The Works of George Berkeley Part 59

_Phil._ And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;-_external, I mean, to your own mind_: though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of _ident.i.ty,_ as well as if it existed out of a mind(908). And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

_Hyl._ You have indeed clearly satisfied me-either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

_Phil._ But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

_Hyl._ I acknowledge it.

But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance against _Scepticism_, it amounts to no more than this:-We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

_Phil._ And how are _we_ concerned any farther? I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure _nothing_ cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore _real_. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if by the word _cherry_ you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its _existence_ something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

_Hyl._ But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of sensible things _in a mind_ which you have offered against their existing _in a material substratum_?

_Phil._ When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.

_Hyl._ Is the mind extended or unextended?

_Phil._ Unextended, without doubt.

_Hyl._ Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

_Phil._ They are.

_Hyl._ Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

_Phil._ I believe you may.

_Hyl._ Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can: and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my _substratum_.

_Phil._ Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself(909). This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material _substratum_ intelligible, I would fain know.

_Hyl._ Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

_Phil._ None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general a.n.a.logy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms _comprehend_, _reflect_, _discourse_, &c., which, being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original sense.

_Hyl._ You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.

_Phil._ Let me know this mighty difficulty.

_Hyl._ The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions(910). Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

_Phil._ Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by G.o.d, I make no question. If by _ideas_ you mean fictions and fancies of the mind(911), then these are no ideas. If by _ideas_ you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind(912), then these things are ideas. But whether you do or do not call them _ideas_, it matters little. The difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same.

In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed _ideas_, but _things_. Call them so still: provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of _real_ things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be inc.u.mbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic(913) acceptation, for Matter, or _an unknown __ quiddity, with an absolute existence_. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

_Hyl._ It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?

_Phil._ If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.

_Hyl._ Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

_Phil._ Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being-that is become perceptible-in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to G.o.d, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by G.o.d, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of G.o.d, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them(914). This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of _substratum_, instrument, occasion, or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

_Hyl._ But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were _men_ to perceive them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

_Phil._ In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where n.o.body was present-that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on G.o.d; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [(915)great] Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the _actuality of absolute existence_. You may indeed raise a dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

_Hyl._ I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of G.o.d? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?

_Phil._ And are not you too of opinion, that G.o.d knew all things from eternity?

_Hyl._ I am.

_Phil._ Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

_Hyl._ This I acknowledge.

_Phil._ By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of G.o.d. So we are agreed in that point.

_Hyl._ What shall we make then of the creation?

_Phil._ May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when G.o.d decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a _relative_, or _hypothetical existence_ if you please. But, so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can a.s.sign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of G.o.d. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of G.o.d, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

_Hyl._ Well, but as to this decree of G.o.d's, for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, G.o.d did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things(916). If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.

_Phil._ Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can _we_ conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. G.o.d is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

_Hyl._ I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

_Phil._ What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things-the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of G.o.d(917). Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines?

or, is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.

To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter(918) doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

_Hyl._ I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of the creation.

_Phil._ I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pa.s.s by all that, would not a man think you were a.s.sured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

_Hyl._ And so I am.

_Phil._ Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way?

_Hyl._ In the plain sense, doubtless.

_Phil._ When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by G.o.d; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

_Hyl._ I cannot help thinking so.

_Phil._ And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?