Twenty Years of Congress Volume Ii Part 18

--Mr. Scofield of Pennsylvania asked if the legal-tender notes were not, upon their face, payable on demand.

--Mr. Allison of Iowa insisted that "the Secretary of the Treasury does not propose to return to specie payments immediately, but he expresses the opinion that the reduction of greenbacks by the sum of one hundred million dollars will secure that result."

--Mr. Boutwell of Ma.s.sachusetts was content to try the experiment of converting the interest-bearing obligations into long bonds, but was unwilling to go farther.

--Mr. Sloan of Wisconsin proposed an amendment to make "bonds and all other obligations of the United States hereafter issued payable in lawful money," but the suggestion met with no favor.

--Mr. Roscoe Conkling maintained that "in the first place, the Secretary of the Treasury has now the power, under the Act of March 3, 1865, to exchange any securities of the Government which bear interest for any other securities which bear interest. In the second place, he has the power to call in, to cancel, to annihilate, so that it shall never go out again, every particle of currency issued prior to June 30,1864; and the truth is, that substantially if not literally the whole of the currency was issued previous to that time." . . .

"Only one power," said Mr. Conkling, "remains to be conferred upon him; and that is, the power to put his bonds upon the market when he pleases, where he pleases, as he pleases, sell them for money, and with that money purchase the outstanding obligations of the Government."

--Mr. Garfield argued that "under existing law, the Secretary can issue compound-interest notes and 7-30 bonds to meet current indebtedness; but these are the most expensive forms of government obligations, and therefore he ought not to use the power." He thought the proposed bill was necessary in the interest of the Government. He would "trust the Secretary to proceed cautiously in the path required by honor, to place our currency on a sound basis. . . . We have travelled one-third of the way since Congress met. Gold was then 148.

It is now 130. Defeat this bill, and there will be a jubilee on Wall Street."

--Mr. Lawrence of Ohio opposed the bill, and presented a letter from Mr. Freeman Clarke, then Comptroller of the Currency, saying, "We have full power to fund every dollar of the floating debt without any legislation, and with no occasion for making any loan whatever."

--Mr. Morrill closed debate on the 16th of March; and the bill coming to a vote, was defeated,--_ayes_ 65; _noes_ 70. But on a motion to reconsider, it was again brought before the House on the 19th of March, and after brief debate was recommitted. When it re-appeared, four days later, it contained a _proviso_ "that the Secretary of the Treasury shall not retire more than ten million dollars of legal-tender notes in the first six months after the pa.s.sage of the Act, and not more than four million dollars a month afterwards; and shall make a report to Congress of his action under this provision." Mr. Morrill submitted a letter from Mr. McCulloch, expressing the opinion that "it will be a national calamity if Congress shall fail to grant additional powers to the Secretary." He added, that "the apprehension which exists, that if power is given to the Secretary to retire legal-tender notes the circulation will be ruinously contracted, is without any special foundation." The effect of the discussion was to strengthen the bill in the House where it was pa.s.sed by _ayes_ 83; _noes_ 53.

The bill was favorably reported to the Senate from the Finance Committee, and came up for consideration on the 9th of April, under the charge of Mr. Fessenden.

--Mr. Sherman re-affirmed the objections made in the House, that the power conferred was greater than had ever been granted to any Secretary of the Treasury since the foundation of the Government. "The power,"

said he, "is absolute. The Secretary may sell securities of any form at any time and fund the whole debt. No present necessity exists for such grant of authority. The _proviso_ for restricting contraction is not adequate for that purpose. By retaining a large balance in the Treasury, the Secretary can contract the currency without violating the _proviso_." He deemed it unwise "to place in the hands of any mortal man this absolute and extreme control over the currency."

--Mr. Fessenden said the true principle of this bill was, "that as soon as it can be done with safety, Congress means that we shall get back to the old system of specie payments. That is about all there is of it. The effect of rejecting the measure will be to say to everybody that the Government intends to keep depreciated paper in the financial market."

--Mr. Chandler of Michigan believed the measure "to be evil, and evil only; containing dangerous powers which should not be conferred, and which no man should be willing to accept." Mr. Howe of Wisconsin agreed with him.

--Mr. Guthrie of Kentucky (Secretary of the Treasury under President Pierce) p.r.o.nounced it "necessary and proper to give this power to the Secretary." And Mr. Morgan of New York, agreeing with him, declared that he desired the bill "just as it is."

--An amendment to strike out the words authorizing the sale of the bonds elsewhere than in the United States was overwhelmingly defeated, _ayes_ 7, _noes_ 35. The bill was then pa.s.sed by _ayes_ 32, _noes_ 7, and by the President's signature became a law on the 12th of April, 1866.

The discussion of this important financial measure ill.u.s.trates the various phases of opinion prevailing both in Congress and in the country. The desire to return to a specie basis was general, and yet not a few clung to the legal-tender notes as a permanent and standard currency. While the argument in favor of contraction was prosecuted with great force, the possibility of going too fast, even in the right direction, was conceded by the wisest financiers. The natural disinclination of the American people to entrust unrestricted power to any officer was frequently and forcibly expressed. The policy of funding the obligations bearing interest was admitted on all hands, and for this purpose the sale as well as the direct exchange of bonds was approved. But the repugnance to accepting less than par, or allowing the possibility of such a rate, had its origin and support in the patriotic instincts and in the sound judgment of the people. The requirement of a report from the Secretary and the limitation of the extent of contraction, were the essential changes which made the measure acceptable.

The enactment of this bill presents in an instructive light the character of our financial legislation and the methods by which it is accomplished. As originally presented the bill had the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury and came before the House with the favorable report of the Committee on Ways and Means. Yet it had no such standing as in the British Parliament is given to a financial project of the Government. There, such a proposition would be definitely framed at the Treasury, and its details would be elaborated when first presented.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer would state the full character of the measure and the reasons for asking its adoption. Opposition or question would be expected only from the benches of the rival party.

Here, on the other hand, after the House, using its own judgment, had modified the bill, criticism and hostility came from the Treasury that had originally proposed it. Several prominent members of the dominant party were p.r.o.nounced in opposition. Saved by parliamentary strategy when once defeated, the bill was started into new life by the adoption of restrictions upon the power and the action of the Secretary of the Treasury. These restrictions were shown to be necessary in the progress of the debate. Individual judgment a.s.serted itself and the Act became the harmonious resultant of the conflicting opinions of the entire House.

Congress therefore did not enact anybody's theory. It put into the statute the prudent, cautious sense of the people. Recognizing the principle of funding the floating obligations, and of contraction as a means to resumption, Congress only responded to the common sense of its great const.i.tuency, in forbidding reckless haste, and in defining the rate of speed. The purpose of keeping in Congress the control of the rate of contraction was only a part of the general determination that the representatives of the people and of the States shall prescribe the methods of conduct as well as the principles and broad measures of administration. Every Government finds by practice the system of legislation and administration best adapted to its own wants.

While ministerial power and a trained following, such as obtain in England, may possess advantages under the circ.u.mstances existing in the British Empire, it is the settled judgment of this country that a perfectly free discussion, enlightened but not restrained by departmental recommendation or by dictation of committees, is best adapted to the varied and conflicting wants of the whole people. And this was never better ill.u.s.trated than in the financial bill whose important provisions have been under consideration.

The revenue laws received careful attention during this session. The chief measure was the Act of July 13, 1866. It came before the House with the a.s.surance from the Ways and Means Committee that it would steadily and materially reduce internal taxes. The system of internal revenue which had been so elaborately and intelligently constructed for war purposes, yielded $310,906,984 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1866. Reduction were now made in the taxes on several hundred articles of manufacture, on savings banks, on the gross receipts of certain corporations; and the income tax was in some degree mitigated.

The total reductions were estimated at $75,684,000, but an increase was proposed on raw cotton amounting to nearly one-third of this sum.

Prolonged discussion arose over this tax and resulted in a disagreement between the two Houses. The bill was finally perfected in a conference committee and ended by reducing the total internal revenue to $265,920,474 per annum--with all allowance made for the growth of the country and the elasticity of Government receipts.

Not satisfied with the large reduction of taxes made at the first session after the close of the war, Congress resumed the subject at the second session. Early in February, 1867, Mr. Morrill, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported a bill for the further reduction of taxes, which became a law on the 2d of March. The taxes removed were returning a yearly revenue of more than $36,000,000 to the National Treasury. The princ.i.p.al reductions were $19,500,000 from the income tax; $4,000,000 from clothing; $3,500,000 from woolens; $3,250,000 from leather; $1,000,000 from engines; $600,000 from sugar-refiners; $600,000 from tinware; $500,000 from castings; $500,000 from doors, sashes and blinds; with many others yielding less sums.

All these formed a part of what were termed war taxes, and the steady purpose of Congress was to remove them as rapidly as the obligations of the Treasury would permit. As matter of fact they were removed long before such action was expected by the people, and before the special interests subjected to the burden had time to pet.i.tion for relief or even to complain of hardship.

During the winter of 1866-67 there was a prolonged discussion in Congress over an Act finally pa.s.sed March 2, 1867, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to exchange three per cent certificates of indebtedness for compound-interest notes, and allowing these certificates to be counted as a part of the reserve of National Banks.

The first proposition was to allow interest at 3-65/100 per cent. The exchange of notes not bearing interest for those bearing compound interest was proposed by Mr. Stevens, and at first supported by a majority, but on reconsideration it was defeated. Objections was made to the bill that it was a scheme for giving to the banks interest on their reserves, which they could not otherwise receive when the compound-interest notes should be retired. Of these notes the banks held $90,000,000 and the limit proposed for the certificates was $100,000,000. Congress finally limited the amount of certificates to $50,000,000 at three per cent, and allowed them to stand for two-fifths of the reserve of any bank.

While this arrangement was an obvious advantage to the National banks, no such motive inspired Congress in pa.s.sing the bill. Quite another object was aimed at in its enactment. The influence of contraction, which had gone into operation by the Act of the preceding summer, was already felt in the business of the country. The real significance of the Act just pa.s.sed was that to a certain degree it checked and even neutralized the operation of the statute which ordered contraction. The compound-interest notes served the National banks as a part of their reserve, and as rapidly as they were cancelled, legal-tender notes were to be held in their stead. Their withdrawal from circulation for this purpose led therefore to a direct and forcible contraction of the actual currency of the country. By subst.i.tuting the certificates of indebtedness as available for reserve this contraction was prevented, and by the concession of interest, even at three per cent, the banks were induced to surrender the securities which cost the Government a higher rate. The limit of these certificates was subsequently raised to $75,000,000,--a limit which in fact was often reached,--but as legal-tenders were needed the certificates were surrendered to the Treasury.

This is substantially the history of contraction, or of attempts at contraction made by the Thirty-ninth Congress. The successful effort to parry its effect, as already described, shows how unwelcome it had proved to the business community, and how Congress, without resorting at once to an absolute repeal of the act, sought an indirect mode of neutralizing its effect. Mr. McCulloch, in trying to enforce the policy of contraction, represented an apparently consistent theory in finance; but the great host of debtors who did not wish their obligation to be made more onerous, and the great host of creditors who did not desire that their debtors should be embarra.s.sed and possibly rendered unable to liquidate, united on the practical side of the question and aroused public opinion against the course of the Treasury Department. An individual, by an effort of will, can bring himself to endure present inconvenience and even suffering, for a great good that lies beyond, but it was difficult for forty millions of people to adopt this resolve. Nor were the cases quite similar in motive and influence, for although it might be admitted that the entire nation would be benefitted by the ultimate result, the people knew that the process would bring embarra.s.sment to vast numbers and would reduce not a few to bankruptcy and ruin. It was easy to see, therefore, that as each month the degree of contraction was made public, the people more and more attributed their financial troubles to its operation.

Perhaps, in large degree, this was the result of imagination, and of that common desire in human nature to ascribe one's faults and misfortunes to some superior power. The effect nevertheless was serious and lasting. In the end, outside of banking and financial centres, there was a strong and persistent demand for the repeal of the Contraction Act.

The process of funding and paying the National debt, and of contracting the currency, went on with vigor and persistency during the summer and autumn of 1867. The Treasury statements for the year showed that up to November 1, 1867, the long obligations of the Government had been increased to $1,781,462,050; while the short obligations, other than currency, had been reduced to $441,655,120.63, and the currency in greenbacks, fractional notes and certificates of deposit for gold, to $402,385,677.39. The Treasury held $133,998,398.02; so that the National debt, less this cash, stood at $2,491,504,450. It thus exhibited an average reduction of the debt from its maximum, August 31, 1865, to November 1, 1867, of more than $10,000,000 per month.

Gold was lower than it had been, but great disappointment was felt because the premium, which had ranged in January, 1867, at 32-1/8 @ 37-7/8, was in November 37 @ 48-5/8, and the latter figure was higher than the quotation at the beginning of the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress. The charge was current, and was believed by many, that the premium had been advanced by speculators to compel Congress to enforce the policy of contraction. On the other hand, it was declared to be demonstrably true that the reduction of the volume of paper did not lower the premium on gold. It only depressed production and placed the markets of every kind under the control of reckless operators. Surely, it was argued, the contraction had been severe enough to satisfy the advocates of the most stringent Procrustean policy. The short obligations had been cut down nearly one-half since January, 1866. If account were taken of compound-interest notes the reduction in currency ought to be reckoned at $100,000,000, and even at twice that sum, since the cash held by the Treasury had been taken from the circulation of the country.

The Secretary of the Treasury still adhered to the policy of contraction, and yet was charged with putting into circulation legal-tender notes that had been once withdrawn, in order to affect the market. Thus in August, 1866, between the 8th and the 23d inclusive, he had withdrawn and destroyed $12,530,111, and of the 31st of that month he issued $12,500,000. He had again in October, 1866, cancelled $500,000 on the 24th, and issued anew the same sum on the 25th. On the 31st of January, 1867, he had issued anew $4,000,000, May 31 $2,500,000, and during December, 1867, $1,842,400. In answer to remonstrance against this practice the Secretary maintained that the authority to contract and to cancel the legal-tender notes did not require him to do it, but left it within his discretion. This was unquestionably the law of the case.

Mr. McCulloch in his official report insisted on the funding or payment of the balance of interest-bearing notes, and upon a continued contraction of the currency, as the first measure for promoting the National prosperity; and he presented a strong argument in favor of permanent specie payment. He reported that he had not always retired notes in each month to the extent permitted, but he declared that the effect of the policy as carried out had been salutary and that its continuation would be obviously wise. Yet he feared that financial views were inculcated, which if not corrected might lead to its abandonment. The truth was that the Secretary's policy was counter to the popular wish, and evidence was acc.u.mulating that Congress would not sustain him in its continued enforcement. The Secretary had confidently relied upon the bankers and commercial men of the country; but the serious fact was now developed, that many of the most prudent financiers had concluded that the changes in the volume of the currency were causing mischief, and that the process of contraction had been carried as far as was desirable.

The Secretary argued bravely and wisely in his report, in favor of paying the princ.i.p.al and interest of the Government bonds in coin.

His argument was designed to meet heresies which had found favor in unexpected quarters. The plea was urged by the new and short-lived school of finance that the notes of the National banks should be withdrawn and greenbacks subst.i.tuted for them, that all payments by the Government on the princ.i.p.al of the bonds should be in its own paper.

It was admitted by these novel theorists that the bonds on their face promised coin for interest; but they maintained that the bonds had been issued in large part when gold was at a heavy premium for paper, and could rightfully be liquidated in paper at its advanced value.

Propositions were frequently presented to stop the issue of bonds and to pay out notes for any obligations of the Government offered at the Treasury on becoming due in any form. The pressure of rapid contraction secured a hearing for every extravagant proposition.

Prejudice against speculators in gold, who during the war had grown rich on the disasters of the Union, was added to the discussion, especially while the premium was maintained and the National credit charged with odium on its account.

At the opening of the second session of the Fortieth Congress (December, 1867) numerous resolutions and bills demanding the stoppage of contraction were referred to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Five days afterwards Mr. Schenck reported a bill of four lines, by which the "further reduction of the currency by retiring and cancelling United-States notes is prohibited." It had the unanimous approval of the Committee on Ways and Means, and was pa.s.sed by the House,--_ayes_ 127, _noes_ 32. The minority included a goodly number of leading Republicans. In the Senate Mr. Sherman, in supporting the bill, stated the amount of contraction since August 1, 1866, at $140,122,168. He argued from these figures that "contraction should go no farther while industry is in a measure paralyzed, and that Congress ought to resume control of the currency, which should not be delegated to any single officer." He declared that the measure was entirely preliminary to other legislation, "which must include the banking system, the time and manner of resuming specie payments, the payment of the debt and the kind of money in which it may be paid, and the reduction of expenditures and taxes." Debate was somewhat prolonged, and a conference committee gave final form to the measure, which failed to receive the President's signature, but became a law without it. It is known as the "Act of February 4, 1868, prohibiting any further reduction of the currency, and authorizing the replacing of mutilated notes." By this Act the minimum limit of legal-tender notes was fixed at $356,000,00,--the volume then afloat after Mr. McCulloch's policy of contraction had done its work.

The actual legislation of the second session of the Fortieth Congress included also the repeal of the tax on raw cotton, and the further reduction of internal revenue, by the Acts of March 31 and July 20 (1868). Great relief was given to manufactures by the abolition of the five per cent tax on a variety of products. The surrender of revenue was estimated at $23,000,000 on cotton at $45,000,000 on manufactures. These concessions were much needed, for the producers of cotton were crippled by the condition of their States, and manufacturers found that prices did not justify the payment of these war charges.

In his annual message to Congress in December, 1868, President Johnson argued "that the holders of our securities have already received upon their bonds a larger amount than their original investments, measured by the gold standard. Upon this statement of fact it would seem but just and equitable that the six per cent interest now paid by the Government should be applied to the reduction of the princ.i.p.al, in semi-annual installments, which in sixteen years and eight months would liquidate the entire National debt." This bold and shameless advocacy of repudiation was less mischievous than it would have been if Mr.

Johnson had held a longer lease of power, and if the people had not in the Presidential election p.r.o.nounced so clear and positive a verdict in favor of the maintenance of the National credit. The Senate deemed it worth while to put on record a resolution condemning this part of Mr. Johnson's message. Mr. Hendricks of Indiana moved a subst.i.tute indorsing the statement in the message, and closing with the words of the Democratic National Convention in favor of paying the bonds in _lawful_ money. Only seven senators supported his subst.i.tute, while forty-five opposed it; and President Johnson's proposal for repudiation was, by the action of the Senate, "utterly disapproved and condemned,"

--_ayes_ 43, _noes_ 6. In the House of Representatives a similar resolution was pa.s.sed by a vote of 155 _ayes_ to 6 _noes_, 60 not voting. No Democratic member in that body seemed willing to a.s.sume the objectionable position taken by Mr. Hendricks in the Senate, and a declaration "that all forms of repudiation are odious to the American people" was adopted without a division.

The financial achievement of the National Government herein reviewed, for the four years following the war, may be briefly summarized. The National debt was reduced by the sum of nearly $300,000,000, while at the same time the Government reduced its revenue to the amount of $140,000,000 per annum by the repeal of a long series of internal taxes. During this period more than $35,000,000 had been paid from the Treasury towards the construction of the Union and Central Pacific Railroads, and $7,200,000 was paid to the Russian Government on account of the purchase of the Territory of Alaska. It is also to be noted that within this period were embraced all the expenses incident to the disbandment of the Union army, and also a very large addition to the pension-list. Notwithstanding all these enormous expenditures the business interests of the country continued prosperous, and the fact that so large a reduction had been made in internal taxes gave promise that within a comparatively short period the Government would be able to remove all levies that were in any degree oppressive or even vexatious to private interests.

By reason of his official and personal connection with the President, Mr. McCulloch had failed to secure cordial support from Congress, and had moreover given offense by his obvious sympathy with the free-traders, who were already beginning to a.s.sault the protective tariff which the necessities of war had led the country to adopt. The Secretary had also gone far beyond the popular wish and the best business judgment of the country in regard to the rapid contraction of the currency. But while his politics and his policies were not acceptable to Congress or to the people, he is ent.i.tled to high credit for his direct, honest, intelligent administration of the Treasury Department. In the peculiar embarra.s.sments to the administration of the Government, caused by the course of President Johnson, it was a matter of sincere congratulation that a Secretary of the Treasury, so competent and trustworthy as Mr. McCulloch had approved himself, was firmly in place before the serious political disturbances began--a congratulation in which his most ardent Republican opponents were ready to join, knowing how fatal it might prove if President Johnson had the opportunity to nominate his successor.

Throughout the more difficult period of his administration of the department, Mr. McCulloch was aided by two most intelligent and efficient officers. Mr. William E. Chandler, though only twenty-nine years of age, was appointed First a.s.sistant Secretary in March, 1865, and exhibited great apt.i.tude, discrimination, and ability in his position. He developed an admirable talent for details, a quick insight into the most difficult problems that came before the Department, and at all times an honorable devotion to public duty. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, the most important of the Treasury Department, was under the direction of another citizen of New Hampshire, Edward Ashton Rollins. The Bureau for a time collected more than half the revenue of the United States, and required in its Commissioner integrity, administrative talent, and singular skill in providing against every form of fraud. No department of the Government had to contend against so many corrupt combinations to rob the Government, and the slightest relaxation of vigilance on the part of the Commissioner might involve at any time a loss of millions to the National Treasury. In the complex and difficult duties of this station, Mr. Rollins proved himself equal to every requirement.

The purchase of Alaska was completed by the Act of July 27, 1868, which appropriated the amount agreed upon in the treaty of March 30, 1867,-- negotiated by Mr. Seward on behalf of the United States, and by Baron Stoeckl representing the Emperor of all the Russias. The Russian Government had initiated the matter, and desired to sell much more earnestly than the United States desired to buy. There is little doubt that a like offer from any other European government would have been rejected. The pressure of our financial troubles, the fact that gold was still at a high premium, suggested the absolute necessity of economy in every form in which it could be exercised; and in the general judgment of the people the last thing we needed was additional territory. There was, however, a feeling of marked kindliness towards Russia; and this, no doubt, had great weight with Mr. Seward when he a.s.sented to the obvious wishes of that government. But while there was no special difficulty in securing the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, a more serious question arose when the House was asked to appropriate the necessary amount to fulfill the obligation. Seven million two hundred thousand dollars in gold represented at that time more than ten million dollars in the currency of the Government; and many Republicans felt, on the eve, or rather in the midst, of a Presidential canva.s.s, that it was a hazardous political step (deeply in debt as the Government was, and with its paper still at a heavy discount) to embark in the speculation of acquiring a vast area of "rocks and ice," as Alaska was termed in the popular and derisive description of Mr. Seward's purchase.

When the bill came before the House, General Banks, as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, urged the appropriation with great earnestness, not merely because of the obligation imposed upon the Government by the treaty, which he ably presented; not merely by reason of the intrinsic value of the territory, which he abundantly demonstrated; but especially on account of the fact that Russia was the other party to the treaty, and had for nearly a century shown a most cordial disposition towards the United States. General Banks maintained that at every step of our history, from 1786 to the moment when he was speaking, Russia had been our friend. "In the darkest hour of our peril," said he, "during the Rebellion, when we were enacting a history which no man yet thoroughly comprehends, when France and England were contemplating the recognition of the Confederacy, the whole world was thrilled by the appearance in San Francisco of a fleet of Russian war vessels, and nearly at the same time, whether by accident or design, a second Russian fleet appeared in the harbor of New York. Who knew how many more there were on their voyage here?

From that hour France, on the one hand, and England on the other, receded, and the American Government regained its position and its power. . . . Now, shall we flout the Russian Government in every court in Europe for her friendship? Whoever of the representatives of the American people in this House, on this question, turns his back, not only upon his duty, but upon the friends of his country, upon the Const.i.tution of his Government, and the honor of his generation, cannot long remain in power."

Mr. Cadwalader C. Washburn answered the speech of General Banks on the succeeding day (July 1, 1868). He a.s.sumed the leadership of the opposition to the treaty. He proposed to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the House five distinct propositions: "_First_, that at the time the treaty for Alaska was negotiated, not a soul in the whole United States asked for it; _second_, that it was secretly negotiated, and in a manner to prevent the representatives of the people from being heard; _third_, that by existing treaties we possess every right that is of any value to us, without the responsibility and never-ending expense of governing a nation of savages; _fourth_, that the country ceded is absolutely without value; _fifth_, that it is the right and duty of the House to inquire into the treaty, and to vote or not vote the money, according to its best judgment." Mr. Washburn made an able speech in support of his radical propositions.

General Butler sustained Mr. Washburn's position in a characteristic speech, especially answering General Banks's argument that we should pay this amount from a spirit of friendship for Russia. "If," said General Butler, "we are to pay this price as usury on the friendship of Russia, we are paying for it very dear indeed. If we are to pay for her friendship, I desire to give her the seven million two hundred thousand dollars in cash, and let her keep Alaska, because I think it may be a small sum to give for the friendship if we could only get rid of the land, or rather the ice, which we are to get by paying for it." He maintained that it was in evidence before the House officially, "that for ten years the entire product of the whole country of Alaska did not exceed three million dollars."

--Mr. Peters of Maine p.r.o.nounced the territory "intrinsically valueless; the conclusive proof of which is found in the fact that Russia is willing to sell it." He criticised the action of the Senate in negotiating the treaty. "If the treaty-making power can buy, they can sell. If they can buy land with money, they can buy money with land. If they can buy a part of a country, they can buy the whole of a country. If they can sell a part of our country, they can sell the whole of it!"

--Mr. Spalding of Ohio, on the other hand, maintained that "notwithstanding all the sneers that have been cast on Alaska, if it could be sold again, individuals would take it off our hand and pay us two or three millions for the bargain."

--General Schenck thought the purchase in itself highly objectionable, but was "willing to vote the money because the treaty has been made with a friendly power; one of those that stood by us,--almost the only one that stood by us when all the rest of the powers of the world seemed to be turning away from us in our recent troubles."