The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 26

We at first set forth the argumentation.--Ordinary experience teaches us that those who wish to produce certain effects, such as curds, or earthen jars, or golden ornaments, employ for their purpose certain determined causal substances such as milk, clay, and gold; those who wish to produce sour milk do not employ clay, nor do those who intend to make jars employ milk and so on. But, according to that doctrine which teaches that the effect is non-existent (before its actual production), all this should be possible. For if before their actual origination all effects are equally non-existent in any causal substance, why then should curds be produced from milk only and not from clay also, and jars from clay only and not from milk as well?--Let us then maintain, the asatkaryavadin rejoins, that there is indeed an equal non-existence of any effect in any cause, but that at the same time each causal substance has a certain capacity reaching beyond itself (ati/s/aya) for some particular effect only and not for other effects; that, for instance, milk only, and not clay, has a certain capacity for curds; and clay only, and not milk, an a.n.a.logous capacity for jars.--What, we ask in return, do you understand by that 'ati/s/aya?' If you understand by it the antecedent condition of the effect (before its actual origination), you abandon your doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause, and prove our doctrine according to which it does so exist. If, on the other hand, you understand by the ati/s/aya a certain power of the cause a.s.sumed to the end of accounting for the fact that only one determined effect springs from the cause, you must admit that the power can determine the particular effect only if it neither is other (than cause and effect) nor non-existent; for if it were either, it would not be different from anything else which is either non-existent or other than cause and effect, (and how then should it alone be able to produce the particular effect?) Hence it follows that that power is identical with the Self of the cause, and that the effect is identical with the Self of that power.--Moreover, as the ideas of cause and effect on the one hand and of substance and qualities on the other hand are not separate ones, as, for instance, the ideas of a horse and a buffalo, it follows that the ident.i.ty of the cause and the effect as well as of the substance and its qualities has to be admitted. Let it then be a.s.sumed, the opponent rejoins, that the cause and the effect, although really different, are not apprehended as such, because they are connected by the so-called samavaya connexion[293].--If, we reply, you a.s.sume the samavaya connexion between cause and effect, you have either to admit that the samavaya itself is joined by a certain connexion to the two terms which are connected by samavaya, and then that connexion will again require a new connexion (joining it to the two terms which it binds together), and you will thus be compelled to postulate an infinite series of connexions; or else you will have to maintain that the samavaya is not joined by any connexion to the terms which it binds together, and from that will result the dissolution of the bond which connects the two terms of the samavaya relation[294].--Well then, the opponent rejoins, let us a.s.sume that the samavaya connexion as itself being a connexion may be connected with the terms which it joins without the help of any further connexion.--Then, we reply, conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also must be connected with the two terms which it joins without the help of the samavaya connexion; for conjunction also is a kind of connexion[295].--Moreover, as substances, qualities, and so on are apprehended as standing in the relation of ident.i.ty, the a.s.sumption of the samavaya relation has really no purport.

In what manner again do you--who maintain that the cause and the effect are joined by the samavaya relation--a.s.sume a substance consisting of parts which is an effect to abide in its causes, i.e. in the material parts of which it consists? Does it abide in all the parts taken together or in each particular part?--If you say that it abides in all parts together, it follows that the whole as such cannot be perceived, as it is impossible that all the parts should be in contact with the organs of perception. (And let it not be objected that the whole may be apprehended through some of the parts only), for manyness which abides in all its substrates together (i.e. in all the many things), is not apprehended so long as only some of those substrates are apprehended.--Let it then be a.s.sumed that the whole abides in all the parts by the mediation of intervening aggregates of parts[296].--In that case, we reply, we should have to a.s.sume other parts in addition to the primary originative parts of the whole, in order that by means of those other parts the whole could abide in the primary parts in the manner indicated by you. For we see (that one thing which abides in another abides there by means of parts different from those of that other thing), that the sword, for instance, pervades the sheath by means of parts different from the parts of the sheath. But an a.s.sumption of that kind would lead us into a regressus in infinitum, because in order to explain how the whole abides in certain given parts we should always have to a.s.sume further parts[297].--Well, then, let us maintain the second alternative, viz. that the whole abides in each particular part.--That also cannot be admitted; for if the whole is present in one part it cannot be present in other parts also; not any more than Devadatta can be present in /S/rughna and in Pa/t/aliputra on one and the same day. If the whole were present in more than one part, several wholes would result, comparable to Devadatta and Yaj/n/adatta, who, as being two different persons, may live one of them at /S/rughna and the other at Pa/t/aliputra.--If the opponent should rejoin that the whole may be fully present in each part, just as the generic character of the cow is fully present in each individual cow; we point out that the generic attributes of the cow are visibly perceived in each individual cow, but that the whole is not thus perceived in each particular part.

If the whole were fully present in each part, the consequence would be that the whole would produce its effects indifferently with any of its parts; a cow, for instance, would give milk from her horns or her tail.

But such things are not seen to take place.

We proceed to consider some further arguments opposed to the doctrine that the effect does not exist in the cause.--That doctrine involves the conclusion that the actual origination of an effect is without an agent and thus devoid of substantial being. For origination is an action, and as such requires an agent[298], just as the action of walking does. To speak of an action without an agent would be a contradiction. But if you deny the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, it would have to be a.s.sumed that whenever the origination of a jar, for instance, is spoken of the agent is not the jar (which before its origination did not exist) but something else, and again that when the origination of the two halves of the jar is spoken of the agent is not the two halves but something else. From this it would follow that the sentence, 'the jar is originated' means as much as 'the potter and the other (operative) causes are originated[299].' But as a matter of fact the former sentence is never understood to mean the latter; and it is, moreover, known that at the time when the jar originates, the potter, &c. are already in existence.--Let us then say, the opponent resumes, that origination is the connexion of the effect with the existence of its cause and its obtaining existence as a Self.--How, we ask in reply, can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connexion with something else? A connexion is possible of two existing things only, not of one existing and one non-existing thing or of two non-existing things. To something non-existing which on that account is indefinable, it is moreover not possible to a.s.sign a limit as the opponent does when maintaining that the effect is non-existing before its origination; for experience teaches us that existing things only such as fields and houses have limits, but not non-existing things. If somebody should use, for instance, a phrase such as the following one, 'The son of a barren woman was king previously to the coronation of Pur/n/avarman' the declaration of a limit in time implied in that phrase does not in reality determine that the son of the barren woman, i.e. a mere non-ent.i.ty, either was or is or will be king. If the son of a barren woman could become an existing thing subsequently to the activity of some causal agent, in that case it would be possible also that the non-existing effect should be something existing, subsequently to the activity of some causal agent. But we know that the one thing can take place no more than the other thing; the non-existing effect and the son of the barren woman are both equally non-ent.i.ties and can never be.--But, the asatkaryavadin here objects, from your doctrine there follows the result that the activity of causal agents is altogether purposeless. For if the effect were lying already fully accomplished in the cause and were non-different from it, n.o.body would endeavour to bring it about, no more than anybody endeavours to bring about the cause which is already fully accomplished previously to all endeavour. But as a matter of fact causal agents do endeavour to bring about effects, and it is in order not to have to condemn their efforts as altogether useless that we a.s.sume the non-existence of the effect previously to its origination.--Your objection is refuted, we reply, by the consideration that the endeavour of the causal agent may be looked upon as having a purpose in so far as it arranges the causal substance in the form of the effect. That, however, even the form of the effect (is not something previously non-existing, but) belongs to the Self of the cause already because what is devoid of Selfhood cannot be begun at all, we have already shown above.--Nor does a substance become another substance merely by appearing under a different aspect. Devadatta may at one time be seen with his arms and legs closely drawn up to his body, and another time with his arms and legs stretched out, and yet he remains the same substantial being, for he is recognised as such. Thus the persons also by whom we are surrounded, such as fathers, mothers, brothers, &c., remain the same, although we see them in continually changing states and att.i.tudes; for they are always recognised as fathers, mothers, brothers, and so on. If our opponent objects to this last ill.u.s.trative example on the ground that fathers, mothers, and so on remain the same substantial beings, because the different states in which they appear are not separated from each other by birth or death, while the effect, for instance a jar, appears only after the cause, for instance the clay, has undergone destruction as it were (so that the effect may be looked upon as something altogether different from the cause); we rebut this objection by remarking that causal substances also such as milk, for instance, are perceived to exist even after they have entered into the condition of effects such as curds and the like (so that we have no right to say that the cause undergoes destruction). And even in those cases where the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which there spring sprouts and trees, the term 'birth' (when applied to the sprout) only means that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continual accretion of similar particles of matter; and the term 'death' only means that, through the secession of those particles, the cause again pa.s.ses beyond the sphere of visibility. Nor can it be said that from such separation by birth and death as described just now it follows that the non-existing becomes existing, and the existing non-existing; for if that were so, it would also follow that the unborn child in the mother's womb and the new-born babe stretched out on the bed are altogether different beings.

It would further follow that a man is not the same person in childhood, manhood, and old age, and that terms such as father and the like are illegitimately used.--The preceding arguments may also be used to refute the (Bauddha doctrine) of all existence being momentary only[300].

The doctrine that the effect is non-existent previously to its actual origination, moreover, leads to the conclusion that the activity of the causal agent has no object; for what does not exist cannot possibly be an object; not any more than the ether can be cleft by swords and other weapons for striking or cutting. The object can certainly not be the inherent cause; for that would lead to the erroneous conclusion that from the activity of the causal agent, which has for its object the inherent cause, there results something else (viz. the effect). And if (in order to preclude this erroneous conclusion) the opponent should say that the effect is (not something different from the cause, but) a certain relative power (ati/s/aya) of the inherent cause; he thereby would simply concede our doctrine, according to which the effect exists in the cause already.

We maintain, therefore, as our final conclusion, that milk and other substances are called effects when they are in the state of curds and so on, and that it is impossible, even within hundreds of years, ever to bring about an effect which is different from its cause. The fundamental cause of all appears in the form of this and that effect, up to the last effect of all, just as an actor appears in various robes and costumes, and thereby becomes the basis for all the current notions and terms concerning the phenomenal world.

The conclusion here established, on the ground of reasoning, viz. that the effect exists already before its origination, and is non-different from its cause, results also from a different scriptural pa.s.sage. As under the preceding Sutra a Vedic pa.s.sage was instanced which speaks of the non-existing, the different pa.s.sage referred to in the present Sutra is the one (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 1) which refers to that which is. That pa.s.sage begins, 'Being only was this in the beginning, one without a second,' refers, thereupon, to the doctrine of the Non-existent being the cause of the world ('Others say, Non-being was this in the beginning'), raises an objection against that doctrine ('How could that which is be born of that which is not?'), and, finally, reaffirms the view first set forth, 'Only Being was this in the beginning.' The circ.u.mstance that in this pa.s.sage the effect, which is denoted by the word 'this,' is by Scripture, with reference to the time previous to its origination, coordinated with the cause denoted by the term 'Being,'

proves that the effect exists in--and is non-different from--the cause.

If it were before its origination non-existing and after it inhered in its cause by samavaya, it would be something different from the cause, and that would virtually imply an abandonment of the promise made in the pa.s.sage, 'That instruction by which we hear what is not heard,' &c. (VI, 1, 3). The latter a.s.sertion is ratified, on the other hand, through the comprehension that the effect exists in--and is not different from-the cause.

19. And like a piece of cloth.

As of a folded piece of cloth we do not know clearly whether it is a piece of cloth or some other thing, while on its being unfolded it becomes manifest that the folded thing was a piece of cloth; and as, so long as it is folded, we perhaps know that it is a piece of cloth but not of what definite length and width it is, while on its being unfolded we know these particulars, and at the same time that the cloth is not different from the folded object; in the same way an effect, such as a piece of cloth, is non-manifest as long as it exists in its causes, i.e.

the threads, &c. merely, while it becomes manifest and is clearly apprehended in consequence of the operations of shuttle, loom, weaver, and so on.--Applying this instance of the piece of cloth, first folded and then unfolded, to the general case of cause and effect, we conclude that the latter is non-different from the former.

20. And as in the case of the different vital airs.

It is a matter of observation that when the operations of the different kinds of vital air--such as pra/n/a the ascending vital air, apana the descending vital air, &c.--are suspended, in consequence of the breath being held so that they exist in their causes merely, the only effect which continues to be accomplished is life, while all other effects, such as the bending and stretching of the limbs and so on, are stopped.

When, thereupon, the vital airs again begin to act, those other effects also are brought about, in addition to mere life.--Nor must the vital airs, on account of their being divided into cla.s.ses, be considered as something else than vital air; for wind (air) const.i.tutes their common character. Thus (i.e. in the manner ill.u.s.trated by the instance of the vital airs) the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived.--As, therefore, the whole world is an effect of Brahman and non-different from it, the promise held out in the scriptural pa.s.sage that 'What is not heard is heard, what is not perceived is perceived, what is not known is known' (Ch. Up. VI, 1, 3) is fulfilled[301].

21. On account of the other (i.e. the individual soul) being designated (as non-different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) various faults, as, for instance, not doing what is beneficial.

Another objection is raised against the doctrine of an intelligent cause of the world.--If that doctrine is accepted, certain faults, as, for instance, doing what is not beneficial, will attach (to the intelligent cause, i.e. Brahman), 'on account of the other being designated.' For Scripture declares the other, i.e. the embodied soul, to be one with Brahman, as is shown by the pa.s.sage, 'That is the Self; that art thou, O /S/vetaketu!' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7.)--Or else (if we interpret 'the other'

of the Sutra in a different way) Scripture declares the other, i.e.

Brahman, to be the Self of the embodied soul. For the pa.s.sage, 'Having created that he entered into it,' declares the creator, i.e. the unmodified Brahman, to const.i.tute the Self of the embodied soul, in consequence of his entering into his products. The following pa.s.sage also, 'Entering (into them) with this living Self I will evolve names and forms' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), in which the highest divinity designates the living (soul) by the word 'Self,' shows that the embodied Self is not different from Brahman. Therefore the creative power of Brahman belongs to the embodied Self also, and the latter, being thus an independent agent, might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself, and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease, and whatever may be the other meshes of the net of suffering. For we know that no free person will build a prison for himself, and take up his abode in it. Nor would a being, itself absolutely stainless, look on this altogether unclean body as forming part of its Self. It would, moreover, free itself, according to its liking, of the consequences of those of its former actions which result in pain, and would enjoy the consequences of those actions only which are rewarded by pleasure. Further, it would remember that it had created this manifold world; for every person who has produced some clearly appearing effect remembers that he has been the cause of it. And as the magician easily retracts, whenever he likes, the magical illusion which he had emitted, so the embodied soul also would be able to reabsorb this world into itself. The fact is, however, that the embodied soul cannot reabsorb its own body even. As we therefore see that 'what would be beneficial is not done,' the hypothesis of the world having proceeded from an intelligent cause is unacceptable.

22. But the separate (Brahman, i.e. the Brahman separate from the individual souls) (is the creator); (the existence of which separate Brahman we learn) from the declaration of difference.

The word 'but' discards the purvapaksha.--We rather declare that that omniscient, omnipotent Brahman, whose essence is eternal pure cognition and freedom, and which is additional to, i.e. different from the embodied Self, is the creative principle of the world. The faults specified above, such as doing what is not beneficial, and the like, do not attach to that Brahman; for as eternal freedom is its characteristic nature, there is nothing either beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. Nor is there any impediment to its knowledge and power; for it is omniscient and omnipotent. The embodied Self, on the other hand, is of a different nature, and to it the mentioned faults adhere. But then we do not declare it to be the creator of the world, on account of 'the declaration of difference.' For scriptural pa.s.sages (such as, 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be perceived, to be marked,' B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 5; 'The Self we must search out, we must try to understand,' Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1; 'Then he becomes united with the True,' Ch. Up. VI, 8, 1; 'This embodied Self mounted by the intelligent Self,' B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 35) declare differences founded on the relations of agent, object, and so on, and thereby show Brahman to be different from the individual soul.--And if it be objected that there are other pa.s.sages declaratory of non-difference (for instance, 'That art thou'), and that difference and non-difference cannot co-exist because contradictory, we reply that the possibility of the co-existence of the two is shown by the parallel instance of the universal ether and the ether limited by a jar.--Moreover, as soon as, in consequence of the declaration of non-difference contained in such pa.s.sages as 'that art thou,' the consciousness of non-difference arises in us, the transmigratory state of the individual soul and the creative quality of Brahman vanish at once, the whole phenomenon of plurality, which springs from wrong knowledge, being sublated by perfect knowledge, and what becomes then of the creation and the faults of not doing what is beneficial, and the like? For that this entire apparent world, in which good and evil actions are done, &c., is a mere illusion, owing to the non-discrimination of (the Self's) limiting adjuncts, viz. a body, and so on, which spring from name and form the presentations of Nescience, and does in reality not exist at all, we have explained more than once.

The illusion is a.n.a.logous to the mistaken notion we entertain as to the dying, being born, being hurt, &c. of ourselves (our Selfs; while in reality the body only dies, is born, &c.). And with regard to the state in which the appearance of plurality is not yet sublated, it follows from pa.s.sages declaratory of such difference (as, for instance, 'That we must search for,' &c.) that Brahman is superior to the individual soul; whereby the possibility of faults adhering to it is excluded.

23. And because the case is a.n.a.logous to that of stones, &c. (the objections raised) cannot be established.

As among minerals, which are all mere modifications of earth, nevertheless great variety is observed, some being precious gems, such as diamonds, lapis lazuli, &c., others, such as crystals and the like, being of medium value, and others again stones only fit to be flung at dogs or crows; and as from seeds which are placed in one and the same ground various plants are seen to spring, such as sandalwood and cuc.u.mbers, which show the greatest difference in their leaves, blossoms, fruits, fragrancy, juice, &c.; and as one and the same food produces various effects, such as blood and hair; so the one Brahman also may contain in itself the distinction of the individual Selfs and the highest Self, and may produce various effects. Hence the objections imagined by others (against the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) cannot be maintained.--Further[302] arguments are furnished by the fact of all effect having, as Scripture declares, their origin in speech only, and by the a.n.a.logous instance of the variety of dream phantoms (while the dreaming person remains one).

24. If you object on the ground of the observation of the employment (of instruments); (we say), No; because as milk (transforms itself, so Brahman does).

Your a.s.sertion that the intelligent Brahman alone, without a second, is the cause of the world cannot be maintained, on account of the observation of employment (of instruments). For in ordinary life we see that potters, weavers, and other handicraftsmen produce jars, cloth, and the like, after having put themselves in possession of the means thereto by providing themselves with various implements, such as clay, staffs, wheels, string, &c.; Brahman, on the other hand, you conceive to be without any help; how then can it act as a creator without providing itself with instruments to work with? We therefore maintain that Brahman is not the cause of the world.

This objection is not valid, because causation is possible in consequence of a peculiar const.i.tution of the causal substance, as in the case of milk. Just as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively, without any extraneous means, so it is in the case of Brahman also. And if you object to this a.n.a.logy for the reason that milk, in order to turn into curds, does require an extraneous agent, viz. heat, we reply that milk by itself also undergoes a certain amount of definite change, and that its turning is merely accelerated by heat.

If milk did not possess that capability of itself, heat could not compel it to turn; for we see that air or ether, for instance, is not compelled by the action of heat to turn into sour milk. By the co-operation of auxiliary means the milk's capability of turning into sour milk is merely completed. The absolutely complete power of Brahman, on the other hand, does not require to be supplemented by any extraneous help. Thus Scripture also declares, 'There is no effect and no instrument known of him, no one is seen like unto him or better; his high power is revealed as manifold, as inherent, acting as force and knowledge' (/S/ve. Up. VI, 8). Therefore Brahman, although one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects; just as milk is.

25. And (the case of Brahman is) like that of G.o.ds and other beings in ordinary experience.

Well, let it be admitted that milk and other non-intelligent things have the power of turning themselves into sour milk, &c. without any extraneous means, since it is thus observed. But we observe, on the other hand, that intelligent agents, as, for instance, potters, proceed to their several work only after having provided themselves with a complete set of instruments. How then can it be supposed that Brahman, which is likewise of an intelligent nature, should proceed without any auxiliary?

We reply, 'Like G.o.ds and others.' As G.o.ds, fathers, /ri/shis, and other beings of great power, who are all of intelligent nature, are seen to create many and various objects, such as palaces, chariots, &c., without availing themselves of any extraneous means, by their mere intention, which is effective in consequence of those beings' peculiar power--a fact vouchsafed by mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, and pura/n/as;--and as the spider emits out of itself the threads of its web; and as the female crane conceives without a male; and as the lotus wanders from one pond to another without any means of conveyance; so the intelligent Brahman also may be a.s.sumed to create the world by itself without extraneous means.

Perhaps our opponent will argue against all this in the following style.--The G.o.ds and other beings, whom you have quoted as parallel instances, are really of a nature different from that of Brahman. For the material causes operative in the production of palaces and other material things are the bodies of the G.o.ds, and not their intelligent Selfs. And the web of the spider is produced from its saliva which, owing to the spider's devouring small insects, acquires a certain degree of consistency. And the female crane conceives from hearing the sound of thunder. And the lotus flower indeed derives from its indwelling intelligent principle the impulse of movement, but is not able actually to move in so far as it is a merely intelligent being[303]; it rather wanders from pond to pond by means of its non-intelligent body, just as the creeper climbs up the tree.--Hence all these ill.u.s.trative examples cannot be applied to the case of Brahman.

To this we reply, that we meant to show merely that the case of Brahman is different from that of potters and similar agents. For while potters, &c., on the one side, and G.o.ds, &c., on the other side, possess the common attribute of intelligence, potters require for their work extraneous means (i.e. means lying outside their bodies) and G.o.ds do not. Hence Brahman also, although intelligent, is a.s.sumed to require no extraneous means. So much only we wanted to show by the parallel instance of the G.o.ds, &c. Our intention is to point out that a peculiarly conditioned capability which is observed in some one case (as in that of the potter) is not necessarily to be a.s.sumed in all other cases also.

26. Either the consequence of the entire (Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts.

Hitherto we have established so much that Brahman, intelligent, one, without a second, modifying itself without the employment of any extraneous means, is the cause of the world.--Now, another objection is raised for the purpose of throwing additional light on the point under discussion.--The consequence of the Vedanta doctrine, it is said, will be that we must a.s.sume the entire Brahman to undergo the change into its effects, because it is not composed of parts. If Brahman, like earth and other matter, consisted of parts, we might a.s.sume that a part of it undergoes the change, while the other part remains as it is. But Scripture distinctly declares Brahman to be devoid of parts. Compare, 'He who is without parts, without actions, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (/Sv/e. Up. VI, 19); 'That heavenly person is without body, he is both without and within, not produced' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2); 'That great Being is endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge' (B/ri/. Up. II, 4, 12); 'He is to be described by No, no'

(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 2,6); 'It is neither coa.r.s.e nor fine' (B/ri/. Up.

III, 8, 8); all which pa.s.sages deny the existence of any distinctions in Brahman.--As, therefore, a partial modification is impossible, a modification of the entire Brahman has to be a.s.sumed. But that involves a cutting off of Brahman from its very basis.--Another consequence of the Vedantic view is that the texts exhorting us to strive 'to see'

Brahman become purposeless; for the effects of Brahman may be seen without any endeavour, and apart from them no Brahman exists.--And, finally, the texts declaring Brahman to be unborn are contradicted thereby.--If, on the other hand--in order to escape from these difficulties--we a.s.sume Brahman to consist of parts, we thereby do violence to those texts which declare Brahman not to be made up of parts. Moreover, if Brahman is made up of parts, it follows that it is non-eternal.--Hence the Vedantic point of view cannot be maintained in any way.

27. But (this is not so), on account of scriptural pa.s.sages, and on account of (Brahman) resting on Scripture (only).

The word 'but' discards the objection.--We deny this and maintain that our view is not open to any objections.--That the entire Brahman undergoes change, by no means follows from our doctrine, 'on account of sacred texts.' For in the same way as Scripture speaks of the origin of the world from Brahman, it also speaks of Brahman subsisting apart from its effects. This appears from the pa.s.sages indicating the difference of cause and effect '(That divinity thought) let me enter into these three divinities with this living Self and evolve names and forms;' and, 'Such is the greatness of it, greater than it is the Person; one foot of him are all things, three feet are what is immortal in heaven' (Ch. Up. III, 12, 6); further, from the pa.s.sages declaring the unmodified Brahman to have its abode in the heart, and from those teaching that (in dreamless sleep) the individual soul is united with the True. For if the entire Brahman had pa.s.sed into its effects, the limitation (of the soul's union with Brahman) to the state of dreamless sleep which is declared in the pa.s.sage, 'then it is united with the True, my dear,' would be out of place; since the individual soul is always united with the effects of Brahman, and since an unmodified Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis). Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived. For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be admitted.--Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it. For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authoritative--not the senses, and so on--must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be. Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman pa.s.ses over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts. Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and n.o.body unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought! As the Pura/n/a says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable! The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes[304].' Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But--our opponent will say--even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory. Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman. If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety. If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts. It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions 'at the atiratra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,' and 'at the atiratra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup') any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man. We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.

No, we reply, the difficulty is merely an apparent one; as we maintain that the (alleged) break in Brahman's nature is a mere figment of Nescience. By a break of that nature a thing is not really broken up into parts, not any more than the moon is really multiplied by appearing double to a person of defective vision. By that element of plurality which is the fiction of Nescience, which is characterised by name and form, which is evolved as well as non-evolved, which is not to be defined either as the Existing or the Non-existing, Brahman becomes the basis of this entire apparent world with its changes, and so on, while in its true and real nature it at the same time remains unchanged, lifted above the phenomenal universe. And as the distinction of names and forms, the fiction of Nescience, originates entirely from speech only, it does not militate against the fact of Brahman being without parts.--Nor have the scriptural pa.s.sages which speak of Brahman as undergoing change the purpose of teaching the fact of change; for such instruction would have no fruit. They rather aim at imparting instruction about Brahman's Self as raised above this apparent world; that being an instruction which we know to have a result of its own. For in the scriptural pa.s.sage beginning 'He can only be described by No, no'

(which pa.s.sage conveys instruction about the absolute Brahman) a result is stated at the end, in the words 'O Janaka, you have indeed reached fearlessness' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).--Hence our view does not involve any real difficulties.

28. For thus it is in the (individual) Self also, and various (creations exist in G.o.ds[305], &c.).

Nor is there any reason to find fault with the doctrine that there can be a manifold creation in the one Self, without destroying its character. For Scripture teaches us that there exists a multiform creation in the one Self of a dreaming person, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads, but he himself creates chariots, horses, and roads' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 10). In ordinary life too multiform creations, elephants, horses, and the like are seen to exist in G.o.ds, &c., and magicians without interfering with the unity of their being. Thus a multiform creation may exist in Brahman also, one as it is, without divesting it of its character of unity.

29. And because the objection (raised against our view) lies against his (the opponent's) view likewise.

Those also who maintain that the world has sprung from the pradhana implicitly teach that something not made up of parts, unlimited, devoid of sound and other qualities--viz. the pradhana--is the cause of an effect--viz. the world--which is made up of parts, is limited and is characterised by the named qualities. Hence it follows from that doctrine also either that the pradhana as not consisting of parts has to undergo a change in its entirety, or else that the view of its not consisting of parts has to be abandoned.--But--it might be pleaded in favour of the [email protected] do not maintain their pradhana to be without parts; for they define it as the state of equilibrium of the three gu/n/as, Goodness, Pa.s.sion, and Darkness, so that the pradhana forms a whole containing the three gu/n/as as its parts.--We reply that such a part.i.teness as is here proposed does not remove the objection in hand because still each of the three qualities is declared to be in itself without parts[306]. And each gu/n/a by itself a.s.sisted merely by the two other gu/n/as const.i.tutes the material cause of that part of the world which resembles it in its nature[307].--So that the objection lies against the view likewise.--Well, then, as the reasoning (on which the doctrine of the impart.i.teness of the pradhana rests) is not absolutely safe, let us a.s.sume that the pradhana consists of parts.--If you do that, we reply, it follows that the pradhana cannot be eternal, and so on.--Let it then be said that the various powers of the pradhana to which the variety of its effects is pointing are its parts.--Well, we reply, those various powers are admitted by us also who see the cause of the world in Brahman.

The same objections lie against the doctrine of the world having originated from atoms. For on that doctrine one atom when combining with another must, as it is not made up of parts, enter into the combination with its whole extent, and as thus no increase of bulk takes place we do not get beyond the first atom.[308] If, on the other hand, you maintain that the atom enters into the combination with a part only, you offend against the a.s.sumption of the atoms having no parts.

As therefore all views are equally obnoxious to the objections raised, the latter cannot be urged against any one view in particular, and the advocate of Brahman has consequently cleared his doctrine.

30. And (the highest divinity is) endowed with all (powers) because that is seen (from Scripture).

We have stated that this multiform world of effects is possible to Brahman, because, although one only, it is endowed with various powers.--How then--it may be asked--do you know that the highest Brahman is endowed with various powers?--He is, we reply, endowed with all powers, 'because that is seen.' For various scriptural pa.s.sages declare that the highest divinity possesses all powers, 'He to whom all actions, all desires, all odours, all tastes belong, he who embraces all this, who never speaks, and is never surprised' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 4); 'He who desires what is true and imagines what is true' (Ch. Up. VIII, 7, 1); 'He who knows all (in its totality), and cognizes all (in its detail') (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'By the command of that Imperishable, O Garg, sun and moon stand apart' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 9); and other similar pa.s.sages.

31. If it be said that (Brahman is devoid of powers) on account of the absence of organs; (we reply that) this has been explained (before).

Let this be granted.--Scripture, however, declares the highest divinity to be without (bodily) organs of action[309]; so, for instance, in the pa.s.sage, 'It is without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (B/ri/. Up. III, 8, 8). Being such, how should it be able to produce effects, although it may be endowed with all powers? For we know (from mantras, arthavadas, &c.) that the G.o.ds and other intelligent beings, though endowed with all powers, are capable of producing certain effects only because they are furnished with bodily instruments of action. And, moreover, how can the divinity, to whom the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'No, no,' denies all attributes, be endowed with all powers?

The appropriate reply to this question has been already given above. The transcendent highest Brahman can be fathomed by means of Scripture only, not by mere reasoning. Nor are we obliged to a.s.sume that the capacity of one being is exactly like that which is observed in another. It has likewise been explained above that although all qualities are denied of Brahman we nevertheless may consider it to be endowed with powers, if we a.s.sume in its nature an element of plurality, which is the mere figment of Nescience. Moreover, a scriptural pa.s.sage ('Grasping without hands, hastening without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears'

/S/ve. Up. III, 19) declares that Brahman although devoid of bodily organs, possesses all possible capacities.