Under The Loving Care Of The Fatherly Leader Part 26

14. Choi Yearn-hong, in a Washington-datelined column of reminiscences ent.i.tled "The Korean War," Choi Yearn-hong, in a Washington-datelined column of reminiscences ent.i.tled "The Korean War," Korea Herald, Korea Herald, June 21, 1994. June 21, 1994.

15. Those lyrics comprise the second verse plus the chorus. The first verse (according to Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Those lyrics comprise the second verse plus the chorus. The first verse (according to Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je, Great Leader Kim Jong Il, Great Leader Kim Jong Il, vol. 1 [Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985], p. 114) goes: vol. 1 [Tokyo: Sorinsha, 1985], p. 114) goes: Bright traces of blood on the crags of Changbaek.

Still gleam, Still the Amnok carries along .signs of blood in its stream.

Still do those hallowed traces shine resplendently Over Korea ever flourishing and free.

16. From the transcript of "Testimony from the North," a telecast on South Korea's MBC-TV program From the transcript of "Testimony from the North," a telecast on South Korea's MBC-TV program Current Debate, Current Debate, June 22, 1990. The transcript is excerpted in Kim, June 22, 1990. The transcript is excerpted in Kim, Truth About the Korean War, Truth About the Korean War, pp. 9293. pp. 9293.

17. Glenn D. Paige, Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 2430, 1950 The Korean Decision: June 2430, 1950 (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 117118. (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 117118.

18. c.u.mings describes Acheson s mindset: "If in 1950 the problem was the Korean civil war, Acheson would judge it a war about Europe, or the world, that happened to occur in Korea" (c.u.mings, c.u.mings describes Acheson s mindset: "If in 1950 the problem was the Korean civil war, Acheson would judge it a war about Europe, or the world, that happened to occur in Korea" (c.u.mings, Origins Origins II, p. II, p. 44). 44).

In disagreeing with the Pentagon's view, Acheson argued that American prestige "would greatly suffer if we should withdraw." c.u.mings observes, "The distinction was between what we might call Korea's military-strategic military-strategic significance and its significance and its political-strategic political-strategic significance. Regardless of whether Korea was a good place to fight or not, the United States was there and committed, and thus had to emerge as a good doctor or cause a perceived weakening of its stand elsewhere. Such logic could survive every military argument that Korea was not important strategically ... because the premise was psychological and political, not material or martial" significance. Regardless of whether Korea was a good place to fight or not, the United States was there and committed, and thus had to emerge as a good doctor or cause a perceived weakening of its stand elsewhere. Such logic could survive every military argument that Korea was not important strategically ... because the premise was psychological and political, not material or martial" (Origins (Origins II, p. 48). II, p. 48).

19. See Gardner's introduction to See Gardner's introduction to The Korean War, The Korean War, which he edited. Gardner observes (p. 6), "The State Department's initial soundings of .Moscow's intentions brought responses which satisfied the experts that Korea was in fact which he edited. Gardner observes (p. 6), "The State Department's initial soundings of .Moscow's intentions brought responses which satisfied the experts that Korea was in fact not not the prelude to a general Soviet offensive. But no one in the U.S. government corrected or amended the President's a.s.sertion that the Russians had pa.s.sed beyond subversion to armed invasion and war." the prelude to a general Soviet offensive. But no one in the U.S. government corrected or amended the President's a.s.sertion that the Russians had pa.s.sed beyond subversion to armed invasion and war."

20. For a discussion of this point, quoting Isaac Deutscher and Daniel Yergin, see van Ree, For a discussion of this point, quoting Isaac Deutscher and Daniel Yergin, see van Ree, Socialism in One Zone Socialism in One Zone (see chap. 4, n. 1), pp. 8 ff (see chap. 4, n. 1), pp. 8 ff As an example of the conventional Western view at the time, consider a New York Herald Tribune Herald Tribune correspondent's comment: "If we cede the Asian mainland to the Communists without a fight, we will greatly strengthen our enemy. We will give the Chinese military dictatorship time to build an even stronger and better army. We will give them the opportunity to liberate' the rich prizes of Indo-China and Thailand. But we will not be giving them only man power and raw materials. We will be giving them something of great strategic importance. If we pull out of Asia we say to the Soviet world, Your eastern flank is now comparatively secure. Go ahead and concentrate on Europe.' If we do the Soviet world this favor, Europe will eventually go under" (.Marguerite Higgins, correspondent's comment: "If we cede the Asian mainland to the Communists without a fight, we will greatly strengthen our enemy. We will give the Chinese military dictatorship time to build an even stronger and better army. We will give them the opportunity to liberate' the rich prizes of Indo-China and Thailand. But we will not be giving them only man power and raw materials. We will be giving them something of great strategic importance. If we pull out of Asia we say to the Soviet world, Your eastern flank is now comparatively secure. Go ahead and concentrate on Europe.' If we do the Soviet world this favor, Europe will eventually go under" (.Marguerite Higgins, War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent War in Korea: The Report of a Woman Combat Correspondent [New York: Doubleday 1951], p. 215). [New York: Doubleday 1951], p. 215).

21. Confidential letter from Dulles to South Korean President Syngman Rhee, June 22, 1953, decla.s.sified and published in U.S. Department of State, Confidential letter from Dulles to South Korean President Syngman Rhee, June 22, 1953, decla.s.sified and published in U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 19521954, Foreign Relations of the United States 19521954, vol. XV, Korea (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 12381240. This was a rationale that Washington officials might have done well to recall and ponder carefully in September of 1950, before sending their troops across the 38th parallel to "liberate" North Korea. vol. XV, Korea (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 12381240. This was a rationale that Washington officials might have done well to recall and ponder carefully in September of 1950, before sending their troops across the 38th parallel to "liberate" North Korea.

The swift UN Security Council decision figures in a 2001 argument by Russian scholars that the United States secretly hoped for an invasion and had plans to meet it. Aleksandr Orlov and Viktor Gavrilov (see chap. 4, n. 94) are reported to contend that the resolution must have been drafted beforehand by the U.S. State Department as part of its preparations. However, the remarkable haste was not in the drafting of the resolution. That is the sort of work, after all, that the department's diplomats and lawyers were trained to do expeditiously. Rather, what was remarkable was that the UN Security Council acted almost immediately. For that, there is a plausible explanation that does not involve a high-level U.S. conspiracy to invite an attack. Korean War correspondent Denis Warner reports that the United Nations at the time of the invasion already had dispatched a pair of Australians to observe, from the southern side, the outbreaks of violence that had been occurring along the 38th parallel. The day before the Northern invasion Maj. Stuart Peach and Squadron Leader Ron Rankin reported to the UN Commission in Seoul, saying they had found the South Korean military defensively oriented, not in condition to wage a major attack on the North. When the invasion occurred, the commission urgently cabled the report to the UN secretary-general in New York. "No report could have been more timely," Warner observes (International Herald Tribune, (International Herald Tribune, June 14, 2000, p. 7). "The UN Security Council did not have to rely on information from the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Seoul, the South Korean government or other observers whose impartiality might have been open to question. It had its own report from its own specialists in its own commission in Korea, of which neither the United States nor South Korea was a member." Warner adds that "if the Peach and Rankin report had not been immediately available, days might have pa.s.sed before the Security Council could have mustered enough evidence to persuade its members to act. By that time, the Soviet Union [then boycotting the council] would have resumed its seat and used its veto." Without the Peach and Rankin report, North Korea "probably would have won the war," taking over the whole of the South before the UN forces could intervene. June 14, 2000, p. 7). "The UN Security Council did not have to rely on information from the U.S. Emba.s.sy in Seoul, the South Korean government or other observers whose impartiality might have been open to question. It had its own report from its own specialists in its own commission in Korea, of which neither the United States nor South Korea was a member." Warner adds that "if the Peach and Rankin report had not been immediately available, days might have pa.s.sed before the Security Council could have mustered enough evidence to persuade its members to act. By that time, the Soviet Union [then boycotting the council] would have resumed its seat and used its veto." Without the Peach and Rankin report, North Korea "probably would have won the war," taking over the whole of the South before the UN forces could intervene.

22. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 14, 1990. November 14, 1990.

Yu cited Choe Yong-gon as one who "was said to have opposed all-out war, pointing to the possibility that the United States would intervene." He added that because Choe and Kim Il-sung "were not getting along at the time," Kim Chaek was made frontline commander, a position to which Choe would have been ent.i.tled by rank order not getting along at the time," Kim Chaek was made frontline commander, a position to which Choe would have been ent.i.tled by rank order (Hankuk Ilbo, (Hankuk Ilbo, November 11, 1990). November 11, 1990).

23. "Gook" is a racial and ideological slur applied, in recent decades, mainly to Asians. A retired U.S. Navy admiral in a 1970 book used the word fifty-four times, by the count of one reviewer. The admiral defended his language in this way: "Throughout this book I use the word 'gooks' in referring to the North Koreans. Some people object to this word. By 'gook' I mean precisely an uncivilized Asiatic Communist. I see no reason for anyone who doesn't fit this definition to object to the way I use it" (Daniel V Gallery, "Gook" is a racial and ideological slur applied, in recent decades, mainly to Asians. A retired U.S. Navy admiral in a 1970 book used the word fifty-four times, by the count of one reviewer. The admiral defended his language in this way: "Throughout this book I use the word 'gooks' in referring to the North Koreans. Some people object to this word. By 'gook' I mean precisely an uncivilized Asiatic Communist. I see no reason for anyone who doesn't fit this definition to object to the way I use it" (Daniel V Gallery, The Pueblo Incident The Pueblo Incident [New York: Doubleday 1970], p. xi., quoted in Frank Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire: Reflections on the USS Pueblo," [New York: Doubleday 1970], p. xi., quoted in Frank Baldwin, "Patrolling the Empire: Reflections on the USS Pueblo," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, [Summer 1972]: p. 60). [Summer 1972]: p. 60).

William Safire has reported ("On Language," Asahi Evening News, Asahi Evening News, May 14, 1995) that "gook" began as a term to describe a Spanish-speaker, particularly a Filipino, "and was later used in South Korea and Vietnam to denigrate all non-whites." May 14, 1995) that "gook" began as a term to describe a Spanish-speaker, particularly a Filipino, "and was later used in South Korea and Vietnam to denigrate all non-whites."

Reading Safire s account soon after I had devoted much of a year in Seoul to studying Korean, I wondered about continuity. Could the term, after a period of disuse, have been re-minted independently after 1945 based on the Korean word variously Romanized as gook, guk, kook gook, guk, kook or or kuk kuk ? The word means "country" or "nationality," as in ? The word means "country" or "nationality," as in Hanguk Hanguk for South Korea and for South Korea and Miguk Miguk for the United States of America. Each of us, regardless of race, creed or color, is from one for the United States of America. Each of us, regardless of race, creed or color, is from one kuk kuk or another. But I found evidence against my theory in a John D. MacDonald novel published in the middle of the Korean War, or another. But I found evidence against my theory in a John D. MacDonald novel published in the middle of the Korean War, The d.a.m.ned The d.a.m.ned (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Gold .Medal Books, 1952), which applies the term to .Mexicans. Mac-Donald on page 31 describes killer Del Bennicke as follows: "He had an un-grammatical flair for languages, came from New Jersey, and thought of all other races as gooks." (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Gold .Medal Books, 1952), which applies the term to .Mexicans. Mac-Donald on page 31 describes killer Del Bennicke as follows: "He had an un-grammatical flair for languages, came from New Jersey, and thought of all other races as gooks."

24. Baik II, p. 299. Baik II, p. 299.

25. Hankuk Ilbo, November 14 and 16, 1990. Yu says the frontline command moved south from Seoul to a mountain temple for the Taejon offensive, with Chief of Staff Kang Kon in charge until Kang was killed when his jeep hit a mine. Kang's temporary replacement, Yu, had to report Kang's death to Kim Il-sung, sending the message off to "higher headquarters." From Yu's account, then, it seems Kim would not have been with Kang and Yu in the frontline command headquarters at the time of the Taejon offensive. Hankuk Ilbo, November 14 and 16, 1990. Yu says the frontline command moved south from Seoul to a mountain temple for the Taejon offensive, with Chief of Staff Kang Kon in charge until Kang was killed when his jeep hit a mine. Kang's temporary replacement, Yu, had to report Kang's death to Kim Il-sung, sending the message off to "higher headquarters." From Yu's account, then, it seems Kim would not have been with Kang and Yu in the frontline command headquarters at the time of the Taejon offensive.

If, as Yu implies, Kim as commander in chief stayed away from actual combat situations, that seems a wise enough move for the country's leader-even if Kim's propagandists preferred to picture him recklessly throwing himself into the thick of the fighting. Baik Bong claims that Kim personally led the three most successful battles-the capture of Seoul, the capture of Taejon and the defense of Height 1211, or Heartbreak Ridge. He "visited wretched villages, falling down and burning under the enemy's bombs and fire bombs, comforting the peasants and encouraging them to join the struggle to rout the enemy; called at the smoking front at night when enemy aircraft showered bullets like hail, with star sh.e.l.ls. It appeared that he took no care of his own personal safety, so there was no inducement for adjutants to take things easy" (Baik II, pp. 293294, 613).

Dae-Sook Suh cites a Russian's epic wartime poem recording that Kim was wounded in a battle near Hamhung (Kim Il Sung, (Kim Il Sung, p. 155). There is, however, no mention of such a wound in Baik Bong's biography, and it is hard to imagine Kim pa.s.sing up a chance to enhance his image with a genuine battlefield wound. p. 155). There is, however, no mention of such a wound in Baik Bong's biography, and it is hard to imagine Kim pa.s.sing up a chance to enhance his image with a genuine battlefield wound.

26. Yu Song-chol's testimony in Yu Song-chol's testimony in Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 11, 1990. November 11, 1990.

27. As an official U.S. history put it, "this North Korean method of attack had characterized most earlier actions and it seldom varied in later ones" (Roy E. Apple-man, As an official U.S. history put it, "this North Korean method of attack had characterized most earlier actions and it seldom varied in later ones" (Roy E. Apple-man, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961]). (Lacy C. Barnett, in a ma.n.u.script chapter, "19th Infantry at the k.u.m River," quotes this pa.s.sage. I am grateful to Colonel Logan for pa.s.sing along his copy of the Barnett chapter, which I have found useful.) [Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961]). (Lacy C. Barnett, in a ma.n.u.script chapter, "19th Infantry at the k.u.m River," quotes this pa.s.sage. I am grateful to Colonel Logan for pa.s.sing along his copy of the Barnett chapter, which I have found useful.) c.u.mings writes (Origins (Origins II, p. 687) that "Americans first felt the combination of frontal a.s.sault and guerrilla warfare in the battle for Taejon. Local peasants, including women and children, would come running along the hillsides near the battle lines, as if they were refugees." On signal they would reach into their packs, pull out weapons and attack the Americans. "The retreat from Taejon ran into well organized roadblocks and ambushes, often placed by local citizens. From this point onward, American forces began burning villages suspected of harboring partisans." II, p. 687) that "Americans first felt the combination of frontal a.s.sault and guerrilla warfare in the battle for Taejon. Local peasants, including women and children, would come running along the hillsides near the battle lines, as if they were refugees." On signal they would reach into their packs, pull out weapons and attack the Americans. "The retreat from Taejon ran into well organized roadblocks and ambushes, often placed by local citizens. From this point onward, American forces began burning villages suspected of harboring partisans."

28. It is not the purpose of this book to break new ground on the military conduct of the Korean War, which itself has been the subject of a great many books including several very good ones. But evoking the sheer ferocity of that war is important to the story as it will develop in later chapters. My uncle saw about as much fighting as anyone there at the time. His role figures in some military histories of the war, but they seldom quote him at any length on what he saw. Perhaps the reader will indulge me as I relate a few episodes as seen through Ed Logan's eyes. It is not the purpose of this book to break new ground on the military conduct of the Korean War, which itself has been the subject of a great many books including several very good ones. But evoking the sheer ferocity of that war is important to the story as it will develop in later chapters. My uncle saw about as much fighting as anyone there at the time. His role figures in some military histories of the war, but they seldom quote him at any length on what he saw. Perhaps the reader will indulge me as I relate a few episodes as seen through Ed Logan's eyes.

29. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 14, 1990. November 14, 1990.

30. Goulden, Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War Korea: The Untold Story of the War (see chap. 4, n. 10), p. 183. (see chap. 4, n. 10), p. 183.

31. c.u.mings observes c.u.mings observes (Origins (Origins II, p. 691) that the average GI "came from an American society where people of color were subjugated and segregated, and where the highest law officer in the land, Attorney General McGrath, had called communists 'rodents.' It thus did not take long for soldiers to believe that Koreans were subhuman, and act accordingly." II, p. 691) that the average GI "came from an American society where people of color were subjugated and segregated, and where the highest law officer in the land, Attorney General McGrath, had called communists 'rodents.' It thus did not take long for soldiers to believe that Koreans were subhuman, and act accordingly."

32. Baik II, p. 289. Baik II, p. 289.

33. See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, pp. 163, 171172. pp. 163, 171172.

34. Baik II, pp. 311313. Baik II, pp. 311313.

35. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 14, 1990. Yu adds, "On 28 September Seoul fell, and the new defense lines became meaningless. Each individual was engrossed in fleeing ... , with the KPA command structure in total collapse. Contact between the Front Line Command and the Auxiliary Command Posts was cut off. .Ma.s.s confusion set in to the point where we did not even know the whereabouts of commanders. Kim Il-song had no choice but to have us establish a defense line north of the 38th parallel. ... We desperately tried to halt the northern-advancing ... forces who had broken through the 38th parallel. However, there was nothing we could do with our strength alone. Just as the South Korean regime was rescued at the last minute from a burial at sea by the United States, it was the Chinese forces' entry into the war which saved Kim Il-Song's regime at the last moment." November 14, 1990. Yu adds, "On 28 September Seoul fell, and the new defense lines became meaningless. Each individual was engrossed in fleeing ... , with the KPA command structure in total collapse. Contact between the Front Line Command and the Auxiliary Command Posts was cut off. .Ma.s.s confusion set in to the point where we did not even know the whereabouts of commanders. Kim Il-song had no choice but to have us establish a defense line north of the 38th parallel. ... We desperately tried to halt the northern-advancing ... forces who had broken through the 38th parallel. However, there was nothing we could do with our strength alone. Just as the South Korean regime was rescued at the last minute from a burial at sea by the United States, it was the Chinese forces' entry into the war which saved Kim Il-Song's regime at the last moment."

The first on the communist side to bring up the possible benefits of a "strategic retreat" may have been not Kim but Mao Zedong, who told Yu Song-chol in August or early September, before before Inchon, that the South Korean and American enemy, pushed into a corner in Pusan, naturally would "unite tightly like clenched fists. ... On such an occasion, it is not so bad for you to retreat to some extent and untie the enemy. Then they will dissolve their union as they stretch bended fingers. ... By doing this, you can dissipate their strength by cutting off their fingers one by one" (Lim Un, Inchon, that the South Korean and American enemy, pushed into a corner in Pusan, naturally would "unite tightly like clenched fists. ... On such an occasion, it is not so bad for you to retreat to some extent and untie the enemy. Then they will dissolve their union as they stretch bended fingers. ... By doing this, you can dissipate their strength by cutting off their fingers one by one" (Lim Un, Founding of a Dynasty Founding of a Dynasty [see chap. 2, n. 59], pp. 187188). [see chap. 2, n. 59], pp. 187188).

36. The Americans' fear of North Korean soldiers disguised as civilians apparently led to one incident grave enough to have been compared to Vietnam's notorious My Lai ma.s.sacre. A team of a.s.sociated Press reporters won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting with a 1999 account of the shooting by the Seventh Cavalry's Second Battalion of scores, perhaps hundreds, of South Korean refugees under a bridge at No Gun Ri between July 26 and July 29, 1950. The same reporters investigated further and revealed in a book that they had found nineteen examples of orders by American commanders to fire on civilian refugees in 1950 and 1951. See Charles Hanley Sang-hun Choe and Martha Mendoza, with Randy Herschaft, The Americans' fear of North Korean soldiers disguised as civilians apparently led to one incident grave enough to have been compared to Vietnam's notorious My Lai ma.s.sacre. A team of a.s.sociated Press reporters won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting with a 1999 account of the shooting by the Seventh Cavalry's Second Battalion of scores, perhaps hundreds, of South Korean refugees under a bridge at No Gun Ri between July 26 and July 29, 1950. The same reporters investigated further and revealed in a book that they had found nineteen examples of orders by American commanders to fire on civilian refugees in 1950 and 1951. See Charles Hanley Sang-hun Choe and Martha Mendoza, with Randy Herschaft, The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War The Bridge at No Gun Ri: A Hidden Nightmare from the Korean War (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2001). The Pentagon declined to comment when asked whether the orders showed there had been a pattern of decisions at high levels to fire on civilians, according to Richard Pyle, "Book Details More US Killings of Civilians During Korean War" (a.s.sociated Press dispatch from New York, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2001). The Pentagon declined to comment when asked whether the orders showed there had been a pattern of decisions at high levels to fire on civilians, according to Richard Pyle, "Book Details More US Killings of Civilians During Korean War" (a.s.sociated Press dispatch from New York, Bangkok Post, Bangkok Post, Dec. 1, 2001). Dec. 1, 2001).

37. "Since we were the lead unit we did not stop in Taejon proper but continued our attack through the town to [the] north and west," Logan told me. "I did not pursue who did it, how many [victims], whether civilian, military, etc.-more important things to do at the time." "Since we were the lead unit we did not stop in Taejon proper but continued our attack through the town to [the] north and west," Logan told me. "I did not pursue who did it, how many [victims], whether civilian, military, etc.-more important things to do at the time."

Military historian Clay Blair gives the following account of the atrocity: "North Korean security police had murdered an estimated 5,000 to 7,000 South Korean civilians and 40 American GIs and 17 ROK soldiers. The bodies 'were 'were found wired together in shallow trenches. Six men-two American GIs, one ROK soldier, and three civilians-had survived the ma.s.sacre by feigning death. They found wired together in shallow trenches. Six men-two American GIs, one ROK soldier, and three civilians-had survived the ma.s.sacre by feigning death. They 'were 'were buried alive in shallow graves, still wired to the dead" buried alive in shallow graves, still wired to the dead" (The Forgotten War: America in Korea 19501953 (The Forgotten War: America in Korea 19501953 [New York: Times Books, 1987], p. 312). [New York: Times Books, 1987], p. 312).

It cannot be ruled out that this ma.s.sacre might have been preceded by a South Korean police ma.s.sacre of some 1,700 imprisoned North Korean guerrillas just before the North Koreans captured Taejon. Deane (I Was a Captive [see chap. 4, n. 49], p. 91) describes what he considers reliable reports of such an earlier ma.s.sacre. Halliday and c.u.mings [see chap. 4, n. 49], p. 91) describes what he considers reliable reports of such an earlier ma.s.sacre. Halliday and c.u.mings (Korea (Korea [see chap. 4, n. 60], pp. 9092) offer their own version of the evidence for such a ma.s.sacre between July 2 and 6, 1950, with the victims numbering 4,000 to 7,000. [see chap. 4, n. 60], pp. 9092) offer their own version of the evidence for such a ma.s.sacre between July 2 and 6, 1950, with the victims numbering 4,000 to 7,000.

Logan, who first arrived at Taejon with the Nineteenth's commander, Col. Guy Stanley Meloy Jr. around July 6 and stayed in the area until around July 17, told me he had never heard of these allegations before I called them to his attention in a letter of January 15, 1995. While in the Taejon area he neither heard nor saw anything that would back them up, he said, noting that in all likelihood such a huge ma.s.sacre "would not go unnoticed in a fluid operation underway."

"But who knows?" he added, acknowledging that the limits of an infantryman's knowledge are "about the range of rifle and machine-gun fire. ... Ground plodders do little investigation-accept what we just pa.s.sed and move on to the next objective. Those behind might know more, but we just keep up the pressure."

38. See Clay Blair, See Clay Blair, The Forgotten War, The Forgotten War, pp. 325327; Halberstam, pp. 325327; Halberstam, The Fifties The Fifties (see chap. 4, n. 86), p. 84; and Goulden, (see chap. 4, n. 86), p. 84; and Goulden, Korea, Korea, p. 249. p. 249.

39. Goulden, Goulden, Korea, Korea, p. 248. p. 248.

40. Dwight .Martin, Dwight .Martin, Time Time article, cited in Goulden, article, cited in Goulden, Korea, Korea, p. 251. p. 251.

41. Cable to Kim Il-sung and the commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces, Peng Dehuai, quoted in Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Cable to Kim Il-sung and the commander of the Chinese Volunteer Forces, Peng Dehuai, quoted in Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 185. Mao at this point was about to send his troops to Korea in response to Kim's pleas, so his advice would have carried greater weight than earlier when he had warned, futilely about an Inchon landing. p. 185. Mao at this point was about to send his troops to Korea in response to Kim's pleas, so his advice would have carried greater weight than earlier when he had warned, futilely about an Inchon landing.

42. Baik II, p. 334. Baik II, p. 334.

43. The official later remarried and had another family. His family's grisly history was related to me by a son from that second marriage, Kim Myong-chol, who was born in 1960 and defected to South Korea in 1993 after what he described as an argument with his superiors regarding the disposition of foreign currency earned on his job. The official later remarried and had another family. His family's grisly history was related to me by a son from that second marriage, Kim Myong-chol, who was born in 1960 and defected to South Korea in 1993 after what he described as an argument with his superiors regarding the disposition of foreign currency earned on his job.

His grandparents were also killed during the war, in an explosion, Kim told me when I interviewed him in June 1994. He said he believed his father had been an honest person who distributed the county's land fairly without any attempt at self-aggrandizement. "As far as I know, people at that time weren't that greedy" But his father's formerly well-to-do neighbors nonetheless considered him a traitor.

c.u.mings reports (Origins (Origins II, p. 717), "On the day American forces moved into [Pyongyang], Rhee announnced the abrogation of the northern land reform, prompting the CIA to comment that this 'reflects political pressure by the landlord cla.s.s to nullify ... land reform in order to maintain their traditional controlling position in Korean political and economic life.' Pyongyang's new mayor chose United Nations Day to announce that land would be returned to its rightful owners.'" II, p. 717), "On the day American forces moved into [Pyongyang], Rhee announnced the abrogation of the northern land reform, prompting the CIA to comment that this 'reflects political pressure by the landlord cla.s.s to nullify ... land reform in order to maintain their traditional controlling position in Korean political and economic life.' Pyongyang's new mayor chose United Nations Day to announce that land would be returned to its rightful owners.'"

44. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, pp. 159163. pp. 159163.

45. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say (ibid., pp. 165166) that in a "high-level meeting, the Politburo studied the argument that U.S. planes might drop atomic bombs on advancing troops in order to defeat human-wave a.s.saults, a tactic then under consideration if China entered the war. The majority of Party leaders reasoned that this would be most unlikely but even if the bomb Goncharov, Lewis and Xue say (ibid., pp. 165166) that in a "high-level meeting, the Politburo studied the argument that U.S. planes might drop atomic bombs on advancing troops in order to defeat human-wave a.s.saults, a tactic then under consideration if China entered the war. The majority of Party leaders reasoned that this would be most unlikely but even if the bomb 'were 'were employed on the front lines, Chinese troops would not face a catastrophe. They could devise tactics to minimize the danger to themselves and bring the U.S. defenders within their range of damage. employed on the front lines, Chinese troops would not face a catastrophe. They could devise tactics to minimize the danger to themselves and bring the U.S. defenders within their range of damage.

"These conclusions on both the strategic and the battlefield use of nuclear weapons were based on several different arguments. At the most general level, the advocates for action held to the precepts of People's War and its line that only men, not a weapon of ma.s.s destruction, could determine the outcome of any war. .Moreover, what the Americans would later call a nuclear umbrella had been extended to China by the terms of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The Americans would be deterred, a word never used but clearly implied.

"The advocates further argued that the nation's industry and cities could not be effectively targeted by the small number of nuclear weapons then a.s.sumed to be in the U.S. a.r.s.enal. The industrial base was underdeveloped, mostly small-scale, and scattered, and the urban population was less than 10 percent of the country. A nuclear strike against China would be highly destructive but not decisively so. All these views found official expression throughout the next decade.

"The Politburo deduced that Washington might want to select the PLA's bases and troop concentrations in the Northeast as the priority targets for a U.S. nuclear strike. The Soviet Union had vital interests in the Northeast, thanks to the secret agreements reached in February, and .Moscow would have to retaliate in order to protect its own bases in Lushun and other places. The high command restated its conviction that the Americans would have to weigh possible Soviet retaliation when they pondered the pros and cons of a nuclear strike against China.

"The foregoing arguments mostly concerned an attack on China proper, but the advocates of action [i.e., intervention] also argued that the United States would not resort to nuclear weapons in Korea either. The Chinese forces were experienced in mobile and guerrilla warfare; they could scatter and hide, as indeed they did prior to their ma.s.sive intervention in October. After entering Korea, they could take cover in strong, concealed fortifications, and the Chinese believed that the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the mountainous battlefields of Korea would be limited. Finally, the Chinese and UN forces would be confronting each other in what was called jigsaw pattern warfare.' ... In this confusing and ever changing battlefield, the Americans could not avoid hitting themselves."

46. Ibid., pp. 174180. Ibid., pp. 174180.

47. Wehrfritz, "History Lesson," p. 30; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Wehrfritz, "History Lesson," p. 30; Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, pp. 180185. pp. 180185.

China understood that the war in Korea-like the later Vietnam War-was a "proxy war," c.u.mings observes (Origins (Origins II, p. II, p. 763) 763)-"with the Chinese revolution being the real issue."

48. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, tells the astonishing tale of this turn of events on pp. 187199. tells the astonishing tale of this turn of events on pp. 187199.

49. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 16, 1990. November 16, 1990.

50. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 199. p. 199.

David Halberstam observes that American China experts "predicted accurately what China would do, not based on Communist intentions"-i.e., the policies of a supposedly .Moscow-dominated bloc-"but on Chinese Chinese history." However, because they had been discredited by .McCarthy and others, "the State Department did not heed their warnings on what American moves would bring the Chinese into the war. The warnings unheeded, the Chinese entered, and the anti-Communist pa.s.sions against the China experts mounted. It was a Greek thing" history." However, because they had been discredited by .McCarthy and others, "the State Department did not heed their warnings on what American moves would bring the Chinese into the war. The warnings unheeded, the Chinese entered, and the anti-Communist pa.s.sions against the China experts mounted. It was a Greek thing" (Best and the Brightest (Best and the Brightest [see chap. 4, n. 69], pp. 108, 118). [see chap. 4, n. 69], pp. 108, 118).

51. Newly released Russian doc.u.ments quoted in "Kim Il-sung Masterminded Korean War," Newly released Russian doc.u.ments quoted in "Kim Il-sung Masterminded Korean War," Korea Times, Korea Times, July 21, 1994. July 21, 1994.

Mao's longtime personal physician quotes his patient as having confided that he had asked Stalin to intervene as well, arguing that American conquest of Korea would threaten both China and the USSR. But Stalin, arguing that it would be the beginning of the Third World War, refused, Mao complained. Thereupon the Chinese leader asked Stalin to give or-if Stalin feared such aid would provoke the West-at least sell China weapons it could use to intervene. Stalin agreed only to a sale, and some 90 percent of munitions China used in the war came from Moscow-financed by loans totaling $1.3 billion (Dr. Li Zhizui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao The Private Life of Chairman Mao [New York: Random House, 1994], pp. 117118, [New York: Random House, 1994], pp. 117118, 643). 643).

52. Hankuk Ilbo, Hankuk Ilbo, November 17, 1990. November 17, 1990.

53. Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, on page 191 translate this pa.s.sage, which they describe as having been left out of Khrushchev's "Korean War" as published in English. on page 191 translate this pa.s.sage, which they describe as having been left out of Khrushchev's "Korean War" as published in English.

54. As Yu Song-chol and Pak Hon-yong returned from their Beijing trip, they watched advance units of the Chinese forces crossing into North Korea. Yu recalled, "The Chinese As Yu Song-chol and Pak Hon-yong returned from their Beijing trip, they watched advance units of the Chinese forces crossing into North Korea. Yu recalled, "The Chinese 'were 'were crossing the border with all of the military equipment loaded on handcarts, with three people pulling in front and two people pushing from the rear. This scene showed us the fighting potential of the Chinese forces" crossing the border with all of the military equipment loaded on handcarts, with three people pulling in front and two people pushing from the rear. This scene showed us the fighting potential of the Chinese forces" (Hankuk Ilbo, (Hankuk Ilbo, November 16, 1990). November 16, 1990).

55. Among those who were delighted to be recalled was my father. After spending 1942 to 1945 as a flight-test engineer on the plant's newly built B-29s, he had found himself grounded in peacetime as a Dodge truck salesman. Among those who were delighted to be recalled was my father. After spending 1942 to 1945 as a flight-test engineer on the plant's newly built B-29s, he had found himself grounded in peacetime as a Dodge truck salesman.

56. Origins Origins II, p. II, p. 774. 774.

57. Baik II, pp. 341349. Baik II, pp. 341349.

58. "The Armistice was greeted with relief and approval by the people of North Korea. The strains and privations of the war-incessant bombing, prolonged fear, extended working hours, food shortages, and loss of relatives-had resulted in widespread 'war-weariness' "The Armistice was greeted with relief and approval by the people of North Korea. The strains and privations of the war-incessant bombing, prolonged fear, extended working hours, food shortages, and loss of relatives-had resulted in widespread 'war-weariness' (yomjonjuui, (yomjonjuui, literally "hate warism"). During the conflict, however, there had developed a striking ambivalence in att.i.tudes toward military violence: on the one hand, it was abhorred; on the other, it was welcomed since it might bring quick victory to one of the antagonists and the end of ma.s.s killing" (Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., literally "hate warism"). During the conflict, however, there had developed a striking ambivalence in att.i.tudes toward military violence: on the one hand, it was abhorred; on the other, it was welcomed since it might bring quick victory to one of the antagonists and the end of ma.s.s killing" (Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-War Politics of Communist Korea," in Robert A. Scalapino, ed., North Korea Today North Korea Today [see chap. 3, n. 11], pp. 1819). Lee, a defector to South Korea, evidently of Soviet-Korean background, is described as having been "a writer for [see chap. 3, n. 11], pp. 1819). Lee, a defector to South Korea, evidently of Soviet-Korean background, is described as having been "a writer for Pravda Pravda in Pyongyang for four years until February 1959." in Pyongyang for four years until February 1959."

59. Halliday and c.u.mings, Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, pp. 88, 121. "Contrary to what is generally suggested, Truman's remarks were not a pp. 88, 121. "Contrary to what is generally suggested, Truman's remarks were not a faux pas; faux pas; they were a carefully weighed threat based on contingency planning to use the bomb. The crisis in Korea led to intense high-level discussions about the possible use of, or a threat to use, what Washington liked to call 'weapons of ma.s.s destruction': atomic and chemical weapons." In December, right after British Prime Minister Clement Atlee visited him and won the President's oral a.s.surances that he would not use the A-bomb in Korea, "Truman secretly moved non-a.s.sembled bombs to an aircraft-carrier off Korea and later, equally secretly, carried out dummy nuclear runs over North Korea" (pp. 123124). "US policy-making was treading a razor's edge over atomic weapons. It would seem that the USA came closest to using them in early spring 1951. On 10 .March MacArthur asked for something he called a 'D Day atomic capability.' At the end of March atomic-bomb-loading pits on Okinawa were operational; the bombs were ostensibly carried there una.s.sembled and put together at the base. It is not clear whether the bombs were a.s.sembled and ready for use. But on 5 April the Joint Chiefs ordered immediate atomic retaliation against Manchurian bases if large numbers of new troops came into the fighting, or, it appears, if bombers were launched from there against American forces; and on 6 April Truman issued an order approving the Joint Chiefs' request and the transfer of a limited number of complete atomic weapons 'to military custody' " (p. 155). they were a carefully weighed threat based on contingency planning to use the bomb. The crisis in Korea led to intense high-level discussions about the possible use of, or a threat to use, what Washington liked to call 'weapons of ma.s.s destruction': atomic and chemical weapons." In December, right after British Prime Minister Clement Atlee visited him and won the President's oral a.s.surances that he would not use the A-bomb in Korea, "Truman secretly moved non-a.s.sembled bombs to an aircraft-carrier off Korea and later, equally secretly, carried out dummy nuclear runs over North Korea" (pp. 123124). "US policy-making was treading a razor's edge over atomic weapons. It would seem that the USA came closest to using them in early spring 1951. On 10 .March MacArthur asked for something he called a 'D Day atomic capability.' At the end of March atomic-bomb-loading pits on Okinawa were operational; the bombs were ostensibly carried there una.s.sembled and put together at the base. It is not clear whether the bombs were a.s.sembled and ready for use. But on 5 April the Joint Chiefs ordered immediate atomic retaliation against Manchurian bases if large numbers of new troops came into the fighting, or, it appears, if bombers were launched from there against American forces; and on 6 April Truman issued an order approving the Joint Chiefs' request and the transfer of a limited number of complete atomic weapons 'to military custody' " (p. 155).

60. Halliday and c.u.mings (ibid., p. 160) say that in early June of 1951 U.S. Defense Secretary George Marshall "is reported to have said that he would recommend to Truman that they tell the Chinese leaders ... that unless the fighting stopped 'we are going to give them a taste of the atom.'" The suggestion seems to be that such a message might have been pa.s.sed to the Chinese, disposing them toward negotiations-which began the following month. The authors add (pp. 163164): "The first tests of tactical nuclear weapons had been held in January 1951. In June that year the Joint Chiefs again considered using the bomb, this time in tactical battle circ.u.mstances. Robert Oppenheimer was involved in Halliday and c.u.mings (ibid., p. 160) say that in early June of 1951 U.S. Defense Secretary George Marshall "is reported to have said that he would recommend to Truman that they tell the Chinese leaders ... that unless the fighting stopped 'we are going to give them a taste of the atom.'" The suggestion seems to be that such a message might have been pa.s.sed to the Chinese, disposing them toward negotiations-which began the following month. The authors add (pp. 163164): "The first tests of tactical nuclear weapons had been held in January 1951. In June that year the Joint Chiefs again considered using the bomb, this time in tactical battle circ.u.mstances. Robert Oppenheimer was involved in Project Vista,' designed to gauge the feasibility of the tactical use of atomic weapons. On 5 July 1951, in the interval between the agreement to start peace talks and their actual opening, the Army Operations Division produced a memorandum recommending the use of the bomb if there was a deadlock in the talks. In the meantime it recommended field tests. Korea was the obvious place for these. In September and October 1951, while the peace talks were suspended over violations of the neutral zone and during the fiercest land battle of the war between US and North Korean troops, on Height 1211/Heartbreak Ridge, the USA carried out 'Operation Hudson Harbor' in conditions of utmost secrecy. Lone B-29 bombers flew over North Korea on simulated atomic-bombing runs, dropping dummy atomic bombs or heavy TNT bombs. ... [T]he project indicated that the bombs were probably not useful (for purely tactical reasons)."

61. See Baik II, pp. 252, 266. See Baik II, pp. 252, 266.

Halliday and c.u.mings argue that "these negotiations were an immense breakthrough for North Korea and China. ... This was a double psychological victory: over the USA because Americans were negotiating with people they did not 'recognize' and over the South Koreans, who were subordinate to the USA" (Korea, (Korea, p. 160). p. 160).

62. Clark, Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu From the Danube to the Yalu (see chap. 1, n. 1), p. 82. (see chap. 1, n. 1), p. 82.

63. Halliday and c.u.mings, Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, p. 200. The Chinese figures are particularly murky. Halliday and c.u.mings say that one source estimates the Chinese dead at 3 million. Other sources say that even the 1 million figure refers to total casualties, not deaths. See, e.g., Kim, p. 200. The Chinese figures are particularly murky. Halliday and c.u.mings say that one source estimates the Chinese dead at 3 million. Other sources say that even the 1 million figure refers to total casualties, not deaths. See, e.g., Kim, Truth About the Korean War, Truth About the Korean War, p. 42. p. 42.

64. That is an achievement whose value became clearer to him and many others after the South had progressed, providing its people prosperity and substantial personal and political freedom, than it had been at the time. From the early 1950s to 1987, Western policy makers repeatedly had to make excuses for not-very-nice South Korean governments while seeking to portray the Demilitarized Zone as "Freedom's Frontier." That is an achievement whose value became clearer to him and many others after the South had progressed, providing its people prosperity and substantial personal and political freedom, than it had been at the time. From the early 1950s to 1987, Western policy makers repeatedly had to make excuses for not-very-nice South Korean governments while seeking to portray the Demilitarized Zone as "Freedom's Frontier."

65. See, e.g., .Mark Clark, See, e.g., .Mark Clark, From the Danube, From the Danube, p. 85. p. 85.

66. Goulden, Goulden, Korea, Korea, pp. pp. 471472. 471472.

67. Robert F Futrell, Robert F Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 195053 The United States Air Force in Korea, 195053 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 648, cited in Rosemary Foot, (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 648, cited in Rosemary Foot, A Subst.i.tute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks A Subst.i.tute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 207. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 207.

68. See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, See Goncharov, Lewis and Xue, Uncertain Partners, Uncertain Partners, p. 188. p. 188.

69. See Baik II, pp. 342, 399. See Baik II, pp. 342, 399.

70. Ibid., p. 339. Ibid., p. 339.

71. Kim, Kim, With the Century With the Century (see chap. 1, n. 1), vol. 3, pp. 333334. (see chap. 1, n. 1), vol. 3, pp. 333334.

72. Halliday and c.u.mings write: "Most Western sources suggest that the guerrillas were a short-lived phenomenon that soon dwindled away. This is not true." They consider guerrilla warfare to have been "the most important factor characterizing the nature of the conflict" Halliday and c.u.mings write: "Most Western sources suggest that the guerrillas were a short-lived phenomenon that soon dwindled away. This is not true." They consider guerrilla warfare to have been "the most important factor characterizing the nature of the conflict" (Korea, (Korea, p. 146). p. 146).

73. Baik II, pp. 381382. Baik II, pp. 381382.

74. Ibid., pp. 399, 403. Ibid., pp. 399, 403.

75. See Deane, See Deane, I Was a Captive, I Was a Captive, p. 17, regarding South Korean soldiers' arrogance; p. 79, regarding drunkenness and looting on the part of North Korean soldiers; pp. 96 ff. regarding capture and imprisonment of South Korean politicians; p. 223 regarding conscriptions of young South Koreans. p. 17, regarding South Korean soldiers' arrogance; p. 79, regarding drunkenness and looting on the part of North Korean soldiers; pp. 96 ff. regarding capture and imprisonment of South Korean politicians; p. 223 regarding conscriptions of young South Koreans.

76. Hastings, Hastings, Korean War, Korean War, p. 132. p. 132.

The U.S. diplomat Harold n.o.ble (Emba.s.sy at War, (Emba.s.sy at War, p. 205) wrote that Koreans and Americans returning to Seoul in 1950 after the Northern occupiers withdrew for the first time found the bodies of South Koreans "trussed up and shot through the head. ... Bodies were so numerous, especially lying in alleys just off the main streets, that their removal and burial was a major problem." p. 205) wrote that Koreans and Americans returning to Seoul in 1950 after the Northern occupiers withdrew for the first time found the bodies of South Koreans "trussed up and shot through the head. ... Bodies were so numerous, especially lying in alleys just off the main streets, that their removal and burial was a major problem."

77. Higgins, Higgins, War in Korea, War in Korea, pp. 209211. pp. 209211.

78. Weathersby "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations" (see chap. 4, n. 30). Weathersby "Limits to Revisionist Interpretations" (see chap. 4, n. 30).

79. Choi Yearn-hong, "Korean War." Choi Yearn-hong, "Korean War."

80. c.u.mings writes c.u.mings writes (Origins (Origins II, p. 671), "About sixty members of the National a.s.sembly remained in Seoul, and toward the end of July, forty-eight of them held a meeting expressing their allegiance to the DPRK." The decision of moderates to remain in Seoul, c.u.mings says (p. 495), "has a retrospective eloquence" regarding Northern efforts to woo them. II, p. 671), "About sixty members of the National a.s.sembly remained in Seoul, and toward the end of July, forty-eight of them held a meeting expressing their allegiance to the DPRK." The decision of moderates to remain in Seoul, c.u.mings says (p. 495), "has a retrospective eloquence" regarding Northern efforts to woo them.

The American diplomat Harold n.o.ble made a study of the North Korean occupation, interviewing some Seoul residents who escaped south after the occupation was under way and many more of them after the South Korean and American forces had returned to Seoul. Regarding the 210-member National a.s.sembly, n.o.ble calculated that those members who stayed behind numbered about thirty-eight. He concluded that, although "a few of them appear to have been somewhat sympathetic to the communist cause, I'm convinced that most of them 'were 'were not but simply became confused that last day, remembered their resolution never to desert the people, and stayed behind until it was too late. The communists picked up a few of the most leftist among them very quickly, and took them to Pyongyang, but left the rest alone for about ten days." Then the authorities brought those more than thirty remaining members in for a speech (telling one that his situation was like that of "a rat in a jar"), placed them under surveillance and later brought them back for interrogation. "None of them appears to have been heroic in refusing to sign confessions of crimes against the people, although in fairness I must add that those I've talked with a.s.sured me they had no doubt of an early UN and ROK victory and reoccupation of Seoul, and believed that if they could keep alive in the interim it wouldn't matter what they signed. ... On three occasions, when the communist captors presented doc.u.ments for their signature, these a.s.semblymen signed. Two were pet.i.tions to the Security Council of the United Nations protesting against UN and US action in Korea. One of these men has told me he knew he had to sign, so he did, but he didn't bother to read the doc.u.ment." Some members were asked to broadcast propaganda speeches. "One little man who doesn't possess a great deal of physical courage cleverly agreed to their invitation knowing he would be turned down. He removed and hid his false teeth, and when the radio technicians heard him mumbling his prepared speech they said he wouldn't do." Among others, "some of the ablest promptly agreed to broadcast after being shown the blunt end of a pistol or the open blade of a knife." The occupation study is summarized in two ma.n.u.script chapters, "Seoul Under the Communists" and "Communist Last Days in Seoul," which were not included when n.o.ble's not but simply became confused that last day, remembered their resolution never to desert the people, and stayed behind until it was too late. The communists picked up a few of the most leftist among them very quickly, and took them to Pyongyang, but left the rest alone for about ten days." Then the authorities brought those more than thirty remaining members in for a speech (telling one that his situation was like that of "a rat in a jar"), placed them under surveillance and later brought them back for interrogation. "None of them appears to have been heroic in refusing to sign confessions of crimes against the people, although in fairness I must add that those I've talked with a.s.sured me they had no doubt of an early UN and ROK victory and reoccupation of Seoul, and believed that if they could keep alive in the interim it wouldn't matter what they signed. ... On three occasions, when the communist captors presented doc.u.ments for their signature, these a.s.semblymen signed. Two were pet.i.tions to the Security Council of the United Nations protesting against UN and US action in Korea. One of these men has told me he knew he had to sign, so he did, but he didn't bother to read the doc.u.ment." Some members were asked to broadcast propaganda speeches. "One little man who doesn't possess a great deal of physical courage cleverly agreed to their invitation knowing he would be turned down. He removed and hid his false teeth, and when the radio technicians heard him mumbling his prepared speech they said he wouldn't do." Among others, "some of the ablest promptly agreed to broadcast after being shown the blunt end of a pistol or the open blade of a knife." The occupation study is summarized in two ma.n.u.script chapters, "Seoul Under the Communists" and "Communist Last Days in Seoul," which were not included when n.o.ble's Emba.s.sy at War Emba.s.sy at War was published posthumously. I am grateful to Mrs. n.o.ble for kindly providing copies and permitting me to quote from the ma.n.u.script chapters. was published posthumously. I am grateful to Mrs. n.o.ble for kindly providing copies and permitting me to quote from the ma.n.u.script chapters.

81. Higgins, Higgins, War in Korea, War in Korea, pp. 209211. pp. 209211.

n.o.ble ("Seoul Under the Communists") wrote that the first occupation was "so bitter a lesson that although nearly the whole population stayed behind in June, 1950, the next winter when it appeared that Seoul would be captured again by the communists, despite the snow and ice and bitter cold, well over a million people left the city and scarcely a hundred thousand remained a second time. ..."

82. Scalapino and Lee write that, as the war came to an end, South Korea was "one of the most staunchly anti-Communist societies in the world. On the other hand, every speech and action of the North Korean officials reflected their deep anxiety regarding the loyalty of their own people and the deplorable conditions prevailing throughout their country" Scalapino and Lee write that, as the war came to an end, South Korea was "one of the most staunchly anti-Communist societies in the world. On the other hand, every speech and action of the North Korean officials reflected their deep anxiety regarding the loyalty of their own people and the deplorable conditions prevailing throughout their country" (Communism in Korea, (Communism in Korea, p. 462). p. 462).

c.u.mings (Origins (Origins II, p. 669) acknowledges that South Koreans retained horrible memories of the Northern occupation, but he questions whether their memories were true ones: "In the early days of the new regime, the released prisoners settled scores with their antagonists who had abused and jailed them, mainly members of the Korean National Police and the rightist youth groups. People's courts arraigned and denounced them, after which summary executions took place. This experience has led to a general judgment, reinforced by American propaganda, that the occupation of the south was a living h.e.l.l for those who experienced it. I myself seem always to be running into Koreans who say the experience was terrible, while also saying they successfully hid out during the entire three months. Evidence from the time, including interviews with ROK officials who fled Seoul, does not suggest that the occupation was politically onerous for the majority of Seoul's citizens, although generalized fear, food shortages and the American bombing made it an often h.e.l.lish experience." II, p. 669) acknowledges that South Koreans retained horrible memories of the Northern occupation, but he questions whether their memories were true ones: "In the early days of the new regime, the released prisoners settled scores with their antagonists who had abused and jailed them, mainly members of the Korean National Police and the rightist youth groups. People's courts arraigned and denounced them, after which summary executions took place. This experience has led to a general judgment, reinforced by American propaganda, that the occupation of the south was a living h.e.l.l for those who experienced it. I myself seem always to be running into Koreans who say the experience was terrible, while also saying they successfully hid out during the entire three months. Evidence from the time, including interviews with ROK officials who fled Seoul, does not suggest that the occupation was politically onerous for the majority of Seoul's citizens, although generalized fear, food shortages and the American bombing made it an often h.e.l.lish experience."

83. Higgins, Higgins, War in Korea, War in Korea, pp. 209211. pp. 209211.

84. Halliday and c.u.mings, Halliday and c.u.mings, Korea, Korea, p. 143. p. 143.