The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Sankaracarya Part 14

9. The eater (is the highest Self) since what is movable and what is immovable is mentioned (as his food).

We read in the Ka/th/avalli (I, 2, 25), 'Who then knows where He is, He to whom the Brahmans and Kshattriyas are but food, and death itself a condiment?' This pa.s.sage intimates, by means of the words 'food' and 'condiment,' that there is some eater. A doubt then arises whether the eater be Agni or the individual soul or the highest Self; for no distinguishing characteristic is stated, and Agni as well as the individual soul and the highest Self is observed to form, in that Upanishad, the subjects of questions[141].

The purvapakshin maintains that the eater is Agni, fire being known from Scripture as well (cp. B/ri/. Up. I, 4, 6) as from ordinary life to be the eater of food. Or else the individual soul may be the eater, according to the pa.s.sage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit' (Mu. Up.

III, 1, 1). On the other hand, the eater cannot be Brahman on account of the pa.s.sage (which forms the continuation of the one quoted from the Mu.

Up.), 'The other looks on without eating.'

The eater, we reply, must be the highest Self 'because there is mentioned what is movable and what is immovable.' For all things movable and immovable are here to be taken as const.i.tuting the food, while death is the condiment. But nothing beside the highest Self can be the consumer of all these things in their totality; the highest Self, however, when reabsorbing the entire aggregate of effects may be said to eat everything. If it is objected that here no express mention is made of things movable and things immovable, and that hence we have no right to use the (alleged) mention made of them as a reason, we reply that this objection is unfounded; firstly, because the aggregate of all living beings is seen to be meant from the circ.u.mstance of death being the condiment; and, secondly, because the Brahmans and Kshattriyas may here, on account of their pre-eminent position, be viewed as instances only (of all beings). Concerning the objection that the highest Self cannot be an eater on account of the pa.s.sage quoted ('the other looks on without eating'), we remark that that pa.s.sage aims at denying the fruition (on the part of the highest Self) of the results of works, such fruition being mentioned in immediate proximity, but is not meant to negative the reabsorption of the world of effects (into Brahman); for it is well established by all the Vedanta-texts that Brahman is the cause of the creation, subsistence, and reabsorption of the world. Therefore the eater can here be Brahman only.

10. And on account of the topic under discussion. That the highest Self only can be the eater referred to is moreover evident from the pa.s.sage (Ka. Up. I, 2, 18), ('The knowing Self is not born, it dies not'), which shows that the highest Self is the general topic. And to adhere to the general topic is the proper proceeding. Further, the clause, 'Who then knows where he is,' shows that the cognition is connected with difficulties; which circ.u.mstance again points to the highest Self.

11. The 'two entered into the cave' (are the individual soul and the highest Self), for the two are (intelligent) Selfs (and therefore of the same nature), as it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature).

In the same Ka/th/avalli we read (I, 3, 1), 'There are the two drinking the reward of their works in the world, (i.e. the body,) entered into the cave, dwelling on the highest summit. Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise those householders who perform the Tri/n/a/k/iketa sacrifice.'

Here the doubt arises whether the mind (buddhi) and the individual soul are referred to, or the individual soul and the highest Self. If the mind and the individual soul, then the individual soul is here spoken of as different from the aggregate of the organs of action, (i.e. the body,) among which the mind occupies the first place. And a statement on this point is to be expected, as a question concerning it is asked in a preceding pa.s.sage, viz. I, 1, 20, 'There is that doubt when a man is dead--some saying he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.' If, on the other hand, the pa.s.sage refers to the individual soul and the highest Self, then it intimates that the highest Self is different from the individual soul; and this also requires to be declared here, on account of the question contained in the pa.s.sage (I, 2, 14), 'That which thou seest as different from religious duty and its contrary, from effect and cause, from the past and the future, tell me that.'

The doubt to which the pa.s.sage gives rise having thus been stated, a caviller starts the following objection: neither of the stated views can be maintained.--Why?--On account of the characteristic mark implied in the circ.u.mstance that the two are said to drink, i.e. to enjoy, the fruit of their works in the world. For this can apply to the intelligent individual soul only, not to the non-intelligent buddhi. And as the dual form 'drinking' (pibantau) shows that both are drinking, the view of the two being the buddhi and the individual soul is not tenable. For the same reason the other opinion also, viz. of the two being the individual soul and the highest Self, cannot be maintained; for drinking (i.e. the fruition of reward) cannot be predicated of the highest Self, on account of the mantra (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'The other looks on without eating.'

These objections, we reply, are without any force. Just as we see that in phrases such as 'the men with the umbrella (lit. the umbrella-men) are walking,' the attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only is secondarily ascribed to many, so here two agents are spoken of as drinking because one of them is really drinking. Or else we may explain the pa.s.sage by saying that, while the individual soul only drinks, the Lord also is said to drink because he makes the soul drink. On the other hand, we may also a.s.sume that the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, the instrument being figuratively spoken of as the agent--a figure of speech exemplified by phrases such as 'the fuel cooks (the food).' And in a chapter whose topic is the soul no two other beings can well be represented as enjoying rewards. Hence there is room for the doubt whether the two are the buddhi and the individual soul, or the individual soul and the highest Self.

Here the purvapakshin maintains that the former of the two stated views is the right one, because the two beings are qualified as 'entered into the cave.' Whether we understand by the cave the body or the heart, in either case the buddhi and the individual soul may be spoken of as 'entered into the cave.' Nor would it be appropriate, as long as another interpretation is possible, to a.s.sume that a special place is here ascribed to the omnipresent Brahman. Moreover, the words 'in the world of their good deeds' show that the two do not pa.s.s beyond the sphere of the results of their good works. But the highest Self is not in the sphere of the results of either good or bad works; according to the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'It does not grow larger by works nor does it grow smaller.' Further, the words 'shade and light' properly designate what is intelligent and what is non-intelligent, because the two are opposed to each other like light and shade. Hence we conclude that the buddhi and the individual soul are spoken of.

To this we make the following reply:--In the pa.s.sage under discussion the individual soul (vij/n/anatman) and the highest Self are spoken of, because these two, being both intelligent Selfs, are of the same nature.

For we see that in ordinary life also, whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same cla.s.s are understood to be meant; when, for instance, the order is given, 'Look out for a second (i.e. a fellow) for this bull,' people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or a man. So here also, where the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant, we understand at once, when a second is required, that the highest Self has to be understood; for the highest Self is intelligent, and therefore of the same nature as the soul.--But has it not been said above that the highest Self cannot be meant here, on account of the text stating that it is placed in the cave?--Well, we reply, /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti speaks of the highest Self as placed in the cave. Compare, for instance (Ka. Up. I, 2, 12), 'The Ancient who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss;' Taitt.

Up. II, 1, 'He who knows him hidden in the cave, in the highest ether;'

and, 'Search for the Self entered into the cave.' That it is not contrary to reason to a.s.sign to the omnipresent Brahman a special locality, for the purpose of clearer perception, we have already demonstrated. The attribute of existing in the world of its good works, which properly belongs to one of the two only, viz. to the individual soul, may be a.s.signed to both, a.n.a.logously to the case of the men, one of whom carries an umbrella. Their being compared to light and shade also is un.o.bjectionable, because the qualities of belonging and not belonging to this transmigratory world are opposed to each other, like light and shade; the quality of belonging to it being due to Nescience, and the quality of not belonging to it being real. We therefore understand by the two 'entered into the cave,' the individual soul and the highest Self.--Another reason for this interpretation follows.

12. And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned).

Moreover, the distinctive qualities mentioned in the text agree only with the individual Self and the highest Self. For in a subsequent pa.s.sage (I, 3, 3), 'Know the Self to be the charioteer, the body to be the chariot,' which contains the simile of the chariot, the individual soul is represented as a charioteer driving on through transmigratory existence and final release, while the pa.s.sage (9), 'He reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place of Vish/n/u,' represents the highest Self as the goal of the driver's course. And in a preceding pa.s.sage also, (I, 2, 12, 'The wise, who by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the dark, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as G.o.d, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind,') the same two beings are distinguished as thinker and as object of thought. The highest Self is, moreover, the general topic. And further, the clause, 'Those who know Brahman call them,' &c., which brings forward a special cla.s.s of speakers, is in its place only if the highest Self is accepted (as one of the two beings spoken of). It is therefore evident that the pa.s.sage under discussion refers to the individual soul and the highest Self.

The same reasoning applies to the pa.s.sage (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1), 'Two birds, inseparable friends,' &c. There also the Self is the general topic, and hence no two ordinary birds can be meant; we therefore conclude from the characteristic mark of eating, mentioned in the pa.s.sage, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit,' that the individual soul is meant, and from the characteristic marks of abstinence from eating and of intelligence, implied in the words, 'The other looks on without eating,' that the highest Self is meant. In a subsequent mantra again the two are distinguished as the seer and the object of sight. 'Merged into the same tree (as it were into water) man grieves at his own impotence (ani/s/a), bewildered; but when he sees the other Lord (i/s/a.) contented and knows his glory, then his grief pa.s.ses away.'

Another (commentator) gives a different interpretation of the mantra, 'Two birds inseparable,' &c. To that mantra, he says, the final decision of the present head of discussion does not apply, because it is differently interpreted in the [email protected] Brahma/n/a. According to the latter the being which eats the sweet fruit is the sattva; the other being which looks on without eating, the individual soul (j/n/a); so that the two are the sattva and the individual soul (kshetraj/n/a). The objection that the word sattva might denote the individual soul, and the word kshetraj/n/a, the highest Self, is to be met by the remark that, in the first place, the words sattva and kshetraj/n/a have the settled meaning of internal organ and individual soul, and are in the second place, expressly so interpreted there, (viz. in the [email protected],) 'The sattva is that by means of which man sees dreams; the embodied one, the seer, is the kshetraj/n/a; the two are therefore the internal organ and the individual soul.' Nor does the mantra under discussion fall under the purvapaksha propounded above. For it does not aim at setting forth the embodied individual soul, in so far as it is characterised by the attributes connected with the transmigratory state, such as acting and enjoying; but in so far rather as it transcends all attributes connected with the sa/m/sara and is of the nature of Brahman, i.e. is pure intelligence; as is evident from the clause, 'The other looks on without eating.' That agrees, moreover, with /s/ruti and sm/ri/ti pa.s.sages, such as, 'That art thou,' and 'Know me also to be the individual soul' (Bha. Gita XIII, 2). Only on such an explanation of the pa.s.sage as the preceding one there is room for the declaration made in the concluding pa.s.sage of the section, 'These two are the sattva and the kshetraj/n/a; to him indeed who knows this no impurity attaches[142].'--But how can, on the above interpretation, the non-intelligent sattva (i.e. the internal organ) be spoken of as an enjoyer, as is actually done in the clause, 'One of them eats the sweet fruit?'--The whole pa.s.sage, we reply, does not aim at setting forth the fact that the sattva is an enjoyer, but rather the fact that the intelligent individual soul is not an enjoyer, but is of the nature of Brahman. To that end[143] the pa.s.sage under discussion metaphorically ascribes the attribute of being an enjoyer to the internal organ, in so far as it is modified by pleasure, pain, and the like. For all acting and enjoying is at the bottom based on the non-discrimination (by the soul) of the respective nature of internal organ and soul: while in reality neither the internal organ nor the soul either act or enjoy; not the former, because it is non-intelligent; not the latter, because it is not capable of any modification. And the internal organ can be considered as acting and enjoying, all the less as it is a mere presentment of Nescience. In agreement with what we have here maintained, Scripture ('For where there is as it were duality there one sees the other,' &c.; B/ri/. Up. IV, 5, 15) declares that the practical a.s.sumption of agents, and so on--comparable to the a.s.sumption of the existence of elephants, and the like, seen in a dream--holds good in the sphere of Nescience only; while the pa.s.sage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that all that practically postulated existence vanishes for him who has arrived at discriminative knowledge.

13. The person within (the eye) (is Brahman) on account of the agreement (of the attributes of that person with the nature of Brahman).

Scripture says, 'He spoke: The person that is seen in the eye that is the Self. This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman. Even though they drop melted b.u.t.ter or water on it (the eye) it runs away on both sides,' &c. (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 1).

The doubt here arises whether this pa.s.sage refers to the reflected Self which resides in the eye, or to the individual Self, or to the Self of some deity which presides over the sense of sight, or to the Lord.

With reference to this doubt the purvapakshin argues as follows: What is meant (by the person in the eye) is the reflected Self, i.e. the image of a person (reflected in the eye of another): for of that it is well known that it is seen, and the clause, 'The person that is seen in the eye,' refers to it as something well known. Or else we may appropriately take the pa.s.sage as referring to the individual Self. For the individual Self (cognitional Self, vij/n/anatman) which perceives the colours by means of the eye is, on that account, in proximity to the eye; and, moreover, the word 'Self' (which occurs in the pa.s.sage) favours this interpretation. Or else the pa.s.sage is to be understood as referring to the soul animating the sun which a.s.sists the sense of sight; compare the pa.s.sage (B/ri/. Up. V, 5, 2), 'He (the person in the sun) rests with his rays in him (the person in the right eye).' Moreover, qualities such as immortality and the like (which are ascribed to the subject of the scriptural pa.s.sage) may somehow belong to individual deities. The Lord, on the other hand[144], cannot be meant, because a particular locality is spoken of.

Against this we remark that the highest Lord only can be meant here by the person within the eye.--Why?--'On account of the agreement.' For the qualities mentioned in the pa.s.sage accord with the nature of the highest Lord. The quality of being the Self, in the first place, belongs to the highest Lord in its primary (non-figurative or non-derived) sense, as we know from such texts as 'That is the Self,' 'That art thou.' Immortality and fearlessness again are often ascribed to him in Scripture. The location in the eye also is in consonance with the nature of the highest Lord. For just as the highest Lord whom Scripture declares to be free from all evil is not stained by any imperfections, so the station of the eye also is declared to be free from all stain, as we see from the pa.s.sage, 'Even though they drop melted b.u.t.ter or water on it it runs away on both sides.' The statement, moreover, that he possesses the qualities of sa/m/yadvama, &c. can be reconciled with the highest Lord only (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 2, 'They call him Sa/m/yadvama, for all blessings (vama) go towards him (sa/m/yanti). He is also vamani, for he leads (nayati) all blessings (vama). He is also Bhamani, for he shines (bhati) in all worlds'). Therefore, on account of agreement, the person within the eye is the highest Lord.

14. And on account of the statement of place, and so on.

But how does the confined locality of the eye agree with Brahman which is omnipresent like the ether?--To this question we reply that there would indeed be a want of agreement if that one locality only were a.s.signed to the Lord. For other localities also, viz. the earth and so on, are attributed to him in the pa.s.sage, 'He who dwells in the earth,'

&c. (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 3). And among those the eye also is mentioned, viz. in the clause, 'He who dwells in the eye,' &c. The phrase 'and so on,' which forms part of the Sutra, intimates that not only locality is a.s.signed to Brahman, although not (really) appropriate to it, but that also such things as name and form, although not appropriate to Brahman which is devoid of name and form, are yet seen to be attributed to it.

That, in such pa.s.sages as 'His name is ut, he with the golden beard'

(Ch. Up. I, 6, 7, 6), Brahman although devoid of qualities is spoken of, for the purposes of devotion, as possessing qualities depending on name and form, we have already shown. And we have, moreover, shown that to attribute to Brahman a definite locality, in spite of his omnipresence, subserves the purposes of contemplation, and is therefore not contrary to reason[145]; no more than to contemplate Vish/n/u in the sacred /s/alagram.

15. And on account of the pa.s.sage referring to that which is distinguished by pleasure (i.e. Brahman).

There is, moreover, really no room for dispute whether Brahman be meant in the pa.s.sage under discussion or not, because the fact of Brahman being meant is established 'by the reference to that which is distinguished by pleasure.' For the same Brahman which is spoken of as characterised by pleasure in the beginning of the chapter[146], viz. in the clauses, 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' that same Brahman we must suppose to be referred to in the present pa.s.sage also, it being proper to adhere to the subject-matter under discussion; the clause, 'The teacher will tell you the way[147],' merely announcing that the way will be proclaimed [by the teacher; not that a new subject will be started].--How then, it may be asked, is it known that Brahman, as distinguished by pleasure, is spoken of in the beginning of the pa.s.sage?--We reply: On hearing the speech of the fires, viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman,' Upako/s/ala says, 'I understand that breath is Brahman, but I do not understand that Ka or Kha is Brahman.' Thereupon the fires reply, 'What is Ka is Kha, what is Kha is Ka.' Now the word Kha denotes in ordinary language the elemental ether.

If therefore the word Ka which means pleasure were not applied to qualify the sense of 'Kha,' we should conclude that the name Brahman is here symbolically[148] given to the mere elemental ether as it is (in other places) given to mere names and the like. Thus also with regard to the word Ka, which, in ordinary language, denotes the imperfect pleasure springing from the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. If the word Kha were not applied to qualify the sense of Ka we should conclude that ordinary pleasure is here called Brahman. But as the two words Ka and Kha (occur together and therefore) qualify each other, they intimate Brahman whose Self is pleasure. If[149] in the pa.s.sage referred to (viz. 'Breath is Brahman, Ka is Brahman, Kha is Brahman') the second Brahman (i.e. the word Brahman in the clause 'Ka is Brahman') were not added, and if the sentence would run 'Ka, Kha is Brahman,' the word Ka would be employed as a mere qualifying word, and thus pleasure as being a mere quality would not be represented as a subject of meditation. To prevent this, both words--Ka as well as Kha--are joined with the word Brahman ('Ka (is) Brahman, Kha (is) Brahman'). For the pa.s.sage wishes to intimate that pleasure also, although a quality, should be meditated upon as something in which qualities inhere. It thus appears that at the beginning of the chapter Brahman, as characterised by pleasure, is spoken of. After that the Garhapatya and the other sacred fires proclaim in turns their own glory, and finally conclude with the words, 'This is our knowledge, O friend, and the knowledge of the Self;' wherein they point back to the Brahman spoken of before. The words, 'The teacher will tell you the way' (which form the last clause of the concluding pa.s.sage), merely promise an explanation of the way, and thus preclude the idea of another topic being started. The teacher thereupon saying, 'As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no evil deed clings to one who knows it' (which words intervene between the concluding speech of the fires and the information given by the teacher about the person within the eye) declares that no evil attacks him who knows the person within the eye, and thereby shows the latter to be Brahman. It thus appears that the teacher's intention is to speak about that Brahman which had formed the topic of the instruction of the fires; to represent it at first as located in the eye and possessing the qualities of Sa/m/yadvama and the like, and to point out afterwards that he who thus knows pa.s.ses on to light and so on. He therefore begins by saying, 'That person that is seen in the eye that is the Self.'

16. And on account of the statement of the way of him who has heard the Upanishads.

The person placed in the eye is the highest lord for the following reason also. From /s/ruti as well as sm/ri/ti we are acquainted with the way of him who has heard the Upanishads or the secret knowledge, i.e.

who knows Brahman. That way, called the path of the G.o.ds, is described (Pra. Up. I, 10), 'Those who have sought the Self by penance, abstinence, faith, and knowledge gain by the northern path the sun. This is the home of the spirits, the immortal, free from fear, the highest.

From thence they do not return;' and also (Bha. Gita VIII, 24), 'Fire, light, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, on that way those who know Brahman go, when they have died, to Brahman.' Now that very same way is seen to be stated, in our text, for him who knows the person within the eye. For we read (Ch. Up. IV, 15, 5), 'Now whether people perform obsequies for him or no he goes to light;' and later on, 'From the sun (he goes) to the moon, from the moon to lightning. There is a person not human, he leads them to Brahman.

This is the path of the G.o.ds, the path that leads to Brahman. Those who proceed on that path do not return to the life of man.' From this description of the way which is known to be the way of him who knows Brahman we ascertain that the person within the eye is Brahman.

17. (The person within the eye is the highest), not any other Self; on account of the non-permanency (of the other Selfs) and on account of the impossibility (of the qualities of the person in the eye being ascribed to the other Selfs).

To the a.s.sertion made in the purvapaksha that the person in the eye is either the reflected Self or the cognitional Self (the individual soul) or the Self of some deity the following answer is given.--No other Self such as, for instance, the reflected Self can be a.s.sumed here, on account of non-permanency.--The reflected Self, in the first place, does not permanently abide in the eye. For when some person approaches the eye the reflection of that person is seen in the eye, but when the person moves away the reflection is seen no longer. The pa.s.sage 'That person within the eye' must, moreover, be held, on the ground of proximity, to intimate that the person seen in a man's own eye is the object of (that man's) devout meditation (and not the reflected image of his own person which he may see in the eye of another man). [Let, then, another man approach the devout man, and let the latter meditate on the image reflected in his own eye, but seen by the other man only. No, we reply, for] we have no right to make the (complicated) a.s.sumption that the devout man is, at the time of devotion, to bring close to his eye another man in order to produce a reflected image in his own eye.

Scripture, moreover, (viz. Ch. Up. VIII, 9, 1, 'It (the reflected Self) perishes as soon as the body perishes,') declares the non-permanency of the reflected Self.--And, further, 'on account of impossibility' (the person in the eye cannot be the reflected Self). For immortality and the other qualities ascribed to the person in the eye are not to be perceived in the reflected Self.--Of the cognitional Self, in the second place, which is in general connexion with the whole body and all the senses, it can likewise not be said that it has its permanent station in the eye only. That, on the other hand, Brahman although all-pervading may, for the purpose of contemplation, be spoken of as connected with particular places such as the heart and the like, we have seen already.

The cognitional Self shares (with the reflected Self) the impossibility of having the qualities of immortality and so on attributed to it.

Although the cognitional Self is in reality not different from the highest Self, still there are fict.i.tiously ascribed to it (adhyaropita) the effects of nescience, desire and works, viz, mortality and fear; so that neither immortality nor fearlessness belongs to it. The qualities of being the sa/m/yadvama, &c. also cannot properly be ascribed to the cognitional Self, which is not distinguished by lordly power (ai/s/varya).--In the third place, although the Self of a deity (viz.

the sun) has its station in the eye--according to the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'He rests with his rays in him'--still Selfhood cannot be ascribed to the sun, on account of his externality (paragrupatva).

Immortality, &c. also cannot be predicated of him, as Scripture speaks of his origin and his dissolution. For the (so-called) deathlessness of the G.o.ds only means their (comparatively) long existence. And their lordly power also is based on the highest Lord and does not naturally belong to them; as the mantra declares, 'From terror of it (Brahman) the wind blows, from terror the sun rises; from terror of it Agni and Indra, yea, Death runs as the fifth.'--Hence the person in the eye must be viewed as the highest Lord only. In the case of this explanation being adopted the mention (of the person in the eye) as something well known and established, which is contained in the words 'is seen' (in the phrase 'the person that is seen in the eye'), has to be taken as referring to (the mental perception founded on) the /s/astra which belongs to those who know; and the glorification (of devout meditation) has to be understood as its purpose.

18. The internal ruler over the devas and so on (is Brahman), because the attributes of that (Brahman) are designated.

In B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 1 ff. we read, 'He who within rules this world and the other world and all beings,' and later on, 'He who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who rules the earth within, he is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' &c. The entire chapter (to sum up its contents) speaks of a being, called the antaryamin (the internal ruler), who, dwelling within, rules with reference to the G.o.ds, the world, the Veda, the sacrifice, the beings, the Self.--Here now, owing to the unusualness of the term (antaryamin), there arises a doubt whether it denotes the Self of some deity which presides over the G.o.ds and so on, or some Yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers, such as, for instance, the capability of making his body subtle, or the highest Self, or some other being.

What alternative then does recommend itself?

As the term is an unknown one, the purvapakshin says, we must a.s.sume that the being denoted by it is also an unknown one, different from all those mentioned above.--Or else it may be said that, on the one hand, we have no right to a.s.sume something of an altogether indefinite character, and that, on the other hand, the term antaryamin--which is derived from antaryamana (ruling within)--cannot be called altogether unknown, that therefore antaryamin may be a.s.sumed to denote some G.o.d presiding over the earth, and so on. Similarly, we read (B/ri/. Up. III, 9, 16), 'He whose dwelling is the earth, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light,'

&c. A G.o.d of that kind is capable of ruling the earth, and so on, dwelling within them, because he is endowed with the organs of action; rulership is therefore rightly ascribed to him.--Or else the rulership spoken of may belong to some Yogin whom his extraordinary powers enable to enter within all things.--The highest Self, on the other hand, cannot be meant, as it does not possess the organs of action (which are required for ruling).

To this we make the following reply.--The internal ruler, of whom Scripture speaks with reference to the G.o.ds, must be the highest Self, cannot be anything else.--Why so?--Because its qualities are designated in the pa.s.sage under discussion. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the G.o.ds, and so on, is an appropriate attribute of the highest Self, since omnipotence depends on (the omnipotent ruler) being the cause of all created things.--The qualities of Selfhood and immortality also, which are mentioned in the pa.s.sage, 'He is thy Self, the ruler within, the immortal,' belong in their primary sense to the highest Self.--Further, the pa.s.sage, 'He whom the earth does not know,' which declares that the internal ruler is not known by the earth-deity, shows him to be different from that deity; for the deity of the earth knows itself to be the earth.--The attributes 'unseen,' 'unheard,' also point to the highest Self, which is devoid of shape and other sensible qualities.--The objection that the highest Self is dest.i.tute of the organs of action, and hence cannot be a ruler, is without force, because organs of action may be ascribed to him owing to the organs of action of those whom he rules.--If it should be objected that [if we once admit an internal ruler in addition to the individual soul] we are driven to a.s.sume again another and another ruler ad infinitum; we reply that this is not the case, as actually there is no other ruler (but the highest Self[150]). The objection would be valid only in the case of a difference of rulers actually existing.--For all these reasons, the internal ruler is no other but the highest Self.

19. And (the internal ruler is) not that which the Sm/ri/ti a.s.sumes, (viz. the pradhana,) on account of the statement of qualities not belonging to it.

Good so far, a [email protected] opponent resumes. The attributes, however, of not being seen, &c., belong also to the pradhana a.s.sumed by the [email protected]/ri/ti, which is acknowledged to be devoid of form and other sensible qualities. For their Sm/ri/ti says, 'Undiscoverable, unknowable, as if wholly in sleep' (Manu I, 5). To this pradhana also the attribute of rulership belongs, as it is the cause of all effects.

Therefore the internal ruler may be understood to denote the pradhana.

The pradhana has, indeed, been set aside already by the Sutra I, 1, 5, but we bring it forward again, because we find that attributes belonging to it, such as not being seen and the like, are mentioned in Scripture.

To this argumentation the Sutrakara replies that the word 'internal ruler' cannot denote the pradhana, because qualities not belonging to the latter are stated. For, although the pradhana may be spoken of as not being seen, &c, it cannot be spoken of as seeing, since the admit it to be non-intelligent. But the scriptural pa.s.sage which forms the complement to the pa.s.sage about the internal ruler (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 23) says expressly, 'Unseen but seeing, unheard but hearing, unperceived but perceiving, unknown but knowing.'--And Selfhood also cannot belong to the pradhana.

Well, then, if the term 'internal ruler' cannot be admitted to denote the pradhana, because the latter is neither a Self nor seeing; let us suppose it to denote the embodied (individual) soul, which is intelligent, and therefore hears, sees, perceives, knows; which is internal (pratya/nk/), and therefore of the nature of Self; and which is immortal, because it is able to enjoy the fruits of its good and evil actions. It is, moreover, a settled matter that the attributes of not being seen, &c., belong to the embodied soul, because the agent of an action, such as seeing, cannot at the same time be the object of the action. This is declared in scriptural pa.s.sages also, as, for instance (B/ri/. Up. III, 4, 2), 'Thou couldst not see the seer of sight.' The individual soul is, moreover, capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action, as it is the enjoyer. Therefore the internal ruler is the embodied soul.--To this reasoning the following Sutra replies.

20. And the embodied soul (also cannot be understood by the internal ruler), for both also (i.e. both recensions of the B/ri/had ara/n/yaka) speak of it as different (from the internal ruler).

The word 'not' (in the Sutra) has to be supplied from the preceding Sutra. Although the attributes of seeing, &c., belong to the individual soul, still as the soul is limited by its adjuncts, as the ether is by a jar, it is not capable of dwelling completely within the earth and the other beings mentioned, and to rule them. Moreover, the followers of both /s/akhas, i.e. the Ka/n/vas as well as the Madhyandinas, speak in their texts of the individual soul as different from the internal ruler, viz. as const.i.tuting, like the earth, and so on, his abode and the object of his rule. The Ka/n/vas read (B/ri/. Up. III, 7, 22), 'He who dwells in knowledge;' the Madhyandinas, 'He who dwells in the Self.' If the latter reading is adopted, the word 'Self' denotes the individual soul; if the former, the individual soul is denoted by the word 'knowledge;' for the individual soul consists of knowledge. It is therefore a settled matter that some being different from the individual soul, viz. the lord, is denoted by the term 'internal ruler.'--But how, it may be asked, is it possible that there should be within one body two seers, viz. the lord who rules internally and the individual soul different from him?--Why--we ask in return--should that be impossible?--Because, the opponent replies, it is contrary to scriptural pa.s.sages, such as, 'There is no other seer but he,' &c., which deny that there is any seeing, hearing, perceiving, knowing Self, but the internal ruler under discussion.--May, we rejoin, that pa.s.sage not have the purpose of denying the existence of another ruler?--No, the opponent replies, for there is no occasion for another ruler (and therefore no occasion for denying his existence), and the text does not contain any specification, (but merely denies the existence of any other seer in general.)

We therefore advance the following final refutation of the opponent's objection.--The declaration of the difference of the embodied Self and the internal ruler has its reason in the limiting adjunct, consisting of the organs of action, presented by Nescience, and is not absolutely true. For the Self within is one only; two internal Selfs are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two; just as we make a distinction between the ether of the jar and the universal ether. Hence there is room for those scriptural pa.s.sages which set forth the distinction of knower and object of knowledge, for perception and the other means of proof, for the intuitive knowledge of the apparent world, and for that part of Scripture which contains injunctions and prohibitions. In accordance with this, the scriptural pa.s.sage, 'Where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another,' declares that the whole practical world exists only in the sphere of Nescience; while the subsequent pa.s.sage, 'But when the Self only is all this, how should he see another?' declares that the practical world vanishes in the sphere of true knowledge.