Two Chancellors Part 7

It was with the mission of negotiating a _secret act_, binding the two parties in the sense indicated by the note which we have just given, that M. Benedetti left Paris towards the end of the month of August. The act was to provide for an offensive and defensive alliance between the two states, and, in exchange for the recognition of the changes already accomplished or still to be accomplished in Germany, to a.s.sure to Napoleon III. the diplomatic aid of Prussia for the acquisition of Luxemburg, and its _armed_ aid at the moment when France should judge it opportune to annex Belgium. Immediately on his arrival at his post the French amba.s.sador went resolutely to work: he carried on the negotiation _without the knowledge of his immediate chief_, and only referred to the emperor and the minister of state.[92] He begged the president of the council of Prussia to regard the propositions of the 5th August, those relative to the left bank of the Rhine, as null and void, as a joke of M. Drouyn de Lhuys during the sickness of his august master, and submitted to him a new project in five articles concerning Belgium. It matters little that the amba.s.sador of France had with him the minute of it which he had written in the cabinet of the Prussian minister, at his request, and, "in some measure at his dictation;" it is certain that Benedetti acted according to the instructions from Paris,[93] and that M. de Bismarck on his part did not decline such overtures. He had even made observations on some of the terms employed in the draft, and insisted on introducing several changes in the text. The project thus amended was sent to Paris, and returned anew to Berlin with rectifications made by the emperor and M. Rouher. On the banks of the Seine, in the councils of the small number initiated in the secret, they were full of expectation and cheerfulness; they debated the question of the successor of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and the opinions were divided between M. La Valette and M. Benedetti; they exchanged ideas which were soon expressed in a sadly celebrated doc.u.ment, and they rejoiced at seeing "the treaties of 1815 destroyed, the coalition of the three Powers of the North broken, and Prussia made sufficiently independent and sufficiently compact to ignore its former traditions."[94] All of a sudden a discouraging dispatch from the amba.s.sador of France at the court of Berlin (29th August) troubled their minds, and they had again some apprehensions on the subject of the "necessary and fruitful alliance" which they flattered themselves with having established.

The conferences had continued up to the last days of the month of August, and M. de Bismarck had lent himself with good grace to the _dilatory negotiations_. In the mean time, the peace of Prague, the definite peace with Austria, was signed (26th August); the States of the South had adhered one after the other to the stipulations of Nikolsburg, and solemnly recognized the confederation of the North, as well as the territorial acquisitions of Prussia. The secret act concerning Belgium was in the hands of the minister of William I., and only needed to be fairly copied and signed, but at this moment M. Benedetti suddenly met with strange inconceivable distrusts which did not fail to wound him deeply. M. de Bismarck hesitated, spoke to him of his fears "that the Emperor Napoleon would wish to make use of such a negotiation to create suspicion between Prussia and England." The stupefaction of the French amba.s.sador was extreme. "What degree of confidence can we on our side accord to those open to such suspicions?" he asked in his dispatch of the 29th August.[95] The proceeding seemed to him unjustifiable, and, in order not to be tempted to qualify it, he judged it opportune "to go for a fortnight to Carlsbad where he would hold himself ready to return to Berlin on receipt of the first telegram which M. de Bismarck should address to him." Slightly moved at this circ.u.mstance, the court of the Tuileries was not the less obstinate in believing in the _secret act_ which was preparing at Berlin; it dismissed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and long before the arrival of his successor from Constantinople, M. de Moustier, they hastened to publish that famous circular of the 16th September, which bore the signature of the minister of the interior, M. de La Valette, and was one more pledge given to the conqueror of Sadowa. The manifest praised the theory of combinations and affirmed that "Prussia, enlarged, free henceforth from any solidarity, would a.s.sure the independence of Germany;" as to the most secret hopes, scarcely an allusion was made to them: "France can only desire territorial aggrandizements which do not alter its powerful cohesion." Nothing happened, however, and M. Benedetti waited in vain under the elms and the beautiful firs of Carlsbad: M. de Bismarck gave no sign of life. He had gone to Varzin, from whence he did not return until the month of December. The _dilatory negotiations_ had borne all their fruit in the month of August, and the French government would have been too happy if all those shadowy intrigues had remained for it only a simple deception: they became its chastis.e.m.e.nt.

M. de Benedetti had, however, pretended to know his man, to have _followed_ him for fifteen years! He had followed him in any case during the negotiations of the spring which brought about the treaty between Prussia and Italy; he had then contemplated the magnificent tilt between the _viper_ and the _charlatan_, and himself very judiciously judged a situation in which the plenipotentiaries of the two countries had surpa.s.sed one another in miracles of the true Punic faith. "M. de Bismarck and General Govone distrusted and still distrust one another,"

M. Benedetti wrote in his dispatch of the 27th of March, 1866. "It is feared at Florence that, finding itself in possession of _an act which places Italy in a certain degree at its discretion_, Prussia will make known the stipulations of it at Vienna and will persuade the Austrian cabinet, by intimidation, to peacefully make the coveted concessions. At Berlin, they fear that Italy, if they promised to negotiate on these bases, will directly inform Austria before concluding any treaty, and will thus try to obtain from it the abandonment of Venice." After a similar experience _in anima vili_, how could M. Benedetti have left on the table of the president of the council of Berlin his compromising autograph on the subject of Belgium, _an act which in a certain degree placed France at the mercy of Prussia_? How could he be astonished at seeing his interlocutor "open to certain suspicion," and did he not on the contrary make the same calculations for his own account and profit?

It was, however, very foolish to suppose that M. de Bismarck had the will to do unto others that which he declared he did not wish others to do unto him! And the amba.s.sador of France would have scarcely been wrong in crediting this charitable thought to his interlocutor, however unevangelical, for the amusing or rather the sad part of the affair,--the true humor of all this imbroglio, as the Bardolph of Shakspere would say,--is that the cavalier of the Mark had already executed precisely the manoeuvre, indifferently chivalric surely, of which he pretended to suspect Napoleon III., and that the thing was done at the moment when he demanded if they had nothing in their hands and pockets. They had left in his hands two very secret and dangerous doc.u.ments, the two plans of the treaties on the Rhine and Belgium,[96]

and he took care not to avail himself of them immediately at the expense of the interested parties, whom he had every interest to attach to himself.

The preliminaries of Nikolsburg, the reader will remember, had stipulated that the States of the South should remain outside of the new confederation directed by Prussia, and that they should form among themselves a restricted union. That was the great success obtained by the French mediation, the salutary combination of the _three fragments_, much more favorable to the interests of France, according to its opinion, than that of the former _Bund_, the ill-omened creation of 1815. It is true that among the persons initiated in the secret of Benedetti's mission, "this group of confederates" was only regarded as "a matter of business for a reasonable profit;" in waiting, however, they "saved" the South, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys honestly exerted himself, in this month of August, 1866, to aid the unhappy plenipotentiaries of Bavaria, of Wurtemberg, of Hesse, etc., who had gone to seek a definite peace at Berlin. M. de Bismarck had first frightened them by his fiscal and territorial demands; they had invoked and obtained the support of the emperor, and in the Tuileries they flattered themselves with having in truth persuaded the minister of William I. to more equitable sentiments. Still, on the 24th August, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote to his agent in Bavaria: "I am happy to think that our last step has not been without influence on the result of a negotiation which is ending in a more satisfactory manner than the cabinet of Munich had at first thought possible;" and it was not only M. Benedetti who took to himself in this matter the credit of playing the fine _role_ of moderator.[97] The truth is, that if M. de Bismarck ended by becoming more moderate and even amicable towards the Southern States, he had very different motives than the desire of being agreeable to the cabinet of the Tuileries. He had simply shown to "the group of confederates" the project of the treaty of the 5th August; he had made them see that the French government, at the same time when it seemed to protect, sought to extend itself together with Prussia at their expense, and demanded portions of the Palatinate and of Hesse. In place of demanding from them the sacrifices which they feared, the minister of William I. offered to defend them against the "hereditary enemy." There was no hesitation: the States of the South surrendered, and Prussia concluded with them (from the 17th to the 23d August) _secret_ treaties of offensive and defensive alliance. The contracting parties guaranteed reciprocally the integrity of their respective territories, and the States of the South engaged to place, in case of war, all their military forces at the disposal of the King of Prussia. The "matter of business," on which M. Rouher had counted, was henceforward out of the market; the line of the Main found itself free before it had been traced on the official map of Europe, and from the month of August, 1866, M. de Bismarck could count on the armed cooperation of all Germany.[98]

The military conventions with the States of the South were kept rigorously secret for a long time, and it was not till the spring of the following year that M. de Bismarck found it convenient to give them a crafty publicity in reply to the speech of the minister of state on the _three fragments_. Up to that time M. Benedetti had been ignorant of them, like other mortals, but he had shown himself more clear-sighted as regards another very grave event, contemporary with these conventions concluded with the South, and he recognized from the beginning the ominous bearing of the mission of General Manteuffel to St. Petersburg in the month of August, 1866. It must not be forgotten that at the bottom of the "new policy" which during this month they were flattering themselves with having inaugurated at the Tuileries by a cordial understanding with the court of Berlin, a Russian problem was agitating.

Would the monarchy of Brandenburg, "rendered sufficiently independent and sufficiently compact to loosen itself from its traditions, free henceforward from all solidarity," decide to break its secular and hitherto unrelaxed ties with the empire of the czars? That was the true and vital question of the future. "Prussia must have an alliance with a great Power," the minister of William I. did not cease to reiterate at this epoch; but, as Austria was destroyed, and England had long since condemned itself to widowhood, only France and Russia remained, between whom the lucky conqueror of Sadowa had then the position of the Don Juan of Mozart, between Dona Anna and Dona Elvira. Surprised in the darkness, imposed upon in a moment of deplorable misunderstanding, the proud and pa.s.sionate Dona Anna occasionally cast glances of defiance and _venganza_, oftener, alas! looks still ardent from the last embrace, and betraying the secret flame, which even said very plainly, that she would go still farther, provided there was reparation, provided that a marriage followed, if it was only a clandestine marriage. Russia was Dona Elvira, the former, the _legitimate_ ally a little vexed at recent neglect, even very gravely injured in family interests, but always loving, always fascinated, and only waiting for a kind word to forget all and to throw herself into the arms of the fickle one. We only speak briefly of Zerline, of Italy, a cunning and lively soubrette, intruding herself everywhere, in love, she also, the poor little thing, with the irresistible seducer, and often treated very cavalierly, happy, nevertheless, to be pinched privately, and to say that she also was "protected by a great lord."

Such being the situation in this decisive month, the amba.s.sador of France to the court of Berlin experienced a violent shock in learning one day of the sudden departure for St. Petersburg of General Manteuffel, the general-diplomat, more diplomat than general, the confidant, _par excellence_, of King William, and always the man for private missions. "I have asked M. de Bismarck," M. Benedetti hastened to write to Paris, "what I should think of this mission, confided to a general commanding troops in the campaign. After having pretended that he thought he had informed me of it, M. de Bismarck a.s.sured me that he had told M. de Goltz, in order that he might instruct you." Strictly speaking, one finds it natural that the king wished to plead before his imperial nephew the extenuating circ.u.mstances of a painful situation, which forced him to take the goods and the crowns of several very near relations of the House of Romanoff; but the French amba.s.sador was above all struck by the circ.u.mstance that the journey of M. de Manteuffel had been decided the day after he had delivered his project of the treaty.

"I asked the president of the council," he continues in the same dispatch, "if this general officer had been informed of our overture; he answered that he had had no occasion to make him a party to it, but that he could not guarantee to me that the king had not told him the substance. I should add, as I have told you by telegraph, that I gave a copy of our project to M. de Bismarck on Sunday morning, and that General Manteuffel, who had scarcely removed his head-quarters to Frankfort, was called to Berlin in the following night." Towards the end of the month of August, when M. de Bismarck for the first time showed his hesitation in signing the secret act concerning Belgium, M.

Benedetti wrote, in a letter to M. Rouher, concerning the mission that M. de Manteuffel continued to fill at St. Petersburg. "They have elsewhere obtained a.s.surances which dispense with our aid," said he; "if they decline our alliance, it is because they are already provided, or on the eve of being."[99]

General Manteuffel remained several weeks at St. Petersburg; he stayed there long enough to dissipate a certain sadness caused by the recent misfortunes of the Houses of Hanover, Ca.s.sel, Na.s.sau, etc., all allied by blood to the imperial family of Russia, also long enough to communicate such projects and show autographs by which they had treacherously endeavored to turn the Hohenzollern from his loyal, unalterable affection for his relative of the North. Thanks to all these proceedings, and all these attentions, the good harmony between the two courts became greater than ever; they easily explained the past, and arranged for the future, and the amba.s.sador of France at the court of Berlin was not deceived in designating, from this moment, the "bear,"

whose skin the general-diplomat had gone to sell on the banks of the Neva. To speak in the words of the Marquis La Marmora, it was a bear of the Balkans, which had not been well for a long time, and which the Emperor Nicholas had declared _sick_ twenty years before. One will see in the sequel that Alexander Mikhalovitch did not the less miss the deer at the general hunt in 1870, that he scarcely succeeded in getting for himself a handful of hair well fitted to adorn his helmet; that takes nothing from the merit of the perspicacity which the unfortunate negotiator of the _secret_ act concerning Belgium had given proof of on this occasion. M. Benedetti early foresaw the desolating truth, which, for M. Thiers, was not visible until very late, at the bottom of this _Russian box_ which M. de Bismarck allowed him one evening, at Versailles, to rummage with a liberality which was certainly not free from malice.

In endeavoring, after the great disaster of the campaign of Bohemia, to obtain from Prussia compensations first on the Rhine, then on the Meuse, the Emperor Napoleon III., in those months of July and August, 1866, had only facilitated for M. de Bismarck the two great political combinations which were since, in 1870, of such prodigious use: the armed cooperation of the Southern States, and the moral aid of Russia in case of a war with France. The chief fault, however, of the Napoleonic policy the day after Sadowa, was to have so well served Prussia in its desire to escape from all control on the part of Europe, and to have given its sanction from the very first to such an immense derangement of the equilibrium of the world, without the cause being brought before the areopagus of nations. This forgetfulness of the duties towards the great Christian family of states was only too quickly and too cruelly avenged, alas! and Prince Gortchakof, in 1870, only followed a recent and lamentable example in allowing France and Germany to decide their quarrel in the lists, in hindering all common action of the Powers, all European concert. "I see no Europe!" cried M. de Beust, in 1870, in a celebrated dispatch, and no one thought of disputing this dolorous affirmation. A few only observed with sadness that the eclipse had already lasted several years, that it dated from the preliminaries of Nikolsburg and from the treaty of Prague.

FOOTNOTES:

[76] This detail, as well as those which follow, are taken from the narration made by M. Thiers himself, some days later, to the diocese of Orleans, and gathered together by M. A. Boucher in his interesting _Story of the Invasion_ (Orleans, 1871), pp. 318-325.

[77] "He (M. de Bismarck) only goes out accompanied, and agents of French police will come as far as the frontier to follow him during the whole journey," announced M. de Barral from Berlin, the 1st June, 1866, three days after the a.s.sault by Blind. M. Jules Favre (_History of the Government of the National Defense_, vol. i. p. 163-164) speaks of the uneasiness manifested by the minister of William I. at the interview at the castle of _Haute-Maison_, at Montry: "We are very badly off here; your _Franc-tireurs_ can take aim at me through the windows." One can also recall the language of the German chancellor in the Prussian chambers concerning the a.s.sault by Kulmann.

[78] According to the a.n.a.lysis of Lord Lyons, to whom M. de Chaudordy communicated this telegram.--Dispatch of Lord Lyons, of the 6th October, 1870. It is curious to compare with this singular telegram of M. Thiers the opinion expressed by Prince Gortchakof before the English amba.s.sador, "that the conditions indicated in the circular of M. de Bismarck of the 16th September could only be modified by military events, and that nothing authorized such a conjecture."--Dispatch of Sir A. Buchanan of the 17th October. Now the conditions indicated in the Prussian circular of the 16th September were already _Alsace and Metz_.

[79] Confidential note of M. Magne for the emperor.--_Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 240.

[80] The letter addressed to the minister of France at the Hague and placed under the eyes of the emperor, was re-found at the Tuileries after the 4th September.--_Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 14.

[81] This, however, was only a short desire on the part of Prince Gortchakof, a design without consequence, and of which we find the only authentic trace in an obscure phrase of a dispatch of the French amba.s.sador at Berlin. Vide Benedetti, _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 226.

[82] Dispatch in cipher intercepted by the Austrians and published in connection with the war of 1866 by the Austrian staff.

[83] _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. ii. pp.

225, 228. The editors pretend that this letter was addressed to M. de Moustier, which is entirely erroneous, M. de Moustier being then at Constantinople. We are inclined to believe that the receiver was M.

Conti, who had accompanied the emperor to Vichy. It will be remembered that Napoleon III., very unwell and suffering during this whole epoch, had gone the 27th July to Vichy, where M. Drouyn de Lhuys went to see him for a short time; the chief of the state could not, however, prolong his sojourn in the watering-place, and returned to Paris on the 8th August.

[84] "For some time it has been too often said that France _is not ready_."--Confidential note of M. Magne of the 20th July (_Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. p. 241). M. de Goltz had early discovered this secret, and had not ceased to recommend to M. de Bismarck a firm att.i.tude as regarded France.

[85] _My Mission in Prussia_, pp. 171-172. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had already obtained from Austria the cession, in any case, of Venetia, insisted at this moment more strongly than ever that they should also take pledges in advance from Prussia, "the most formidable, the most active of the parties." M. Benedetti did not cease to oppose such a proceeding, fearing that Prussia would renounce in this case all idea of war against Austria, and this dispatch of the 8th July was in reality only a new plea in favor of the _laisser-aller_ without conditions which should be granted to M. de Bismarck.

[86] Benedetti, _My Mission in Prussia_, pp. 177 and 178. _Moniteur prussien_ (_Reichsanzeiger_) of the 21st October, 1871.

[87] _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 181. This a.s.sertion of M. Benedetti is fully confirmed by the note found among the papers of the Tuileries, of which we will speak farther on.

[88] "Prussia will disregard what justice and foresight demand, and will give us at the same time the measure of its ingrat.i.tude, if it refuses us the guarantees which the extension of its frontiers obliges us to claim."--Dispatch of M. Benedetti, the 5th August, 1866, found at the castle of Cercay among the papers of M. Rouher, and published in the _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871. Towards the same epoch, they spoke also of the ingrat.i.tude of Italy. "The unjustifiable ingrat.i.tude of Italy irritates the calmest minds," wrote M. Magne in his confidential note by order of the emperor, dated the 20th July. The cabinet of Florence in truth created in France at this moment unheard of embarra.s.sments by susceptibilities and demands which, to say the least, were very ill-timed. After having been beaten on land and sea, at Custozza and at Lissa, and having received as a recompense the magnificent gift of Venetia, the Italians made pretensions to Tyrol!

There was even an instant when the emperor thought "of renouncing the fatal gift made him, and of declaring, by an official act, that he gave back to Austria its parole." See the curious note of M. Rouher written by order of the emperor, _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. ii. pp. 229 and 23.

[89] La Marmora, _Un po piu di luce_, p. 117. Report of General Govone, 3d June, 1866. _Ibid._ p. 275.

[90] "All the efforts which he (M. de Bismarck) has without cessation made to bring about an agreement with us prove sufficiently that, in his opinion, it was essential to indemnify France."--_My Mission in Prussia_, p. 192. Thus thought the ex-amba.s.sador of France, even in 1871!

[91] _Papers and Correspondence of the Imperial Family_, vol. i. pp. 16, 17. The editors thought that they recognized in this note the handwriting of M. Conti, chief of the emperor's cabinet.

[92] "On my departure from Paris, towards the middle of August," says M.

Benedetti, in his book, _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 194, "M. Drouyn de Lhuys had offered his resignation, and I supposed that his successor would be M. Moustier, who was then amba.s.sador at Constantinople. At this moment there was no minister of foreign affairs. In this state of things, I thought it _proper_ to address to the minister of state, M.

Rouher, the letter in which I announced my interview with M. de Bismarck, and which accompanied the plan of treaty relative to Belgium."

M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not tendered his resignation towards the middle of August; right or wrong, he believed at this epoch that he was "doing an act of honesty and disinterestedness in remaining," and his portfolio was not taken from him till 1st September, 1866. Up to that date M.

Drouyn de Lhuys had not ceased to direct the department; the amba.s.sador himself quotes in his book several dispatches exchanged with him, on grave questions, dated 21st and 25th August (pp. 204, 223), and M.

Benedetti has singular ideas on the hierarchical duties, believing that it is _proper_ for an agent to evade the control of his immediate chief in view of his near retirement. The conclusion of the pa.s.sage quoted in the book of M. Benedetti is not less curious: "M. Rouher," says he, "has not laid before the ministry, having never taken the direction of it, the correspondence which I, during several days, exchanged with him. If I gave it here, I should not know how to refer the reader, that he might verify the text of it, to the depot of the archives, as I am authorized to do with all the doc.u.ments which I put before his eyes." What of that?

Once decided to make revelations, M. Benedetti could have well produced this correspondence with M. Rouher on such a disputed subject, while conscientiously warning the reader that he could not find the originals at the depot of the archives. (It is known that the originals were seized by the Prussians, with a great number of other important doc.u.ments, in the castle of M. Rouher, at Cercay.) While throwing "a little more light" on all the unnatural obscurities, let us also observe that it is wrongfully, but with a design easy to divine, that the celebrated circular of M. de Bismarck, of the 29th July, 1870 (at the beginning of the war), had a.s.signed to this plan of the secret treaty concerning Belgium a much later date, the year 1867, the epoch after the arrangement of the affair of Luxemburg. This allegation does not withstand a first examination and a simple comparison of the parts delivered to the public. The shadowy negotiation on the subject of Belgium was held in the second half of the month of August, 1866, as M.

Benedetti says.

[93] The _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871, gives (from the doc.u.ments seized at Cercay) extracts from the instructions sent from Paris the 16th August to M. Benedetti concerning the secret treaty. A pa.s.sage from these instructions contains "the designation of the persons to whom this negotiation was to be confined."

[94] Quoted from the circular of M. de La Valette of the 16th September, 1862.

[95] These details, as well as those which follow, are taken from the papers seized at Cercay and published in the _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871.

[96] The two plans of the treaties have since been published by the Prussian journals of the 29th July and 8th August, 1870. The Prussian government is now in possession of two French autographs of the plan concerning Belgium; the one which M. Benedetti left with M. de Bismarck in the month of August, 1866, the other likewise from the hand of M.

Benedetti, with marginal notes by Napoleon III. and M. Rouher; this latter doc.u.ment was seized at Cercay. For the description and other details, see the _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871, and the article from the _North German Gazette_ on the subject of the affair La Marmora.

[97] Private letter from M. Benedetti to the Duke of Gramont, dated 22d August, 1866. _My Mission in Prussia_, p. 192.

[98] Albert Sorel, _Diplomatic History of the Franco-German War_, vol.

i. pp. 29, 30.

[99] Papers seized at Cercay, _Moniteur prussien_ of the 21st October, 1871.

V.

ORIENT AND OCCIDENT.

I.

"They have provided themselves elsewhere," the French amba.s.sador at the court of William I. sadly wrote, in the last days of the month of August, 1866, on seeing Prussia so brusquely break off the _dilatory negotiations_ concerning Belgium; and it is just to add that he has never since ceased to clearly appreciate the situation, and to keep his country constantly on its guard as regards the confidential harmony and absolute agreement between the two courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg after the mission of General Manteuffel. If he nevertheless endeavored for some time to obtain a compensation for his country,--a very modest one, it is true, and consonant with the new fortune of France,--if, during the first months of the year 1867, he particularly flattered himself with obtaining from the kindness of M. de Bismarck the permission to buy Luxemburg from the King of Holland, if he even once went so far, during a hasty journey to Paris, as to affirm, in a confidential conversation, that he already had the fortress of Alzette "in his pocket," it was not that he thought it possible to return to the beautiful dream of the head-quarters of Brunn, and to effect that "necessary and fruitful alliance with Prussia" with which at a certain moment some sanguine minds on the banks of the Seine had been deluded.

He was only persuaded that the conqueror of Sadowa would not envy France this paltry atonement of Luxemburg, that he would even find it worth while to "indemnify" the Emperor Napoleon III. so cheaply, so that, in the words of the poet, "the lion would only gape before such a little morsel." The lion roared, however, shook his mane with fury, and signified harshly that it had done forever with any _politique de pour-boire_. But even this only confirmed M. Benedetti in the opinion that they had provided themselves elsewhere, and that henceforward they were on the verge of great trouble. He thought rightly that M. de Bismarck must be very sure of the support, in any case, of his former colleague of Frankfort, to refuse to France even this moderate prize (_aubaine_), and to give it on this occasion "the measure of its ingrat.i.tude."

At the same time with the affair of Luxemburg, the events in Crete showed in their turn to the cabinets of Vienna and the Tuileries how far Prince Gortchakof was already pledged to M. de Bismarck, and how resolved to sacrifice to his friendship with Prussia the most brilliant prospects. Whoever reads attentively the curious exchange of notes which the troubles of Crete had caused, will see that, during the entire epoch from the month of November, 1866, to the month of March, 1867, the two governments of Austria and France had sought to sound the designs of the court of St. Petersburg, and to make very significant advances to it.