The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 32

Concerning this system we remark that we do not intend to controvert the doctrine that Naraya/n/a, who is higher than the Undeveloped, who is the highest Self, and the Self of all, reveals himself by dividing himself in multiple ways; for various scriptural pa.s.sages, such as 'He is onefold, he is threefold' (Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2), teach us that the highest Self appears in manifold forms. Nor do we mean to object to the inculcation of unceasing concentration of mind on the highest Being which appears in the Bhagavata doctrine under the forms of reverential approach, &c.; for that we are to meditate on the Lord we know full well from Sm/ri/ti and Scripture. We, however, must take exception to the doctrine that [email protected]/n/a springs from Vasudeva, Pradyumna from [email protected]/n/a, Aniruddha from Pradyumna. It is not possible that from Vasudeva, i.e. the highest Self, there should originate [email protected]/n/a, i.e. the individual soul; for if such were the case, there would attach to the soul non-permanency, and all the other imperfections which belong to things originated. And thence release, which consists in reaching the highest Being, could not take place; for the effect is absorbed only by entering into its cause.--That the soul is not an originated thing, the teacher will prove later on (II, 3, 17). For this reason the Bhagavata hypothesis is unacceptable.

43. And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.

The Bhagavata hypothesis is to be rejected for that reason also, that observation never shows us an instrument, such as a hatchet and the like, to spring from an agent such as Devadatta, or any other workman.

But the Bhagavatas teach that from an agent, viz. the individual soul termed [email protected]/n/a, there springs its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and again from this offspring of the agent another instrument, viz. the [email protected] termed Aniruddha. Such doctrines cannot be settled without observed instances. And we do not meet with any scriptural pa.s.sage in their favour.

44. Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sutra 42).

Let us then--the Bhagavatas may say--understand by [email protected]/n/a, and so on, not the individual soul, the mind, &c., but rather Lords, i.e.

powerful beings distinguished by all the qualities characteristic of rulers, such as pre-eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, glory. All these are Vasudevas free from faults, without a substratum (not sprung from pradhana), without any imperfections. Hence the objection urged in Sutra 42 does not apply.

Even on this interpretation of your doctrine, we reply, the 'non-exclusion of that,' i.e. the non-exclusion of the impossibility of origination, can be established.--Do you, in the first place, mean to say that the four individual Lords, Vasudeva, and so on, have the same attributes, but do not const.i.tute one and the same Self?--If so, you commit the fault of uselessly a.s.suming more than one Lord, while all the work of the Lord can be done by one. Moreover, you offend thereby against your own principle, according to which there is only one real essence, viz. the holy Vasudeva.--Or do you perhaps mean to say that from the one highest Being there spring those four forms possessing equal attributes?--In that case the objection urged in Sutra 42 remains valid. For [email protected]/n/a cannot be produced from Vasudeva, nor Pradyumna from [email protected]/n/a, nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna, since (the attributes of all of them being the same) there is no supereminence of any one of them. Observation shows that the relation of cause and effect requires some superiority on the part of the cause--as, for instance, in the case of the clay and the jar (where the cause is more extensive than the effect)--and that without such superiority the relation is simply impossible. But the followers of the Pa/nk/aratra do not acknowledge any difference founded on superiority of knowledge, power, &c. between Vasudeva and the other Lords, but simply say that they all are forms of Vasudeva, without any special distinctions. The forms of Vasudeva cannot properly be limited to four, as the whole world, from Brahman down to a blade of gra.s.s, is understood to be a manifestation of the supreme Being.

45. And on account of contradictions.

Moreover, manifold contradictions are met with in the Bhagavata system, with reference to the a.s.sumption of qualities and their bearers.

Eminence of knowledge and ruling capacity, strength, valour, and glory are enumerated as qualities, and then they are in some other place spoken of as Selfs, holy Vasudevas, and so on.--Moreover, we meet with pa.s.sages contradictory of the Veda. The following pa.s.sage, for instance, blames the Veda, 'Not having found the highest bliss in the Vedas /S/a/nd/ilya studied this /s/astra.'--For this reason also the Bhagavata doctrine cannot be accepted.

Notes:

[Footnote 314: The characteristics of Goodness, Pa.s.sion, and Darkness, the three const.i.tuent elements (gu/n/a) of the pradhana. Sa. Ka. 12, 13.]

[Footnote 315: Viz. the great principle (mahat). ahanka a, &c. Sa. Ka.

3.]

[Footnote 316: The arguments here referred to are enumerated in the Sa.

Ka. 15: Sa. Sutras I, 189 ff.]

[Footnote 317: If we attempt to infer the nature of the universal cause from its effects on the ground of parallel instances, as, for instance, that of an earthen jar whose material cause is clay, we must remember that the jar has sprung from clay not without the co-operation of an intelligent being, viz. the potter.]

[Footnote 318: As had been a.s.serted above for the purpose of inferring therefrom, according to the principle of the equality of cause and effect, the existence of the three const.i.tuents of the pradhana.]

[Footnote 319: And a thing cannot consist of that of which it is the cause.]

[Footnote 320: Which differences cannot be reconciled with the [email protected] hypothesis of the object itself consisting of either pleasure or pain, &c.--'If things consisted in themselves of pleasure, pain, &c., then sandal ointment (which is cooling, and on that account pleasant in summer) would be pleasant in winter also; for sandal never is anything but sandal.--And as thistles never are anything but thistles they ought, on the [email protected] hypothesis, to be eaten with enjoyment not only by camels but by men also.' Bha.]

[Footnote 321: Sa/m/[email protected] iti gu/n/ana/m/ sa/m/s/ri/sh/t/anekavastuprak/ri/tikatvaprasaktir ity artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 322: For they limit one another.]

[Footnote 323: To proceed to the argument 'from the separateness of cause and effect' (Sa. Ka. 15).]

[Footnote 324: The next sentences furnish the answer to the question how the intelligent Self is known at all if it is not the object of perception.--Pratyakshatvabhave katham atmasiddhir ity [email protected] anumanad ity aha, prav/ri/tt.i.ti. Anumanasiddhasya /k/etanasya na pravr/i/ttya/s/rayateti dar/s/ayitum evakara/h/. Katham anumanam ity apekshaya/m/ tatprakara/m/; su/k/ayati kevaleti. Vailaksha/n/ya/m/ pra/n/adimattvam. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 325: Viz. that whatever moves or acts does so under the influence of intelligence.--Sadhyapakshanikshiptatva/m/ sadhyavati pakshe pravish/t/atvam eva ta/k/ /k/a sapakshanizkshiptatvasyapy upalaksha/n/am, anpanyaso na vyabhi/k/arabhumin ity artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 326: It might be held that for the transformation of gra.s.s into milk no other cause is required than the digestive heat of the cow's body; but a reflecting person will acknowledge that there also the omniscient Lord is active. Bha.]

[Footnote 327: Anadheyati/s/ayasya sukhadukhapraptiparihararupati/s/aya/s/unyasyety artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 328: For the soul as being of an entirely inactive nature cannot of itself aim at release, and the pradhana aims--ex hypothesi--only at the soul's undergoing varied experience.]

[Footnote 329: I.e. for the various items const.i.tuting enjoyment or experience.]

[Footnote 330: T/ri/tiyes'pi katipaya/s/abdadyupalabdhir va samastatadupalabdhir va bhoga iti vikalpyadye sarvesham ekadaiva mukti/h/ syad iti manvano dvitiya/m/ pratyaha ubhayarthateti. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 331: The MSS. of ananda Giri omit sa/m/saranu/kkh/edat; the Bhamati's reading is: Sarga/s/aktyanu/kkh/edavad d/ri/k/s/aktyanu/kkh/edat.]

[Footnote 332: On the theory that the soul is the cause of the pradhana's activity we again have to ask whether the pradhana acts for the soul's enjoyment or for its release, &c.]

[Footnote 333: Anantaro dosho mahadadikaryotpadayoga/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 334: In the former case the five intellectual senses are looked upon as mere modifications of the sense of touch.]

[Footnote 335: Buddhi in the latter case being the generic name for buddhi, [email protected], and manas.]

[Footnote 336: Lit. that which burns and that which is burned, which literal rendering would perhaps be preferable throughout. As it is, the context has necessitated its retention in some places.--The sufferers are the individual souls, the cause of suffering the world in which the souls live.]

[Footnote 337: In the case of the lamp, light and heat are admittedly essential; hence the Vedantin is supposed to bring forward the sea with its waves, and so on, as furnishing a case where attributes pa.s.s away while the substance remains.]

[Footnote 338: 'Artha,' a useful or beneficial thing, an object of desire.]

[Footnote 339: In reality neither suffering nor sufferers exist, as the Vedantin had pointed out in the first sentences of his reply; but there can of course be no doubt as to who suffers and what causes suffering in the vyavaharika-state, i.e. the phenomenal world.]

[Footnote 340: In order to explain thereby how the soul can experience pain.]

[Footnote 341: And that would be against the [email protected] dogma of the soul's essential purity.]

[Footnote 342: So that the fact of suffering which cannot take place apart from an intelligent principle again remains unexplained.]

[Footnote 343: atmanas tapte sattve pratibimitatvad yukta taptir iti /s/[email protected] sattveti. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 344: For it then indicates no more than a fict.i.tious resemblance.]

[Footnote 345: The [email protected] Purvapakshin had objected to the Vedanta doctrine that, on the latter, we cannot account for the fact known from ordinary experience that there are beings suffering pain and things causing suffering.--The Vedantin in his turn endeavours to show that on the [email protected] doctrine also the fact of suffering remains inexplicable, and is therefore to be considered not real, but fict.i.tious merely, the product of Nescience.]

[Footnote 346: Not only 'suffering as it were,' as it had been called above.]

[Footnote 347: For real suffering cannot be removed by mere distinctive knowledge on which--according to the also--release depends.]

[Footnote 348: This in answer to the remark that possibly the conjunction of soul and pradhana may come to an end when the influence of Darkness declines, it being overpowered by the knowledge of Truth.]

[Footnote 349: I.e. according as they are atoms of earth, water, fire, or air.]

[Footnote 350: Parima/nd/ala, spherical is the technical term for the specific form of extension of the atoms, and, secondarily, for the atoms themselves. The latter must apparently be imagined as infinitely small spheres. Cp. Vi/s/. Sut. VII, 1, 20.]

[Footnote 351: Viz. during the period of each pralaya. At that time all the atoms are isolated and motionless.]