The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 28

[Footnote 284: As long as the 'vyavahara' presents itself to our mind, we might feel inclined to a.s.sume in Brahman an element of manifoldness whereby to account for the vyavahara; but as soon as we arrive at true knowledge, the vyavahara vanishes, and there remains no longer any reason for qualifying in any way the absolute unity of Brahman.]

[Footnote 285: Tatreti, s/ri/sh/t/yadi/s/rutina/m/ svarthe phatavaikalye sat.i.ti yavat. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 286: A Mima/m/sa principle. A sacrificial act, for instance, is independent when a special result is a.s.signed to it by the sacred texts; an act which is enjoined without such a specification is merely auxiliary to another act.]

[Footnote 287: According to the /S/ruti 'in whatever mode he worships him into that mode he pa.s.ses himself.']

[Footnote 288: Tattvanyatvabhyam iti, na hisvaratvena te niru/k/yete ja/d/ajadayor abhedayogat napi tatoxnyatvenax niruktim arhata/h/ svatantrye/n/a sattasphurtyasambhavat na hi j/ad/am aga/d/anapekshya/m/ sattasphurtimad upalakshyate ja/d/[email protected]@ngat tasmad avidyatmake namarupe ity artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 289: So that from the instance of the potter and the jar we cannot conclude that the relation of clay and the jar is only that of nimitta and naimittika, not that of non-difference.]

[Footnote 290: For instance, smoke extending in a long line whose base is connected with some object on the surface of the earth.]

[Footnote 291: I.e. (as an. Gi. explains) because we a.s.sume the relation of cause and effect not merely on the ground of the actual existence of one thing depending on that upon another, but on the additional ground of the mental existence, the consciousness of the one not being possible without the consciousness of the other.--Tadbhavanuvidhayibhavatvam tadbhananuvidhayibhanatva/m/ /k/a karyasya kara/n/ananyatve hetur dhumavi/s/eshasya /k/agnibhavanuvidhayibhavatvesxpi na tadbhananuvidhayibhanatvam agnibhanasya dhumabhanadhinatvat.]

[Footnote 292: For simplicity's sake, asat will be translated henceforth by non-existing.]

[Footnote 293: Samavaya, commonly translated by inherence or intimate relation, is, according to the Nyaya, the relation connecting a whole and its parts, substances, and qualities, &c.]

[Footnote 294: Samavayasya svatantryapaksha/m/ dushayati anabhyupagamyamane/k/eti. Samavayasya samavayibhi/h/ sambandho neshyate ki/m/ tu svatantryam evety atravayavavayavinor dravyagu/n/adina/m/ /k/a.

viprakarsha/h/ syat sa/m/nidhayakabhavad ity artha/h/. an. Gi.]

[Footnote 295: A conclusion which is in conflict with the Nyaya tenet that sa/m/yoga, conjunction, as, for instance, of the jar and the ground on which it stands, is a quality (gu/n/a) inherent in the two conjoined substances by means of the samavaya relation.]

[Footnote 296: So that the whole can be apprehended by us as such if we apprehend a certain part only; a.n.a.logously to our apprehending the whole thread on which a garland of flowers is strung as soon as we apprehend some few of the flowers.]

[Footnote 297: Kalpantaram utthapayati atheti, tatha /k/a yathavayavai/h/ sutra/m/ kusumani vyapnuvat katipayakusumagraha/n/expi g/r/ihyate tatha katipayavayavagraha/n/expi bhavaty avayavino graha/n/am ity artha/h/. Tatra kim arambhakavayavair eva teshv avayavi vartteta ki/m/ va tadatiriklavayavair iti vikalpyadyam pratyaha tadapiti. Yatra yad varttate tat tadatiriktavayavair eva tatra vartamana/m/ drish/l/am iti d/ri/sh/t/antagarbha/m/ hetum a/k/ash/l/e ko/s/eti. Dvitiyam dushayati anavastheti. Kalpitanantavayavavyavahitataya prak/ri/tavayavino duraviprakarshat tantunish/th/atvam pa/t/asya na syad iti bhava/h/. An. Gi.]

[Footnote 298: I.e. a something in which the action inheres; not a causal agent.]

[Footnote 299: Every action, /S/[email protected] says, requires an agent, i.e. a substrate in which the action takes place. If we deny that the jar exists in the clay even before it is actually originated, we lose the substrate for the action of origination, i.e. entering into existence (for the non-existing jar cannot be the substratum of any action), and have to a.s.sume, for that action, other substrates, such as the operative causes of the jar.]

[Footnote 300: Which doctrine will be fully discussed in the second pada of this adhyaya.]

[Footnote 301: Because it has been shown that cause and effect are identical; hence if the cause is known, the effect is known also.]

[Footnote 302: Which arguments, the commentators say, are hinted at by the 'and' of the Sutra.]

[Footnote 303: The right reading appears to be 'svayam eva /k/etana' as found in some MSS. Other MSS. read /k/etana/h/.]

[Footnote 304: Prak/ri/tibhya iti, pratyakshad/ri/sh/t/apadarthasvabhavebhyo yat para/m/ vilaksha/n/am a/k/aryadyupade/s/agamya/m/ tad a/k/intyam ity arta/h/ an. Gi.]

[Footnote 305: This is the way in which /S/[email protected] divides the Sutra; an. Gi. remarks to 'lokezspo, &c.: atmani /k/eti vyakhyaya vi/k/itra/s/ /k/a hiti vya/k/ash/t/e.']

[Footnote 306: So that if it undergoes modifications it must either change in its entirety, or else--against the a.s.sumption--consist of parts.]

[Footnote 307: The last clause precludes the justificatory remark that the stated difficulties can be avoided if we a.s.sume the three gu/n/as in combination only to undergo modification; if this were so the inequality of the different effects could not be accounted for.]

[Footnote 308: As an atom has no parts it cannot enter into partial contact with another, and the only way in which the two can combine is entire interpenetration; in consequence of which the compound of two atoms would not occupy more s.p.a.ce than one atom.]

[Footnote 309: The Sutra is concerned with the body only as far as it is an instrument; the case of extraneous instruments having already been disposed of in Sutra 24.]

[Footnote 310: The nature (svabhava) of the Lord is, the commentators say, Maya joined with time and karman.]

[Footnote 311: This clause is an answer to the objection that the Lord might remain at rest instead of creating a world useless to himself and the cause of pain to others. For in consequence of his conjunction with Maya the creation is unavoidable. Go. an. Avidya naturally tends towards effects, without any purpose. Bha.

an. Gi. remarks: Nanu liladav asmadadinam akasmad eva niv/ri/tter api darsanad i/s/varasyapi mayamayyam lilayam tatha-bhave vinapi sa/my/agj/n/ana/m/ sa/m/sarasamu/kkh/ittir ili tatraha na /ke/ti.

Anirva/ky/a khalv avidya paras/yes/varasya /k/a. svabhavo lileti /kok/yate tatra na prat.i.tikasvabhavayam anupapattir avatarat.i.ty artha/h/.]

[Footnote 312: From this pa.s.sage we must not--the commentators say--infer injustice on the part of the Lord; for the previous merit or demerit of a being determines the specific quality of the actions which he performs in his present existence, the Lord acting as the common cause only (as Parjanya does).]

[Footnote 313: Ragadveshamoha ragadayas le /k/a purusha/m/ dukhadibhi/h/ kli/s/yant.i.ta kle/s/as tesb/am/ kartneapia/vi/uyanugu/rr/as tabhir aksbipta/m/ dharmadilaksbilaksha/n/a/m/ kurma tadapekshavidya. an. Gi.]

SECOND PADA.

REVERENCE TO THE HIGHEST SELF!

1. That which is inferred (by the [email protected], viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).

Although it is the object of this system to define the true meaning of the Vedanta-texts and not, like the science of Logic, to establish or refute some tenet by mere ratiocination, still it is inc.u.mbent on thorough students of the Vedanta to refute the [email protected] and other systems which are obstacles in the way of perfect knowledge. For this purpose a new chapter is begun. (Nor must it be said that the refutation of the other systems ought to have preceded the establishment of the Vedanta position; for) as the determination of the sense of the Vedanta-pa.s.sages directly subserves perfect knowledge, we have at first, by means of such a determination, established our own position, since this is a task more important than the refutation of the views entertained by others.

Here an opponent might come forward and say that we are indeed ent.i.tled to establish our own position, so as to define perfect knowledge which is the means of release to those desirous of it, but that no use is apparent of a refutation of other opinions, a proceeding productive of nothing but hate and anger.--There is a use, we reply. For there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence looking upon the [email protected] and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge, because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons, and profess to lead to perfect knowledge. Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments were propounded by omniscient sages, and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness.

But, it might be said, the [email protected] and similar systems have already been impugned in several Sutras of the first adhyaya (I, 1, 5, 18; I, 4, 28); why, then, controvert them again?--The task--we reply--which we are now about to undertake differs from what we have already accomplished.

As the [email protected] and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedanta-pa.s.sages and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. Now, however, we are going to refute their arguments in an independent manner, without any reference to the Vedanta-texts.

The [email protected], to make a beginning with them, argue as follows.--Just as jars, dishes, and other products which possess the common quality of consisting of clay are seen to have for their cause clay in general; so we must suppose that all the outward and inward (i.e. inanimate and animate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain, and dulness[314] have for their causes pleasure, pain, and dulness in general. Pleasure, pain, and dulness in their generality together const.i.tute the threefold pradhana. This pradhana which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications[315], in order thus to effect the purposes (i.e.

enjoyment, release, and so on) of the intelligent soul.--The existence of the pradhana is to be inferred from other circ.u.mstances also, such as the limitation of all effects and the like[316].

Against this doctrine we argue as follows.--If you Sankhyas base your theory on parallel instances merely, we point out that a non-intelligent thing which, without being guided by an intelligent being, spontaneously produces effects capable of subserving the purposes of some particular person is nowhere observed in the world. We rather observe that houses, palaces, couches, pleasure-grounds, and the like--things which according to circ.u.mstances are conducive to the obtainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain--are made by workmen endowed with intelligence. Now look at this entire world which appears, on the one hand, as external (i.e. inanimate) in the form of earth and the other elements enabling (the souls) to enjoy the fruits of their various actions, and, on the other hand, as animate, in the form of bodies which belong to the different cla.s.ses of beings, possess a definite arrangement of organs, and are therefore capable of const.i.tuting the abodes of fruition; look, we say, at this world, of which the most ingenious workmen cannot even form a conception in their minds, and then say if a non-intelligent principle like the pradhana is able to fashion it! Other non-intelligent things such as stones and clods of earth are certainly not seen to possess a.n.a.logous powers. We rather must a.s.sume that just as clay and similar substances are seen to fashion themselves into various forms, if worked upon by potters and the like, so the pradhana also (when modifying itself into its effects) is ruled by some intelligent principle. When endeavouring to determine the nature of the primal cause (of the world), there is no need for us to take our stand on those attributes only which form part of the nature of material causes such as clay, &c., and not on those also which belong to extraneous agents such as potters, &c.[317] Nor (if remembering this latter point) do we enter into conflict with any means of right knowledge; we, on the contrary, are in direct agreement with Scripture which teaches that an intelligent cause exists.--For the reason detailed in the above, i.e. on account of the impossibility of the 'orderly arrangement' (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.--The word 'and' (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. 'on account of the non-possibility of endowment,' &c. For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and inward effects are 'endowed' with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].--(Turning to the next [email protected] argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three const.i.tuents of the pradhana, viz. Goodness, Pa.s.sion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].--Further[323], it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for a.s.suming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2. And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pa.s.s on to the activity by which it is produced.--The three gu/n/as, pa.s.sing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.--Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like. For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots--which are in their own nature non-intelligent--enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c.

in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case. From what is seen we determine what is not seen. Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.

But, the [email protected] rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.--True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.--But, the [email protected] again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.--Very well; the question then arises: Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the [email protected] says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?--We must, the [email protected] replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation. A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is. The[324]

existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.--Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we--the Vedantins--make the following reply.--We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things. The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.--But--an objection will be raised--your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.--A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense. So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.--If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power as in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman no motion can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being fict.i.tiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and form presented by Nescience.--Hence motion can be reconciled with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause.

3. If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).

Well, the resumes, listen then to the following instances.--As non-sentient milk flows forth from its own nature merely for the nourishment of the young animal, and as non-sentient water, from its own nature, flows along for the benefit of mankind, so the pradhana also, although non-intelligent, may be supposed to move from its own nature merely for the purpose of effecting the highest end of man.