The Works of Robert G. Ingersoll Volume X Part 15

Now, gentlemen, at that time--I want you to remember it; I do not want you to forget it--when these routes came to Mr. Dorsey, he, not understanding the business, turned it over to Mr. James W. Bosler.

Mr. Bosler, as I told you before, is a man of wealth. But, say these gentlemen, "While these routes were in your possession, and while Stephen W. Dorsey had an interest in them he asked men to sign pet.i.tions in favor of an increase of trips and decrease of time." What if he did?

Suppose you have a house out here somewhere; you can pet.i.tion to have a street opened, even if you have the contract for paving the street.

You have a right to pet.i.tion to have a schoolhouse located in your neighborhood even if you have children. There is no harm about that. You certainly can pet.i.tion to have cows prevented from running at large even if there is no fence around your yard. I think you could do so without being indicted for conspiracy. I think a man might start a subscription for a church, even if he owned a brick-yard and expected to sell bricks to build it. Now, suppose I had a contract to carry the mail through the State of California from one end to the other once a week, is there any harm in my asking the people of that country to pet.i.tion to have it carried twice a week? Do you not remember what I told you? All the members of Congress out there, when they go home want to say to the people when they meet at the convention with all the delegates on hand.

"Why, gentlemen, you did not used to get the New York Herald or New York Times, or The Sun, until it was two weeks old, and now it is only a week old. Where you only had one mail I have given you three. I have got fifty thousand dollars to improve your harbor, and one hundred thousand dollars for a new custom-house. Look at me, gentlemen, I am a candidate for re-election." That is natural. This Court will instruct you that any man who is carrying a mail anywhere in the United States has the right to use his influence in getting up pet.i.tions for the increase of that service or the expedition of that time. They say Dorsey did this. What of it? They say Dorsey tried to manufacture public opinion. That is what these gentlemen of the prosecution have been doing for eighteen months, and now they object to the manufacture of public opinion. Public opinion is their stock in trade.

Leaving that charge, every man who has a contract for carrying the mail has the right to call the attention of every editor in that country to the fact that they need more mail service. He has the right to send his agents there and if the people want to pet.i.tion for more service, and if Congress is willing to give them more service, no human being has a right to complain in this manner and in a criminal court. If any offence has been committed it is of a political nature. If a member of Congress gets too much service his people can keep him at home. If he does too much for his locality they need not elect him the next time. It is a political offence for which there is a political punishment and a political remedy. So much for the right of pet.i.tion. I am perfectly willing to tell all he did in regard to the increase of service and the expedition.

While I am on that point I want you to distinctly understand what increase is and what expedition is. Increase of service means more of the same kind. Suppose I am to carry the mail from one place to another.

We will call it from Si-Wash to Oo-Ray. If I am to carry that mail once a week for five hundred dollars and they want it twice a week, I have one thousand dollars, but do not carry it any faster. That is an increase. Suppose I am carrying it in say two hundred hours and they want it carried in half that time. That is what they call expedition.

Now, the question is as to the difference in cost of carrying the mail at six miles an hour, or at two and a half, or two, or one and a half.

If I carry it slowly, I can go at a reasonable rate in the day and can lie by at night. I want you to understand distinctly the difference between increase of service, which is more of the same kind, and expedition, which means the same kind at a faster rate. Now, I can carry the mail twenty miles and back in a day and do that a great deal easier than if I were to make the distance in four or five hours. The difference is just about the same with a locomotive as with a horse. If a train runs twenty miles an hour and you want to increase its speed to thirty, it will cost altogether more than twice as much as it does to run it at twenty. If you want to increase it still further to forty or sixty, it will cost at sixty more than three times as much as at twenty.

The cost increases in an increased proportion. I want you to understand that. Now, we are charged with having done some frightful things on several of these routes, and for three days and a half your ears were filled with charges of the rascality we have perpetrated. We had some ten or eleven routes, and we are charged with having defrauded the Government on those particular routes. Let us see what my clients did.

Do not understand me as saying that because my clients have done nothing the other defendants have. I do not take that position. I take the position that according to the evidence in this case there is nothing against any of these defendants. Leave out pa.s.sion, prejudice, falsehood, and hatred and there is absolutely nothing left. If you will take from Mr. Bliss's speech all the mistakes he made in law and fact, there will be nothing left to answer; not a word. But I think it due to my client, gentlemen, my client who is not able to be in this court, my client who sits at home wrapped in darkness, that I should answer every allegation touching every route in which he was interested. I think it due to him. [Resuming]

I will call your attention to a few of the routes, possibly to all, in which my clients were interested. It will take but a short time. I want you to know whether or not these routes were important, whether it was proper to carry the mails as they were carried, whether it was proper that they should be carried from once to seven times a week, and whether it was proper that the speed should be expedited. Now, you may think after hearing the evidence that there were some routes that never should have been established; but that does not establish a conspiracy. That simply establishes the fact that Congress created routes where they were not absolutely necessary. You may come to the conclusion that General Brady ordered more trips on some of these routes than he should have ordered. That does not establish a conspiracy. The most that it could establish would be extravagance, and extravagance is not a crime. If it were, the penitentiaries of the day would not be large enough--or rather would be large enough, and too large, to hold the honest men. You may say after you have heard the evidence that the time was faster than it need be; but you must take into consideration all the connecting routes, and even if you should so feel, it is for you to say whether that establishes any conspiracy. All these things must be taken into consideration.

We will take first the route from Garland to Parrott City. ***

Now, I have gone over just a few of these charges. I have shown you that they are false; that they are without the slightest shadow of foundation in fact. Now, gentlemen, after you hear all this evidence, it is for you to determine. It is for you to say whether these men entered into a conspiracy to defraud this Government. It is for you to say whether our testimony is to be believed, or whether you are to decide this case upon the suspicions of the Government. It is for you to say whether you will believe the contracts and the witnesses, or whether you will take the prejudice of the public press; whether you will take the opinion of the Attorney-General; whether you will take the letter of some counselor at law, or whether you will be governed by the testimony in this case. It is for you to say, gentlemen, whether a man shall be found guilty on inference; whether a man shall be deprived of his liberty by prejudice.

It is for you to say whether reputation shall be destroyed by malice and by ignorance. It is for you to say whether a man who fought to sustain this Government shall not have the protection of the laws. It is for you [indicating a juror] and it is for you [indicating another juror] and you [indicating another juror] and you [indicating another juror] to say whether a man who fought to take the chains off your body shall have chains put upon his by your prejudice and by your ignorance. It is for you to say whether you will be guided by law, by evidence, by justice, and by reason, or whether you will be controlled by fear, by prejudice, and by official power. That, gentlemen, is all I wish to say in this opening.

CLOSING ADDRESS IN SECOND STAR ROUTE TRIAL

Closing Address to the Jury in the Second Star Route Trial.

MAY it please the Court and gentlemen of the jury: Perhaps some of you, may be all of you, will remember that I made one of the opening speeches of this case, and that in that opening speech I endeavored to give you the scheme or plan of the indictment. I told you, I believe, at that time, that all these defendants were indicted for having conspired together to defraud the United States. In that indictment they were kind enough to tell us how we agreed to accomplish that object; that we went into partnership with the Second a.s.sistant Postmaster-General, he being one of these defendants, and that we then and there agreed to get up false pet.i.tions, to have them signed by persons who were not interested in the mail service, to sign fict.i.tious names to these pet.i.tions, those names representing no actual, real, living persons; that we also agreed to have false and fraudulent letters written to the department urging this service; that in addition to all that we were to make and file false and fraudulent affidavits, in which we were to swear falsely as to the number of men and horses to be employed, and the number of men and horses then necessary; that in addition to that we were to file fraudulent subcontracts; that the Second a.s.sistant Postmaster-General was to make false and corrupt orders, and that all these things were to be done to deceive, mislead, and blindfold the Postmaster-General. They also set out that these orders so corruptly made were to be corruptly certified to the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post-Office Department in order that we might draw our pay. That is what is known as the general scheme or plan of this indictment. You have heard the testimony, and remember some of it. Of course you do not remember it all. Probably no man ever lived who could do such a thing. You have heard the testimony discussed, I believe, for about twenty days, so that I take it for granted you know something about it, or at least have an idea that you do. The story that we told you in the first place, and that we now tell you, is about this:

In 1877 Mr. Peck, Mr. Miner, and John W. Dorsey made up their minds to make bids and to go into the mail business. I want you to remember that there is not one word in this indictment about any false bid ever having been made. Remember that. There is nothing in this indictment about a false bond having been given; not a thing. There is nothing in this indictment charging that any of the original contracts were false. I want you to remember that. There is no evidence that any person signing any one of those contracts as security was not perfectly solvent. There is no evidence, not one syllable, that any proposal was fraudulent, or that any bid was fraudulent. How is it possible for a bid to be fraudulent? I will tell you. If you make a bid, and make a contract or enter into an agreement at the same time with some of the Post-Office officials so that your bid will be accepted when it is not the lowest, there is a fraud, and there is a fraudulent bid. There is one other way, and that is to put in a bid to carry the mail at so many thousand dollars, and then have below that straw bidders, men not responsible, and when the time comes to accept the bid of those gentlemen they refuse to carry it out, and then the law is that it shall be given to the next highest, and he refuses, and the next, and he refuses, and the next highest, and he refuses, and so on until it comes to the highest bidder.

There are such combinations and have been, I have no doubt, for many years in the Post-Office Department. That is called straw bidding, and it is fraudulent bidding. There is no such charge as that in this case.

Every bid that was made was made in good faith, and every bid that was accepted was followed by a good and sufficient contract entered into by the party making the bid, and so that is the end of that.

Now, in 1877, I say these men entered into an agreement among themselves that they would bid on certain routes, and Mr. Peck, or Mr. Miner, or John W. Dorsey--they may have it as they choose--somebody, wrote a letter to Stephen W. Dorsey and in that letter told what they were going to do and requested him to get some man to obtain information in regard to these routes. You know that testimony. Stephen W. Dorsey was then in the United States Senate. He sent for Mr. Boone and he showed him that letter. In consequence of that Mr. Boone sent out his circulars to the postmasters all over the country, or all over the portion as to which they were to bid, and asked them about the roads, about the price of oats and corn, about the price of labor, and about the winters; in other words, all the questions necessary for an intelligent man, after having received intelligent answers, to make up his mind as to the amount for which he could carry that mail. Mr. Boone, you remember, says that he was to have at that time a certain share. There is a conflict of testimony there. Mr. Dorsey says that he told Boone that when John W.

Dorsey came here they could arrange that, and he had no doubt that they would be willing to give him a share; but that he did not give it to him. The circulars were sent out and the information in some instances, and I do not know but all, came back. Then they agreed upon the amounts they were to bid. I believe Mr. Miner came here in December, and John W.

Dorsey, I think, in January, and in February the bids were made. All the amounts were put in the bidding-book issued by the Government, by Mr.

Miner and Mr. Boone; all with two exceptions, and those amounts had been placed there by them, but under the advice of Stephen W. Dorsey those amounts were lowered. I remember one was upon the Tongue River route, the other route I have forgotten. Mr. Miner, Mr. Peck, and John W.

Dorsey were together. Afterwards a partnership was formed between John W. Dorsey and A. E. Boone. Stephen W. Dorsey advanced some money. There is nothing criminal about that. It is often foolish to advance money, but it is not a crime. It is often foolish to indorse for another, and many a man has been convinced of that, but it is not a crime. He advanced until, I believe, he was responsible for some fourteen or fifteen thousand dollars, and thereupon he declined to advance any more.

He saw Mr. Miner in Saint Louis, and said to Mr. Miner, "This is the last I am going to advance." I think he gave him some notes that he hypothecated or discounted at the German-American National Bank. He wanted security, and thereupon they gave him Post-Office drafts for the purpose of securing his debt. He would advance no more money and went away to New Mexico. Mr. Miner had a power of attorney from John W.

Dorsey who was absent, and a power of attorney from John M. Peck who was absent. I believe on the 7th of August, or about that time, Mr. Boone went out. Why? They had not the money at the time to put on the service.

Why? A great many more bids had been accepted than they had antic.i.p.ated, and instead of getting twenty or thirty routes they got, I believe, one hundred and thirty-four routes. The consequence was they did not have the money to stock the routes. There was another difficulty.

There was an investigation by Congress, and that delayed them a month or two, and the consequence was that when the 1st of July came, the day upon which the service should have been put on, it was not only not put on, but they had not the means to do it. Then what happened? Then it was that Mr. Miner took in Mr. Vaile, and an agreement was made which bears date the 16th day of August, 1878. It was not finally signed by all the parties, I believe, until some time in September or October. Under that contract, which you have all heard read, Mr. Vaile was given an interest in this business. More than that; subcontracts were given to Mr. Vaile, and under the subcontract law which was pa.s.sed on the 17th day of May, 1878, I believe, Vaile could file his subcontract in the Post-Office Department, and that rendered all Post-Office drafts or orders that had been given absolutely worthless. That was done. The subcontracts were given to Vaile under the powers of attorney that Miner held from Peck and John W. Dorsey, and of course he could act for himself. That was the situation. Stephen W. Dorsey was not here. When he returned he found that everything had been disposed of except his liability, and that he would have to pay the notes. His security was gone, and the subcontracts were filed. At that time he and Mr. Vaile had a quarrel. That is our story. In the meantime John W. Dorsey was on the Tongue River route. I believe he visited Washington in November and left word that he would like to sell out all his interests in these routes, and I believe fixed the price. Some time in November or December Mr. Vaile made up his mind to take the routes, and afterwards changed his mind. Stephen W. Dorsey was then in the Senate. On the 4th of March, 1879, his term expired. I believe on that very day, or about that day, he wrote a letter to Brady calling his attention to these subcontracts that had been filed for the protection of Vaile and denouncing them. That was the first thing he did. Then a few days afterwards the parties met. In a little while afterwards they made a division of this entire business. You know how the division was made. Stephen W. Dorsey fell heir to about thirty of these routes, I think. In addition he had to pay ten thousand dollars to his brother and ten thousand dollars to Peck. Mr. Vaile, I think, took forty per cent, and Mr. Miner thirty per cent. Mr. Vaile and Mr. Miner went into partnership and Stephen W. Dorsey took his routes, and that ended it. Mr. Peck was out and John W. Dorsey was out. That is our story. When they divided those routes, in order to vest the property of those routes in the persons to whom they fell, it was necessary to execute subcontracts and give PostOffice drafts and things of that character. All those necessary papers they then and there agreed to make. Up to this point there is not one act established by the evidence not entirely consistent with perfect innocence; not an act. That is our story. After these routes fell to us we did what we had the right to do and what we could to make the routes of value. As business men we had the right to do it, and we did only what we had the right to do.

The next question that arises, and which of course is at the very threshold of this case, is, did these parties conspire? That is the great question. In my judgment you should settle that the first thing when you go to the jury-room. After having heard the case as it will be presented by the Government, and after having heard the charge of the Court, the first thing for you to decide is, was there a conspiracy?

How is a conspiracy proved? Precisely as everything else is proved. You prove that men conspire precisely as you prove them guilty of larceny or murder or any other crime or misdemeanor. It has been suggested to you that as conspiracy is very hard to prove you should not require much evidence; that you should take into consideration the hardships of the Government in proving a crime which in its nature is secret. Nearly all crimes are secret. Very few men steal publicly, with a band of music and with a torch in each hand. They generally need their hands for other purposes, if they are in that business. All crime loves darkness. We all know that. One of the troubles about proving that a man has committed a crime is that he tries to keep it as secret as possible. He does not carry a placard on his breast or on his back stating what he is about to do. The consequence is that it is nearly always difficult to prove men guilty as stated in the indictment. But that does not relieve the prosecution. That burden is taken by the Government, and they must prove men guilty of conspiracy precisely as they prove anything else. Is circ.u.mstantial evidence sufficient? Certainly, certainly. Circ.u.mstantial evidence will prove anything, provided the circ.u.mstances are right, and provided further that all the circ.u.mstances are right. A chain of circ.u.mstances is no stronger than the weakest circ.u.mstance, as a chain of iron is no stronger than the weakest link. Where you establish or attempt to establish a fact by circ.u.mstances, each circ.u.mstance must be proved not only beyond a reasonable doubt, but each circ.u.mstance must be wholly inconsistent with the innocence of the defendants. Now, let me call your attention to what I claim to be the law upon the subject, and I will call the attention of the Court to it at the same time. I will take this as a kind of test:

The hypothesis of guilt must flow naturally from the facts proved and must be consistent with them; not with some of them, not with the majority of them, but with all of them.

In other words if they establish one hundred circ.u.mstances and ninety-nine point to guilt and one circ.u.mstance thoroughly established is inconsistent with guilt or perfectly consistent with innocence, that is the end of the case.

It is as if you were building an arch. Every stone that you put into the arch must fit with every other and must make that segment of the circle. If one stone does not fit, the arch is not complete. So with circ.u.mstantial evidence. Every circ.u.mstance must fit every other. Every solitary circ.u.mstance must be of the exact shape to fit its neighbor, and when they are all together the arch must be absolutely complete.

Otherwise you must find the defendants not guilty. The next sentence is:

The evidence must be such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt. In other words, all the facts proved must be consistent with and point to the guilt of the defendants not only, but they must be inconsistent, and every fact proved must be inconsistent, with their innocence.

Now, what does that mean? It means that every fact that is absolutely established in this case, must point to the guilt of the defendants. It means that if there is one established fact that is inconsistent with their guilt, that fact becomes instantly an impenetrable shield that no honest verdict can pierce. That is what it means. That being so--and the Court in my judgment will instruct you that that is the law--let us talk a little about what has been established.

In the first place, nearly all that has been established, or I will not say established, but nearly all that has been said, for the purpose of showing that our motives were corrupt, and that we actually conspired, rests upon evidence of what we call conversations. Some witness had a conversation with somebody, three years ago, four years ago, or five years ago. The unsafest and the most unsatisfactory evidence in this world is evidence of conversation. Words leave no trace. They leave no scar in the air, no footsteps. Memory writes upon the secret tablet of the brain words that no human eye can see. No man can look into the brain of another and tell whether he is giving a true transcript of what is there. It is absolutely impossible for you to tell whether it is memory or imagination. No one can do it. Another thing: Probably there is not a man in the world whose memory makes an absolutely perfect record. The moment it is written it begins to fade, and as the days pa.s.s it grows dim, and as the years go by, no matter how deeply it may have been engraven, it is covered by the moss of forgetfulness. And yet you are asked to take from men their liberty, to take from citizens their reputation, to tear down roof-trees, on testimony about conversation that happened years and years ago, as to which the party testifying had not the slightest interest. As a rule, memory is the child of attention--memory is the child of interest. Take the avaricious man. He sets down a debt in his brain, and he graves it as deep as graving upon stone. A man must have interest. His attention must be aroused. Tell me that a man can remember a conversation of four or five years ago in which he had no interest. We have been in this trial I don't know how many years. I have seen you, gentlemen, gradually growing gray. You have, during this trial, heard argument after argument as to what some witness said, as to some line embodied in this library. [Indicating record.] You have heard the counsel for the prosecution say one thing, the counsel for the defence another, and often his Honor, holding the impartial scales of memory, differs from us both, and then we have turned to the record and found that all were mistaken. That has happened again and again, and yet when that witness was testifying every attorney for the defence was watching him, and every attorney for the prosecution was looking at him. How hard it would be for you, Mr. Juror, or for any one of you to tell what a witness has said in this case. Yet men are brought here who had a casual conversation with one of the defendants five years ago about a matter in which no one of the witnesses was interested to the extent of one cent, and pretend to give that conversation entire. For ray part, were I upon the jury, I would pay no more attention to such evidence than I would to the idle wind. Such men are not giving a true transcript of their brains. It is the result of imagination. They wish to say something. They recollect they had a conversation upon a certain subject, and then they fill it out to suit the prosecution.

Now, I am told another thing; that after getting through with conversations they then gave us notice that we must produce our books, our papers, our letters, our stubs, and our checks; that we must produce everything in which we have any interest, and hand them all over to this prosecution. They say they only want what pertains to the mail business, but who is to judge of that? They want to look at them to see if they do pertain to the mail business. They won't take our word. We must produce them all. It may be that with such a net they might bring in something that would be calculated to get somebody in trouble about something, no matter whether this business or not. They might find out something that would annoy somebody. They gave us a notice wide enough and broad enough to cover everything we had or were likely to have. What did they want with those things? May be one of their witnesses wanted to see them. May be he wanted to stake out his testimony. May be he did not entirely rely upon his memory and wanted to find whether he should swear as to check-books or a check-book, and whether he should swear as to one stub or as to many. May be he wanted to look them all over so that he could fortify the story he was going to tell. We did not give them the books.

We would not do it. We took the consequences. But what did we offer?

That is the only way to find out our motive. I believe that on page 3776 there is something upon that subject. I will read what I said:

Now, gentlemen, with regard to the books. As there has been a good deal said on that subject I make this proposition: Mr. Dorsey has books extending over a period of twenty years, or somewhere in that neighborhood. He has had accounts with a great many people on a great many subjects. He does not wish to bring those books into court, or to have those accounts gone over by this prosecution, not for reasons in this case, but for reasons entirely outside of the case. If the gentlemen on the other side will agree, or if the Court will appoint any two men or any three men, we will present to those men all our books, every one that we ever had in the world, and allow them to go over every solitary item and report to this court every item pertaining to John W.

Dorsey & Co., Miner, Peck & Co., or Vaile, Miner & Co., with regard to every dollar connected, directly or indirectly, with this entire business from November or December, 1877, to the present moment, and report to this Court exactly every item just as it is. I make that proposition.

That proposition was refused. What else did I do? I offered to bring into court every check, including the time they said we drew money to pay Brady. I offered to bring in every check on every bank in which we had one dollar deposited; every one. That was not admitted. And why?

Because the Court distinctly said that it rests upon the oath of the defendant at last; he may have had money in banks that we know nothing about. To which I replied at the time that if we stated here in open court the name of every bank in which we did business, and there is any other bank knowing that we did do business with it, we will hear from it. So that we offered, gentlemen, in this case, every check on every bank but one. I did not know at that time that we had ever had an account with the German-American Savings Bank; I did not find that out until afterwards. But you will remember that Mr. Merrick held in his hand the account of Dorsey with that bank; and Mr. Keyser, who, I believe, had charge of that bank, was here, and if there had been anything upon those books, certainly the Government would have shown it.

More than that; that bank went into the hands of a receiver, I think, eight months before any of these checks are said to have been given for money which was afterwards given to Brady. Now, they insist, that because we failed to bring the books into court, therefore the law presumes that the absolute evidence of our guilt is in those books.

I believe they claim that as the law. If my memory serves me rightly, Colonel Bliss so claimed in his speech. In other words, that when they give us notice to produce a book, and we do not produce it, there is a presumption against us. That is not the law, gentlemen. When they give us notice to produce a book or letter and we do not produce it, what can they do? They can prove the contents of the book or letter. In other words, if we fail to produce what is called the best evidence, then the Government can introduce secondary evidence. They can prove the contents by the memory of some witness, by some copy, no matter how; and that is the only possible consequence flowing from a refusal to produce the book or letter.

And yet, in this case, gentlemen, Mr. Bliss wishes you to give a verdict based upon two things: first, upon what we failed to prove; secondly, on what the Court would not let them prove. He tells you that they offered to prove so and so, but the Court would not let them; he wants you to take that into consideration; and secondly, that there were certain things that we did not prove; and that those two make up a case. That is their idea. Now, let us see if I am right about the law.

The first case to which I will call the attention of the Court is a very small one, but the principle is clear. It is the case of Lawson and another, a.s.signees of Shiffner, vs. Sherwood, and it is found in 2 English Common-Law Reports; 1 Starkie, 314.

The Court. Colonel Ingersoll, you cannot argue that question to the jury; you cannot cite an authority and discuss it to the jury.

Mr. Ingersoll. Then I will discuss it with the Court; it is immaterial to me which way I turn when I am talking. I insist that the jury must at last decide the law in this case. I will read another case to the Court, found in 9 Maryland, Spring Garden Mutual Insurance Company, vs. Evans.

The Court decides in this case that the only consequence of their refusal to produce the papers, they not denying that they had them, was to allow the opposite party to prove their contents. That is all; that it could not be patched out with a presumption.

The Court. But if afterwards they should attempt to contradict the secondary evidence the Court would not have allowed them to do it.

Mr. Ingersoll. It does not say so.

The Court. That is the law.

Mr. Ingersoll. Suppose, after the other side had proved the contents, there was an offer of the actual original papers. I can find plenty of authority that they must be received.

The Court. I have never seen such authority, but I have seen a great many to the contrary.

Mr. Ingersoll. I have never seen an authority to the contrary that was very well reasoned. But, then, I will not argue about that, for that is not a point in this case.

The Court. If you have the papers, and have received notice to produce them, you are bound to produce them. If you do not produce them secondary evidence is admissible to prove their contents. But after the secondary evidence has been received, the Court will not allow you then, after having first failed to produce the papers upon notice, to resort to the primary evidence which you ought to have produced upon the notice, for the purpose of contradicting the secondary evidence that was given.