The World as Will and Idea Volume II Part 11

[Metals circle with Alkalis circle inside it]

Figure 2

When this is transposed into the first figure the minor must be converted, and thus runs: "Some metals are alkalis." It therefore merely a.s.serts that some metals lie in the sphere "alkalis," thus [Figure 1], while our actual knowledge is that all alkalis lie in the sphere "metals," thus [Figure 2]: It follows that if the first figure is to be regarded as the only normal one, in order to think naturally we would have to think less than we know, and to think indefinitely while we know definitely. This a.s.sumption has too much against it. Thus in general it must be denied that when we draw inferences in the second and third figures we tacitly convert a proposition. On the contrary, the third, and also the second, figure exhibits just as rational a process of thought as the first. Let us now consider another example of the other cla.s.s of the third figure, in which the separableness of two predicates is the result; on account of which one premiss must here be negative:

No Buddhist believes in a G.o.d; Some Buddhists are rational: Therefore some rational beings do not believe in a G.o.d.

As in the examples given above the _compatibility_ of two properties is the problem of reflection, now their _separableness_ is its problem, which here also must be decided by comparing them with _one_ subject and showing that _one_ of them is present in it without the _other_. Thus the end is directly attained, while by means of the first figure it could only be attained indirectly. For in order to reduce the syllogism to the first figure we must convert the minor, and therefore say: "Some rational beings are Buddhists," which would be only a faulty expression of its meaning, which really is: "Some Buddhists are yet certainly rational."

As the guiding principle of this figure I therefore give: for the affirmative moods: _Ejusdem rei not, modo sit altera universalis, sibi invicem sunt not particulares_; and for the negative moods: _Nota rei competens, not eidem repugnanti, particulariter repugnat, modo sit altera universalis_. Translated: If two predicates are affirmed of one subject, and at least one of them universally, they are also affirmed of each other particularly; and, on the contrary, they are denied of each other particularly whenever one of them contradicts the subject of which the other is affirmed; provided always that either the contradiction or the affirmation be universal.

In the _fourth figure_ the subject of the major has to be compared with the predicate of the minor; but in the conclusion they must both exchange their value and position, so that what was the subject of the major appears as the predicate of the conclusion, and what was the predicate of the minor appears as the subject of the conclusion. By this it becomes apparent that this figure is merely the _first_, wilfully turned upside down, and by no means the expression of a real process of thought natural to the reason.

On the other hand, the first three figures are the ectypes of three real and essentially different operations of thought. They have this in common, that they consist in the comparison of two judgments; but such a comparison only becomes fruitful when these judgments have _one_ conception in common. If we present the premisses to our imagination under the sensible form of two rods, we can think of this conception as a clasp that links them to each other; indeed in lecturing one might provide oneself with such rods. On the other hand, the three figures are distinguished by this, that those judgments are compared either with reference to the subjects of both, or to the predicates of both, or lastly, with reference to the subject of the one and the predicate of the other. Since now every conception has the property of being subject or predicate only because it is already part of a judgment, this confirms my view that in the syllogism only judgments are primarily compared, and conceptions only because they are parts of judgments. In the comparison of two judgments, however, the essential question is, in _respect of what_ are they compared? not _by what means_ are they compared? The former consists of the concepts which are different in the two judgments; the latter consists of the middle, that is, the conception which is identical in both. It is therefore not the right point of view which Lambert, and indeed really Aristotle, and almost all the moderns have taken in starting from the _middle_ in the a.n.a.lysis of syllogisms, and making it the princ.i.p.al matter and its position the essential characteristic of the syllogisms. On the contrary, its role is only secondary, and its position a consequence of the logical value of the conceptions which are really to be compared in the syllogism. These may be compared to two substances which are to be chemically tested, and the middle to the reagent by which they are tested. It therefore always takes the place which the conceptions to be compared leave vacant, and does not appear again in the conclusion.

It is selected according to our knowledge of its relation to both the conceptions and its suitableness for the place it has to take up.

Therefore in many cases we can change it at pleasure for another without affecting the syllogism. For example, in the syllogism:

All men are mortal; Caius is a man:

I can exchange the middle "man" for "animal existence." In the syllogism:

All diamonds are stones; All diamonds are combustible:

I can exchange the middle "diamond" for "anthracite." As an external mark by which we can recognise at once the figure of a syllogism the middle is certainly very useful. But as the fundamental characteristic of a thing which is to be explained, we must take what is essential to it; and what is essential here is, whether we place two propositions together in order to compare their predicates or their subjects, or the predicate of the one and the subject of the other.

Therefore, in order as premisses to yield a conclusion, two judgments must have a conception in common; further, they must not both be negative, nor both particular; and lastly, in the case in which the conceptions to be compared are the subjects of both, they must not both be affirmative.

The voltaic pile may be regarded as a sensible image of the syllogism. Its point of indifference, at the centre, represents the middle, which holds together the two premisses, and by virtue of which they have the power of yielding a conclusion. The two different conceptions, on the other hand, which are really what is to be compared, are represented by the two opposite poles of the pile. Only because these are brought together by means of their two conducting wires, which represent the copulas of the two judgments, is the spark emitted upon their contact-the new light of the conclusion.

Chapter XI.(22) On Rhetoric.

Eloquence is the faculty of awakening in others our view of a thing, or our opinion about it, of kindling in them our feeling concerning it, and thus putting them in sympathy with us. And all this by conducting the stream of our thought into their minds, through the medium of words, with such force as to carry their thought from the direction it has already taken, and sweep it along with ours in its course. The more their previous course of thought differs from ours, the greater is this achievement. From this it is easily understood how personal conviction and pa.s.sion make a man eloquent; and in general, eloquence is more the gift of nature than the work of art; yet here, also, art will support nature.

In order to convince another of a truth which conflicts with an error he firmly holds, the first rule to be observed, is an easy and natural one: _let the premisses come first, and the conclusion follow_. Yet this rule is seldom observed, but reversed; for zeal, eagerness, and dogmatic positiveness urge us to proclaim the conclusion loudly and noisily against him who adheres to the opposed error. This easily makes him shy, and now he opposes his will to all reasons and premisses, knowing already to what conclusion they lead. Therefore we ought rather to keep the conclusion completely concealed, and only advance the premisses distinctly, fully, and in different lights. Indeed, if possible, we ought not to express the conclusion at all. It will come necessarily and regularly of its own accord into the reason of the hearers, and the conviction thus born in themselves will be all the more genuine, and will also be accompanied by self-esteem instead of shame. In difficult cases we may even a.s.sume the air of desiring to arrive at a quite opposite conclusion from that which we really have in view. An example of this is the famous speech of Antony in Shakspeare's "Julius Caesar."

In defending a thing many persons err by confidently advancing everything imaginable that can be said for it, mixing up together what is true, half true, and merely plausible. But the false is soon recognised, or at any rate felt, and throws suspicion also upon the cogent and true arguments which were brought forward along with it. Give then the true and weighty pure and alone, and beware of defending a truth with inadequate, and therefore, since they are set up as adequate, sophistical reasons; for the opponent upsets these, and thereby gains the appearance of having upset the truth itself which was supported by them, that is, he makes _argumenta ad hominem_ hold good as _argumenta ad rem_. The Chinese go, perhaps, too far the other way, for they have the saying: "He who is eloquent and has a sharp tongue may always leave half of a sentence unspoken; and he who has right on his side may confidently yield three-tenths of his a.s.sertion."

Chapter XII.(23) On The Doctrine Of Science.

From the a.n.a.lysis of the different functions of our intellect given in the whole of the preceding chapters, it is clear that for a correct use of it, either in a theoretical or a practical reference, the following conditions are demanded: (1.) The correct apprehension through perception of the real things taken into consideration, and of all their essential properties and relations, thus of all _data_. (2.) The construction of correct conceptions out of these; thus the connotation of those properties under correct abstractions, which now become the material of the subsequent thinking. (3.) The comparison of those conceptions both with the perceived object and among themselves, and with the rest of our store of conceptions, so that correct judgments, pertinent to the matter in hand, and fully comprehending and exhausting it, may proceed from them; thus the right _estimation_ of the matter. (4.) The placing together or _combination_ of those judgments as the premisses of _syllogisms_. This may be done very differently according to the choice and arrangement of the judgments, and yet the actual _result_ of the whole operation primarily depends upon it. What is really of importance here is that from among so many possible combinations of those different judgments which have to do with the matter free deliberation should hit upon the very ones which serve the purpose and are decisive. But if in the first function, that is, in the apprehension through perception of the things and relations, any single essential point has been overlooked, the correctness of all the succeeding operations of the mind cannot prevent the result from being false; for there lie the data, the material of the whole investigation. Without the certainty that these are correctly and completely collected, one ought to abstain, in important matters, from any definite decision.

A conception is _correct_; a judgment is _true_; a body is _real_; and a relation is _evident_. A proposition of immediate certainty is an _axiom_.

Only the fundamental principles of logic, and those of mathematics drawn _a priori_ from intuition or perception, and finally also the law of causality, have immediate certainty. A proposition of indirect certainty is a maxim, and that by means of which it obtains its certainty is the proof. If immediate certainty is attributed to a proposition which has no such certainty, this is a _pet.i.tio principii_. A proposition which appeals directly to the empirical perception is an _a.s.sertion_: to confront it with such perception demands judgment. Empirical perception can primarily afford us only _particular_, not universal truths. Through manifold repet.i.tion and confirmation such truths indeed obtain a certain universality also, but it is only comparative and precarious, because it is still always open to attack. But if a proposition has absolute universality, the perception to which it appeals is not empirical but _a priori_. Thus Logic and Mathematics alone are absolutely certain sciences; but they really teach us only what we already knew beforehand. For they are merely explanations of that of which we are conscious _a priori_, the forms of our own knowledge, the one being concerned with the forms of thinking, the other with those of perceiving. Therefore we spin them entirely out of ourselves. All other scientific knowledge is empirical.

A proof proves _too much_ if it extends to things or cases of which that which is to be proved clearly does not hold good; therefore it is refuted apagogically by these. The _deductio ad absurdum_ properly consists in this, that we take a false a.s.sertion which has been made as the major proposition of a syllogism, then add to it a correct minor, and arrive at a conclusion which clearly contradicts facts of experience or unquestionable truths. But by some round-about way such a refutation must be possible of every false doctrine. For the defender of this will yet certainly recognise and admit some truth or other, and then the consequences of this, and on the other hand those of the false a.s.sertion, must be followed out until we arrive at two propositions which directly contradict each other. We find many examples in Plato of this beautiful artifice of genuine dialectic.

A _correct hypothesis_ is nothing more than the true and complete expression of the present fact, which the originator of the hypothesis has intuitively apprehended in its real nature and inner connection. For it tells us only what really takes place here.

The opposition of the _a.n.a.lytical_ and _synthetical_ methods we find already indicated by Aristotle, yet perhaps first distinctly described by Proclus, who says quite correctly: "?e??d?? de pa?ad?d??ta?; ?a???st? e?

? d?a t?? a?a??se?? ep? a???? ???????e??? a?a???sa t? ??t??e???; ?? ?a?

??at??, ?? fas?, ?a?daa?t? pa?ed??e?. ?.t.?." (_Methodi traduntur sequentes: pulcherrima quidem ea, quae per a.n.a.lysin quaesitum refert ad principium, de quo jam convenit; quam etiam Plato Laodamanti tradidisse dicitur._) "_In Primum Euclidis Librum_," L. iii. Certainly the a.n.a.lytical method consists in referring what is given to an admitted principle; the synthetical method, on the contrary, in deduction from such a principle.

They are therefore a.n.a.logous to the epa???? and apa???? explained in chapter ix.; only the latter are not used to establish propositions, but always to overthrow them. The a.n.a.lytical method proceeds from the facts; the particular, to the principle or rule; the universal, or from the consequents to the reasons; the other conversely. Therefore it would be much more correct to call them _the inductive and the deductive methods_, for the customary names are unsuitable and do not fully express the things.

If a philosopher tries to begin by thinking out the methods in accordance with which he will philosophise, he is like a poet who first writes a system of aesthetics in order to poetise in accordance with it. Both of them may be compared to a man who first sings himself a tune and afterwards dances to it. The thinking mind must find its way from original tendency. Rule and application, method and achievement, must, like matter and form, be inseparable. But after we have reached the goal we may consider the path we have followed. aesthetics and methodology are, from their nature, younger than poetry and philosophy; as grammar is younger than language, thorough ba.s.s younger than music, and logic younger than thought.

This is a fitting place to make, in pa.s.sing, a remark by means of which I should like to check a growing evil while there is yet time. That Latin has ceased to be the language of all scientific investigations has the disadvantage that there is no longer an immediately common scientific literature for the whole of Europe, but national literatures. And thus every scholar is primarily limited to a much smaller public, and moreover to a public hampered with national points of view and prejudices. Then he must now learn the four princ.i.p.al European languages, as well as the two ancient languages. In this it will be a great a.s.sistance to him that the _termini technici_ of all sciences (with the exception of mineralogy) are, as an inheritance from our predecessors, Latin or Greek. Therefore all nations wisely retain these. Only the Germans have hit upon the unfortunate idea of wishing to Germanise the _termini technici_ of all the sciences. This has two great disadvantages. First, the foreign and also the German scholar is obliged to learn all the technical terms of his science twice, which, when there are many-for example, in Anatomy-is an incredibly tiresome and lengthy business. If the other nations were not in this respect wiser than the Germans, we would have the trouble of learning every _terminus technicus_ five times. If the Germans carry this further, foreign men of learning will leave their books altogether unread; for besides this fault they are for the most part too diffuse, and are written in a careless, bad, and often affected and objectionable style, and besides are generally conceived with a rude disregard of the reader and his requirements. Secondly, those Germanised forms of the _termini technici_ are almost throughout long, patched-up, stupidly chosen, awkward, jarring words, not clearly separated from the rest of the language, which therefore impress themselves with difficulty upon the memory, while the Greek and Latin expressions chosen by the ancient and memorable founders of the sciences possess the whole of the opposite good qualities, and easily impress themselves on the memory by their sonorous sound. What an ugly, harsh-sounding word, for instance, is "_Stickstoff_"

instead of _azot_! "_Verb.u.m_," "_substantiv_," "_adjectiv_," are remembered and distinguished more easily than "_Zeitwort_," "_Nennwort_,"

"_Beiwort_," or even "_Umstandswort_" instead of "_adverbium_." In Anatomy it is quite unsupportable, and moreover vulgar and low. Even "_Pulsader_"

and "_Blutader_" are more exposed to momentary confusion than "_Arterie_"

and "_Vene_;" but utterly bewildering are such expressions as "_Fruchthalter_," "_Fruchtgang_," and "_Fruchtleiter_" instead of "_uterus_," "_v.a.g.i.n.a_," and "_tuba Faloppii_," which yet every doctor must know, and which he will find sufficient in all European languages. In the same way "_Speiche_" and "_Ellenbogenrohre_" instead of "_radius_" and "_ulna_," which all Europe has understood for thousands of years.

Wherefore then this clumsy, confusing, drawling, and awkward Germanising?

Not less objectionable is the translation of the technical terms in Logic, in which our gifted professors of philosophy are the creators of a new terminology, and almost every one of them has his own. With G. E. Schulze, for example, the subject is called "_Grundbegriff_," the predicate "_Beilegungsbegriff_;" then there are "_Beilegungsschlusse_,"

"_Voraussetzungsschlusse_," and "_Entgegensetzungsschlusse_;" the judgments have "_Grosse_," "_Beschaffenheit_," "_Verhaltniss_," and "_Zuverla.s.sigkeit_," _i.e._, quant.i.ty, quality, relation, and modality.

The same perverse influence of this Germanising mania is to be found in all the sciences. The Latin and Greek expressions have the further advantage that they stamp the scientific conception as such, and distinguish it from the words of common intercourse, and the ideas which cling to them through a.s.sociation; while, for example, "_Speisebrei_"

instead of _chyme_ seems to refer to the food of little children, and "_Lungensack_" instead of _pleura_, and "_Herzbeutel_" instead of _pericardium_ seem to have been invented by butchers rather than anatomists. Besides this, the most immediate necessity of learning the ancient languages depends upon the old _termini technici_, and they are more and more in danger of being neglected through the use of living languages in learned investigations. But if it comes to this, if the spirit of the ancients bound up with their languages disappears from a liberal education, then coa.r.s.eness, insipidity, and vulgarity will take possession of the whole of literature. For the works of the ancients are the pole-star of every artistic or literary effort; if it sets they are lost. Even now we can observe from the miserable and puerile style of most writers that they have never written Latin.(24) The study of the cla.s.sical authors is very properly called the study of _Humanity_, for through it the student first becomes a _man_ again, for he enters into the world which was still free from all the absurdities of the Middle Ages and of romanticism, which afterwards penetrated so deeply into mankind in Europe that even now every one comes into the world covered with it, and has first to strip it off simply to become a man again. Think not that your modern wisdom can ever supply the place of that initiation into manhood; ye are not, like the Greeks and Romans, born freemen, unfettered sons of nature. Ye are first the sons and heirs of the barbarous Middle Ages and of their madness, of infamous priestcraft, and of half-brutal, half-childish chivalry. Though both now gradually approach their end, yet ye cannot yet stand on your own feet. Without the school of the ancients your literature will degenerate into vulgar gossip and dull philistinism.

Thus for all these reasons it is my well-intended counsel that an end be put at once to the Germanising mania condemned above.

I shall further take the opportunity of denouncing here the disorder which for some years has been introduced into German orthography in an unprecedented manner. Scribblers of every species have heard something of conciseness of expression, but do not know that this consists in the careful omission of everything superfluous (to which, it is true, the whole of their writings belong), but imagine they can arrive at it by clipping the words as swindlers clip coin; and every syllable which appears to them superfluous, because they do not feel its value, they cut off without more ado. For example, our ancestors, with true tact, said "_Beweis_" and "_Verweis_;" but, on the other hand, "_Nachweisung_." The fine distinction a.n.a.logous to that between "_Versuch_" and "_Versuchung_,"

"_Betracht_" and "_Betrachtung_," is not perceptible to dull ears and thick skulls; therefore they have invented the word "_Nachweis_," which has come at once into general use, for this only requires that an idea should be thoroughly awkward and a blunder very gross. Accordingly a similar amputation has already been proposed in innumerable words; for example, instead of "_Untersuchung_" is written "_Untersuch_;" nay, even instead of "_allmalig_," "_malig_;" instead of "_beinahe_," "_nahe_;"

instead of "_bestandig_," "_standig_." If a Frenchman took upon himself to write "_pres_" instead of "_presque_," or if an Englishman wrote "_most_"

instead of "_almost_," they would be laughed at by every one as fools; but in Germany whoever does this sort of thing pa.s.ses for a man of originality. Chemists already write "_loslich_" and "_unloslich_" instead of "_unaufloslich_," and if the grammarians do not rap them over the knuckles they will rob the language of a valuable word. Knots, shoe-strings, and also conglomerates of which the cement is softened, and all a.n.a.logous things are "_loslich_" (can be loosed); but what is "_aufloslich_" (soluble), on the other hand, is whatever vanishes in a liquid, like salt in water. "_Auflosen_" (to dissolve) is the _terminus ad hoc_, which says this and nothing else, marking out a definite conception; but our acute improvers of the language wish to empty it into the general rinsing-pan "_losen_" (to loosen); they would therefore in consistency be obliged to make "_losen_" also take the place everywhere of "_ablosen_"

(to relieve, used of guards), "_auslosen_" (to release), "_einlosen_" (to redeem), &c., and in these, as in the former case, deprive the language of definiteness of expression. But to make the language poorer by a word means to make the thought of the nation poorer by a conception. Yet this is the tendency of the united efforts of almost all our writers of books for the last ten or twenty years. For what I have shown here by _one_ example can be supported by a hundred others, and the meanest stinting of syllables prevails like a disease. The miserable wretches actually count the letters, and do not hesitate to mutilate a word, or to use one in a false sense, whenever by doing so they can gain two letters. He who is capable of no new thoughts will at least bring new words to market, and every ink-slinger regards it as his vocation to improve the language.

Journalists practise this most shamelessly; and since their papers, on account of the trivial nature of their contents, have the largest public, indeed a public which for the most part reads nothing else, a great danger threatens the language through them. I therefore seriously advise that they should be subjected to an orthographical censorship, or that they should be made to pay a fine for every unusual or mutilated word; for what could be more improper than that changes of language should proceed from the lowest branch of literature? Language, especially a relatively speaking original language like German, is the most valuable inheritance of a nation, and it is also an exceedingly complicated work of art, easily injured, and which cannot again be restored, therefore a _noli me tangere_. Other nations have felt this, and have shown great piety towards their languages, although far less complete than German. Therefore the language of Dante and Petrarch differs only in trifles from that of to-day; Montaigne is still quite readable, and so also is Shakspeare in his oldest editions. For a German indeed it is good to have somewhat long words in his mouth; for he thinks slowly, and they give him time to reflect. But this prevailing economy of language shows itself in yet more characteristic phenomena. For example, in opposition to all logic and grammar, they use the imperfect for the perfect and pluperfect; they often stick the auxiliary verb in their pocket; they use the ablative instead of the genitive; for the sake of omitting a couple of logical particles they make such intricate sentences that one has to read them four times over in order to get at the sense; for it is only the paper and not the reader's time that they care to spare. In proper names, after the manner of Hottentots, they do not indicate the case either by inflection or article: the reader may guess it. But they are specially fond of contracting the double vowel and dropping the lengthening _h_, those letters sacred to prosody; which is just the same thing as if we wanted to banish ? and ?

from Greek, and make e and ? take their place. Whoever writes _Scham_, _Marchen_, _Ma.s.s_, _Spa.s.s_, ought also to write _Lon_, _Son_, _Stat_, _Sat_, _Jar_, _Al_, &c. But since writing is the copy of speech, posterity will imagine that one ought to speak as one writes; and then of the German language there will only remain a narrow, mouth-distorting, jarring noise of consonants, and all prosody will be lost. The spelling "_Literatur_"

instead of the correct "_Litteratur_" is also very much liked, because it saves a letter. In defence of this the participle of the verb _linere_ is given as the root of the word. But _linere_ means to smear; therefore the favoured spelling might actually be correct for the greater part of German bookmaking; so that one could distinguish a very small "_Litteratur_" from a very extensive "_Literatur._" In order to write concisely let a man improve his style and shun all useless gossip and chatter, and then he will not need to cut out syllables and letters on account of the dearness of paper. But to write so many useless pages, useless sheets, useless books, and then to want to make up this waste of time and paper at the cost of the innocent syllables and letters-that is truly the superlative of what is called in English being penny wise and pound foolish. It is to be regretted that there is no German Academy to take charge of the language against literary _sans-culottism_, especially in an age when even those who are ignorant of the ancient language venture to employ the press. I have expressed my mind more fully on the whole subject of the inexcusable mischief being done at the present day to the German language in my "Parerga," vol. ii. chap. 23.

In my essay on the principle of sufficient reason, -- 51, I already proposed a first _cla.s.sification of the sciences_ in accordance with the form of the principle of sufficient reason which reigns in them; and I also touched upon it again in ---- 7 and 15 of the first volume of this work. I will give here a small attempt at such a cla.s.sification, which will yet no doubt be susceptible of much improvement and perfecting:-

I. Pure _a priori_ Sciences.

1. The doctrine of the ground of being.

(_a._) In s.p.a.ce: Geometry.