The World's Greatest Books - Volume 11 Part 8

In the battle, the Aeginetans and the Athenians did the best of all the Greeks, and Themistocles best among the commanders; nor was ever any fleet more utterly put to rout than that of the Persians, among whom Queen Artemisia won praise unmerited. As for King Xerxes, panic seized him when he saw the disaster to his fleet, and he made haste to flee. He consented, however, to leave Mardonius behind with 300,000 troops in Thessaly, he being still a.s.sured that he could crush the Greeks. And it was well for him that Themistocles was over-ruled in his desire to pursue and annihilate the fleet, then sail to the h.e.l.lespont and destroy the bridge.

When the winter and spring were pa.s.sed, Mardonius marched from Thessaly and again occupied Athens, which the Athenians had again evacuated, the Spartans having failed to send succour. But when at length the Lacedaemonians, fearing to lose the Athenian fleet, sent forth an army, the Persians fell back to Boeotia. So the Greek hosts gathered near Plataea to the number of 108,000 men, but the troops of Mardonius were about 350,000. Yet, by reason of doubtful auguries, both armies held back, till Mardonius resolved to attack, whereof warning was brought to the Athenians by Alexander of Macedon. But when the Spartan Pausanias, the general of the Greeks, heard of this, he did what caused no little wonder, for he proposed that the Athenians instead of the Lacedaemonians should face the picked troops of the Persians, as having fought them at Marathon. But Mardonius, seeing them move, moved his picked troops also.

Then Mardonius sent some light horse against the Greeks by a fountain whence flowed the water for the army; which, becoming choked, it was needful to move to a new position. But the move being made by night, most of the allies withdrew into the town. But the Spartans, and Tegeans and Athenians, perceiving this, held each their ground till dawn.

Now, in the morning the picked Persian troops fell on the Spartans, and their Grecian allies attacked the Athenians. But, Mardonius being slain, the Persians fled to their camp, which was stormed by the Spartans and Tegeans, and the Athenians, who also had routed their foes; and there the barbarians were slaughtered, so that of 300,000 men not 3,000 were left alive. But Artabazus, who, before the battle, had withdrawn with 40,000 men, escaped by forced marches to the h.e.l.lespont.

And on that same day was fought another fight by sea at Mycale in Ionia, where also the barbarians were utterly routed, for the fleet had sailed thither. And thence the Greeks sailed to Sestos, captured the place, and so went home.

THUCYDIDES

The Peloponnesian War

The Athenian historian, Thucydides, was born about 471 B.C., within ten years of the great repulse of the Persian invasion.

Before he was thirty, the great political ascendancy of Pericles was completely established at Athens, and the ascendancy of Athens among the Greek states was unchallenged, except by Sparta. He was forty at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was appointed to a military command seven years later, but his failure in that office caused his banishment. From that time he remained an exiled spectator of events; the date of his death is uncertain. His great work is the history of the Peloponnesian War to its twentieth year, where his history is abruptly broken off. To Herodotus, history presented itself as a drama; Thucydides views it with the eyes of a philosophical statesman, but writes it also with extraordinary descriptive power, not only in pregnant sentences which have never been effectively rendered in translation, but in pa.s.sages of sustained intensity, of which it would be vain to reproduce fragments.

The abridged translation given here has been made direct from the Greek.

_I.--The Beginning of the War_

I have written the account of the war between Athens and Sparta, since it is the greatest and the most calamitous of all wars. .h.i.therto to the Greeks. For the contest with the Medes was decided in four battles; but this war was protracted over many years, and wrought infinite injury and bloodshed.

Of the immediate causes of the war the first is to be found in the affairs of Epid.a.m.nus, Corcyra, and Corinth, of which Corcyra was a colony. Of the Greek states, the most were joined either to the Athenian or the Peloponnesian league, but Corcyra had joined neither. But having a quarrel with Corinth about Epid.a.m.nus, she now formed an alliance with Athens, whose intervention enraged the Corinthians.

They then helped Potidaea, a Corinthian colony, but an Athenian tributary, to revolt from Athens. Corinth next appealed to Sparta, as the head of h.e.l.las, to intervene ere it should be too late and check the Athenian aggression, which threatened to make her the tyrant of all Greece. At Sparta the war party prevailed, although King Archidamus urged that sufficient pressure could be brought to bear without actual hostilities.

The great prosperity and development of Athens since the Persian war had filled other states with fear and jealousy. She had rebuilt her city walls and refortified the port of Piraeus after the Persian occupation; Sparta had virtually allowed her to take the lead in the subsequent stages of the war, as having the most effective naval force at command.

Hence she had founded the Delian league of the maritime states, to hold the seas against Persia. At first these states provided fixed contingents of ships and mariners; but Athens was willing enough to accept treasure in subst.i.tution, so that she might herself supply the ships and men.

Thus the provision of forces by each state to act against Persia was changed in effect into a tribute for the expansion of the Athenian fleet. The continuous development of the power of Athens had been checked only momentarily by her disastrous Egyptian expedition. Her nominal allies found themselves actually her tributary dependencies, and various attempts to break free from her yoke had made it only more secure and more burdensome.

Hence the warlike decision of Sparta was welcomed by others besides Corinth. But diplomatic demands preceded hostilities. Sparta and Athens sent to each other summons and counter-summons for the "expulsion of the curse," that is of all persons connected with certain families which lay under the curse of the G.o.ds.

In the case of Athens, this amounted to requiring the banishment of her greatest citizen and statesman, Pericles. To this the Spartans added the demand that the Athenians should "restore the freedom of h.e.l.las," and should specifically remove certain trading disabilities imposed on the people of Megara.

At this crisis Pericles laid down the rules of policy on which Athens ought to act--rules which required her to decline absolutely to submit to any form of dictation from Sparta. When a principle was at stake, it made no difference whether the occasion was trivial or serious. Athens could face war with confidence. Her available wealth was far greater--a matter of vital importance in a prolonged struggle. Her counsels were not divided by the conflicting interests of allies all claiming to direct military movements and policy. Her fleet gave her command of the sea, and enabled her to strike when and where she chose. If Peloponnesian invaders ravaged Attica, still no permanent injury would be done comparable to that which the Athenians could inflict upon them.

The one necessity was to concentrate on the war, and attempt no extension of dominion while it was in progress.

War was not yet formally declared when the Thebans attempted to seize Plataea, a town of Boeotia, which had long been closely allied to Athens.

The attempt failed, and the Thebans were put to death; but the Plataeans appealed to Athens for protection against their powerful neighbour, and when the Athenian garrison was sent to them, this was treated as a _casus belli_.

Preparations were urged on both sides; Sparta summoned her allies to muster their contingents on the Isthmus for the invasion of Attica, nearly all the mainland states joining the Peloponnesian league. The islanders and the cities in Asia Minor, on the other hand, were nearly all either actually subject to Athens or in alliance with her.

As Pericles advised, the Athenians left the country open to the ravages of the invading forces, and themselves retired within the city. In spite of the resentment of those who saw their property being laid waste, Pericles maintained his ascendency, and persuaded the people to devote their energies to sending out an irresistible fleet, and to establishing a great reserve both of ships and treasure, which were to be an annual charge and brought into active use only in the case of dire emergency.

The fleet sailed round the Peloponnese, and the ravages it was able to inflict, with the alarm it created, caused the withdrawal of the forces in Attica.

In that winter Pericles delivered a great funeral oration, or panegyric, in memory of the Athenians who had so far fallen gloriously in defence of their country, in which he painted the characteristic virtues of the Athenian people in such a fashion as to rouse to the highest pitch the patriotic pride of his countrymen, and their confidence in themselves, in their future, and in their leader.

_II.--Early Successes of Athens_

In the second year of the war, Athens suffered from a fearful visitation of the plague, which, however, made no way in the Peloponnese. It broke out also among the reinforcements dispatched to Potidaea; and it required all the skill of Pericles to reconcile the Athenians to the continuation of the war, after seeing their territories overrun for the second time for six weeks. By dint of dwelling on the supreme importance of their decisive command of the sea, and on the vast financial resources which secured their staying power, he maintained his ascendency until his death in the following year, though he had to submit to a fine. The events which followed his death only confirmed the profundity of his political judgment, and the accuracy with which he had gauged the capacities of the state. In that winter Potidaea was forced to capitulate to the Athenians.

In the summer of the third year, the Lacedaemonians called on the Plataeans to desert the Athenian alliance. On their refusal, Plataea was besieged by the allied forces of the Peloponnesians. With splendid resolution, the Plataeans defeated the attempt of the allies to force an entry till they were able to complete and withdraw behind a second and more easily tenable line of defence, when the Peloponnesians settled down to a regular investment. The same year was marked by the brilliant operations of the Athenian admiral Phormio in the neighbourhood of Naupactus.

On the other hand, a Peloponnesian squadron threatened the Piraeus, caused some temporary panic, and awakened the Athenians to the necessity of maintaining a look-out, but otherwise effected little. The year is further noted for the invasion of Macedonia by the Thracian or Scythian king Sitalces, who was, however, induced to retire.

In the next year, Lesbos revolted against the Athenian supremacy. As a result, an Athenian squadron blockaded Mitylene. The Lacedaaeonians were well pleased to accept alliance with a sea-power which claimed to have struck against Athens, not as being subject to her, but in antic.i.p.ation of attempted subjugation. The prompt equipment, however, of another Athenian fleet chilled the naval enthusiasm of Sparta.

During this winter the Plataeans began to feel in straits from shortage of supplies, and it was resolved that a party of them should break through the siege lines, and escape to Athens, a feat of arms which was brilliantly and successfully accomplished.

In the next--the fifth--summer, Mitylene capitulated; the fate of the inhabitants was to be referred to Athens. Here Cleon had now become the popular leader, and he persuaded the Athenians to order the whole of the adult males to be put to death. The opposition, however, succeeded in getting this bloodthirsty resolution rescinded. The second dispatch, racing desperately after the first, did not succeed in overtaking it, but was just in time to prevent the order for the ma.s.sacre from being carried out. Lesbos was divided among Athenian citizens, who left the Lesbians in occupation as before, but drew a large rental from them.

In the same summer the remaining garrison of Plataea surrendered to the Lacedaemonians, on terms to be decided by Lacedaemonian commissioners.

Before them the Plataeans justified their resistance, but the commissioners ignored the defence, and, on the pretext that the only question was whether they had suffered any "wrong" at the hands of the Plataeans, and that the answer to that was obvious, put the Plataeans to death and razed the city to the ground.

Meanwhile, at Corcyra, the popular and the oligarchical parties, who favoured the Athenians and Peloponnesians respectively, had reached the stage of murderous hostility to each other. The oligarchs captured the government, and were then in turn attacked by the popular party; and there was savage faction fighting. An attempt was made by the commander of the Athenian squadron at Naupactus to act as moderator; the appearance of a Peloponnesian squadron and a confused sea-fight, somewhat in favour of the latter, brought the popular party to the verge of a compromise. But the Peloponnesians retired on the reported approach of a fresh Athenian fleet, and a democratic reign of terror followed.

"The father slew the son, and the supplicants were torn from the temples and slain near them." And thus was initiated the peculiar horror of this war--the desperate civil strife in one city after another, oligarchs hoping to triumph by Lacedaemonian and democrats by Athenian, support, and either party, when uppermost, ruling by terror. It was at this time also that the Ionian and Dorian cities of Sicily, headed by Leontini and Syracuse respectively, went to war with each other, and an Athenian squadron was first induced to partic.i.p.ate in the struggle.

Among the operations of the next, or sixth, summer was a campaign which the Athenian commander Demosthenes conducted in aetolia--successful at the outset, but terminating in disaster, which made the general afraid to return to Athens. He seized a chance, however, of recovering his credit by foiling a Lacedaemonian expedition against Naupactus; and in other ways he successfully established a high military reputation, so that he was no longer afraid to reappear at Athens.

Next year, the Athenians dispatched a larger fleet with Sicily for its objective. Demosthenes, however, who had a project of his own in view, was given an independent command. He was thus enabled to seize and fortify Pylos, a position on the south-west of Peloponnese, with a harbour sheltered by the isle of Sphacteria. The Spartans, in alarm, withdrew their invading force from Attica, and attempted to recover Pylos, landing over 400 of their best men on Sphacteria. The locality now became the scene of a desperate struggle, which finally resulted in the Spartans on Sphacteria being completely isolated.

So seriously did the Lacedaemonians regard this blow that they invited the Athenians to make peace virtually in terms of an equal alliance; but the Athenians were now so confident of a triumphant issue that they refused the terms--chiefly at the instigation of Cleon. Some supplies, however, were got into Sphacteria, owing to the high rewards offered by the Lacedaemonians for successful blockade-running. At this moment, Cleon, the Athenian demagogue, having rashly declared that he could easily capture Sphacteria, was taken at his word and sent to do it. He had the wit, however, to choose Demosthenes for his colleague, and to take precisely the kind of troops Demosthenes wanted; with the result that within twenty days, as he had promised, the Spartans found themselves with no other alternatives than annihilation or surrender.

Their choice of the latter was an overwhelming blow to Lacedaemonian prestige.

_III.--Victories of Lacedaemon_

The capture of the island of Cythera in the next summer gave the Athenians a second strong station from which they could constantly menace the Peloponnese. On the other hand, in this year the Sicilians were awakening to the fact that Athens was not playing a disinterested part on behalf of the Ionian states, but was dreaming of a Sicilian empire. At a sort of peace congress, Hermocrates of Syracuse successfully urged all Sicilians to compose their quarrels on the basis of _uti possidetis,_ and thus deprive the Athenians of any excuse for remaining. Thus for the time Athenian aspirations in that quarter were checked.

At Megara this year the dissensions of the oligarchical and popular factions almost resulted in its capture by the Athenians. The Lacedaemonian Brasidas, however--who had distinguished himself at Pylos--effected an entry, so that the oligarchical and Peloponnesian party became permanently established in power. The most important operations were now in two fields. Brasidas made a dash through Thessaly into Macedonia, in alliance with Perdiccas of Macedon, with the hope of stirring the cities of Chalcidice to throw off the Athenian yoke; and the democrats of Boeotia intrigued with Athens to a.s.sist in a general revolution. Owing partly to misunderstandings and partly to treachery, the Boeotian democrats failed to carry out their programme, the Athenians were defeated at Delium, and Delium itself was captured by the Boeotians.

Meanwhile, Brasidas succeeded in persuading Acanthus to revolt, he himself winning the highest of reputations for justice and moderation as well as for military skill. Later in the year he suddenly turned his forces against the Athenian colony of Amphipolis, which he induced to surrender by offering very favourable terms before Thucydides, who was in command of Thasos, arrived to relieve it. The further successes of Brasidas during this winter made the Athenians ready to treat for peace, and a truce was agreed upon for twelve months. Brasidas, however, continued to render aid to the subject cities which revolted from Athens--this being now the ninth year of the war--but he failed in an attempt to capture Potidaea.

The period of truce terminating without any definite peace being arrived at, the summer of the tenth year is chiefly notable for the expedition sent under Cleon to recover Amphipolis, and for a recrudescence of the old quarrel in Sicily between Leontini and Syracuse. Before Amphipolis, the incompetent Cleon was routed by the skill of Brasidas; but the victor as well as the vanquished was slain, though he lived long enough to know of the victory. Their deaths removed two of the most zealous opponents of the peace for which both sides were now anxious. Hence at the close of the tenth year a definite peace was concluded.

The Lacedaemonians, however, were almost alone in being fully satisfied by the terms, and the war was really continued by an anti-Laconian confederation of the former Peloponnesian allies, who saw in the peace a means to the excessive preponderance of Athens and Sparta. Argos was brought into the new confederacy in the hope of establishing her nominal equality with Sparta. For some years from this point the combinations of the states were constantly changing, while Athens and Sparta remained generally on terms of friendliness, the two prominent figures at Athens being the conservative Nicias and the restless and ambitious young intriguer Alcibiades.