The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 3

Adhik. I (1-7) teaches that the soul, when pa.s.sing out of the body at the time of death, remains invested with the subtle material elements (bhutasukshma) which serve as an abode to the pra/n/as attached to the soul.

Adhik. II (8-11) shows that, when the souls of those who had enjoyed the reward of their good works in the moon descend to the earth in order to undergo a new embodiment, there cleaves to them a remainder (anu/s/aya) of their former deeds which determines the nature of the new embodiment.

Adhik. III (12-21) discusses the fate after death of those whom their good works do not ent.i.tle to pa.s.s up to the moon.

Adhik. IV, V, VI (22; 23; 24-27) teach that the subtle bodies of the souls descending from the moon through the ether, air, &c., do not become identical with ether, air, &c., but only like them; that the entire descent occupies a short time only; and that, when the souls finally enter into plants and so on, they do not partic.i.p.ate in the life of the latter, but are merely in external contact with them.

PaDA II.

Adhik. I (1-6) treats of the soul in the dreaming state. According to /S/[email protected] the three first Sutras discuss the question whether the creative activity ascribed to the soul in some scriptural pa.s.sages produces things as real as those by which the waking soul is surrounded, or not; Sutra 3 settles the point by declaring that the creations of the dreaming soul are mere 'Maya,' since they do not fully manifest the character of real objects. Sutra 4 adds that dreams, although mere Maya, yet have a prophetic quality. Sutras 5 and 6 finally reply to the question why the soul, which after all is a part of the Lord and as such partic.i.p.ates in his excellencies, should not be able to produce in its dreams a real creation, by the remark that the soul's knowledge and power are obscured by its connexion with the gross body.

The considerably diverging interpretation given of this adhikara/n/a by Ramanuja has the advantage of more closely connecting the Sutras with each other. According to him the question is not whether the creations of a dream are real or not, but whether they are the work of the individual soul or of the Lord acting within the soul. Sutras 1 and 2 set forth the purvapaksha. The creations of dreams (are the work of the individual soul); for thus Scripture declares: 'And the followers of some /s/akas declare (the soul to be) a creator,' &c. The third Sutra states the siddhanta view: 'But the creations of dreams are Maya, i.e.

are of a wonderful nature (and as such cannot be effected by the individual soul), since (in this life) the nature (of the soul) is not fully manifested.' Concerning the word 'maya,' Ramanuja remarks, 'maya/s/abdo hy a/sk/aryava/k/i janaka/s/ya kule jata devamayeva nirmita ityadishu tatha dar/s/anat.' The three remaining Sutras are exhibited in the /S/ri-bhashya in a different order, the fourth Sutra, according to /S/[email protected], being the sixth according to Ramanuja. Sutras 4 and 5 (according to Ramanuja's numeration) are explained by Ramanuja very much in the same way as by /S/[email protected]; but owing to the former's statement of the subject-matter of the whole adhikara/n/a they connect themselves more intimately with the preceding Sutras than is possible on /S/[email protected]'s interpretation. In Sutra 6 (su/k/aka/s/ /k/a hi) Ramanuja sees a deduction from the siddhanta of the adhikara/n/a, 'Because the images of a dream are produced by the highest Lord himself, therefore they have prophetic significance.'

Adhik. II teaches that in the state of deep dreamless sleep the soul abides within Brahman in the heart.

Adhik. III (9) expounds the reasons ent.i.tling us to a.s.sume that the soul awakening from sleep is the same that went to sleep.--Adhik. IV (9) explains the nature of a swoon.

Adhik. V (11-21) is, according to /S/[email protected], taken up with the question as to the nature of the highest Brahman in which the individual soul is merged in the state of deep sleep. Sutra 11 declares that twofold characteristics (viz. absence and presence of distinctive attributes, nirvi/s/eshatva and savi/s/eshatva) cannot belong to the highest Brahman even through its stations, i.e. its limiting adjuncts; since all pa.s.sages which aim at setting forth Brahman's nature declare it to be dest.i.tute of all distinctive attributes.--The fact, Sutra 12 continues, that in many pa.s.sages Brahman is spoken of as possessing distinctive attributes is of no relevancy, since wherever there are mentioned limiting adjuncts, on which all distinction depends, it is specially stated that Brahman in itself is free from all diversity; and--Sutra 13 adds--in some places the a.s.sumption of diversity is specially objected to.--That Brahman is devoid of all form (Sutra 14), is the pre-eminent meaning of all Vedanta-texts setting forth Brahman's nature.--That Brahman is represented as having different forms, as it were, is due to its connexion with its (unreal) limiting adjuncts; just as the light of the sun appears straight or crooked, as it were, according to the nature of the things he illuminates (15).--The B/ri/hadara/n/yaka expressly declares that Brahman is one uniform ma.s.s of intelligence (16); and the same is taught in other scriptural pa.s.sages and in Sm/ri/ti (l7).--At the unreality of the apparent manifoldness of the Self, caused by the limiting adjuncts, aim those scriptural pa.s.sages in which the Self is compared to the sun, which remains one although his reflections on the surface of the water are many (18).--Nor must the objection be raised that that comparison is unsuitable, because the Self is not material like the sun, and there are no real upadhis separate from it as the water is from the sun; for the comparison merely means to indicate that, as the reflected image of the sun partic.i.p.ates in the changes, increase, decrease, &c., which the water undergoes while the sun himself remains unaffected thereby, so the true Self is not affected by the attributes of the upadhis, while, in so far as it is limited by the latter, it is affected by them as it were (19, 20).--That the Self is within the upadhis, Scripture declares (21).

From the above explanation of this important adhikara/n/a the one given in the Sri-bhashya differs totally. According to Ramanuja the adhikara/n/a raises the question whether the imperfections clinging to the individual soul (the discussion of which has now come to an end) affect also the highest Lord who, according to Scripture, abides within the soul as antaryamin. 'Notwithstanding the abode (of the highest Self within the soul) (it is) not (affected by the soul's imperfections) because everywhere (the highest Self is represented) as having twofold characteristics (viz. being, on one hand, free from all evil, apahatapapman, vijara, vim/ri/tyu, &c., and, on the other hand, endowed with all auspicious qualities, satyakama, satyasa/m/kalpa, &c.) (11).--Should it be objected that, just as the soul although essentially free from evil--according to the Praj.a.pativakya in the Chandogya--yet is liable to imperfections owing to its connexion with a variety of bodies, so the antaryamin also is affected by abiding within bodies; we deny this because in every section of the chapter referring to the antaryamin (in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka) he is expressly called the Immortal, the ruler within; which shows him to be free from the shortcomings of the jiva (12).--Some, moreover, expressly a.s.sert that, although the Lord and the soul are within one body, the soul only is imperfect, not the Lord (dva supar/n/a sayuja sakhaya) (13).--Should it be said that, according to the Chandogya, Brahman entered together with the souls into the elements previously to the evolution of names and forms, and hence partic.i.p.ates in the latter, thus becoming implicated in the sa/m/sara; we reply that Brahman, although connected with such and such forms, is in itself devoid of form, since it is the princ.i.p.al element (agent; pradhana) in the bringing about of names and forms (according to 'aka/s/o ha vai namarupayor nirvahita') (14).--But does not the pa.s.sage 'satya/m/ j/n/anam anantam brahma' teach that Brahman is nothing but light (intelligence) without any difference, and does not the pa.s.sage 'neti neti' deny of it all qualities?--As in order, we reply, not to deprive pa.s.sages as the one quoted from the Taittiriya of their purport, we admit that Brahman's nature is light, so we must also admit that Brahman is satyasa/m/kalpa, and so on; for if not, the pa.s.sages in which those qualities are a.s.serted would become purportless (15).--Moreover the Taittiriya pa.s.sage only a.s.serts so much, viz. the praka/s/arupata of Brahman, and does not deny other qualities (l6).--And the pa.s.sage 'neti neti' will be discussed later on.--The [email protected] of Brahman in the sense a.s.signed above is a.s.serted in many places /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti (17).--Because Brahman although abiding in many places is not touched by their imperfections, the similes of the reflected sun, of the ether limited by jars, &c., are applicable to it (18).--Should it be said that the ill.u.s.tration is not an appropriate one, because the sun is apprehended in the water erroneously only while the antaryamin really abides within all things, and therefore must be viewed as sharing their defects (19); we reply that what the simile means to negative is merely that Brahman should, owing to its inherence in many places, partic.i.p.ate in the increase, decrease, and so on, of its abodes. On this view both similes are appropriate (20).--a.n.a.logous similes we observe to be employed in ordinary life, as when we compare a man to a lion (21).

Sutras 22-30 const.i.tute, according to /S/[email protected], a new adhikara/n/a (VI), whose object it is to show that the clause 'not so, not so' (neti neti; B/ri/hadar) negatives, not Brahman itself, but only the two forms of Brahman described in the preceding part of the chapter. Sutras 23-26 further dwell on Brahman being in reality devoid of all distinctive attributes which are altogether due to the upadhis. The last four Sutras return to the question how, Brahman being one only, the souls are in so many places spoken of as different from it, and, two explanatory hypotheses having been rejected, the conclusion is arrived at that all difference is unreal, due to fict.i.tious limiting adjuncts.

According to Ramanuja, Sutras 22 ff. continue the discussion started in Sutra 11. How, the question is asked, can the [email protected] of Brahman be maintained considering that the 'not so, not so' of the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned modes (prakara), so that it can only be called that which is (sanmatra)?--The reply given in Sutra 22 is that 'not so, not so' does not deny of Brahman the distinctive qualities or modes declared previously (for it would be senseless at first to teach them, and finally to deny them again[16]), but merely denies the prak/ri/taitavattva, the previously stated limited nature of Brahman, i.e. it denies that Brahman possesses only the previously mentioned qualifications. With this agrees, that subsequently to 'neti neti' Scripture itself enunciates further qualifications of Brahman. That Brahman as stated above is not the object of any other means of proof but Scripture is confirmed in Sutra 23, 'Scripture declares Brahman to be the non-manifest.'--And the intuition (sakshatkkara) of Brahman ensues only upon its sa/m/radhana, i.e. upon its being perfectly pleased by the worshipper's devotion, as Scripture and Sm/ri/ti declare (24).--That this interpretation of 'neti'

is the right one, is likewise shown by the fact that in the same way as praka/s/a, luminousness, j/n/ana, intelligence, &c., so also the quality of being differentiated by the world (prapa/nk/avsish/t/ata) is intuited as non-different, i.e. as likewise qualifying Brahman; and that praka/s/a, and so on, characterise Brahman, is known through repeated practice (on the part of /ri/shis like Vamadeva) in the work of sa/m/radhana mentioned before (25).--For all these reasons Brahman is connected with the infinite, i.e. the infinite number of auspicious qualities; for thus the twofold indications ([email protected]) met with in Scripture are fully justified (26).--In what relation, then, does the a/k/id vastu, i.e. the non-sentient matter, which, according to the b/ri/hadara/n/yaka, is one of the forms of Brahman, stand to the latter?--Non-sentient beings might, in the first place, be viewed as special arrangements (sa/m/sthanavisesha/h/) of Brahman, as the coils are of the body of the snake; for Brahman is designated as both, i.e.

sometimes as one with the world (Brahman is all this, &c.), sometimes as different from it (Let me enter into those elements, &c.) (27).--Or, in the second place, the relation of the two might be viewed as a.n.a.logous to that of light and the luminous object which are two and yet one, both being fire (28).--Or, in the third place, the relation is like that stated before, i.e. the material world is, like the individual souls (whose case was discussed in II, 3, 43), a part--a/ms/a--of Brahman (29, 30).

Adhik. VII (31-37) explains how some metaphorical expressions, seemingly implying that there is something different from Brahman, have to be truly understood.

Adhik. VIII (38-41) teaches that the reward of works is not, as Jaimini opines, the independent result of the works acting through the so-called apurva, but is allotted by the Lord.

PaDA III.

With the third pada of the second adhyaya a new section of the work begins, whose task it is to describe how the individual soul is enabled by meditation on Brahman to obtain final release. The first point to be determined here is what const.i.tutes a meditation on Brahman, and, more particularly, in what relation those parts of the Upanishads stand to each other which enjoin identical or partly identical meditations. The reader of the Upanishads cannot fail to observe that the texts of the different /s/akhas contain many chapters of similar, often nearly identical, contents, and that in some cases the text of even one and the same /s/akha exhibits the same matter in more or less varied forms. The reason of this clearly is that the common stock of religious and philosophical ideas which were in circulation at the time of the composition of the Upanishads found separate expression in the different priestly communities; hence the same speculations, legends, &c. reappear in various places of the sacred Scriptures in more or less differing dress. Originally, when we may suppose the members of each Vedic school to have confined themselves to the study of their own sacred texts, the fact that the texts of other schools contained chapters of similar contents would hardly appear to call for special note or comment; not any more than the circ.u.mstance that the sacrificial performances enjoined on the followers of some particular /s/akha were found described with greater or smaller modifications in the books of other /s/akhas also. But already at a very early period, at any rate long before the composition of the Vedanta-sutras in their present form, the Vedic theologians must have apprehended the truth that, in whatever regards sacrificial acts, one /s/akha may indeed safely follow its own texts, disregarding the texts of all other /s/akhas; that, however, all texts which aim at throwing light on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul must somehow or other be combined into one consistent systematical whole equally valid for the followers of all Vedic schools. For, as we have had occasion to remark above, while acts may be performed by different individuals in different ways, cognition is defined by the nature of the object cognised, and hence can be one only, unless it ceases to be true cognition. Hence the attempts, on the one hand, of discarding by skilful interpretation all contradictions met with in the sacred text, and, on the other hand, of showing what sections of the different Upanishads have to be viewed as teaching the same matter, and therefore must be combined in one meditation. The latter is the special task of the present pada.

Adhik. I and II (1-4; 5) are concerned with the question whether those vidyas, which are met with in identical or similar form in more than one sacred text, are to be considered as const.i.tuting several vidyas, or one vidya only. /S/[email protected] remarks that the question affects only those vidyas whose object is the qualified Brahman; for the knowledge of the non-qualified Brahman, which is of an absolutely uniform nature, can of course be one only wherever it is set forth. But things lie differently in those cases where the object of knowledge is the sagu/n/am brahma or some outward manifestation of Brahman; for the qualities as well as manifestations of Brahman are many. Antic.i.p.ating the subject of a later adhikara/n/a, we may take for an example the so-called /S/a/nd/ilyavidya which is met with in Ch. Up. III, 14, again--in an abridged form--in B/ri/. Up. V, 6, and, moreover, in the tenth book of the /S/atapathabrahma/n/a (X, 6, 3). The three pa.s.sages enjoin a meditation on Brahman as possessing certain attributes, some of which are specified in all the three texts (as, for instance, manomayatva, bharupatva), while others are peculiar to each separate pa.s.sage (pra/n/a/s/ariratva and satyasa/m/kalpatva, for instance, being mentioned in the Chandogya Upanishad and /S/atapatha-brahma/n/a, but not in the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad, which, on its part, specifies sarvava/s/itva, not referred to in the two other texts). Here, then, there is room for a doubt whether the three pa.s.sages refer to one object of knowledge or not. To the devout Vedantin the question is not a purely theoretical one, but of immediate practical interest. For if the three texts are to be held apart, there are three different meditations to be gone through; if, on the other hand, the vidya is one only, all the different qualities of Brahman mentioned in the three pa.s.sages have to be combined into one meditation.--The decision is here, as in all similar cases, in favour of the latter alternative. A careful examination of the three pa.s.sages shows that the object of meditation is one only; hence the meditation also is one only, comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the three texts.

Adhik. III (6-8) discusses the case of vidyas being really separate, although apparently identical. The examples selected are the udgithavidyas of the Chandogya Upanishad (I, 1-3) and the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad (I, 3), which, although showing certain similarities--such as bearing the same name and the udgitha being in both identified with pra/n/a--yet are to be held apart, because the subject of the Chandogya vidya is not the whole udgitha but only the sacred syllabic Om, while the B/ri/hadara/n/yaka Upanishad represents the whole udgitha as the object of meditation.

Sutra 9 const.i.tutes in /S/[email protected]'s view a new adhikara/n/a (IV), proving that in the pa.s.sage, 'Let a man meditate' (Ch. Up. I, 1, 1), the O/m/kara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other, the meaning being, 'Let a man meditate on that O/m/kara which,'

&c.--According to Ramanuja's interpretation, which seems to fall in more satisfactorily with the form and the wording of the Sutra, the latter merely furnishes an additional argument for the conclusion arrived at in the preceding adhikara/n/a.--Adhik. V (10) determines the unity of the so-called pra/n/a-vidyas and the consequent comprehension of the different qualities of the pra/n/a, which are mentioned in the different texts, within one meditation.

Adhik. VI comprises, according to /S/[email protected], the Sutras 11-13. The point to be settled is whether in all the meditations on Brahman all its qualities are to be included or only those mentioned in the special vidya. The decision is that the essential and unalterable attributes of Brahman, such as bliss and knowledge, are to be taken into account everywhere, while those which admit of a more or less (as, for instance, the attribute of having joy for its head, mentioned in the Taitt. Up.) are confined to special meditations.--Adhik. VII (14, 15), according to /S/[email protected], aims at proving that the object of Ka/th/a. Up. III, 10, 11 is one only, viz. to show that the highest Self is higher than everything, so that the pa.s.sage const.i.tutes one vidya only.--Adhik. VIII (16, 17) determines, according to /S/[email protected], that the Self spoken of in Ait. ar. II, 4, 1, 1 is not a lower form of the Self (the so-called sutratman), but the highest Self; the discussion of that point in this place being due to the wish to prove that the attributes of the highest Self have to be comprehended in the Aitarcyaka meditation.

According to Ramanuja the Sutras 11-17 const.i.tute a single adhikara/n/a whose subject is the same as that of /S/[email protected]'s sixth adhikar/n/a.

Sutras 11-13 are, on the whole, explained as by /S/[email protected]; Sutra 12, however, is said to mean, 'Such attributes as having joy for its head, &c. are not to be viewed as qualities of Brahman, and therefore not to be included in every meditation; for if they were admitted as qualities, difference would be introduced into Brahman's nature, and that would involve a more or less on Brahman's part.' Sutras 14-17 continue the discussion of the pa.s.sage about the priya/s/irastva.--If priya/s/irastva, &c. are not to be viewed as real qualities of Brahman, for what purpose does the text mention them?--'Because,' Sutra 14 replies, 'there is no other purpose, Scripture mentions them for the purpose of pious meditation.'--But how is it known that the Self of delight is the highest Self? (owing to which you maintain that having limbs, head, &c. cannot belong to it as attributes.)--'Because,' Sutra 15 replies, 'the term "Self" (atma anandamaya) is applied to it.'--But in the previous parts of the chapter the term Self (in atma pra/n/amaya, &c.) is applied to non-Selfs also; how then do you know that in atma anandamaya it denotes the real Self?--'The term Self,' Sutra 16 replies, 'is employed here to denote the highest Self as in many other pa.s.sages (atmaa va idam eka, &c.), as we conclude from the subsequent pa.s.sage, viz. he wished, May I be many.'--But, an objection is raised, does not the context show that the term 'Self,' which in all the preceding clauses about the pra/n/amaya, &c. denoted something other than the Self, does the same in anandamaya atman, and is not the context of greater weight than a subsequent pa.s.sage?--To this question asked in the former half of 17 (anvayad iti /k/et) the latter half replies, 'Still it denotes the Self, owing to the affirmatory statement,' i.e. the fact of the highest Self having been affirmed in a previous pa.s.sage also, viz.

II, 1, 'From that Self sprang ether.'

Adhik. IX (18) discusses a minor point connected with the pra/n/asa/m/vada.--The subject of Adhik. X (19) has been indicated already above under Adhik. I.--Adhik. XI (20-22) treats of a case of a contrary nature; in B/ri/. Up. V, 5, Brahman is represented first as abiding in the sphere of the sun, and then as abiding within the eye; we therefore, in spite of certain counter-indications, have to do with two separate vidyas.--Adhik. XII (23) refers to a similar case; certain attributes of Brahman mentioned in the Ra/n/ayaniya-khila have not to be introduced into the corresponding Chandogya vidya, because the stated difference of Brahman's abode involves difference of vidya.--Adhik. XIII (24) treats of another instance of two vidyas having to be held apart.

Adhik. XIV (25) decides that certain detached mantras and brahma/n/a pa.s.sages met with in the beginning of some Upanishads--as, for instance, a brahma/n/a about the mahavrata ceremony at the beginning of the Aitareya-ara/n/yaka--do, notwithstanding their position which seems to connect them with the brahmavidya, not belong to the latter, since they show unmistakable signs of being connected with sacrificial acts.

Adhik. XV (26) treats of the pa.s.sages stating that the man dying in the possession of true knowledge shakes off all his good and evil deeds, and affirms that a statement, made in some of those pa.s.sages only, to the effect that the good and evil deeds pa.s.s over to the friends and enemies of the deceased, is valid for all the pa.s.sages.

Sutras 27-30 const.i.tute, according to /S/[email protected], two adhikara/n/as of which the former (XVI; 27, 28) decides that the shaking off of the good and evil deeds takes place--not, as the Kaush. Up. states, on the road to Brahman's world--but at the moment of the soul's departure from the body; the Kaus.h.i.taki statement is therefore not to be taken literally.--The latter adhikara/n/a (XVII; 29, 30) treats of the cognate question whether the soul that has freed itself from its deeds proceeds in all cases on the road of the G.o.ds (as said in the Kaush. Up.), or not. The decision is that he only whose knowledge does not pa.s.s beyond the sagu/n/am brahma proceeds on that road, while the soul of him who knows the nirgu/n/am brahma becomes one with it without moving to any other place.

The /S/ri-bhashya treats the four Sutras as one adhikara/n/a whose two first Sutras are explained as by /S/[email protected], while Sutra 29 raises an objection to the conclusion arrived at, 'the going (of the soul on the path of the G.o.ds) has a sense only if the soul's freeing itself from its works takes place in both ways, i.e. partly at the moment of death, partly on the road to Brahman; for otherwise there would be a contradiction' (the contradiction being that, if the soul's works were all shaken off at the moment of death, the subtle body would likewise perish at that moment, and then the bodiless soul would be unable to proceed on the path of the G.o.ds). To this Sutra 30 replies, 'The complete shaking off of the works at the moment of death is possible, since matters of that kind are observed in Scripture,' i.e. since scriptural pa.s.sages show that even he whose works are entirely annihilated, and who has manifested himself in his true shape, is yet connected with some kind of body; compare the pa.s.sage, 'para/m/ jyotir upasampadya svena rupe/n/abhinishpadyate sa tatra paryeti kri/d/an ramamana/h/ sa svara/d/ bhavati tasya sarveshu lokeshu kama/k/aro bhavati.' That subtle body is not due to karman, but to the soul's vidyamahatmya.--That the explanation of the /S/ri-bhashya agrees with the text as well as /S/[email protected]'s, a comparison of the two will show; especially forced is /S/[email protected]'s explanation of 'arthavattvam ubhayatha,' which is said to mean that there is arthavattva in one case, and non-arthavattva in the other case.

The next Sutra (31) const.i.tutes an adhikara/n/a (XVIII) deciding that the road of the G.o.ds is followed not only by those knowing the vidyas which specially mention the going on that road, but by all who are acquainted with the sagu/n/a-vidyas of Brahman.--The explanation given in the /S/ri-bhashya (in which Sutras 31 and 32 have exchanged places) is similar, with the difference however that all who meditate on Brahman--without any reference to the distinction of nirgu/n/a and sagu/n/a--proceed after death on the road of the G.o.ds. (The /S/ri-bhashya reads 'sarvesham,' i.e. all worshippers, not 'sarvasam,'

all sagu/n/a-vidyas.)

Adhik. XIX (32) decides that, although the general effect of true knowledge is release from all forms of body, yet even such beings as have reached perfect knowledge may retain a body for the purpose of discharging certain offices.--In the /S/ri-bhashya, where the Sutra follows immediately on Sutra 30, the adhikara/n/a determines, in close connexion with 30, that, although those who know Brahman as a rule divest themselves of the gross body--there remaining only a subtle body which enables them to move--and no longer experience pleasure and pain, yet certain beings, although having reached the cognition of Brahman, remain invested with a gross body, and hence liable to pleasure and pain until they have fully performed certain duties.

Adhik. XX (33) teaches that the negative attributes of Brahman mentioned in some vidyas--such as its being not gross, not subtle, &c.--are to be included in all meditations on Brahman.--Adhik. XXI (34) determines that Ka/th/a Up. III, 1, and Mu. Up. III, 1, const.i.tute one vidya only, because both pa.s.sages refer to the highest Brahman. According to Ramanuja the Sutra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Sutra.--Adhik. XXII (35, 36) maintains that the two pa.s.sages, B/ri/. Up. III, 4 and III, 5, const.i.tute one vidya only, the object of knowledge being in both cases Brahman viewed as the inner Self of all.--Adhik. XXIII (37) on the contrary decides that the pa.s.sage Ait. ar. II, 2, 4, 6 const.i.tutes not one but two meditations.--Adhik. XXIV (38) again determines that the vidya of the True contained in B/ri/. Up. V, 4, 5, is one only--According to Ramanuja, Sutras 35-38 const.i.tute one adhikara/n/a only whose subject is the same as that of XXII according to /S/[email protected]

Adhik. XXV (39) proves that the pa.s.sages Ch. Up. VIII, 1 and B/ri/. Up.

IV, 4, 22 cannot const.i.tute one vidya, since the former refers to Brahman as possessing qualities, while the latter is concerned with Brahman as dest.i.tute of qualities.--Adhik. XXVI (40, 41) treats, according to /S/[email protected], of a minor question connected with Ch. Up. V, 11 ff.--According to the /S/ri-bhashya, Sutras 39-41 form one adhikara/n/a whose first Sutra reaches essentially the same conclusion as /S/[email protected] under 39. Sutras 40, 41 thereupon discuss a general question concerning the meditations on Brahman. The qualities, an opponent is supposed to remark, which in the two pa.s.sages discussed are predicated of Brahman--such as va/s/itva, satyakamatva, &c.--cannot be considered real (paramarthika), since other pa.s.sages (sa esha neti neti, and the like) declare Brahman to be devoid of all qualities. Hence those qualities cannot be admitted into meditations whose purpose is final release.--To this objection Sutra 40 replies, '(Those qualities) are not to be left off (from the meditations on Brahman), since (in the pa.s.sage under discussion as well as in other pa.s.sages) they are stated with emphasis[17].'--But, another objection is raised, Scripture says that he who meditates on Brahman as satyakama, &c. obtains a mere perishable reward, viz. the world of the fathers, and similar results specified in Ch. Up. VIII, 2; hence, he who is desirous of final release, must not include those qualities of Brahman in his meditation.--To this objection Sutra 41 replies, 'Because that (i.e. the free roaming in all the worlds, the world of the fathers, &c.) is stated as proceeding therefrom (i.e. the approach to Brahman which is final release) in the case of (the soul) which has approached Brahman;' (therefore a person desirous of release, may include satyakamatva, &c. in his meditations.)

Adhik. XXVII (42) decides that those meditations which are connected with certain matters forming const.i.tuent parts of sacrificial actions, are not to be considered as permanently requisite parts of the latter.--Adhik. XXVIII (43) teaches that, in a B/ri/. Up. pa.s.sage and a similar Ch. Up. pa.s.sage, Vayu and Pra/n/a are not to be identified, but to be held apart.--Adhik. XXIX (44-52) decides that the firealtars made of mind, &c., which are mentioned in the Agnirahasya, do not const.i.tute parts of the sacrificial action (so that the mental, &c. construction of the altar could optionally be subst.i.tuted for the actual one), but merely subjects of meditations.

Adhik. x.x.x (53, 54) treats, according to /S/[email protected], in the way of digression, of the question whether to the Self an existence independent of the body can be a.s.signed, or not (as the Materialists maintain).--According to the /S/ri-bhashya the adhikara/n/a does not refer to this wide question, but is concerned with a point more immediately connected with the meditations on Brahman, viz. the question as to the form under which, in those meditations, the Self of the meditating devotee has to be viewed. The two Sutras then have to be translated as follows: 'Some (maintain that the soul of the devotee has, in meditations, to be viewed as possessing those attributes only which belong to it in its embodied state, such as j/n/at/ri/tva and the like), because the Self is (at the time of meditation) in the body.'--The next Sutra rejects this view, 'This is not so, but the separatedness (i.e.

the pure isolated state in which the Self is at the time of final release when it is freed from all evil, &c.) (is to be transferred to the meditating Self), because that will be[18] the state (of the Self in the condition of final release).'

Adhik. x.x.xI (55, 56) decides that meditations connected with const.i.tuent elements of the sacrifice, such as the udgitha, are, in spite of difference of svara in the udgitha, &c., valid, not only for that /s/akha in which the meditation actually is met with, but for all /s/akhas.--Adhik. x.x.xII (57) decides that the Vai/s/vanara Agni of Ch.

Up. V, 11 ff. is to be meditated upon as a whole, not in his single parts.--Adhik. x.x.xIII (58) teaches that those meditations which refer to one subject, but as distinguished by different qualities, have to be held apart as different meditations. Thus the daharavidya, /S/a/nd/ilyavidya, &c. remain separate.

Adhik. x.x.xIV (59) teaches that those meditations on Brahman for which the texts a.s.sign one and the same fruit are optional, there being no reason for their being c.u.mulated.--Adhik. x.x.xV (60) decides that those meditations, on the other hand, which refer to special wishes may be c.u.mulated or optionally employed according to choice.--Adhik. x.x.xVI (61-66) extends this conclusion to the meditations connected with const.i.tuent elements of action, such as the udgitha.

PaDA IV.

Adhik. I (1-17) proves that the knowledge of Brahman is not kratvartha, i.e. subordinate to action, but independent.--Adhik. II (18-20) confirms this conclusion by showing that the state of the pravrajins is enjoined by the sacred law, and that for them vidya only is prescribed, not action.--Adhik. III (21, 22) decides that certain clauses forming part of vidyas are not mere stutis (arthavadas), but themselves enjoin the meditation.--The legends recorded in the Vedanta-texts are not to be used as subordinate members of acts, but have the purpose of glorifying--as arthavadas--the injunctions with which they are connected (Adhik. IV, 23, 24).--For all these reasons the urdhvaretasa/h/ require no actions but only knowledge (Adhik. V, 25).--Nevertheless the actions enjoined by Scripture, such as sacrifices, conduct of certain kinds, &c., are required as conducive to the rise of vidya in the mind (Adhik.

VI, 26, 27).--Certain relaxations, allowed by Scripture, of the laws regarding food, are meant only for cases of extreme need (Adhik. VII, 28-3l).--The a/s/ramakarma/n/i are obligatory on him also who does not strive after mukti (Adhik. VIII, 32-35).--Those also who, owing to poverty and so on, are ana/s/rama have claims to vidya (Adhik. IX, 36-39).--An urdhvaretas cannot revoke his vow (Adhik. X, 40).--Expiation of the fall of an urdhvaretas (Adhik. XI, 41, 42).--Exclusion of the fallen urdhvaretas in certain cases (Adhik. XII, 43).--Those meditations, which are connected with subordinate members of the sacrifice, are the business of the priest, not of the yajamana (Adhik.

XIII, 44-46).--B/ri/. Up. III, 5, 1 enjoins mauna as a third in addition to balya and pa/nd/itya (Adhik. XIV, 47-49).--By balya is to be understood a childlike innocent state of mind (Adhik. XV, 50).

Sutras 51 and 52 discuss, according to Ramanuja, the question when the vidya, which is the result of the means described in III, 4, arises.

Sutra 51 treats of that vidya whose result is mere exaltation (abhyudaya), and states that 'it takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstacle in the form of a prabalakarmantara (in which latter case the vidya arises later only), on account of Scripture declaring this (in various pa.s.sages).'--Sutra 52, 'Thus there is also absence of a definite rule as to (the time of origination of) that knowledge whose fruit is release, it being averred concerning that one also that it is in the same condition (i.e. of sometimes having an obstacle, sometimes not).'--/S/, who treats the two Sutras as two adhikara/n/as, agrees as to the explanation of 51, while, putting a somewhat forced interpretation on 52, he makes it out to mean that a more or less is possible only in the case of the sagu/n/a-vidyas.

Notes:

[Footnote 16: All the mentioned modes of Brahman are known from Scripture only, not from ordinary experience. If the latter were the case, then, and then only, Scripture might at first refer to them 'anuvadena,' and finally negative them.]