives but by moral exhortation. In a 'way, 'way, Korean Confucianism was strengthened by communism in North Korea. This particularly explains the lack of development of the service sector and consumer goods in North Korea. ... Pluralistic values help explain the extraordinary commercial bustle, the materialism, and conspicuous consumption of the people in South Korea. Christians are somewhat overrepresented in the entrepreneurial population in South Korea .... This is particularly helped by a Weberian 'spirit of capitalism' abetted by aspects of Protestant dogma thought to encourage commercial activities as a means of achieving personal salvation" (Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Korean Confucianism was strengthened by communism in North Korea. This particularly explains the lack of development of the service sector and consumer goods in North Korea. ... Pluralistic values help explain the extraordinary commercial bustle, the materialism, and conspicuous consumption of the people in South Korea. Christians are somewhat overrepresented in the entrepreneurial population in South Korea .... This is particularly helped by a Weberian 'spirit of capitalism' abetted by aspects of Protestant dogma thought to encourage commercial activities as a means of achieving personal salvation" (Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, Two Koreas in Development Two Koreas in Development [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 179180). [see chap. 1, n. 2], pp. 179180).

2. Baik II, p. 528 (see chap. 4, n. 24). Baik II, p. 528 (see chap. 4, n. 24).

3. "Central planning was highly effective and capable of developing the North Korean economy at the beginning stage-the first seven or fifteen years-relying on mobilization measures. As the size of the economy grew, the complexity of planning and choice-making multiplied, making the central decision-making process more inefficient and wasteful than in the formative and reconstruction period" (Kim, "Central planning was highly effective and capable of developing the North Korean economy at the beginning stage-the first seven or fifteen years-relying on mobilization measures. As the size of the economy grew, the complexity of planning and choice-making multiplied, making the central decision-making process more inefficient and wasteful than in the formative and reconstruction period" (Kim, Two Koreas in Development, Two Koreas in Development, p. 123). p. 123).

Andrei Lankov (From Stalin to Kim Il Sung (From Stalin to Kim Il Sung [see chap. 4, note 45], p. 135) points additionally to unintended aftereffects of the purge of Soviet-Koreans, who had comprised a large percentage of North Korea's best-trained officials: "The ma.s.s exodus of Soviet Koreans in the late 1950s and early 1960s became one of the factors contributing to the deceleration of the country's economic development." [see chap. 4, note 45], p. 135) points additionally to unintended aftereffects of the purge of Soviet-Koreans, who had comprised a large percentage of North Korea's best-trained officials: "The ma.s.s exodus of Soviet Koreans in the late 1950s and early 1960s became one of the factors contributing to the deceleration of the country's economic development."

4. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights (1) Problems of Human Rights (1) (see chap. 2, n. 1). (see chap. 2, n. 1).

5. Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, citing a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report among other sources, observes Byoung-Lo Philo Kim, citing a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency report among other sources, observes (Two Koreas in Development, (Two Koreas in Development, p. p. 66), 66), "Although a GNP comparison is hard to draw because of the lack of reliable data and differences in measurement, several estimates agree on the suggestion that the North had a higher per capita output than the South at least until the mid-1970s." "Although a GNP comparison is hard to draw because of the lack of reliable data and differences in measurement, several estimates agree on the suggestion that the North had a higher per capita output than the South at least until the mid-1970s."

6. "Ma.s.s movements, exhortations, political campaigns, 'socialistic compet.i.tion,' and the like have been widely and consistently relied upon as subst.i.tutes for pecuniary incentives. ... [T]hese movements tend to create sectoral imbalances, secondary disruptions, overambitious targets, and planning errors. Defaulting of product quality is another consequence. .Moreover, mobilization of the general populace, even if successful, would have economic limitations. Except in the areas of such highly labor-intensive projects as food processing, irrigation facilities, and construction of unpaved roads, continued subst.i.tution of labor for capital will produce, after a point, very small or near zero marginal output. Eventually, expansion in labor must be accompanied by an increased supply of capital or other inputs" (Chung, "Ma.s.s movements, exhortations, political campaigns, 'socialistic compet.i.tion,' and the like have been widely and consistently relied upon as subst.i.tutes for pecuniary incentives. ... [T]hese movements tend to create sectoral imbalances, secondary disruptions, overambitious targets, and planning errors. Defaulting of product quality is another consequence. .Moreover, mobilization of the general populace, even if successful, would have economic limitations. Except in the areas of such highly labor-intensive projects as food processing, irrigation facilities, and construction of unpaved roads, continued subst.i.tution of labor for capital will produce, after a point, very small or near zero marginal output. Eventually, expansion in labor must be accompanied by an increased supply of capital or other inputs" (Chung, North Korean Economy North Korean Economy [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155). [see chap. 6, n. 16], p. 155).

As for the use of t.i.tles and medals, "an authoritarian character has been inherent in the national character of the Korean people," observes Prof. Koh Young-bok of Seoul National University. "The socialist version of authoritarianism is combined with the traditional base to reinforce and intensify their common authoritarianism. The t.i.tles of 'hero' and many other medals and honors so freely lavished upon the people contribute to breeding and furthering the authoritarian trend in north Korea" (Koh, "The Structure and Nature of North Korean Society," Vantage Point Vantage Point [December 1979]: p. 10). [December 1979]: p. 10).

Kim's "Chongsan-ri method" in agriculture sought to get the bureaucrats from the local level to stop shuffling papers in their offices and go out to guide the farm leaders directly. See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea Communism in Korea (see chap. 2, n. 28), pp. 562, 575. (see chap. 2, n. 28), pp. 562, 575.

7. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, Problems of Human Rights (2) Problems of Human Rights (2) (see chap. 6, n. 104). (see chap. 6, n. 104).

8. He first used the term in a report whose main purpose was to "slander" several returnees from the Soviet Union, Lim Un alleges. "In this report, there He first used the term in a report whose main purpose was to "slander" several returnees from the Soviet Union, Lim Un alleges. "In this report, there 'were 'were a few points which emphasized national pride, but the basic purpose was to inspire an anti-Soviet and an exclusionism spirit" a few points which emphasized national pride, but the basic purpose was to inspire an anti-Soviet and an exclusionism spirit" (Founding of a Dynasty (Founding of a Dynasty [see chap. 2, n. 59], p. 301). [see chap. 2, n. 59], p. 301).

9. Suh, Suh, Kim Il Sung Kim Il Sung (see chap. 2, n. 35), p. 144, and Scalapino and Lee, (see chap. 2, n. 35), p. 144, and Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 624635. pp. 624635.

10. Baik II, p. 3. Baik II, p. 3.

11. Translated in Scalapino and Lee, Translated in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 660. p. 660.

12. Kim, Kim, Two Koreas in Development, Two Koreas in Development, p. p. 66. 66.

13. "As far as is known, the military spending of North Korea jumped from around 19 percent in the early 1960s to over 30 percent in 196771. (In 1968 it hit a high of 32.4 percent.) With the beginning of the south-north dialogue it dropped to below 20 percent" (Cha Byong-gwon, "The Financial Structure of North Korea-Its Characteristics," "As far as is known, the military spending of North Korea jumped from around 19 percent in the early 1960s to over 30 percent in 196771. (In 1968 it hit a high of 32.4 percent.) With the beginning of the south-north dialogue it dropped to below 20 percent" (Cha Byong-gwon, "The Financial Structure of North Korea-Its Characteristics," Vantage Point Vantage Point [January 1979]: p. 5). [January 1979]: p. 5).

14. Here is a South Korean explanation of how the South prospered while the North stagnated: "The wide discrepancy in the economies of south and north Korea today resulted from the phenomenal growth of the south Korean economy through successive development plans in the 1960s and 1970s, which have reached the stage of heavy and chemical industries. On the contrary, north Korea failed in its economic planning in the 1960s, lost much of its overseas market in the 1970s, brought in increased foreign capital and equipment in excess of its debt-servicing and managerial capacity and spent too much for military purposes to realize its Four .Major Military Policies. These factors combined to delay the growth of production" (Kim Chang Soon, "North Korea Today," Here is a South Korean explanation of how the South prospered while the North stagnated: "The wide discrepancy in the economies of south and north Korea today resulted from the phenomenal growth of the south Korean economy through successive development plans in the 1960s and 1970s, which have reached the stage of heavy and chemical industries. On the contrary, north Korea failed in its economic planning in the 1960s, lost much of its overseas market in the 1970s, brought in increased foreign capital and equipment in excess of its debt-servicing and managerial capacity and spent too much for military purposes to realize its Four .Major Military Policies. These factors combined to delay the growth of production" (Kim Chang Soon, "North Korea Today," Vantage Point Vantage Point [March 1979]: p. 11). [March 1979]: p. 11).

15. In an interview conducted by the author in 1992, Prof. Zhao Fengbin, a North Korea specialist at Jilin University in China, implicitly backed Pyongyang's version. Zhao said North Korea had overemphasized its heavy industry-and as a result had fallen behind the South economically by the early 1970s-because of concern aroused by American policies in the 1960s in Cuba and Vietnam. In an interview conducted by the author in 1992, Prof. Zhao Fengbin, a North Korea specialist at Jilin University in China, implicitly backed Pyongyang's version. Zhao said North Korea had overemphasized its heavy industry-and as a result had fallen behind the South economically by the early 1970s-because of concern aroused by American policies in the 1960s in Cuba and Vietnam.

Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, a former Workers' Party secretary who defected to South Korea in 1997, is quoted as having said that the Cuban Missile Crisis sparked Kim's policy of simultaneous development of the economy and the military. "Money in your own pocket is better than money in your brother's, and it is always best to keep one's wallet full," Kim said after he heard of the crisis, Hw.a.n.g is said to have recalled ("Preparations for War in North Korea" in Testimonies of North Korean Defectors: True Picture of North Korea According to a Former Workers Party Secretary Testimonies of North Korean Defectors: True Picture of North Korea According to a Former Workers Party Secretary [Seoul: National Intelligence Service], an undated summary that was posted on the NIS's Web site as of May 17, 2002, but is no longer available there). [Seoul: National Intelligence Service], an undated summary that was posted on the NIS's Web site as of May 17, 2002, but is no longer available there).

16. Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, quoted in "Preparations for War." Hw.a.n.g Jang-yop, quoted in "Preparations for War."

17. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 638641. By the time he made a key October 1966 speech, "The Present Situation and the Task Confronting Our Party" the authors relate, Kim Il-sung "was dispensing criticism against pp. 638641. By the time he made a key October 1966 speech, "The Present Situation and the Task Confronting Our Party" the authors relate, Kim Il-sung "was dispensing criticism against both both major Communist states in almost equal amounts, and in neither case was the criticism trivial. The att.i.tude that one took toward US imperialist aggression in Vietnam,' proclaimed Kim, showed whether or not one was resolutely opposed to imperialism, and whether or not one actively supported the people's liberation struggle. ... The importance Kim attached to the Vietnamese issue is manifest in the prominence given that issue in his speech, the urgent tone used in discussing it, and such pa.s.sages as this: 'If all the socialist countries a.s.sist the Vietnamese people in shattering U.S. aggression, U.S. imperialism will be doomed like the sun setting in the west and the revolutionary movements of all countries in Asia and the rest of the world will surge forward greatly. " major Communist states in almost equal amounts, and in neither case was the criticism trivial. The att.i.tude that one took toward US imperialist aggression in Vietnam,' proclaimed Kim, showed whether or not one was resolutely opposed to imperialism, and whether or not one actively supported the people's liberation struggle. ... The importance Kim attached to the Vietnamese issue is manifest in the prominence given that issue in his speech, the urgent tone used in discussing it, and such pa.s.sages as this: 'If all the socialist countries a.s.sist the Vietnamese people in shattering U.S. aggression, U.S. imperialism will be doomed like the sun setting in the west and the revolutionary movements of all countries in Asia and the rest of the world will surge forward greatly. "

18. Wen-ko T'ung-hsun Wen-ko T'ung-hsun (Gw.a.n.gjou), February 15, 1968, translated and cited in Scalapino and Lee, (Gw.a.n.gjou), February 15, 1968, translated and cited in Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, p. 641. p. 641.

19. A formerly top-secret 1958 update of the U.S. statement of policy on Korea includes the following three items regarding North Korea: A formerly top-secret 1958 update of the U.S. statement of policy on Korea includes the following three items regarding North Korea: "Make clear that the United States does not regard the North Korean regime as a legitimate regime.

"Encourage the non-Communist states and the UN to continue to refuse to recognize the North Korean regime, and to treat it as a non-legitimate regime condemned for aggression and discourage any non-Communist political or economic intercourse with North Korea.

"Encourage the people of North Korea to oppose the Communist North Korean regime and to sympathize with the Republic of Korea" (NSC 5817 [see chap. 6, n. 99], p. 491).

Halliday and c.u.mings note that the United States "maintains its toughest embargo vis-a-vis vis-a-vis any state in the world on North Korea." They argue, "This long-term attempt at isolation reflects powerful and unresolved psychological and political issues left over from the Korean war" any state in the world on North Korea." They argue, "This long-term attempt at isolation reflects powerful and unresolved psychological and political issues left over from the Korean war" (Korea (Korea [see chap. 4, n. 60], p. 216). [see chap. 4, n. 60], p. 216).

20. One Yi Dynasty ruler in the seventeenth century outlawed the mining of silver and gold to reduce foreigners' interest in intruding into the country. One Yi Dynasty ruler in the seventeenth century outlawed the mining of silver and gold to reduce foreigners' interest in intruding into the country.

21. Izidor Urian, "The 10 Years I Spent in Pyongyang," Izidor Urian, "The 10 Years I Spent in Pyongyang," Chosun Ilbo Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), January 1, 1991, translated in (Seoul), January 1, 1991, translated in Vantage Point Vantage Point (January 1991): pp. 1518. Urian's diplomatic duties kept him in Pyongyang intermittently from 1963 until 1983. During that time he rose to the position of charge d'affairs. (January 1991): pp. 1518. Urian's diplomatic duties kept him in Pyongyang intermittently from 1963 until 1983. During that time he rose to the position of charge d'affairs.

22. "The highly publicized 1968 "The highly publicized 1968 Pueblo Pueblo and 1969 EC-121 incidents and 1969 EC-121 incidents 'were 'were preceded by thousands of clandestine operations and electronic surveillance missions launched from U.S. bases in j.a.pan" (from Frank Baldwin's introduction to preceded by thousands of clandestine operations and electronic surveillance missions launched from U.S. bases in j.a.pan" (from Frank Baldwin's introduction to Without Parallel Without Parallel [see chap. 4, n. 1], p. 24). [see chap. 4, n. 1], p. 24).

23. An enlightening discussion of this and related issues may be found in McCor-mack, "Kim Country" (see chap. 3, n. An enlightening discussion of this and related issues may be found in McCor-mack, "Kim Country" (see chap. 3, n. 44). 44).

24. See Scalapino and Lee, See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, Communism in Korea, pp. 564, 590595, 647653. pp. 564, 590595, 647653.

25. Ibid., pp. 596597, 601, 609. Ibid., pp. 596597, 601, 609.

26. Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire" (see chap. 5, n. 23), p. 73, n. Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire" (see chap. 5, n. 23), p. 73, n. 66, 66, citing hearings held by a Senate subcommittee. Baldwin (pp. 63 ff) a.s.serts that the North Koreans adopted a harder-line policy in response to American and South Korean initiatives. North Korea citing hearings held by a Senate subcommittee. Baldwin (pp. 63 ff) a.s.serts that the North Koreans adopted a harder-line policy in response to American and South Korean initiatives. North Korea "did "did increase pressure along the Demilitarized Zone from October 1966, and encouraged subversive and guerrilla activity in the South. ... Nevertheless, an objective examination of the Korean situation and the Pueblo incident indicates that North Korea was increase pressure along the Demilitarized Zone from October 1966, and encouraged subversive and guerrilla activity in the South. ... Nevertheless, an objective examination of the Korean situation and the Pueblo incident indicates that North Korea was reacting reacting to ... U.S./South Korean provocations" (italics in original). Besides espionage gathering, those included covert North-South warfare. Baldwin gives few details on the subject of "a private, covert war between North and South Korea," but he cites an exchange in a hearing in which Senator J. William Fulbright asked, "Have there been no raids from the South to the North? No action?" In reply, William J. Porter, amba.s.sador to South Korea, said, "Nothing on the scale that could be called as provocative as that which, for example, the North launched in 1968 against the residence of the President of South Korea." Later the amba.s.sador denied that there had been any South Korean raids on the North. to ... U.S./South Korean provocations" (italics in original). Besides espionage gathering, those included covert North-South warfare. Baldwin gives few details on the subject of "a private, covert war between North and South Korea," but he cites an exchange in a hearing in which Senator J. William Fulbright asked, "Have there been no raids from the South to the North? No action?" In reply, William J. Porter, amba.s.sador to South Korea, said, "Nothing on the scale that could be called as provocative as that which, for example, the North launched in 1968 against the residence of the President of South Korea." Later the amba.s.sador denied that there had been any South Korean raids on the North.

27. Baldwin (ibid.) suggests that the American use of South Korean troops in Vietnam from 1965, with the seasoning it gave those troops, brought about "a dangerous shift in the military balance in Korea" and thus was seen by Kim Il-sung as another provocation. Baldwin (ibid.) suggests that the American use of South Korean troops in Vietnam from 1965, with the seasoning it gave those troops, brought about "a dangerous shift in the military balance in Korea" and thus was seen by Kim Il-sung as another provocation.

A Hanoi-datelined .March 29, 2000, dispatch by South Korea's Yonhap news agency said that Yonhap reporters, "in a joint search with the South Korean emba.s.sy here for evidence of North Korea's partic.i.p.ation in the Vietnamese war, found Wednesday a graveyard of North Korean soldiers killed in the war near here. ... The graveyard, with a memorial monument erected in honor of 14 North Korean air force soldiers killed in the war, is located in Bac Giang, 60 kilometers north of the capital city. ... The 14 North Korean soldiers killed in the war included 11 fighter pilots and three mechanics and included in the pilots were Ri Chang-il and Pak Tong-jun. People in Bac Giang said the North Korean soldiers fought against U.S. fighter-bombers during U.S. air raids on Hai Phong in 1967."

Scalapino and Lee (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, p. 595) say that, for Pyongyang, using the Vietnam strategy "would require substantial preparations. A southern branch of the Party and a substantial guerrilla force would have to be built, and the north would have to be guarded against retaliation when the military pressures upon the south mounted. In short, South Korea was not South Vietnam at this point. Kim and his generation were determined to liberate' the south on their terms, and a full decade might be required." p. 595) say that, for Pyongyang, using the Vietnam strategy "would require substantial preparations. A southern branch of the Party and a substantial guerrilla force would have to be built, and the north would have to be guarded against retaliation when the military pressures upon the south mounted. In short, South Korea was not South Vietnam at this point. Kim and his generation were determined to liberate' the south on their terms, and a full decade might be required."

The same authors add (p. 647) 647) that "there is some reason to believe that the major shift in priorities undertaken in December 1962, and the new emphasis upon large-scale militarization, were directly connected with a decision that South Korea had to be liberated' in the early 1970s at the latest. The frustration of being unable either to take advantage of Rhee's overthrow or to prevent the subsequent military takeover undoubtedly contributed to this decision. But there was also rising concern over j.a.pan's potential role in Northeast Asia. Later, the increasing signs of economic growth in South Korea were to have the same effect. With respect to their public, political formula for unification, the Communists stood by their proposals at the Fourth [Workers' Party] Congress [in 1961]. However, it was also in that Congress that Kim had called openly for the establishment of 'a true .Marxist-Leninist Party' in the south, and a.s.serted emphatically that Korea would be 'peacefully unified' only when the Americans had been driven out of South Korea and the [Park Chung-hee] government overthrown. This, Kim certainly implied, would require a revolution, and a violent one. Thus the renewed liberation' drive was to be conducted on the pattern of Vietnam, not the Korean War. The north would serve as a training and infiltration base while a revolutionary movement was constructed in the south. Only when that movement had become strong would further steps be taken, combinations of legal and illegal action, as well as guerrilla warfare. At this later stage, North Korea could determine its role in accordance with the circ.u.mstances, supposedly secure in the knowledge that its internal defenses were impregnable." that "there is some reason to believe that the major shift in priorities undertaken in December 1962, and the new emphasis upon large-scale militarization, were directly connected with a decision that South Korea had to be liberated' in the early 1970s at the latest. The frustration of being unable either to take advantage of Rhee's overthrow or to prevent the subsequent military takeover undoubtedly contributed to this decision. But there was also rising concern over j.a.pan's potential role in Northeast Asia. Later, the increasing signs of economic growth in South Korea were to have the same effect. With respect to their public, political formula for unification, the Communists stood by their proposals at the Fourth [Workers' Party] Congress [in 1961]. However, it was also in that Congress that Kim had called openly for the establishment of 'a true .Marxist-Leninist Party' in the south, and a.s.serted emphatically that Korea would be 'peacefully unified' only when the Americans had been driven out of South Korea and the [Park Chung-hee] government overthrown. This, Kim certainly implied, would require a revolution, and a violent one. Thus the renewed liberation' drive was to be conducted on the pattern of Vietnam, not the Korean War. The north would serve as a training and infiltration base while a revolutionary movement was constructed in the south. Only when that movement had become strong would further steps be taken, combinations of legal and illegal action, as well as guerrilla warfare. At this later stage, North Korea could determine its role in accordance with the circ.u.mstances, supposedly secure in the knowledge that its internal defenses were impregnable."

28. Biographer Robert A. Caro quotes Johnson as having made the comment to an unnamed Biographer Robert A. Caro quotes Johnson as having made the comment to an unnamed Time Time correspondent on January 22, 1968 (Caro, "The Compa.s.sion of Lyndon Johnson," correspondent on January 22, 1968 (Caro, "The Compa.s.sion of Lyndon Johnson," The New Yorker, The New Yorker, April 1, 2002). (The rest of the quotation, which Caro used to ill.u.s.trate Johnson's ambivalence on racial issues: "It is just like you driving home at night and you come up to a stoplight, and there's some n.i.g.g.e.r there b.u.mping you and sc.r.a.ping you.") April 1, 2002). (The rest of the quotation, which Caro used to ill.u.s.trate Johnson's ambivalence on racial issues: "It is just like you driving home at night and you come up to a stoplight, and there's some n.i.g.g.e.r there b.u.mping you and sc.r.a.ping you.") 29. See Trevor Armbrister, See Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair A Matter of Accountability: The True Story of the Pueblo Affair (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1970). For the basic account of events of January 2123, including the Blue House raid and the capture of the (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1970). For the basic account of events of January 2123, including the Blue House raid and the capture of the Pueblo, Pueblo, see pt. 1, pp. 378. Reference to the see pt. 1, pp. 378. Reference to the Chesapeake Chesapeake is on p. 350. Armbrister covered the case as a journalist and interviewed a great many of the partic.i.p.ants. Commander Bucher and his second in command also published, separately, their own memoirs. is on p. 350. Armbrister covered the case as a journalist and interviewed a great many of the partic.i.p.ants. Commander Bucher and his second in command also published, separately, their own memoirs.

30. Ibid., pp. 232233. Ibid., pp. 232233.

31. Ibid., pp. 245246, 381. Ibid., pp. 245246, 381.

32. Ibid., p. 249. Ibid., p. 249.

33. New York Times, New York Times, January 25, 1968, cited in Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire," p. 55. January 25, 1968, cited in Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire," p. 55.

34. Armbrister, Armbrister, Matter of Accountability, Matter of Accountability, pp. 212214, 264, 273, 288. pp. 212214, 264, 273, 288.

35. Ibid., pp. 259, 262, 275277. Ibid., pp. 259, 262, 275277.

36. Ibid., pp. 319330. Ibid., pp. 319330.

37. Ibid., pp. 335343. Washington had warned Pyongyang after the U.S. presidential election in November 1968 that only one more effort would be made to resolve the issue before the inauguration of Richard Nixon, who was expected to take a harder line against the North. See Doc.u.ment 324, Ibid., pp. 335343. Washington had warned Pyongyang after the U.S. presidential election in November 1968 that only one more effort would be made to resolve the issue before the inauguration of Richard Nixon, who was expected to take a harder line against the North. See Doc.u.ment 324, Foreign Relations of the United States 19641968, Foreign Relations of the United States 19641968, vol. XXIX vol. XXIX Korea. Korea.

Scalapino and Lee observe (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, p. p. 644) 644) that getting the American letter "was the equivalent of having 'American imperialism' kowtow before the leaders of Pyongyang, and they were subsequently to boast repeatedly that, because of the impregnable defenses that had been created in the north, the enemy did not dare to take military action and was forced to admit his crimes before the world." that getting the American letter "was the equivalent of having 'American imperialism' kowtow before the leaders of Pyongyang, and they were subsequently to boast repeatedly that, because of the impregnable defenses that had been created in the north, the enemy did not dare to take military action and was forced to admit his crimes before the world."

38. "Without recourse to North Korean or other revealing doc.u.mentation from Moscow or Beijing, it is impossible to know the other side's motivation" "Without recourse to North Korean or other revealing doc.u.mentation from Moscow or Beijing, it is impossible to know the other side's motivation" (Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, (Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. XXIX vol. XXIX Korea, Korea, Pt. 1 [Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1999], http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/ history/ vol_xxix/summaryhtml). Pt. 1 [Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1999], http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/ history/ vol_xxix/summaryhtml).

Cdr. Richard Mobley in " Pueblo: Pueblo: A Retrospective" A Retrospective" (NWC Review, (NWC Review, Spring 2001, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Spring/art8-sp1.htm), p. 3, quotes a February 5, 1968, Central Intelligence Agency briefing package as having given the CIA's view that the Spring 2001, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/Review/2001/Spring/art8-sp1.htm), p. 3, quotes a February 5, 1968, Central Intelligence Agency briefing package as having given the CIA's view that the Pueblo Pueblo "was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North Korean government. ... It seems likely ... that the North Koreans had identified the ship and her mission at least a day in advance. It is possible that the original intent was only to hara.s.s and drive off the "was almost certainly taken as a result of a decision at the highest levels of the North Korean government. ... It seems likely ... that the North Koreans had identified the ship and her mission at least a day in advance. It is possible that the original intent was only to hara.s.s and drive off the Pueblo; Pueblo; the final decision to take the ship into Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that U.S. forces the final decision to take the ship into Wonsan may have only been taken when it eventually appeared that U.S. forces 'were 'were not coming to a.s.sist the not coming to a.s.sist the Pueblo." Pueblo."

Frank Baldwin argues that "North Korea kept heavy pressure along the DMZ and increased subversive and espionage activities elsewhere in South Korea from 1966 to 1969 as a contribution to the Vietnamese war effort. The U.S. was forced to keep about 50,000 troops in South Korea and public uneasiness in South Korea inhibited the R.O.K government from further troop dispatch to Vietnam. The sequence of these events is crucial to an a.s.sessment of North Korean motives in January 1968. The increase in North Korean guerrilla and subversive operations came after after South Korea became deeply involved in Vietnam, in fact only shortly after the second South Korean infantry division was dispatched [in 1966]. The fragile, tentative detente, which had kept violence at a relatively low level in Korea since 1953, was upset by the AmericanSouth Korean escalation in Vietnam. To North Korea, the ma.s.sive South Korean intervention in Vietnam was a moral challenge; sympathy for North Vietnam's cause ensured a North Korean response." Baldwin makes clear such considerations were not "the sole operating factors in North Korean decision making. Obviously, other policy objectives South Korea became deeply involved in Vietnam, in fact only shortly after the second South Korean infantry division was dispatched [in 1966]. The fragile, tentative detente, which had kept violence at a relatively low level in Korea since 1953, was upset by the AmericanSouth Korean escalation in Vietnam. To North Korea, the ma.s.sive South Korean intervention in Vietnam was a moral challenge; sympathy for North Vietnam's cause ensured a North Korean response." Baldwin makes clear such considerations were not "the sole operating factors in North Korean decision making. Obviously, other policy objectives 'were 'were intermingled; for example, North Korea's oft-expressed intention to create a socialist revolution in South Korea" (Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire," p. intermingled; for example, North Korea's oft-expressed intention to create a socialist revolution in South Korea" (Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire," p. 67 67 and n. and n. 46 46 on p. 72). on p. 72).

A more recent author argues that the key motivation for carrying out the capture could be found in Kim Il-sung's wish to show himself domestically as a fierce nationalist, to offset popular disappointment over the regime's failure to make adequate improvement in the people's livelihood. See Mitch.e.l.l B. Lerner, The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2002), pp. 99122. It may be a mistake to emphasize "suffering" (p. 110) by North Koreans as an ov