Their Finest Hour Part 16

I doubt whether any of the dictators had as much effective power throughout his whole nation as the British War Cabinet. When we expressed our desires we were sustained by the people's representatives, and cheerfully obeyed by all. Yet at no time was the right of criticism impaired. Nearly always the critics respected the national interest. When on occasions they challenged us, the Houses voted them down by overwhelming majorities, and this, in contrast with totalitarian methods, without the slightest coercion, intervention, or use of the police or Secret Service. It was a proud thought that Parliamentary Democracy, or whatever our British public life can be called, can endure, surmount, and survive all trials. Even the threat of annihilation did not daunt our Members, but this fortunately did not come to pa.s.s.

3.

"London Can Take It"

Grim and Gay - Pa.s.sion in the United States - The London Drains - Danger o f Epidemics - Broken Windows - The Delayed-Action Bombs - Minutes Thereupon - The U.X.B. Detachments - The Peril Mastered - Heavy Parachute Mines - The Question of Reprisals - Later German Experiences Compared with Ours - Need of Security for the Central Government - "Paddock" Rehearsal - Herbert Morrison Succeeds John Anderson as Home Secretary - The Incendiary Attacks Begin - The National Fire Service - Civil Defence, a Fourth Arm of the Crown - Power of London to Take Punishment - Permanent Arrangements for Safeguarding the War Machine - I Am Placed in Safety in Piccadilly Underground - Return to the Annexe - Another Change of the German Plan - The Provincial Cities - Coventry - Birmingham - Attacks on the Ports - Great Burning of the City of London, December 29, 1940 - The King at Buckingham Palace - His Majesty's Mastery of Business - A Thought for the Future.

THESE WERE THE TIMES When the English, and particularly the Londoners, who had the place of honour, were seen at their best. Grim and gay, dogged and serviceable, with the confidence of an unconquered people in their bones, they adapted themselves to this strange new life, with all its terrors, with all its jolts and jars. One evening when I was leaving for an inspection on the east coast, on my way to King's Cross the sirens sounded, the streets began to empty, except for long queues of very tired, pale people, waiting for the last bus that would run. An autumn mist and drizzle shrouded the scene. The air was cold and raw. Night and the enemy were approaching. I felt, with a spasm of mental pain, a deep sense of the strain and suffering that was being borne throughout the world's largest capital city. How long would it go on? How much more would they have to bear? What were the limits of their vitality? What effects would their exhaustion have upon our productive warmaking power? When the English, and particularly the Londoners, who had the place of honour, were seen at their best. Grim and gay, dogged and serviceable, with the confidence of an unconquered people in their bones, they adapted themselves to this strange new life, with all its terrors, with all its jolts and jars. One evening when I was leaving for an inspection on the east coast, on my way to King's Cross the sirens sounded, the streets began to empty, except for long queues of very tired, pale people, waiting for the last bus that would run. An autumn mist and drizzle shrouded the scene. The air was cold and raw. Night and the enemy were approaching. I felt, with a spasm of mental pain, a deep sense of the strain and suffering that was being borne throughout the world's largest capital city. How long would it go on? How much more would they have to bear? What were the limits of their vitality? What effects would their exhaustion have upon our productive warmaking power? 1 1 Away across the Atlantic the prolonged bombardment of London, and later of other cities and seaports, aroused a wave of sympathy in the United States, stronger than any ever felt before or since in the English-speaking world. Pa.s.sion flamed in American hearts, and in none more than in the heart of President Roosevelt. The temperature rose steadily in the United States. I could feel the glow of millions of men and women eager to share the suffering, burning to strike a blow. As many Americans as could get pa.s.sages came, bringing whatever gifts they could, and their respect, reverence, deep love and comradeship were very inspiring. However, this was only September, and we had many months before us of this curious existence.

Under the pressure of the bombardment, the shelters and defences grew continually. I was worried princ.i.p.ally on three counts. The first was the drains. When you had six or seven million people living in a great built-up area, the smashing of their sewers and water supply seemed to me a very great danger. Could we keep the sewage system working or would there be a pestilence? What would happen if the drains got into the water supply? Actually, early in October the main sewage outfall was destroyed and we had to let all our sewage flow into the Thames, which stank, first of sewage and afterwards of the floods of chemicals we poured into it. But all was mastered. Secondly, I feared that the long nights for millions in the crowded street-shelters only blast-proof at that would produce epidemics of influenza, diphtheria, the common cold, and what-not. But it appeared that Nature had already provided against this danger. Man is a gregarious animal, and apparently the mischievous microbes he exhales fight and neutralise each other. They go out and devour each other, and Man walks off unharmed. If this is not scientifically correct, it ought to be. The fact remains that during this rough winter the health of the Londoners was actually above the average. Moreover, the power of enduring suffering in the ordinary people of every country, when their spirit is roused, seems to have no bounds.

My third fear was a gla.s.s famine. Sometimes whole streets had every window-frame smashed by the blast of a single bomb. In a series of Minutes I inquired anxiously about this, and proposed to stop all export of gla.s.s forthwith. I was, however, rea.s.sured by facts and figures, and this danger also never came to pa.s.s.

In the middle of September, a new and damaging form of attack was used against us. Large numbers of delayed-action bombs were now widely and plentifully cast upon us and became an awkward problem. Long stretches of railway line, important junctions, the approaches to vital factories, airfields, main thoroughfares, had scores of times to be blocked off and denied to us in our need. These bombs had to be dug out, and exploded or rendered harmless. This was a task of the utmost peril, especially at the beginning, when the means and methods had all to be learned by a series of decisive experiences. I have already recounted in Volume I the drama of dismantling the magnetic mine, but this form of self-devotion now became commonplace while remaining sublime. I had always taken an interest in the delayed-action fuze, which had first impressed itself on me in 1918, when the Germans had used it on a large scale to deny us the use of the railways by which we planned to advance into Germany. I had urged its use by us both in Norway and in the Kiel Ca.n.a.l. There is no doubt that it is a most effective agent in warfare, on account of the prolonged uncertainty which it creates. We were now to taste it ourselves. A special organisation to deal with it was set up under General King, a highly capable, energetic officer, whom I interviewed myself at Chequers. In a series of Minutes I tried to stimulate the work.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

13.IX.40.

As I telephoned to you last night, it appears to be of high importance to cope with the U.X.B. [unexploded bombs] in London, and especially on the railways. The congestion in the marshalling yards is becoming acute, mainly from this cause. It would be well to bring in clearance parties both from the north and the west, and also to expand as rapidly as possible General King's organisation. It must be planned on large enough lines to cope with this nuisance, which may soon wear a graver aspect.

Prime Minister to Minister of Supply.

21.IX.40.

The rapid disposal of unexploded bombs is of the highest importance. Any failure to grapple with this problem may have serious results on the production of aircraft and other vital war material. The work of the bomb-disposal squads must be facilitated by the provision of every kind of up-to-date equipment. The paper, which I have received from the Secretary of State for War, shows the experiments on foot, and the equipment being planned. Priority 1 (a) (a) should be allotted to the production of the equipment required, and to any further requirements which may come to light. should be allotted to the production of the equipment required, and to any further requirements which may come to light.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

14.IX.40.

I hear that there is a special type of auger manufactured in the United States which is capable of boring in the s.p.a.ce of less than an hour a hole of such a size and depth as would take two to three days to dig manually.You should, I think, consider ordering a number of these appliances for the use of the bomb-disposal squads. The essence of this business is to reach the bomb and deal with it with the least possible delay.These augers may perhaps be expensive, but they will pay for themselves many times over by the saving they will effect in life and property. Besides, I consider that we owe it to these brave men to provide them with the very best technical equipment.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.

28.IX.40.

I am told that there is good evidence to show that the system of dealing with time-bombs by trepanning 2 2 is proving very successful. In view of the serious and growing trouble that is being caused by these bombs, I should like to be a.s.sured that this method is being used on a large enough scale. Will you please let me have a report on the extent to which trepanning is being used. is proving very successful. In view of the serious and growing trouble that is being caused by these bombs, I should like to be a.s.sured that this method is being used on a large enough scale. Will you please let me have a report on the extent to which trepanning is being used.

Special companies were formed in every city, town and district. Volunteers pressed forward for the deadly game. Teams were formed which had good or bad luck. Some survived this phase of our ordeal. Others ran twenty, thirty, or even forty courses before they met their fate. The unexploded-bomb (U.X.B.) detachments presented themselves wherever I went on my tours. Somehow or other their faces seemed different from those of ordinary men, however brave and faithful. They were gaunt, they were haggard, their faces had a bluish look, with bright gleaming eyes and exceptional compression of the lips; withal a perfect demeanour. In writing about our hard times, we are apt to overuse the word "grim." It should have been reserved for the U.X.B. disposal squads.3

One squad I remember which may be taken as symbolic of many others. It consisted of three people the Earl of Suffolk, his lady private secretary, and his rather aged chauffeur. They called themselves "the Holy Trinity." Their prowess and continued existence got around among all who knew. Thirty-four unexploded bombs did they tackle with urbane and smiling efficiency. But the thirty-fifth claimed its forfeit. Up went the Earl of Suffolk in his Holy Trinity. But we may be sure that, as for Mr. Valiant-for-Truth, "all the trumpets sounded for them on the other side."

Very quickly, but at heavy sacrifice of our n.o.blest, the devotion of the U.X.B. detachments mastered the peril. In a month I could write:

Prime Minister to General Ismay.

9.X.40.

We have not heard much lately about the delayed-action bomb which threatened to give so much trouble at the beginning of September. I have a sort of feeling that things are easier in this respect. Let me have a report showing how many have been cast upon us lately, and how many have been handled successfully or remain a nuisance.Is the eas.e.m.e.nt which we feel due to the enemy's not throwing them, or to our improved methods of handling? 4 4 * * * * *

About the same time the enemy began to drop by parachute numbers of naval mines of a weight and explosive power never carried by aircraft before. Many formidable explosions took place. To this there was no defence except reprisal. The abandonment by the Germans of all pretence of confining the air war to military objectives had also raised this question of retaliation. I was for it, but I encountered many conscientious scruples.

Prime Minister to V.C.A.S.

6.IX.40.

I never suggested any departure from our main policy, but I believe that moral advantage would be gained in Germany at the present time if on two or three nights in a month a number of minor, unexpected, widespread attacks were made upon the smaller German centers. You must remember that these people are never told the truth, and that wherever the air force has not been they are probably told that the German defences are impregnable. Many factors have to be taken into consideration, and some of them are those which are not entirely technical. I hope, therefore, you will consider my wish, and make me proposals for giving effect to it as opportunity serves.

Among those who demurred was my friend Admiral Tom Phillips, Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee. (Admiral Phillips to see.) 19.IX.40.

1. It was not solely on moral grounds that we decided against retaliation upon Germany. It pays us better to concentrate upon limited high-cla.s.s military objectives. Moreover, in the indiscriminate warfare the enemy's lack of skill in navigation, etc., does not tell against him so much.2. However, the dropping of large mines by parachute proclaims the enemy's entire abandonment of all pretence of aiming at military objectives. At five thousand feet he cannot have the slightest idea what he is going to hit. This, therefore, proves the "act-of-terror" intention against the civil population. We must consider whether his morale would stand up to this as well as ours. Here is a simple war thought.3. My inclination is to say that we will drop a heavy parachute mine on German cities for everyone he drops on ours; and it might be an intriguing idea to mention a list of cities that would be black-listed for this purpose. I do not think they would like it, and there is no reason why they should not have a period of suspense.4. The time and character of the announcement is a political decision. Meanwhile, I wish to know when the tackle could be ready. Let care be taken to make a forthcoming response to this. Let officers be set to propose the best method on a substantial scale in the shortest time. It would be better to act by parachute mines upon a number of German towns not hitherto touched, but if we have to use thousand-pound air-bombs which we have because otherwise the delay would be too long, let the case be stated.5. I wish to know by Sat.u.r.day night what is the worst form of proportionate retaliation, i.e., equal equal retaliation, that we can inflict upon ordinary German cities for what they are now doing to us by means of the parachute mine. Today we were informed that thirty-six had been dropped, but by tomorrow it may be a hundred. Well, let it be a hundred and make the best plan possible on that scale for action within, say, a week or ten days. If we have to wait longer, so be it, but make sure there is no obstruction. retaliation, that we can inflict upon ordinary German cities for what they are now doing to us by means of the parachute mine. Today we were informed that thirty-six had been dropped, but by tomorrow it may be a hundred. Well, let it be a hundred and make the best plan possible on that scale for action within, say, a week or ten days. If we have to wait longer, so be it, but make sure there is no obstruction.6. Pending the above information I agree that we should not make a wail or a whine about what has happened. Let me have practical propositions by Sat.u.r.day night.

A month later, I was still pressing for retaliation; but one objection after another, moral and technical, obstructed it.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and C.A.S.

16.X.40.

I see it reported that last night a large number of land mines were dropped here, many of which have not yet gone off, and that great harm was done.Let me have your proposals forthwith for effective retaliation upon Germany.I am informed that it is quite possible to carry similar mines or large bombs to Germany, and that the squadrons wish to use them, but that the Air Ministry are refusing permission. I trust that due consideration will be given to my views and wishes. It is now about three weeks since I began pressing for similar treatment of German military objectives to that which they are meting out to us. Who is responsible for paralysing action?

It is difficult to compare the ordeal of the Londoners in the winter of 194041 with that of the Germans in the last three years of the war. In this latter phase the bombs were much more powerful and the raids far more intense. On the other hand, long preparation and German thoroughness had enabled a complete system of bomb-proof shelters to be built, into which all were forced to go by iron routine. When eventually we got into Germany, we found cities completely wrecked, but strong buildings standing up above the ground, and s.p.a.cious subterranean galleries where the inhabitants slept night after night, although their houses and property were being destroyed all round. In many cases only the rubble-heaps were stirred. But in London, although the attack was less overpowering, the security arrangements were far less developed. Apart from the Tubes there were no really safe places. There were very few bas.e.m.e.nts or cellars which could withstand a direct hit. Virtually the whole ma.s.s of the London population lived and slept in their homes or in their Anderson shelters under the fire of the enemy, taking their chance with British phlegm after a hard day's work. Not one in a thousand had any protection except against blast and splinters. But there was as little psychological weakening as there was physical pestilence. Of course, if the bombs of 1943 had been applied to the London of 1940, we should have pa.s.sed into conditions which might have pulverised all human organisation. However, everything happens in its turn and in its relation, and no one has a right to say that London, which was certainly unconquered, was not also unconquerable.

Little or nothing had been done before the war or during the pa.s.sive period to provide bomb-proof strongholds from which the central government could be carried on. Elaborate plans had been made to move the seat of Government from London. Complete branches of many departments had already been moved to Harrogate, Bath, Cheltenham, and elsewhere. Accommodation had been requisitioned over a wide area, providing for all Ministers and important functionaries in the event of an evacuation of London. But now under the bombardment the desire and resolve of the Government and of Parliament to remain in London was unmistakable, and I shared this feeling to the full. I, like others, had often pictured the destruction becoming so overpowering that a general move and dispersal would have to be made. But under the impact of the event, all our reactions were in the contrary sense.

Prime Minister to Sir Edward Bridges, General Ismay or Colonel Jacob, and Private Office.

14.IX.40.

1. I have not at any time contemplated wholesale movement from London of black or yellow Civil Servants.5 Anything of this nature is so detrimental that it could only be forced upon us by Central London becoming practically uninhabitable. Moreover, new resorts of Civil Servants would soon be identified and hara.s.sed, and there is more shelter in London than anywhere else. Anything of this nature is so detrimental that it could only be forced upon us by Central London becoming practically uninhabitable. Moreover, new resorts of Civil Servants would soon be identified and hara.s.sed, and there is more shelter in London than anywhere else.2. The movement of the high control from the Whitehall area to "Paddock" or other citadels stands on a different footing. We must make sure that the centre of Government functions harmoniously and vigorously. This would not be possible under conditions of almost continuous air raids. A movement to "Paddock" by echelons of the War Cabinet, War Cabinet Secretariat, Chiefs of the Staff Committee, and Home Forces G.H.Q. must now be planned, and may even begin in some minor respects. War Cabinet Ministers should visit their quarters in "Paddock" and be ready to move there at short notice. They should be encouraged to sleep there if they want quiet nights. Secrecy cannot be expected, but publicity must be forbidden.We must expect that the Whitehall-Westminster area will be the subject of intensive air attack any time now. The German method is to make the disruption of the Central Government a vital prelude to any major a.s.sault upon the country. They have done this everywhere. They will certainly do it here, where the landscape can be so easily recognised, and the river and its high buildings afford a sure guide, both by day and night. We must forestall this disruption of the Central Government.3. It is not necessary to move the Admiralty yet. They are well provided for. The Air Ministry should begin to get from one leg to the other. The War Office and Home Forces must have all their preparations made.4. Pray concert forthwith all the necessary measures for moving not more than two or three hundred princ.i.p.al persons and their immediate a.s.sistants to the new quarters, and show how it should be done step by step. Let me have this by Sunday night, in order that I may put a well-thought-out scheme before the Cabinet on Monday. On Monday the Cabinet will meet either in the Cabinet Room or in the Central War Room, in accordance with the rules already prescribed.

On the line of sticking it out in London it was necessary to construct all kinds of strongholds under or above ground from which the Executive, with its thousands of officials, could carry out their duties. A citadel for the War Cabinet had already been prepared near Hampstead, with offices, bedrooms, and wire and fortified telephone communication. This was called "Paddock." On September 29, I prescribed a dress rehearsal, so that everybody should know what to do if it got too hot. "I think it important that 'Paddock' should be broken in. Thursday next, therefore, the Cabinet will meet there. At the same time, other Departments should be encouraged to try a preliminary move of a skeleton staff. If possible, lunch should be provided for the Cabinet and those attending it." We held a Cabinet meeting at "Paddock" far from the light of day, and each Minister was requested to inspect and satisfy himself about his sleeping and working apartments. We celebrated this occasion by a vivacious luncheon and then returned to Whitehall. This was the only time "Paddock" was ever used by Ministers. Over the War Room and offices in the bas.e.m.e.nt of the Annexe we floated-in six feet of steel and concrete, and made elaborate arrangements for ventilation, water supply, and above all telephones. As these offices were far below the level of the Thames, only two hundred yards away, care had to be taken that those in them were not trapped by an inrush of water.

October came in raw and rough. But it seemed that London was adapting itself to the new peculiar conditions of existence or death. Even in some directions there was an eas.e.m.e.nt.

Transport into and out of the Whitehall area became an outstanding problem, with the frequently repeated daily raids, the rush hour, and the breakdowns on the railways. I cast about for some solution.

Prime Minister to Sir Horace Wilson.

12.X.40.

About a fortnight ago I directed that the talk about four days a week for Civil Servants should stop, because I feared the effect in the factories of such an announcement. I am, however, now coming round to the idea of a five-day week, sleeping in for four nights (and where possible feeding in), and three nights and two days away at home. This, of course, would apply only to people who work in London and live in the suburbs. I see such queues at the bus stops, and no doubt it is going to become increasingly difficult to get in and out of London quickly. Each Department should work out a scheme to suit their own and their staff's convenience. The same amount of work must be crowded into the five days as is now done. Efforts should also be made to stagger the hours of arrival and departure, so as to get as many away as possible before the rush hour and spread the traffic over the day.Let me have your views on this, together with proposals for action in a circular to Departments.

Nothing came of this plan, which broke down under detailed examination.

The retirement of Mr. Chamberlain, enforced by grave illness, led to important Ministerial changes. Mr. Herbert Morrison had been an efficient and vigorous Minister of Supply, and Sir John Anderson had faced the Blitz of London with firm and competent management. By the early days of October, the continuous attack on the largest city in the world was so severe and raised so many problems of a social and political character in its vast hara.s.sed population that I thought it would be a help to have a long-trained Parliamentarian at the Home Office, which was now also the Ministry of Home Security. London was bearing the brunt. Herbert Morrison was a Londoner, versed in every aspect of metropolitan administration. He had unrivalled experience of London government, having been leader of the County Council, and in many ways the princ.i.p.al figure in its affairs. At the same time I needed John Anderson, whose work at the Home Office had been excellent, as Lord President of the Council in the wider sphere of the Home Affairs Committee, to which an immense ma.s.s of business was referred, with great relief to the Cabinet. This also lightened my own burden and enabled me to concentrate upon the military conduct of the war, in which my colleagues seemed increasingly disposed to give me lat.i.tude.

I therefore invited these two high Ministers to change their offices. It was no bed of roses which I offered Herbert Morrison. These pages certainly cannot attempt to describe the problems of London government, when often night after night ten or twenty thousand people were made homeless, and when nothing but the ceaseless vigil of the citizens as fire guards on the roofs prevented uncontrollable conflagrations; when hospitals filled with mutilated men and women were themselves struck by the enemy's bombs; when hundreds of thousands of weary people crowded together in unsafe and insanitary shelters; when communications by road and rail were ceaselessly broken down; when drains were smashed and light, power, and gas paralysed; and when, nevertheless, the whole fighting, toiling life of London had to go forward, and nearly a million people be moved in and out for their work every night and morning. We did not know how long it would last. We had no reason to suppose that it would not go on getting worse. When I made the proposal to Mr. Morrison, he knew too much about it to treat it lightly. He asked for a few hours' consideration; but in a short time he returned and said he would be proud to shoulder the job. I highly approved his manly decision.

In Mr. Chamberlain's day a Civil Defence Committee of the Cabinet had already been set up. This met regularly every morning to review the whole situation. In order to make sure that the new Home Secretary was armed with all the powers of State, I also held a weekly meeting, usually on Fridays, of all authorities concerned. The topics discussed were often far from pleasant.

Quite soon after the Ministerial movements, a change in the enemy's method affected our general policy. Till now the hostile attack had been confined almost exclusively to high-explosive bombs; but with the full moon of October 15, when the heaviest attack of the month fell upon us, about 480 German aircraft dropped 386 tons of high-explosive and in addition 70,000 incendiary bombs. Hitherto we had encouraged the Londoners to take cover, and every effort was being made to improve their protection. But now "To the bas.e.m.e.nts" must be replaced by "To the roofs." It fell to the new Minister of Home Security to inst.i.tute this policy. An organisation of fire-watchers and fire-services on a gigantic scale and covering the whole of London (apart from measures taken in provincial cities) was rapidly brought into being. At first the fire-watchers were volunteers; but the numbers required were so great, and the feeling that every man should take his turn upon the roster so strong, that fire-watching soon became compulsory. This form of service had a bracing and buoyant effect upon all cla.s.ses. Women pressed forward to take their share. Large-scale systems of training were developed to teach the fire-watchers how to deal with the various kinds of incendiaries which were used against us. Many became adept, and thousands of fires were extinguished before they took hold. The experience of remaining on the roof night after night under fire, with no protection but a tin hat, soon became habitual.

Mr. Morrison presently decided to consolidate the fourteen hundred local fire brigades into a single National Fire Service, and to supplement this with a great fire guard of civilians trained and working in their spare time. The fire guard, like the roof-watchers, was at first recruited on a voluntary basis, but like them it became by general consent compulsory. The National Fire Service gave us the advantages of greater mobility, a universal standard of training and equipment, and formally recognised ranks. The other Civil Defence forces produced regional columns ready at a minute's notice to go anywhere. The name Civil Defence Service was subst.i.tuted for the pre-war t.i.tle of Air-Raid Precautions (A.R.P.). Good uniforms were provided for large numbers, and they became conscious of being a fourth arm of the Crown. In all this work Herbert Morrison was ably a.s.sisted by a brave woman whose death we have lately mourned, Ellen Wilkinson. She was out and about in the shelters at all hours of the day and night and took a prominent part in the organisation of the fire guard. The Women's Voluntary Services, under the inspiring leadership of Lady Reading, also played an invaluable part.

I was glad that, if any of our cities were to be attacked, the brunt should fall on London. London was like some huge prehistoric animal, capable of enduring terrible injuries, mangled and bleeding from many wounds, and yet preserving its life and movement. The Anderson shelters were widespread in the working-cla.s.s districts of two-storey houses, and everything was done to make them habitable and to drain them in wet weather. Later the Morrison shelter was developed, which was no more than a heavy kitchen table made of steel with strong wire sides, capable of holding up the ruins of a small house and thus giving a measure of protection. Many owed their lives to it. For the rest, "London could take it." They took all they got, and could have taken more. Indeed, at this time we saw no end but the demolition of the whole metropolis. Still, as I pointed out to the House of Commons at the time, the law of diminishing returns operates in the case of the demolition of large cities. Soon many of the bombs would only fall upon houses already ruined and only make the rubble jump. Over large areas there would be nothing more to burn or destroy, and yet human beings might make their homes here and there, and carry on their work with infinite resource and fort.i.tude. At this time anyone would have been proud to be a Londoner. The admiration of the whole country was given to London, and all the other great cities in the land braced themselves to take their bit as and when it came and not to be outdone. Indeed, many persons seemed envious of London's distinction, and quite a number came up from the country in order to spend a night or two in town, share the task, and see the fun. We had to check this tendency for administrative reasons.

As we could see no reason why the hostile bombing of London should not go on throughout the war, it was necessary to make long-term plans for safely housing the central Government machine.