Their Finest Hour Part 7

It is of the utmost importance to find some projectile which can be fired from a rifle at a tank, like a rifle grenade, or from an anti-tank rifle, like a trench-mortar bomb. The "sticky" bomb seems to be useful for the first of these, but perhaps this is not so. Anyhow, concentrate attention upon finding something that can be fired from anti-tank rifles or from ordinary rifles.

I pressed the matter hard.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

16.VI.40.

Who is responsible for making the "sticky" bomb? I am told that a great sloth is being shown in pressing this forward. Ask General Carr to report today upon the position, and to let me have on one sheet of paper the back history of the subject from the moment when the question was first raised.The matter is to be pressed forward from day to day, and I wish to receive a report every three days.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.VI.40.

I minuted some days ago about the "sticky" bombs. All preparations for manufacture should proceed in antic.i.p.ation that the further trials will be successful. Let me have a time-table showing why it is that delay has crept into all this process which is so urgent.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

24.VI.40.

I understand that the trials were not entirely successful and the bomb failed to stick on tanks which were covered with dust and mud. No doubt some more sticky mixture can be devised, and Major Jefferis should persevere.Any chortling by officials, who have been slothful in pushing this bomb, over the fact that at present it has not succeeded will be viewed with great disfacour by me.

In the end the "sticky" bomb was accepted as one of our best emergency weapons. We never had to use it at home; but in Syria, where equally primitive conditions prevailed, it proved its value.

We had evidently to do our utmost to form French forces which might aid General de Gaulle in keeping the true personification of France alive.

Prime Minister to First Lord of the Admiralty and other Service Ministers.

27.VI.40.

1. The French naval personnel at Aintree Camp, numbering 13,600, equally with the 5530 military at Trentham Park, the 1900 at Arrow Park, and the details at Blackpool, are to be immediately repatriated to French territory, i.e., Morocco, in French ships now in our hands.2. They should be told we will take them to French Africa because all French metropolitan ports are in German hands, and that the French Government will arrange for their future movements.3. If, however, any wish to remain here to fight against Germany, they must immediately make this clear. Care must be taken that no officer or man is sent back into French jurisdiction against his will. The shipping is to be ready tomorrow. The troops should move under their own officers, and carry their personal arms, but as little ammunition as possible. Some arrangements should be made for their pay. The French material on board ships from Narvik will be taken over by us with the ammunition from the Lombardy Lombardy and other ships as against expenses to which we are put. and other ships as against expenses to which we are put.4. Great care is to be taken of the French wounded. All who can be moved without danger should be sent back direct to France if possible. The French Government should be asked where they wish them delivered, and if at French metropolitan ports, should arrange with the Germans for their safe entry; otherwise Casablanca. All dangerous cases must be dealt with here.5. Apart from any volunteers in the above groups of personnel who may wish to stay, there must be many individuals who have made their way here, hoping to continue to fight. These also should be given the option of returning to France, or serving in the French units under General de Gaulle, who should be told of our decisions, and given reasonable facilities to collect his people. I have abandoned the hope that he could address the formed bodies, as their morale has deteriorated too fast.

My desire that our own Army should regain its poise and fighting quality was at first hampered because so many troops were being absorbed in fortifying their own localities or sectors of the coast.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

25.VI.40.

It is shocking that only 57,000 men [civilians] are being employed on all these [defence] works. Moreover, I fear that the troops are being used in large numbers on fortifications. At the present stage they should be drilling and training for at least eight hours a day, including one smart parade every morning. All the labour necessary should be found from civilian sources. I found it extremely difficult to see even a single battalion on parade in East Anglia during my visit. The fighting troops in the Brigade Groups should neither be used for guarding vulnerable points nor for making fortifications. Naturally a change like this cannot be made at once, but let me have your proposals for bringing it about as soon as possible.

Prime Minister to Minister of Information.

26.VI.40.

The press and broadcast should be asked to handle air raids in a cool way and on a diminishing tone of public interest. The facts should be chronicled without undue prominence or headlines. The people should be accustomed to treat air raids as a matter of ordinary routine. Localities affected should not be mentioned with any precision. Photographs showing shattered houses should not be published unless there is something very peculiar about them, or to ill.u.s.trate how well the Anderson shelters work. It must be clear that the vast majority of people are not at all affected by any single air raid, and would hardly sustain any evil impression if it were not thrust before them. Everyone should learn to take air raids and air-raid alarms as if they were no more than thunderstorms. Pray try to impress this upon the newspaper authorities, and persuade them to help. If there is difficulty in this, I would myself see the Newspaper Proprietors' a.s.sociation, but I hope this will not be necessary. The press should be complimented on their work so far in this matter.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

27.VI.40.

Enclosed [dates of troop convoys from India] make me anxious to know how you propose to use these eight fine Regular battalions. Obviously, they will be a reinforcement for your shock troops. One would suppose they might make the infantry of two divisions, with five good Territorial battalions added to each division, total eighteen. Should they not also yield up a certain number of officers and N.C.O.'s to stiffen the Territorial battalions so attached? You would thus have six brigades of infantry quite soon. Alas, I fear the artillery must lag behind, but not I trust for long.

As rumours grew of peace proposals and a message was sent to us from the Vatican through Berne, I thought it right to send the following minute to the Foreign Secretary: 28.VI.40.I hope it will be made clear to the Nuncio that we do not desire to make any inquiries as to terms of peace with Hitler, and that all our agents are strictly forbidden to entertain any such suggestions.

But here is the record of a qualm.

Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.

29.VI.40.

While we are hastening our preparations for air mastery, the Germans will be organising the whole industries of the captured countries for air production and other war production suitable [for use] against us. It is therefore a race. They will not be able to get the captured factories working immediately, and meanwhile we shall get round the invasion danger through the growth of our defences and Army strength. But what sort of relative outputs must be faced next year unless we are able to bomb the newly acquired German plants? Germany also, being relieved from the need of keeping a gigantic army in constant contact with the French Army, must have spare capacity for the air and other methods of attacking us. Must we not expect this will be very great? How soon can it come into play? Hitherto I have been looking at the next three months because of the emergency, but what about 1941? It seems to me that only immense American supplies can be of use in turning the corner.

As the month of June ground itself out, the sense of potential invasion at any moment grew upon us all.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

30.VI.40.

The Admiralty charts of tides and state of the moon, Humber, Thames Estuary, Beachy Head, should be studied with a view to ascertaining on which days conditions will be most favourable to a sea-borne landing. The Admiralty view is sought.

A landing or descent in Ireland was always a deep anxiety to the Chiefs of Staff. But our resources seemed to me too limited for serious troop movements.

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

30.VI.40.

It would be taking an undue risk to remove one of our only two thoroughly equipped divisions out of Great Britain at this juncture. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the Irish situation will require the use of divisional formations complete with their technical vehicles as if for Continental war. The statement that it would take ten days to transport a division from this country to Ireland, even though every preparation can be made beforehand, is not satisfactory. Schemes should be prepared to enable two or three lightly equipped brigades to move at short notice, and in not more than three days, into Northern Ireland. Duplicate transport should be sent on ahead. It would be a mistake to send any large force of artillery to Ireland. It is not at all likely that a naval descent will be effected there. Air-borne descents cannot carry much artillery. Finally, nothing that can happen in Ireland can be immediately decisive.

In bringing home the troops from Palestine I had difficulties with both my old friends, the Secretary of State for India, Mr. Amery, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Lloyd, who was a convinced anti-Zionist and pro-Arab. I wished to arm the Jewish colonists. Mr. Amery at the India Office had a different view from mine about the part which India should play. I wanted Indian troops at once to come into Palestine and the Middle East, whereas the Viceroy and the India Office were naturally inclined to a long-term plan of creating a great Indian Army based upon Indian munition factories.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India (Mr. Amery) 22.VI.40.

1. We have already very large ma.s.ses of troops in India of which no use is being made for the general purposes of the war. The a.s.sistance of India this time is incomparably below that of 1914-18.... It seems to me very likely that the war will spread to the Middle East, and the climates of Iraq, Palestine, and Egypt are well suited to Indian troops. I recommend their organisation in brigade groups, each with a proportion of artillery on the new British model. I should hope that six or eight of these groups could be ready this winter. They should include some brigades of Gurkhas.2. The process of liberating the Regular British battalions must continue, and I much regret that a fortnight's delay has become inevitable in returning you the Territorial battalions in exchange. You should rea.s.sure the Viceroy that it is going forward.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for the Colonies (Lord Lloyd).

28.VI.40.

The failure of the policy which you favour is proved by the very large numbers of sorely needed troops you [we] have to keep in Palestine: 6 battalions of infantry9 regiments of yeomanry8 battalions of Australian infantry the whole probably more than twenty thousand men. This is the price we have to pay for the anti-Jewish policy which has been persisted in for some years. Should the war go heavily into Egypt, all these troops will have to be withdrawn, and the position of the Jewish colonists will be one of the greatest danger. Indeed I am sure that we shall be told we cannot withdraw these troops, though they include some of our best, and are vitally needed elsewhere. If the Jews were properly armed, our forces would become available, and there would be no danger of the Jews attacking the Arabs, because they are entirely dependent upon us and upon our command of the seas. I think it is little less than a scandal that at a time when we are fighting for our lives these very large forces should be immobilised in support of a policy which commends itself only to a section of the Conservative Party.I had hoped you would take a broad view of the Palestine situation, and would make it an earnest objective to set the British garrison free. I could certainly not a.s.sociate myself with such an answer as you have drawn up for me. I do not at all admit that Arab feeling in the Near East and India would be prejudiced in the manner you suggest. Now that we have the Turks in such a friendly relationship, the position is much more secure.

For the first time in a hundred and twenty-five years a powerful enemy was now established across the narrow waters of the English Channel. Our re-formed Regular Army, and the larger but less well-trained Territorials, had to be organised and deployed to create an elaborate system of defences, and to stand ready, if the invader came, to destroy him for there could be no escape. It was for both sides "Kill or Cure." Already the Home Guard could be included in the general framework of defence. On June 25, General Ironside, Commander-in-Chief Home Forces, exposed his plans to the Chiefs of Staff. They were, of course, scrutinised with anxious care by the experts, and I examined them myself with no little attention. On the whole they stood approved. There were three main elements in this early outline of a great future plan: first, an entrenched "crust" on the probable invasion beaches of the coast, whose defenders should fight where they stood, supported by mobile reserves for immediate counter-attack; secondly, a line of anti-tank obstacles, manned by the Home Guard, running down the east centre of England and protecting London and the great industrial centres from inroads by armoured vehicles; thirdly, behind that line, the main reserves for major counter-offensive action.

Ceaseless additions and refinements to this first plan were effected as the weeks and months pa.s.sed; but the general conception remained. All troops, if attacked, should stand firm, not in linear only but in all-round defence, in all-round defence, whilst others moved rapidly to destroy the attackers, whether they came from sea or air. Men who had been cut off from immediate help would not have merely remained in position. Active measures were prepared to hara.s.s the enemy from behind; to interfere with his communications and to destroy material, as the Russians did with great results when the German tide flowed over their country a year later. Many people must have been bewildered by the innumerable activities all around them. They could understand the necessity for wiring and mining the beaches, the anti-tank obstacles at the defiles, the concrete pillboxes at the crossroads, the intrusions into their houses to fill an attic with sandbags, onto their golf-courses or most fertile fields and gardens to burrow out some wide anti-tank ditch. All these inconveniences, and much more, they accepted in good part. But sometimes they must have wondered if there was a general scheme, or whether lesser individuals were not running amok in their energetic use of newly granted powers of interference with the property of the citizen. whilst others moved rapidly to destroy the attackers, whether they came from sea or air. Men who had been cut off from immediate help would not have merely remained in position. Active measures were prepared to hara.s.s the enemy from behind; to interfere with his communications and to destroy material, as the Russians did with great results when the German tide flowed over their country a year later. Many people must have been bewildered by the innumerable activities all around them. They could understand the necessity for wiring and mining the beaches, the anti-tank obstacles at the defiles, the concrete pillboxes at the crossroads, the intrusions into their houses to fill an attic with sandbags, onto their golf-courses or most fertile fields and gardens to burrow out some wide anti-tank ditch. All these inconveniences, and much more, they accepted in good part. But sometimes they must have wondered if there was a general scheme, or whether lesser individuals were not running amok in their energetic use of newly granted powers of interference with the property of the citizen.

There was, however, a central plan, elaborate, co-ordinated, and all-embracing. As it grew, it shaped itself thus: the over-all command was maintained at General Headquarters in London. All Great Britain and Northern Ireland were divided into seven commands; these again into areas of corps and divisional commands. Commands, corps, and divisions were each required to hold a proportion of their resources in mobile reserve, only the minimum being detailed to hold their own particular defences. Gradually there were built up in rear of the beaches zones of defence in each divisional area, behind these similar corps zones and command zones, the whole system amounting in depth to a hundred miles or more. And behind these was established the main anti-tank obstacle running across Southern England and northward into Nottinghamshire. Above all was the final reserve directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces. This it was our policy to keep as large and mobile as possible.

Within this general structure were many variations. Each of our ports on the east and south coasts was a special study. Direct frontal attack upon a defended port seemed an unlikely contingency, and all were made into strong-points equally capable of defence from the landward or the seaward side. It astonishes me that when this principle of fortifying the gorges was so universally accepted and rigorously enforced by all military authorities at home, no similar measures were adopted at Singapore by the succession of high officers employed there. But this is a later story. Obstacles were placed on many thousand square miles of Britain to impede the landing of air-borne troops. All our aerodromes, radar stations, and fuel depots, of which even in the summer of 1940 there were three hundred and seventy-five, needed defence by special garrisons and by their own airmen. Many thousands of "vulnerable points" bridges, power-stations, depots, vital factories, and the like had to be guarded day and night from sabotage or sudden onset. Schemes were ready for the immediate demolition of resources helpful to the enemy, if captured. The destruction of port facilities, the cratering of key roads, the paralysis of motor transport and of telephones and telegraph stations, of rolling stock or permanent way, before they pa.s.sed out of our control, were planned to the last detail. Yet, despite all these wise and necessary precautions, in which the civilian departments gave unstinted help to the military, there was no question of a "scorched-earth policy"; England was to be defended by its people, not destroyed.

9.

The French Agony

Telegram to President Roosevelt - My Visit to Tours - Increasing Degeneration - M. Baudouin - The Great Mandel - Conversation with Reynaud - My Refusal to Release France from the Obligation of March 28, 1940 - Resolute Att.i.tude of MM. Herriot and Jeanneney - "L'Homme du Destin" - French Government Decide to Move to Bordeaux - President Roosevelt to M. Reynaud, June 13 - My Telegram to the President - And to Reynaud - "Indissoluble Union of France and Britain" - Disappointing Telegram from the President - My Telegram to the President of June 14/15 - A Grave Suggestion - Great Battle of June 9 Along the Aisne - Defeat of the French - Forlorn Resistance on the Maginot Line - Our Slender Contribution - General Brooke's New Command - Talk of a Bridgehead in Brittany - Brooke Declares the Military Situation Hopeless - I Agree - Our Troops Withdraw and Re-embark, June 16/17 - The Petain Government Asks for an Armistice - A Second Dunkirk Evacuation - A Hundred and Fifty Thousand British and Forty-two Thousand Poles Carried to Britain - The "Lancastria" Horror - My Message of June 16 to the Dominion Prime Ministers - My Hopes of the Air Battle over Britain.

FUTURE GENERATIONS may deem it noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter of course by these men of all parties in the State, and we were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal, academic issues. We were united also in viewing the new phase with good confidence. It was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts. I was invited to send a message in the same sense to President Roosevelt, and also to sustain the determination of the French Government and a.s.sure them of our utmost support. may deem it noteworthy that the supreme question of whether we should fight on alone never found a place upon the War Cabinet agenda. It was taken for granted and as a matter of course by these men of all parties in the State, and we were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal, academic issues. We were united also in viewing the new phase with good confidence. It was decided to tell the Dominions the whole facts. I was invited to send a message in the same sense to President Roosevelt, and also to sustain the determination of the French Government and a.s.sure them of our utmost support.