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The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll.
Vol. 11.
by Robert G. Ingersoll.
ADDRESS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT.
ON the 22d of October, 1883, a vast number of citizens met at Lincoln Hall, Washington, D. C., to give expression to their views concerning the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in which it is held that the Civil Rights Act is unconst.i.tutional.
Col. Robert G. Ingersoll was one of the speakers.
The Hon. Frederick Dougla.s.s introduced him as follows:
Abou Ben Adhem--(may his tribe increase!) Awoke one night from a deep dream of peace, And saw within the moonlight of his room, Making it rich and like a lily in bloom, An angel writing in a book of gold: Exceeding peace had made Ben Adhem bold; And to the presence in the room he said, "What writest thou?" The vision raised its head, And, with a look made all of sweet accord, Answered, "The names of those who love the Lord."
"And is mine one?" asked Abou. "Nay, not so,"
Replied the angel. Abou spoke more low, But cheerily still; and said, "I pray thee, then, Write me as one that loves his fellow-men."
The angel wrote, and vanished. The next night It came again, with a great wakening light, And showed the names whom love of G.o.d had blest; And, lo! Ben Adhem's name led all the rest.
I have the honor to introduce Robert G. Ingersoll.
MR. INGERSOLL'S SPEECH.
Ladies and Gentlemen:
We have met for the purpose of saying a few words about the recent decision of the Supreme Court, in which that tribunal has held the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act to be unconst.i.tutional; and so held in spite of the fact that for years the people of the North and South have, with singular unanimity, supposed the Act to be const.i.tutional--supposed that it was upheld by the 13th and 14th Amendments,--and so supposed because they knew with certainty the intention of the framers of the amendments. They knew this intention, because they knew what the enemies of the amendments and the enemies of the Civil Rights Act claimed was the intention. And they also knew what the friends of the amendments and the law admitted the intention to be. The prejudices born of ignorance and of slavery had died or fallen asleep, and even the enemies of the amendments and the law had accepted the situation.
But I shall speak of the decision as I feel, and in the same manner as I should speak even in the presence of the Court. You must remember that I am not attacking persons, but opinions--not motives, but reasons--not judges, but decisions.
The Supreme Court has decided:
1. That the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875, are unconst.i.tutional, as applied to the States--not being authorized by the 13th and 14th Amendments.
2. That the 14th Amendment is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation forbidden to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it, is not "direct" legislation, but "corrective,"--such as may be necessary or proper for counteracting and restraining the effect of laws or acts pa.s.sed or done by the several States.
3. That the 13th Amendment relates only to slavery and involuntary servitude, which it abolishes.
4. That the 13th Amendment establishes universal freedom in the United States.
5. That Congress may probably pa.s.s laws directly enforcing its provisions.
6. That such legislative power in Congress extends only to the subject of slavery, and its incidents.
7. That the denial of equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances and places of public amus.e.m.e.nt, imposes no badge of slavery or involuntary servitude upon the party, but at most infringes rights which are protected from State aggression by the 14th Amendment.
8. The Court is uncertain whether the accommodations and privileges sought to be protected by the first and second sections of the Civil Rights Act are or are not rights const.i.tutionally demandable,--and if they are, in what form they are to be protected.
9. Neither does the Court decide whether the law, as it stands, is operative in the Territories and the District of Columbia.
10. Neither does the Court decide whether Congress, under the commercial power, may or may not pa.s.s a law securing to all persons equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between two or more States.
11. The Court also holds, in the present case, that until some State law has been pa.s.sed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been taken adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the 14th Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment, or any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity, for the reason that the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority. The essence of said decision being, that the managers and owners of inns, railways, and all public conveyances, of theatres and all places of public amus.e.m.e.nt, may discriminate on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and that the citizen so discriminated against, is without redress.
This decision takes from seven millions of people the shield of the Const.i.tution. It leaves the best of the colored race at the mercy of the meanest of the white. It feeds fat the ancient grudge that vicious ignorance bears toward race and color. It will be approved and quoted by hundreds of thousands of unjust men. The masked wretches who, in the darkness of night, drag the poor negro from his cabin, and lacerate with whip and thong his quivering flesh, will, with b.l.o.o.d.y hands, applaud the Supreme Court. The men who, by mob violence, prevent the negro from depositing his ballot--who with gun and revolver drive him from the polls, and those who insult with vile and vulgar words the inoffensive colored girl, will welcome this decision with hyena joy. The basest will rejoice--the n.o.blest will mourn.
But even in the presence of this decision, we must remember that it is one of the necessities of government that there should be a court of last resort; and while all courts will more or less fail to do justice, still, the wit of man has, as yet, devised no better way. Even after reading this decision, we must take it for granted that the judges of the Supreme Court arrived at their conclusions honestly and in accordance with the best light they had. While they had the right to render the decision, every citizen has the right to give his opinion as to whether that decision is good or bad. Knowing that they are liable to be mistaken, and honestly mistaken, we should always be charitable enough to admit that others may be mistaken; and we may also take another step, and admit that we may be mistaken about their being mistaken. We must remember, too, that we have to make judges out of men, and that by being made judges their prejudices are not diminished and their intelligence is not increased. No matter whether a man wears a crown or a robe or a rag. Under the emblem of power and the emblem of poverty, the man alike resides. The real thing is the man--the distinction often exists only in the clothes. Take away the crown--there is only a man. Remove the robe--there remains a man. Take away the rag, and we find at least a man.
There was a time in this country when all bowed to a decision of the Supreme Court. It was unquestioned. It was regarded as "a voice from on high." The people heard and they obeyed. The Dred Scott decision destroyed that illusion forever. From that day to this the people have claimed the privilege of putting the decisions of the Supreme Court in the crucible of reason. These decisions are no longer exempt from honest criticism. While the decision remains, it is the law. No matter how absurd, no matter how erroneous, no matter how contrary to reason and justice, it remains the law. It must be overturned either by the Court itself (and the Court has overturned hundreds of its own decisions), or by legislative action, or by an amendment to the Const.i.tution. We do not appeal to armed revolution. Our Government is so framed that it provides for what may be called perpetual peaceful revolution. For the redress of any grievance, for the purpose of righting any wrong, there is the perpetual remedy of an appeal to the people.
We must remember, too, that judges keep their backs to the dawn. They find what has been, what is, but not what ought to be. They are tied and shackled by precedent, fettered by old decisions, and by the desire to be consistent, even in mistakes. They pa.s.s upon the acts and words of others, and like other people, they are liable to make mistakes. In the olden time we took what the doctors gave us, we believed what the preachers said; and accepted, without question, the judgments of the highest court. Now it is different. We ask the doctor what the medicine is, and what effect he expects it to produce. We cross-examine the minister, and we criticise the decision of the Chief-Justice. We do this, because we have found that some doctors do not kill, that some ministers are quite reasonable, and that some judges know something about law. In this country, the people are the sovereigns. All officers--including judges--are simply their servants, and the sovereign has always the right to give his opinion as to the action of his agent.
The sovereignty of the people is the rock upon which rests the right of speech and the freedom of the press.
Unfortunately for us, our fathers adopted the common law of England--a law poisoned by kingly prerogative--by every form of oppression, by the spirit of caste, and permeated, saturated, with the political heresy that the people received their rights, privileges and immunities from the crown. The thirteen original colonies received their laws, their forms, their ideas of justice, from the old world. All the judicial, legislative, and executive springs and sources had been touched and tainted.
In the struggle with England, our fathers justified their rebellion by declaring that Nature had clothed all men with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The moment success crowned their efforts, they changed their n.o.ble declaration of equal rights for all, and basely interpolated the word "white." They adopted a Const.i.tution that denied the Declaration of Independence--a Const.i.tution that recognized and upheld slavery, protected the slave-trade, legalized piracy upon the high seas--that demoralized, degraded, and debauched the nation, and that at last reddened with brave blood the fields of the Republic.
Our fathers planted the seeds of injustice, and we gathered the harvest.
In the blood and flame of civil war, we retraced our fathers' steps. In the stress of war, we implored the aid of Liberty, and asked once more for the protection of Justice. We civilized the Const.i.tution of our fathers. We adopted three Amendments--the 13th, 14th and 15th--the Trinity of Liberty.
Let us examine these amendments:
"Neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
"Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
Before the adoption of this amendment, the Const.i.tution had always been construed to be the perfect shield of slavery. In order that slavery might be protected, the slave States were considered as sovereign.
Freedom was regarded as a local prejudice, slavery as the ward of the Nation, the jewel of the Const.i.tution. For three-quarters of a century, the Supreme Court of the United States exhausted judicial ingenuity in guarding, protecting and fostering that infamous inst.i.tution. For the purpose of preserving that infinite outrage, words and phrases were warped, and stretched, and tortured, and thumbscrewed, and racked.
Slavery was the one sacred thing, and the Supreme Court was its const.i.tutional guardian.
To show the faithfulness of that tribunal, I call your attention to the 3d clause of the 2d section of the 4th article of the Const.i.tution:
"No person held to service or labor in any State under the laws thereof, escaping to another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
The framers of the Const.i.tution were ashamed to use the word "slave,"
and thereupon they said "person." They were ashamed to use the word "slavery," and they evaded it by saying, "held to service or labor."
They were ashamed to put in the word "master," so they called him "the party to whom service or labor may be due."
How can a slave owe service? How can a slave owe labor? How could a slave make a contract? How could the master have a legal claim against a slave? And yet, the Supreme Court of the United States found no difficulty in upholding the Fugitive Slave Law by virtue of that clause.
There were hundreds of decisions declaring that Congress had power to pa.s.s laws to carry that clause into effect, and it was carried into effect.
You will observe the wording of this clause:
"No person held to service or labor in any State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."
To whom was this clause directed? To individuals or to States? It expressly provides that the "person" held to service or labor shall not be discharged from such service or labor in consequence of any law or regulation in the "State" to which he has fled. Did that law apply to States, or to individuals?
The Supreme Court held that it applied to individuals as well as to States. Any "person," in any State, interfering with the master who was endeavoring to steal the person he called his slave, was liable to indictment, and hundreds and thousands were indicted, and hundreds languished in prisons because they were n.o.ble enough to hold in infinite contempt such infamous laws and such infamous decisions. The best men in the United States--the n.o.blest spirits under the flag--were imprisoned because they were charitable, because they were just, because they showed the hunted slave the path to freedom, and taught him where to find amid the glittering host of heaven the blessed Northern Star.