The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 18

20. And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different meaning.

The alleged reference to the individual soul which has been pointed out (by the purvapakshin) in the pa.s.sage complementary to the pa.s.sage about the small ether ('Now that serene being,' &c., VIII, 3, 4) teaches, if the small ether is interpreted to mean the highest Lord, neither the worship of the individual soul nor any qualification of the subject under discussion (viz. the small ether), and is therefore devoid of meaning.--On that account the Sutra declares that the reference has another meaning, i.e. that the reference to the individual soul is not meant to determine the nature of the individual soul, but rather the nature of the highest Lord. In the following manner. The individual soul which, in the pa.s.sage referred to, is called the serene being, acts in the waking state as the ruler of the aggregate comprising the body and the sense-organs; permeates in sleep the na/d/is of the body, and enjoys the dream visions resulting from the impressions of the waking state; and, finally, desirous of reaching an inner refuge, rises in the state of deep sleep beyond its imagined connexion with the gross and the subtle body, reaches the highest light, i.e. the highest Brahman previously called ether, and thus divesting itself of the state of specific cognition appears in its own (true) nature. The highest light which the soul is to reach and through which it is manifested in its true nature is the Self, free from sin and so on, which is there represented as the object of worship.--In this sense the reference to the individual soul can be admitted by those also who maintain that in reality the highest Lord is meant.

21. If it be said that on account of the scriptural declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Lord cannot be meant; we reply that) that has been explained (before).

The purvapakshin has remarked that the smallness of the ether stated by Scripture ('In it is that small ether') does not agree with the highest Lord, that it may however be predicated of the individual soul which (in another pa.s.sage) is compared to the point of a goad. As that remark calls for a refutation we point out that it has been refuted already, it having been shown--under I, 2, 7--that a relative smallness may be attributed to the Lord. The same refutation is--as the Sutra points out--to be applied here also.--That smallness is, moreover, contradicted by that scriptural pa.s.sage which compares (the ether within the heart) with the known (universal) ether. ('As large as is this ether so large is the ether within the heart.')

22. On account of the acting after (i.e. the shining after), (that after which sun, moon, &c. are said to shine is the highest Self), and (because by the light) of him (all this is said to be lighted).

We read (Mu. Up. II, 2, 10, and Ka. Up. V, 15), 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, much less this fire. After him when he shines everything shines; by the light of him all this is lighted.' The question here arises whether he 'after whom when he shines everything shines, and by whose light all this is lighted,' is some luminous substance, or the highest Self (praj/n/a atman).

A luminous substance, the purvapakshin maintains.--Why?--Because the pa.s.sage denies the shining only of such luminous bodies as the sun and the like. It is known (from every-day experience) that luminous bodies such as the moon and the stars do not shine at daytime when the sun, which is itself a luminous body, is shining. Hence we infer that that thing on account of which all this, including the moon, the stars, and the sun himself, does not shine is likewise a thing of light. The 'shining after' also is possible only if there is a luminous body already, for we know from experience that 'acting after' (imitation) of any kind takes place only when there are more than one agent of similar nature; one man, for instance, walks after another man who walks himself. Therefore we consider it settled that the pa.s.sage refers to some luminous body.

To this we reply that the highest Self only can be meant.--Why?--On account of the acting after. The shining after mentioned in the pa.s.sage, 'After him when he shines everything shines,' is possible only if the praj/n/a Self, i.e. the highest Self, is understood. Of that praj/n/a Self another scriptural pa.s.sage says, 'His form is light, his thoughts are true' (Ch. Up. III, 14, 2). On the other hand, it is not by any means known that the sun, &c. shines after some other luminous body.

Moreover, on account of the equality of nature of all luminous bodies such as the sun and the like, there is no need for them of any other luminous body after which they should shine; for we see that a lamp, for instance, does not 'shine after' another lamp. Nor is there any such absolute rule (as the purvapakshin a.s.serted) that acting after is observed only among things of similar nature. It is rather observed among things of dissimilar nature also; for a red-hot iron ball acts after, i.e. burns after the burning fire, and the dust of the ground blows (is blown) after the blowing wind.--The clause 'on account of the acting after' (which forms part of the Sutra) points to the shining after (mentioned in the scriptural /s/loka under discussion); the clause 'and of him' points to the fourth pada of the same /s/loka. The meaning of this latter clause is that the cause a.s.signed for the light of the sun, &c. (in the pa.s.sage 'by the light of him everything is lighted') intimates the praj/n/a Self. For of that Self Scripture says, 'Him the G.o.ds worship as the light of lights, as immortal time' (B/ri/. Up. IV, 4, 16). That, on the other hand, the light of the sun, the moon, &c, should shine by some other (physical) light is, in the first place, not known; and, in the second place, absurd as one (physical) light is counteracted by another.--Or else the cause a.s.signed for the shining does not apply only to the sun and the other bodies mentioned in the /s/loka; but the meaning (of the last pada) rather is--as we may conclude from the comprehensive statement 'all this'--that the manifestation of this entire world consisting of names and forms, acts, agents and fruits (of action) has for its cause the existence of the light of Brahman; just as the existence of the light of the sun is the cause of the manifestation of all form and colour.--Moreover, the text shows by means of the word 'there' ('the sun does not shine there,' &c.) that the pa.s.sage is to be connected with the general topic, and that topic is Brahman as appears from Mu. Up. II, 2, 5, 'In whom the heaven, the earth, and the sky are woven,' &c. The same appears from a pa.s.sage subsequent (on the one just quoted and immediately preceding the pa.s.sage under discussion). 'In the highest golden sheath there is the Brahman without pa.s.sion and without parts; that is pure, that is the light of lights, that is it which they know who know the Self.' This pa.s.sage giving rise to the question, 'How is it the light of lights?' there is occasion for the reply given in 'The sun does not shine there,' &c.--In refutation of the a.s.sertion that the shining of luminous bodies such as the sun and the moon can be denied only in case of there being another luminous body--as, for instance, the light of the moon and the stars is denied only when the sun is shining--we point out that it has been shown that he (the Self) only can be the luminous being referred to, nothing else. And it is quite possible to deny the shining of sun, moon, and so on with regard to Brahman; for whatever is perceived is perceived by the light of Brahman only so that sun, moon, &c. can be said to shine in it; while Brahman as self-luminous is not perceived by means of any other light. Brahman manifests everything else, but is not manifested by anything else; according to such scriptural pa.s.sages as, 'By the Self alone as his light man sits,' &c. (B/ri/. Up. IV, 3, 6), and 'He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be comprehended '(B/ri/. Up. IV, 2, 4).

23. Moreover Sm/ri/ti also speaks of him (i.e. of the praj/n/a Self as being the universal light).

Moreover that aspect of the praj/n/a Self is spoken of in Sm/ri/ti also, viz. in the Bhagavad Gita (XV, 6, 12), 'Neither the sun, nor the moon, nor the fire illumines that; having gone into which men do not return, that is my highest seat.' And 'The light which abiding in the sun illumines the whole world, and that which is in the moon and that which is in the fire, all that light know to be mine.'

24. On account of the term, (viz. the term 'lord' applied to it) the (person) measured (by a thumb) (is the highest Lord).

We read (Ka. Up. II, 4, 12), 'The person of the size of a thumb stands in the middle of the Self,' &c., and (II, 4, 13), 'That person, of the size of a thumb, is like a light without smoke, lord of the past and of the future, he is the same to-day and to-morrow. This is that.'--The question here arises whether the person of the size of a thumb mentioned in the text is the cognitional (individual) Self or the highest Self.

The purvapakshin maintains that on account of the declaration of the person's size the cognitional Self is meant. For to the highest Self which is of infinite length and breadth Scripture would not ascribe the measure of a span; of the cognitional Self, on the other hand, which is connected with limiting adjuncts, extension of the size of a span may, by means of some fict.i.tious a.s.sumption, be predicated. Sm/ri/ti also confirms this, 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavat the person of the size of a thumb tied to Yama's noose and helpless' (Mahabh. III, 16763). For as Yama could not pull out by force the highest Self, the pa.s.sage is clearly seen to refer to the transmigrating (individual soul) of the size of a thumb, and we thence infer that the same Self is meant in the Vedic pa.s.sage under discussion.

To this we reply that the person a thumb long can only be the highest Lord.--Why?--On account of the term 'lord of the past and of the future.' For none but the highest Lord is the absolute ruler of the past and the future.--Moreover, the clause 'this is that' connects the pa.s.sage with that which had been enquired about, and therefore forms the topic of discussion. And what had been enquired about is Brahman, 'That which thou seest as neither this nor that, as neither effect nor cause, as neither past nor future, tell me that' (I, 2, 14).--'On account of the term,' i.e. on account of the direct statement, in the text, of a designation, viz. the term 'Lord,' we understand that the highest Lord is meant[191].--But still the question remains how a certain extension can be attributed to the omnipresent highest Self.--The reply to this is given, in the next Sutra.

25. But with reference to the heart (the highest Self is said to be of the size of a span), as men are ent.i.tled (to the study of the Veda).

The measure of a span is ascribed to the highest Lord, although omnipresent with reference to his abiding within the heart; just as to ether (s.p.a.ce) the measure of a cubit is ascribed with reference to the joint of a bamboo. For, on the one hand, the measure of a span cannot be ascribed directly to the highest Self which exceeds all measure, and, on the other hand, it has been shown that none but the highest Lord can be meant here, on account of the term 'Lord,' and so on.--But--an objection may be raised--as the size of the heart varies in the different cla.s.ses of living beings it cannot be maintained that the declaration of the highest Self being of the size of a thumb can be explained with reference to the heart.--To this objection the second half of the Sutra replies: On account of men (only) being ent.i.tled. For the /s/astra, although propounded without distinction (i.e. although not itself specifying what cla.s.s of beings is to proceed according to its precepts), does in reality ent.i.tle men[192] only (to act according to its precepts); for men only (of the three higher castes) are, firstly, capable (of complying with the precepts of the /s/astra); are, secondly, desirous (of the results of actions enjoined by the /s/astra); are, thirdly, not excluded by prohibitions; and are, fourthly, subject to the precepts about the upanayana ceremony and so on[193]. This point has been explained in the section treating of the definition of adhikara (Purva Mim. S. VI, 1).--Now the human body has ordinarily a fixed size, and hence the heart also has a fixed size, viz. the size of a thumb.

Hence, as men (only) are ent.i.tled to study and practise the /s/astra, the highest Self may, with reference to its dwelling in the human heart, be spoken of as being of the size of a thumb.--In reply to the purvapakshin's reasoning that on account of the statement of size and on account of Sm/ri/ti we can understand by him who is of the size of a thumb the transmigrating soul only, we remark that--a.n.a.logously to such pa.s.sages as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou'--our pa.s.sage teaches that the transmigrating soul which is of the size of a thumb is (in reality) Brahman. For the Vedanta-pa.s.sages have a twofold purport; some of them aim at setting forth the nature of the highest Self, some at teaching the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self. Our pa.s.sage teaches the unity of the individual soul with the highest Self, not the size of anything. This point is made clear further on in the Upanishad, 'The person of the size of a thumb, the inner Self, is always settled in the heart of men. Let a man draw that Self forth from his body with steadiness, as one draws the pith from a reed. Let him know that Self as the Bright, as the Immortal' (II, 6, 17).

26. Also (beings) above them, (viz. men) (are qualified for the study and practice of the Veda), on account of the possibility (of it), according to Badaraya/n/a.

It has been said above that the pa.s.sage about him who is of the size of a thumb has reference to the human heart, because men are ent.i.tled to study and act according to the /s/astra. This gives us an occasion for the following discussion.--It is true that the /s/astra ent.i.tles men, but, at the same time, there is no exclusive rule ent.i.tling men only to the knowledge of Brahman; the teacher, Badaraya/n/a, rather thinks that the /s/astra ent.i.tles those (cla.s.ses of beings) also which are above men, viz. G.o.ds, and so on.--On what account?--On the account of possibility.--For in their cases also the different causes on which the qualification depends, such as having certain desires, and so on, may exist. In the first place, the G.o.ds also may have the desire of final release, caused by the reflection that all effects, objects, and powers are non-permanent. In the second place, they may be capable of it as their corporeality appears from mantras, arthavadas, itihasas, pura/n/as, and ordinary experience. In the third place, there is no prohibition (excluding them like /S/udras). Nor does, in the fourth place, the scriptural rule about the upanayana-ceremony annul their t.i.tle; for that ceremony merely subserves the study of the Veda, and to the G.o.ds the Veda is manifest of itself (without study). That the G.o.ds, moreover, for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, undergo discipleship, and the like, appears from such scriptural pa.s.sages as 'One hundred and one years Indra lived as a disciple with Praj.a.pati' (Ch. Up. VIII, 11, 3), and 'Bh/ri/gu Varu/n/i went to his father Varu/n/a, saying, "Sir, teach me Brahman"' (Taitt. Up. III, 1).--And the reasons which have been given above against G.o.ds and /ri/shis being ent.i.tled to perform religious works (such as sacrifices), viz. the circ.u.mstance of there being no other G.o.ds (to whom the G.o.ds could offer sacrifices), and of there being no other /ri/shis (who could be invoked during the sacrifice), do not apply to the case of branches of knowledge. For Indra and the other G.o.ds, when applying themselves to knowledge, have no acts to perform with a view to Indra, and so on; nor have Bh/ri/gu and other /ri/shis, in the same case, to do anything with the circ.u.mstance of their belonging to the same gotra as Bh/ri/gu, &c. What, then, should stand in the way of the G.o.ds' and /ri/shis' right to acquire knowledge?--Moreover, the pa.s.sage about that which is of the size of a thumb remains equally valid, if the right of the G.o.ds, &c. is admitted; it has then only to be explained in each particular case by a reference to the particular size of the thumb (of the cla.s.s of beings spoken of).

27. If it be said that (the corporeal individuality of the G.o.ds involves) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works; we deny that, on account of the observation of the a.s.sumption (on the part of the G.o.ds) of several (forms).

If the right of the G.o.ds, and other beings superior to men, to the acquisition of knowledge is founded on the a.s.sumption of their corporeality, &c., we shall have to admit, in consequence of that corporeality, that Indra and the other G.o.ds stand in the relation of subordinate members () to sacrificial acts, by means of their being present in person just as the priests are. But this admission will lead to 'a contradiction in the sacrificial acts,' because the circ.u.mstance of the G.o.ds forming the members of sacrificial acts by means of their personal presence, is neither actually observed nor possible. For it is not possible that one and the same Indra should, at the same time, be present in person at many sacrifices.

To this we reply, that there is no such contradiction.--Why?--On account of the a.s.sumption of several (forms). For it is possible for one and the same divine Self to a.s.sume several forms at the same time.--How is that known?--From observation.--For a scriptural pa.s.sage at first replies to the question how many G.o.ds there are, by the declaration that there are 'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand,' and subsequently, on the question who they are, declares 'They (the 303 and 3003) are only the various powers of them, in reality there are only thirty-three G.o.ds'

(B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 1, 2); showing thereby that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. After that it proceeds to show that these thirty-three G.o.ds themselves are in reality contained in six, five, &c., and, finally, by replying to the question, 'Who is the one G.o.d?' that Breath is the one G.o.d, shows that the G.o.ds are all forms of Breath, and that Breath, therefore, can at the same time appear in many forms.--Sm/ri/ti also has a similar statement, 'A Yogin, O hero of the Bharatas, may, by his power, multiply his Self in many thousand shapes, and in them walk about on the earth. In some he may enjoy the objects, in others he may undergo dire penance, and, finally, he may again retract them all, just as the sun retracts the mult.i.tude of his rays.' If such Sm/ri/ti pa.s.sages as the above declare that even Yogins, who have merely acquired various extraordinary powers, such as subtlety of body, and the like, may animate several bodies at the same time, how much more capable of such feats must the G.o.ds be, who naturally possess all supernatural powers. The G.o.ds thus being able to a.s.sume several shapes, a G.o.d may divide himself into many forms and enter into relation with many sacrifices at the same time, remaining all the while unseen by others, in consequence of his power to render himself invisible.

The latter part of the Sutra may be explained in a different manner also, viz. as meaning that even beings enjoying corporeal individuality are seen to enter into mere subordinate relation to more than one action. Sometimes, indeed, one individual does not at the same time enter into subordinate relation to different actions; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, is not at the same time entertained by many entertainers.

But in other cases one individual stands in subordinate relation to many actions at the same time; one Brahma/n/a, for instance, may const.i.tute the object of the reverence done to him by many persons at the same time. Similarly, it is possible that, as the sacrifice consists in the parting (on the part of the sacrificer with some offering) with a view (to some divinity), many persons may at the same time part with their respective offerings, all of them having in view one and the same individual divinity. The individuality of the G.o.ds does not, therefore, involve any contradiction in sacrificial works.

28. If it be said (that a contradiction will result) in respect of the word; we refute this objection on the ground that (the world) originates from the word, as is shown by perception and inference.

Let it then be granted that, from the admission of the corporeal individuality of the G.o.ds, no contradiction will result in the case of sacrificial works. Still a contradiction will result in respect of the 'word' (/s/abda).--How?--The authoritativeness of the Veda has been proved 'from its independence,' basing on the original (eternal) connection of the word with its sense ('the thing signified')[194]. But now, although a divinity possessing corporeal individuality, such as admitted above, may, by means of its supernatural powers, be able to enjoy at the same time the oblations which form part of several sacrifices yet it will, on account of its very individuality, be subject to birth and death just as we men are, and hence, the eternal connexion of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing being destroyed, a contradiction will arise with regard to the authoritativeness proved to belong to the word of the Veda.

To this we reply that no such contradiction exists.--Why?--'On account of their origin from it.' For from that very same word of the Veda the world, with the G.o.ds and other beings, originates.--But--an objection will be raised--in Sutra I, 1, 2 ('That whence there is the origin, &c.

of this world') it has been proved that the world originates from Brahman; how then can it be said here that it originates from the word?

And, moreover, even if the origin of the world from the word of the Veda be admitted, how is the contradiction in regard to the word removed thereby, inasmuch as the Vasus, the Rudras, the adityas, the Vi/s/vedevas, and the Maruts[195] are non-eternal beings, because produced; and if they are non-eternal, what is there to preclude the non-eternality of the Vedic words Vasu, &c. designating them? For it is known from every-day life that only when the son of Devadatta is born, the name Yaj/n/adatta is given to him (lit. made for him)[196]. Hence we adhere to our opinion that a contradiction does arise with regard to the 'word.'

This objection we negative, on the ground that we observe the eternity of the connexion between such words as cow, and so on, and the things denoted by them. For, although the individuals of the (species denoted by the word) cow have an origin, their species[197] does not have an origin, since of (the three categories) substances, qualities, and actions the individuals only originate, not the species. Now it is with the species that the words are connected, not with the individuals, which, as being infinite in number, are not capable of entering into that connexion. Hence, although the individuals do not originate, no contradiction arises in the case of words such as cow, and the like, since the species are eternal. Similarly, although individual G.o.ds are admitted to originate, there arises no contradiction in the case of such words as Vasu, and the like, since the species denoted by them are eternal. And that the G.o.ds, and so on, belong to different species, is to be concluded from the descriptions of their various personal appearance, such as given in the mantras, arthavadas, &c. Terms such as 'Indra' rest on the connexion (of some particular being) with some particular place, a.n.a.logously to terms such as 'army-leader;' hence, whoever occupies that particular place is called by that particular name.--The origination of the world from the 'word' is not to be understood in that sense, that the word const.i.tutes the material cause of the world, as Brahman does; but while there exist the everlasting words, whose essence is the power of denotation in connexion with their eternal sense (i.e. the ak/r/itis denoted), the accomplishment of such individual things as are capable of having those words applied to them is called an origination from those words.

How then is it known that the world originates from the word?--'From perception and inference.' Perception here denotes Scripture which, in order to be authoritative, is independent (of anything else).

'Inference' denotes Sm/r/iti which, in order to be authoritative, depends on something else (viz. Scripture). These two declare that creation is preceded by the word. Thus a scriptural pa.s.sage says, 'At the word these Praj.a.pati created the G.o.ds; at the words were poured out he created men; at the word drops he created the fathers; at the words through the filter he created the Soma cups; at the words the swift ones he created the stotra; at the words to all he created the /s/astra; at the word blessings he created the other beings.' And another pa.s.sage says, 'He with his mind united himself with speech (i.e. the word of the Veda.--B/ri/. Up. I, 2, 4). Thus Scripture declares in different places that the word precedes the creation.--Sm/r/ti also delivers itself as follows, 'In the beginning a divine voice, eternal, without beginning or end, formed of the Vedas was uttered by Svayambhu, from which all activities proceeded.' By the 'uttering' of the voice we have here to understand the starting of the oral tradition (of the Veda), because of a voice without beginning or end 'uttering' in any other sense cannot be predicated.--Again, we read, 'In the beginning Mahe/s/vara shaped from the words of the Veda the names and forms of all beings and the procedure of all actions.' And again, 'The several names, actions, and conditions of all things he shaped in the beginning from the words of the Veda' (Manu I, 21). Moreover, we all know from observation that any one when setting about some thing which he wishes to accomplish first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work. We therefore conclude that before the creation the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Praj.a.pati the creator, and that after that he created the things conesponding to those words. Scripture also, where it says (Taitt. Bra. II, 2, 4, 2) 'uttering bhur he created the earth,'

&c., shows that the worlds such as the earth, &c. became manifest, i.e.

were created from the words bhur, &c. which had become manifest in the mind (of Praj.a.pati).

Of what nature then is the 'word' with a view to which it is said that the world originates from the 'word?'--It is the spho/t/a, the purvapakshin says.[198] For on the a.s.sumption that the letters are the word, the doctrine that the individual G.o.ds, and so on, originates from the eternal words of the Veda could not in any way be proved, since the letters perish as soon as they are produced (i.e. p.r.o.nounced). These perishable letters are moreover apprehended as differing according to the p.r.o.nunciation of the individual speaker. For this reason we are able to determine, merely from the sound of the voice of some unseen person whom we hear reading, who is reading, whether Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta or some other man. And it cannot be maintained that this apprehension of difference regarding the letters is an erroneous one; for we do not apprehend anything else whereby it is refuted. Nor is it reasonable to maintain that the apprehension of the sense of a word results from the letters. For it can neither be maintained that each letter by itself intimates the sense, since that would be too wide an a.s.sumption;[199]

nor that there takes place a simultaneous apprehension of the whole aggregate of letters; since the letters succeed one another in time. Nor can we admit the explanation that the last letter of the word together with the impressions produced by the perception of the preceding letters is that which makes us apprehend the sense. For the word makes us apprehend the sense only if it is itself apprehended in so far as having reference to the mental grasp of the constant connexion (of the word and the sense), just as smoke makes us infer the existence of fire only when it is itself apprehended; but an apprehension of the last letter combined with the impressions produced by the preceding letters does not actually take place, because those impressions are not objects of perception.[200] Nor, again, can it be maintained that (although those impressions are not objects of perception, yet they may be inferred from their effects, and that thus) the actual perception of the last letter combined with the impressions left by the preceding letters--which impressions are apprehended from their effects--is that which intimates the sense of the word; for that effect of the impressions, viz. the remembrance of the entire word, is itself something consisting of parts which succeed each other in time.--From all this it follows that the spho/t/a is the word. After the apprehending agent, i.e. the buddhi, has, through the apprehension of the several letters of the word, received rudimentary impressions, and after those impressions have been matured through the apprehension of the last letter, the spho/t/a presents itself in the buddhi all at once as the object of one mental act of apprehension.--And it must not be maintained that that one act of apprehension is merely an act of remembrance having for its object the letters of the word; for the letters which are more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.--As that spho/t/a is recognised as the same as often as the word is p.r.o.nounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely. From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.--But--an objection is raised--it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pa.s.s away!--That a.s.sertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).--Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.--Nor, again, can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.

That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are p.r.o.nounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species. But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are p.r.o.nounced. If, for instance, the word cow is p.r.o.nounced twice, we think not that two different words have been p.r.o.nounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.--But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of p.r.o.nunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.--Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves. Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to a.s.sume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors. Is it then not much simpler to a.s.sume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters? And this very fact of recognition is that mental process which prevents us from looking on the apprehension of difference as having the letters for its object (so that the opponent was wrong in denying the existence of such a process). For how should, for instance, the one syllable ga, when it is p.r.o.nounced in the same moment by several persons, be at the same time of different nature, viz.

accented with the udatta, the anudatta, and the Svarita and nasal as well as non-nasal[201]? Or else[202]--and this is the preferable explanation--we a.s.sume that the difference of apprehension is caused not by the letters but by the tone (dhvani). By this tone we have to understand that which enters the ear of a person who is listening from a distance and not able to distinguish the separate letters, and which, for a person standing near, affects the letters with its own distinctions, such as high or low pitch and so on. It is on this tone that all the distinctions of udatta, anudatta, and so on depend, and not on the intrinsic nature of the letters; for they are recognised as the same whenever they are p.r.o.nounced. On this theory only we gain a basis for the distinctive apprehension of the udatta, the anudatta, and the like. For on the theory first propounded (but now rejected), we should have to a.s.sume that the distinctions of udatta and so on are due to the processes of conjunction and disjunction described above, since the letters themselves, which are ever recognised as the same, are not different. But as those processes of conjunction and disjunction are not matter of perception, we cannot definitely ascertain in the letters any differences based on those processes, and hence the apprehension of the udatta and so on remains without a basis.--Nor should it be urged that from the difference of the udatta and so on there results also a difference of the letters recognised. For a difference in one matter does not involve a difference in some other matter which in itself is free from difference. n.o.body, for instance, thinks that because the individuals are different from each other the species also contains a difference in itself.

The a.s.sumption of the spho/t/a is further gratuitous, because the sense of the word may be apprehended from the letters.--But--our opponent here objects--I do not a.s.sume the existence of the spho/t/a. I, on the contrary, actually perceive it; for after the buddhi has been impressed by the successive apprehension of the letters of the word, the spho/t/a all at once presents itself as the object of cognition.--You are mistaken, we reply. The object of the cognitional act of which you speak is simply the letters of the word. That one comprehensive cognition which follows upon the apprehension of the successive letters of the word has for its object the entire aggregate of the letters const.i.tuting the word, and not anything else. We conclude this from the circ.u.mstance that in that final comprehensive cognition there are included those letters only of which a definite given word consists, and not any other letters. If that cognitional act had for its object the spho/t/a--i.e.

something different from the letters of the given word--then those letters would be excluded from it just as much as the letters of any other word. But as this is not the case, it follows that that final comprehensive act of cognition is nothing but an act of remembrance which has the letters of the word for its object.--Our opponent has a.s.serted above that the letters of a word being several cannot form the object of one mental act. But there he is wrong again. The ideas which we have of a row, for instance, or a wood or an army, or of the numbers ten, hundred, thousand, and so on, show that also such things as comprise several unities can become the objects of one and the same cognitional act. The idea which has for its object the word as one whole is a derived one, in so far as it depends on the determination of one sense in many letters[203]; in the same way as the idea of a wood, an army, and so on. But--our opponent may here object--if the word were nothing else but the letters which in their aggregate become the object of one mental act, such couples of words as jara and raja or pika and kapi would not be cognised as different words; for here the same letters are presented to consciousness in each of the words const.i.tuting one couple.--There is indeed, we reply, in both cases a comprehensive consciousness of the same totality of letters; but just as ants const.i.tute the idea of a row only if they march one after the other, so the letters also const.i.tute the idea of a certain word only if they follow each other in a certain order. Hence it is not contrary to reason that the same letters are cognised as different words, in consequence of the different order in which they are arranged.

The hypothesis of him who maintains that the letters are the word may therefore be finally formulated as follows. The letters of which a word consists--a.s.sisted by a certain order and number--have, through traditional use, entered into a connexion with a definite sense. At the time when they are employed they present themselves as such (i.e. in their definite order and number) to the buddhi, which, after having apprehended the several letters in succession, finally comprehends the entire aggregate, and they thus unerringly intimate to the buddhi their definite sense. This hypothesis is certainly simpler than the complicated hypothesis of the grammarians who teach that the spho/t/a is the word. For they have to disregard what is given by perception, and to a.s.sume something which is never perceived; the letters apprehended in a definite order are said to manifest the spho/t/a, and the spho/t/a in its turn is said to manifest the sense.

Or let it even be admitted that the letters are different ones each time they are p.r.o.nounced; yet, as in that case we necessarily must a.s.sume species of letters as the basis of the recognition of the individual letters, the function of conveying the sense which we have demonstrated in the case of the (individual) letters has then to be attributed to the species.

From all this it follows that the theory according to which the individual G.o.ds and so on originate from the eternal words is un.o.bjectionable.

29. And from this very reason there follows the eternity of the Veda.

As the eternity of the Veda is founded on the absence of the remembrance of an agent only, a doubt with regard to it had been raised owing to the doctrine that the G.o.ds and other individuals have sprung from it. That doubt has been refuted in the preceding Sutra.--The present Sutra now confirms the, already established, eternity of the Veda. The eternity of the word of the Veda has to be a.s.sumed for this very reason, that the world with its definite (eternal) species, such as G.o.ds and so on, originates from it.--A mantra also ('By means of the sacrifice they followed the trace of speech; they found it dwelling in the /ri/shis,'

/Ri/g-veda Sa/m/h. X, 71, 3) shows that the speech found (by the /ri/shis) was permanent.--On this point Vedavyasa also speaks as follows: 'Formerly the great /ri/shis, being allowed to do so by Svayambhu, obtained, through their penance, the Vedas together with the itihasas, which had been hidden at the end of the yuga.'

30. And on account of the equality of names and forms there is no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) in the renovation (of the world); as is seen from /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti.

If--the purvapakshin resumes--the individual G.o.ds and so on did, like the individual animals, originate and pa.s.s away in an unbroken succession so that there would be no break of the course of practical existence including denominations, things denominated and agents denominating; the connexion (between word and thing) would be eternal, and the objection as to a contradiction with reference to the word (raised in Sutra 27) would thereby be refuted. But if, as /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti declare, the whole threefold world periodically divests itself of name and form, and is entirely dissolved (at the end of a kalpa), and is after that produced anew; how can the contradiction be considered to have been removed?

To this we reply: 'On account of the sameness of name and form.'--Even then the beginninglessness of the world will have to be admitted (a point which the teacher will prove later on: II, 1, 36). And in the beginningless sa/m/sara we have to look on the (relative) beginning, and the dissolution connected with a new kalpa in the same light in which we look on the sleeping and waking states, which, although in them according to Scripture (a kind of) dissolution and origination take place, do not give rise to any contradiction, since in the later waking state (subsequent to the state of sleep) the practical existence is carried on just as in the former one. That in the sleeping and the waking states dissolution and origination take place is stated Kaush.

Up. III, 3, 'When a man being asleep sees no dream whatever he becomes one with that pra/n/a alone. Then speech goes to him with all names, the eye with all forms, the ear with all sounds, the mind with all thoughts.

And when he awakes then, as from a burning fire, sparks proceed in all directions, thus from that Self the pra/n/as proceed, each towards its place; from the pra/n/as the G.o.ds, from the G.o.ds the worlds.'

Well, the purvapakshin resumes, it may be that no contradiction arises in the case of sleep, as during the sleep of one person the practical existence of other persons suffers no interruption, and as the sleeping person himself when waking from sleep may resume the very same form of practical existence which was his previously to his sleep. The case of a mahapralaya (i.e. a general annihilation of the world) is however a different one, as then the entire current of practical existence is interrupted, and the form of existence of a previous kalpa can be resumed in a subsequent kalpa no more than an individual can resume that form of existence which it enjoyed in a former birth.

This objection, we reply, is not valid. For although a mahapralaya does cut short the entire current of practical existence, yet, by the favour of the highest Lord, the Lords (i/s/vara), such as Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, may continue the same form of existence which belonged to them in the preceding kalpa. Although ordinary animated beings do not, as we see, resume that form of existence which belonged to them in a former birth; still we cannot judge of the Lords as we do of ordinary beings.

For as in the series of beings which descends from man to blades of gra.s.s a successive diminution of knowledge, power, and so on, is observed--although they all have the common attribute of being animated--so in the ascending series extending from man up to Hira/n/yagarbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power, &c. takes place; a circ.u.mstance which /S/ruti and Sm/ri/ti mention in many places, and which it is impossible to deny. On that account it may very well be the case that the Lords, such as Hira/n/yagarbha and so on, who in a past kalpa were distinguished by superior knowledge and power of action, and who again appear in the present kalpa, do, if favoured by the highest Lord, continue (in the present kalpa) the same kind of existence which they enjoyed in the preceding kalpa; just as a man who rises from sleep continues the same form of existence which he enjoyed previously to his sleep. Thus Scripture also declares, 'He who first creates Brahman (Hira/n/yagarbha) and delivers the Vedas to him, to that G.o.d who is the light of his own thoughts, I, seeking for release, go for refuge' (/S/vet. Up. VI, 18).

/S/aunaka and others moreover declare (in the Anukrama/n/is of the Veda) that the ten books (of the /Ri/g-veda) were seen by Madhu/kkh/andas and other /ri/shis.[204] And, similarly, Sm/ri/ti tells us, for every Veda, of men of exalted mental vision (/ri/shis) who 'saw' the subdivisions of their respective Vedas, such as ka/nd/as and so on. Scripture also declares that the performance of the sacrificial action by means of the mantra is to be preceded by the knowledge of the /ri/shi and so on, 'He who makes another person sacrifice or read by means of a mantra of which he does not know the /ri/shi, the metre, the divinity, and the Brahma/n/a, runs against a post, falls into a pit[205], &c. &c., therefore one must know all those matters for each mantra' (arsheya Brahma/n/a, first section).--Moreover, religious duty is enjoined and its opposite is forbidden, in order that the animate beings may obtain pleasure and escape pain. Desire and aversion have for their objects pleasure and pain, known either from experience or from Scripture, and do not aim at anything of a different nature. As therefore each new creation is (nothing but) the result of the religious merit and demerit (of the animated beings of the preceding creation), it is produced with a nature resembling that of the preceding creation. Thus Sm/ri/ti also declares, 'To whatever actions certain of these (animated beings) had turned in a former creation, to the same they turn when created again and again. Whether those actions were harmful or harmless, gentle or cruel, right or wrong, true or untrue, influenced by them they proceed; hence a certain person delights in actions of a certain kind.'--Moreover, this world when being dissolved (in a mahapralaya) is dissolved to that extent only that the potentiality (/s/akti) of the world remains, and (when it is produced again) it is produced from the root of that potentiality; otherwise we should have to admit an effect without a cause. Nor have we the right to a.s.sume potentialities of different kind (for the different periods of the world). Hence, although the series of worlds from the earth upwards, and the series of different cla.s.ses of animate beings such as G.o.ds, animals, and men, and the different conditions based on caste, a/s/rama, religious duty and fruit (of works), although all these we say are again and again interrupted and thereupon produced anew; we yet have to understand that they are, in the beginningless sa/m/sara, subject to a certain determinateness a.n.a.logous to the determinateness governing the connexion between the senses and their objects. For it is impossible to imagine that the relation of senses and sense-objects should be a different one in different creations, so that, for instance, in some new creation a sixth sense and a corresponding sixth sense-object should manifest themselves.

As, therefore, the phenomenal world is the same in all kalpas and as the Lords are able to continue their previous forms of existence, there manifest themselves, in each new creation, individuals bearing the same names and forms as the individuals of the preceding creations, and, owing to this equality of names and forms, the admitted periodical renovations of the world in the form of general pralayas and general creations do not conflict with the authoritativeness of the word of the Veda. The permanent ident.i.ty of names and forms is declared in /S/ruti as well as Sm/ri/ti; compare, for instance, /Ri/k. Sa/m/h. X, 190, 3, 'As formerly the creator ordered sun and moon, and the sky, and the air, and the heavenly world;' which pa.s.sage means that the highest Lord arranged at the beginning of the present kalpa the entire world with sun and moon, and so on, just as it had been arranged in the preceding kalpa. Compare also Taitt. Brahm. III, 1, 4, 1, 'Agni desired: May I become the consumer of the food of the G.o.ds; for that end he offered a cake on eight potsherds to Agni and the K/ri/ttikas.' This pa.s.sage, which forms part of the injunction of the ish/t/i to the Nakshatras, declares equality of name and form connecting the Agni who offered and the Agni to whom he offered.[206]

Sm/ri/ti also contains similar statements to be quoted here; so, for instance, 'Whatever were the names of the /ri/shis and their powers to see the Vedas, the same the Unborn one again gives to them when they are produced afresh at the end of the night (the mahapralaya). As the various signs of the seasons return in succession in their due time, thus the same beings again appear in the different yugas. And of whatever individuality the G.o.ds of the past ages were, equal to them are the present G.o.ds in name and form.'