The Works of George Berkeley Part 10

(M108) Also from uneasiness and idea together.

The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or ideas.

The Will not distinct from particular volitions.

(M109) It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness, may be without all volition or act.

The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct from ye will.

This allow'd hereafter.

(M110) To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, for the word _can_ presupposes volition.

(M111) Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, plastic vertue, Hylaschic principle-all these vanish(105).

(M112) Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think that's all(106).

Qu. whether it be the vis inertiae that makes it difficult to move a stone, or the vis attractivae, or both, or neither?

Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering objections(107).

(M113) To say ye Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This is idem per idem.

Wt makes men despise extension, motion, &c., & separate them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance.

An extended may have pa.s.sive modes of thinking good actions.

There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might be the greatest uneasiness wthout any volition, therefore the....

(M114) Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that G.o.d is not Matter(108).

(M115) Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we but settle the signification of the word _free_-if we had an idea annext to the word free, and would but contemplate that idea.

(M116) We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free, can, &c.

(M117) Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by experience.

(M118) Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may perhaps acquaint you with its nature.

(M119) Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or coincide wth & const.i.tute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.

(M120) You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I answer, tell me wt you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve you(109).

(M121) Qu. Wt do men mean when they talk of one body's touching another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say, I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other; for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and other bodies behind those whch now seem to touch.

Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty-to confute the mathematicians wth the utmost civility & respect, not to style them Nihilarians, &c.

N. B. To rein in ye satyrical nature.

Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some lat.i.tude. 'Tis wt cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language that you cannot always apprehend the clear and determinate meaning of my words.

Say you, there might be a thinking Substance-something unknown-wch perceives, and supports, and ties together the ideas(110). Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and you shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see the least reason to think should exist.

I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd-no excuse in the world can be given why a man should use a word without an idea(111). Certainly we shall find that wt ever word we make use of in matter of pure reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it, i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly known.

'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he does, banters himself with words.

(M122) We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like difference betwixt man and G.o.d may be imagin'd; or infinitely greater(112) difference.

(M123) We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. We may imagine in G.o.d a greater number, i.e. that ours in number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect thereof. The words difference and number, old and known, we apply to that wch is unknown. But I am embrangled(113) in words-'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.

The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove the mist or veil of words(114). This has occasion'd ignorance & confusion. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians, lawyers and divines.

(M124) The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contemplate, and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth 'tis no idea, nor is there any idea of it.

'Tis _toto caelo_ different from the understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather volition, is something, I answer, there is an h.o.m.onymy(115) in the word _thing_, wn apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding and will. All ideas are pa.s.sive(116).

(M125) Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and meaning.

Why, therefore, do I not use the word thing? Ans. Because thing is of greater lat.i.tude than idea. Thing comprehends also volitions or actions.

Now these are no ideas(117).

(M126) There can be perception wthout volition. Qu. whether there can be volition without perception?

(M127) Existence not conceivable without perception or volition-not distinguish'd therefrom.

(M128) N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that I doubt), gives us the idea of time-or _is_ time itself.

Wt would the solitary man think of number?

(M129) There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us(118).

(M130) Locke seems to be mistaken wn he says thought is not essential to the mind(119).

(M131) Certainly the mind always and constantly thinks: and we know this too. In sleep and trances the mind _exists not_-there is no time, no succession of ideas(120).