The United States and Latin America Part 8

Public opinion in the United States was thoroughly aroused by the execution of policies which not only excited sympathy for the unfortunate inhabitants of Cuba, but which paralyzed the industries of the island and destroyed its commerce. American citizens owned at least fifty millions of property in the island, and American commerce at the beginning of the insurrection amounted to one hundred millions annually.

Furthermore, numbers of persons claiming American citizenship were thrown into prison by Weyler's orders. Some of them were native Americans, but the majority were Cubans who had sought naturalization in the United States in order to return to Cuba and claim American protection.

Other Cubans, including many who were still Spanish subjects, established themselves in American ports and furnished the insurgents with arms and supplies. On June 12, 1895, President Cleveland issued a proclamation calling attention to the Cuban insurrection and warning all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against doing any of the acts prohibited by the American neutrality laws. Notwithstanding all the efforts of the administration, illegal expeditions were continually being fitted out in the United States, and while the great majority of them were stopped by port officials or intercepted by the navy, some of them succeeded in reaching the coasts of Cuba. President Cleveland's proclamation recognized insurgency as a status distinct from belligerency. It merely put into effect the neutrality laws of the United States. It did not recognize a state of belligerency and therefore did not bring into operation any of the rules of neutrality under international law. President Cleveland consistently refused to recognize the Cubans as belligerents. In February, 1896, Congress pa.s.sed a joint resolution, by a vote of 64 to 6 in the Senate and 246 to 27 in the House, recognizing a state of war in Cuba, and offering Spain the good offices of the United States for the establishment of Cuban independence. Notwithstanding the overwhelming majority which this resolution had received, the President ignored it, for it is a well recognized principle that Congress has no right to force the hand of the President in a matter of this kind. It amounted merely to an expression of opinion by Congress.

In April, 1896, Secretary Olney addressed a note to the Spanish minister in which the United States offered to mediate between Spain and the insurgents for the restoration of peace on the basis of autonomy. Spain rejected this offer, claiming that Cuba already enjoyed "one of the most liberal political systems in the world," and suggesting that the United States could contribute greatly to the pacification of the island by prosecuting "the unlawful expeditions of some of its citizens to Cuba with more vigor than in the past."[124] In his last annual message to Congress, President Cleveland reviewed the Cuban situation at length and, in conclusion, declared:

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurgents has become manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.

The McKinley administration, which began March 4, 1897, soon directed its attention to the Cuban question. It was unfortunate that with this question rapidly approaching a crisis the State Department was in feeble hands. John Sherman, the veteran senator from Ohio, was appointed secretary of state by McKinley in order to make a place in the Senate for Mark Hanna, who had so successfully conducted McKinley's campaign.

General Woodford was sent to Madrid to succeed Hannis Taylor, and he was instructed to tender again the good offices of the United States, to remind Spain of the resolution pa.s.sed by the previous Congress, and to warn her that another Congress was soon to a.s.semble.[125] Six days after the receipt of General Woodford's note the Spanish ministry resigned, and on October 14 the liberal ministry of Sagasta a.s.sumed office. Its first act was to recall General Weyler, and to appoint General Blanco to succeed him as governor and captain-general of Cuba. The new ministry promised to grant autonomy to Cuba, and President McKinley in his message of December 6, 1897, declared his intention of allowing time for the new policy to be tested.

It was soon evident that the grant of autonomy had come too late. The Cubans would no longer be satisfied with anything short of independence.

On January 13, 1898, there was serious rioting in Havana, deliberately planned as a demonstration against the autonomy scheme, and Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee cabled his government that it was evident that autonomy would prove a failure, that he doubted whether Blanco could control the situation, and that it might be necessary to send warships for the protection of Americans in Havana. The suggestion as to warships met with a prompter response than General Lee had expected. The United States battleship _Maine_ was immediately dispatched to Havana, where she arrived January 25 and was a.s.signed an anchorage by the port officials.[126] While she was lying quietly at anchor in Havana harbor, attention was suddenly diverted from Cuba to Washington by the Dupuy de Lome incident. On February 9, 1898, the New York _Journal_ published in facsimile a letter from the Spanish minister at Washington to a friend in Cuba which severely criticized President McKinley's policy and referred to him as "a would-be politician who tries to leave a door open behind him while keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party."

The letter was genuine, though surrept.i.tiously acquired, and was of such a character that it could not be overlooked. When called on for an explanation, Senor de Lome admitted having written the letter but questioned the accuracy of the translation. He claimed that the language which he had used was permissible under the seal of private correspondence. When General Woodford, acting under instructions from Washington, informed the Spanish minister of foreign affairs that the President expected the immediate recall of Senor de Lome, he was informed that the latter's resignation had already been accepted by cable.[127]

Before the excitement over this incident had subsided, the battleship _Maine_ was suddenly blown up in Havana harbor on the night of February 15, and two of her officers and two hundred and fifty-eight of her crew were killed. After a careful examination of witnesses and of the wreck, an American naval court of inquiry reported that the destruction of the ship was due to a submarine mine.[128] A Spanish board of inquiry, after examining a number of witnesses who had seen or heard the explosion, made a brief report the following day to the effect that the ship had been destroyed by an explosion in the forward magazine. It is generally admitted that the American report was correct, but the responsibility for the mine has never been disclosed.

As soon as the report of the court of inquiry was made public, the American people, who had displayed great self-control, threw aside all restraint and the country witnessed an outburst of patriotic fervor such as had not been seen since 1861. "Remember the _Maine_" became a watchword, and the demand for war was overwhelming. President McKinley decided, however, to make one more effort at a diplomatic settlement. He proposed an armistice between Spain and the insurgents pending negotiations for a permanent adjustment through the friendly offices of the President of the United States. In reply the Spanish government made counter-propositions to the effect that the questions arising out of the destruction of the _Maine_ be submitted to arbitration and that the pacification of the island be left to a Cuban parliament. Meanwhile, the governor-general would be authorized to accept a suspension of hostilities, provided the insurgents should ask for it and agree to disarm. This was simply an invitation to the insurgents to submit, in which case Spain would consider what degree of autonomy was needed or practicable. The President considered the Spanish reply as a rejection of his proposal and determined to submit the entire question to Congress.[129] This meant war, for public feeling in America was at the highest pitch of excitement, the "yellow" press was clamoring for war, and it was with the greatest difficulty that the President, who really wanted peace, had held Congress in check. The message to Congress was held back a few days in consequence of a telegram from General Lee, who urged that he be given time to get Americans safely out of Havana.

During this period of delay the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia made a formal appeal to the President for peace, and the Pope persuaded the Queen of Spain to authorize General Blanco to suspend hostilities. This concession did not meet fully the American ultimatum and seemed too much like another play for time. The Spanish minister was, therefore, simply informed that the President would notify Congress of this latest communication. President McKinley was later severely criticized for not giving greater consideration to this note and for merely alluding to it in his message instead of transmitting it in full. Had he given it greater consideration, war might have been delayed a few months, but it would not have been averted, for Spain was not willing to make concessions that the Cubans at this late date would have regarded as satisfactory.

In his message to Congress of April 11, 1898, President McKinley referred to the _Maine_ only incidentally as "a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable." He suggested forcible intervention as the only solution of the question and declared that it was justified, not only on grounds of humanity, but as a measure for the protection of the lives and property of American citizens in Cuba, and for the purpose of putting a stop to a conflict which was a constant menace to our peace.[130] Two days later the House pa.s.sed a resolution by vote of 324 to 19, directing the President to intervene at once to stop the war in Cuba with the purpose of "establishing by the free action of the people thereof a stable and independent government of their own in the island." On the same day the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported a resolution demanding the immediate withdrawal of Spain from the Island of Cuba, but the minority report urging in addition the immediate recognition of the Cuban republic as then organized was at first embodied in the Senate resolution by a vote of 67 to 21. It was feared by members of the Senate that if we liberated Cuba without first recognizing the so-called republic of Cuba, the island would inevitably be annexed by the United States. After two days of hot debate, the Senate reconsidered, and the House resolution prevailed. On April 19, the anniversary of the battle of Lexington and of the first bloodshed of the Civil War in the streets of Baltimore, the fateful resolutions were adopted in the following terms:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress a.s.sembled,

_First_, That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

_Second_, That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuban waters.

_Third_, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

_Fourth_, That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and a.s.serts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.[131]

As soon as these resolutions were approved by the President, the Spanish minister asked for his pa.s.sports, thus severing diplomatic relations, and Woodford was directed to leave Madrid. The North Atlantic Squadron, then at Key West under command of Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson, was immediately ordered to blockade the northern coast of Cuba, and Commodore George Dewey was ordered from Hong Kong to Manila Bay for the purpose of capturing or destroying the Spanish fleet. During the war that followed, foreign public opinion, outside of England, was decidedly hostile to the United States, but in the face of the victories of Santiago and Manila Bay this sentiment underwent a marked change, and Spain abandoned whatever hopes she had cherished of European intervention. By the end of July, 1898, the American as well as the European press was beginning to ask why the war should not be brought to a close.

After the surrender of Santiago General Miles embarked for Porto Rico with a force of 16,000 men, and in a two-weeks' campaign overran most of that island with the loss of three killed and forty wounded. A large number of troops had also been sent to the Philippines. It was evident, therefore, that while the war had been undertaken for the liberation of Cuba, the United States did not feel under any obligation to confine its military operations to that island. Having met all the demands of honor, Spain asked the French government to authorize the French amba.s.sador at Washington to arrange with the President of the United States the preliminary terms of peace. The negotiations begun on July 26 resulted in the protocol of August 12, in which Spain agreed to the following demands: first, the immediate evacuation of Cuba and the relinquishment of Spanish sovereignty; second, the cession of Porto Rico and one of the Ladrones by way of indemnity; and third, the occupation by the United States of "the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines."[132]

By the terms of the protocol Paris was selected as the place of meeting for the peace commissioners, and here negotiations were opened on October 1. The United States delegation was composed of William R. Day, who resigned the office of Secretary of State to head the mission; Cushman K. Davis, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; William P. Frye, President _pro tem_ of the Senate; Senator George Gray of Delaware; and Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York _Tribune_; with John Ba.s.sett Moore, a.s.sistant Secretary of State, as Secretary. An entire month was taken up with the Cuban question, the Spanish commissioners striving in vain to saddle the Cuban debt either on the United States or on the people of Cuba. The Philippine question occupied most of the next month. When the commissioners were appointed, President McKinley had not fully made up his mind on this important question. His first intention seems to have been to retain the bay and city of Manila as a naval base and a part or possibly the whole of Luzon. Public sentiment in the United States in favor of acquiring the whole group made rapid headway, and after an extended trip through the South and West, during which he sounded opinion on this question, the President instructed the commissioners to demand the entire group. The commissioners were later authorized to offer $20,000,000 for the cession. This offer, which was recognized by the Spanish commissioners as an ultimatum, was finally accepted under protest. On other points the United States secured what had been demanded in the protocol, and the treaty was signed December 10, 1898.[133]

The treaty was submitted to the Senate January 4, 1899, and precipitated a memorable debate which lasted until February 6. The princ.i.p.al opposition came from Senator h.o.a.r of Ma.s.sachusetts, who declared that the proposal to acquire and govern the Philippine Islands was in violation of the Declaration of Independence, the Const.i.tution, and the whole spirit of American inst.i.tutions. The treaty could not be ratified without the aid of Democrats, and the result was in doubt when Bryan went to Washington and advised his friends in the Senate to vote for ratification, saying that the status of the Philippines could be determined in the next presidential campaign. The outbreak of hostilities between the Filipinos and the American troops occupying Manila put an end to the debate, and on February 6 the treaty was ratified.

When the United States demanded the withdrawal of Spain from Cuba, it was with the declaration that "The United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and a.s.serts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people." Never has a pledge made by a nation under such circ.u.mstances been more faithfully carried out. The administration of Cuba during the period of American military occupation was a model of its kind. General Leonard Wood, the military governor, and his a.s.sociates found the cities and towns crowded with refugees and reconcentrados, and governmental affairs in a state of the utmost confusion. They established order, relieved distress, organized hospitals and charitable inst.i.tutions, undertook extensive public works, reorganized the system of public schools, and put Havana, Santiago, and other cities in a sanitary condition. In a hospital near Havana Major Walter Reed, a surgeon in the United States army, demonstrated the fact that yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of a mosquito. This discovery was at once put to the test in Havana, and the city was rendered free from yellow fever for the first time in one hundred and forty years.[134]

In the organization of a government for the island, the first step was to take a census of the inhabitants, determine the proper basis of suffrage, and hold munic.i.p.al elections for the purpose of organizing local government. This work having been successfully accomplished, a const.i.tutional convention, summoned by General Wood, convened in the city of Havana, November 5, 1900. By February 21, 1901, the convention had agreed upon a const.i.tution modelled in general after that of the United States. The new const.i.tution provided for the recognition of the public debts contracted by the insurgent government, but was silent on the subject of future relations with the United States. This subject had been brought to the attention of the convention early in February by General Wood, who had submitted for incorporation in the const.i.tution certain provisions which had been drafted in Washington. The convention objected to these proposals on the ground that they impaired the independence and sovereignty of the island, and that it was their duty to make Cuba "independent of every other nation, the great and n.o.ble American nation included."

The United States, however, had no intention of withdrawing from the island until this matter was satisfactorily adjusted. A provision, known as the Platt Amendment, was therefore inserted in the army appropriation bill of March 2, 1901, directing the President to leave the control of the island to its people so soon as a government should be established under a const.i.tution which defined the future relations with the United States substantially as follows:

I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

II. That said government shall not a.s.sume or contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of the island, after defraying the current expenses of government shall be inadequate.

III. That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be a.s.sumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.

IV. That all acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated, and all lawful rights acquired thereunder shall be maintained and protected.

V. That the government of Cuba will execute, and as far as necessary extend, the plans already devised or other plans to be mutually agreed upon, for the sanitation of the cities of the island....

VI. That the Isle of Pines shall be omitted from the proposed const.i.tutional boundaries of Cuba, the t.i.tle thereto being left to future adjustment by treaty.

VII. That to enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba, and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points, to be agreed upon with the President of the United States.

VIII. That by way of further a.s.surance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.[135]

These articles, with the exception of the fifth, which was proposed by General Leonard Wood, were carefully drafted by Elihu Root, at that time Secretary of War, discussed at length by President McKinley's cabinet, and entrusted to Senator Platt of Connecticut, who offered them as an amendment to the army appropriation bill. In order to allay doubts expressed by members of the convention in regard to the third article, General Wood was authorized by Secretary Root to state officially that the intervention described in this article did not mean intermeddling in the affairs of the Cuban government, but formal action on the part of the United States, based upon just and substantial grounds. With this a.s.surance the convention adopted the Platt amendment June 12, 1901, and added it as an appendix to the const.i.tution.

On May 20, 1902, Tomas Estrada Palma was inaugurated as first president of the Republic of Cuba, and General Wood handed over to him the government of the island.[136] The Americans left a substantial balance in the Cuban treasury. The total receipts for the entire period were $57,197,140.80, and the expenditures $55,405,031.28. The customs service, which furnished the princ.i.p.al part of the revenues during the period of military occupation, was ably administered by General Tasker H. Bliss.[137]

While the Platt amendment determined the political relations that were to exist between Cuba and the United States, there had been no agreement on the subject of commercial relations. The sugar industry, which had been almost destroyed by the insurrection, was dependent upon the willingness of the United States to arrange for a reduction of its tariff in favor of the Cuban product. Otherwise Cuban sugar could not compete with the bounty-fed beet sugar of Europe or with the sugars of Porto Rico and Hawaii, which were now admitted to the American market free of duty. President Roosevelt had hoped to settle this question before the withdrawal of American troops, and he had urged upon Congress the expediency of providing for a substantial reduction in tariff duties on Cuban imports into the United States, but a powerful opposition, composed of the beet-sugar growers of the North and West and of the cane-sugar planters of Louisiana, succeeded in thwarting for two years the efforts of the administration to do justice to Cuba. All attempts to get a bill through Congress failed.[138]

In the meantime a reciprocity convention was agreed upon in the ordinary diplomatic way December 11, 1902, under which Cuban products were to be admitted to the United States at a reduction of twenty per cent. As the Senate failed to act on this treaty before the 4th of March, 1903, President Roosevelt convened an extra session of the Senate which ratified the treaty with amendments, and with the very unusual provision that it should not go into effect until approved by Congress. As the House was not then in session, this meant that the treaty had to go over until the fall. The Cuban situation grew so bad that the President finally convened Congress in extra session November 9, 1903. In a special message he urged prompt action on the treaty on the ground that the Platt amendment had brought the island of Cuba within our system of international policy, and that it necessarily followed that it must also to a certain degree come within the lines of our economic policy. The House pa.s.sed the bill approving the treaty November 19 by the overwhelming vote of 335 to 21, but the Senate, although it had already ratified the treaty, permitted the extra session to expire without pa.s.sing the measure which was to give the treaty effect. When the new session began December 7, the Cuban treaty bill was made the special order in the Senate until December 16, when the final vote was taken and it pa.s.sed. Under the reciprocity treaty commercial relations with Cuba were established on a firm basis and the volume of trade increased rapidly.

In August, 1906, President Palma was reelected for another term, but the Cubans had not learned the primary lesson of democracy, submission to the will of the majority, and his opponents at once began an insurrectionary movement which had for its object the overthrow of his government. About the middle of September President Roosevelt sent Secretary Taft to Havana for the purpose of reconciling the contending factions, but Mr. Taft's efforts proved unavailing and President Palma resigned. When the Cuban Congress a.s.sembled, it was found impossible to command a quorum. Under these circ.u.mstances Secretary Taft a.s.sumed control of affairs on September 29 and proclaimed a provisional government for the restoration of order and the protection of life and property. A body of United States troops under command of General Franklin Bell was sent to Cuba to preserve order and to uphold the provisional government. On October 3, 1906, Secretary Taft was relieved of the duties of provisional governor in order that he might resume his duties in Washington, and Charles E. Magoon was appointed to take his place at Havana.[139] In his message to Congress December 3, 1906, President Roosevelt declared that while the United States had no desire to annex Cuba, it was "absolutely out of the question that the island should continue independent" if the "insurrectionary habit" should become "confirmed." The second period of American occupation lasted a little over two years, when the control of the government was again restored to the people of the island and the American troops were withdrawn.

FOOTNOTES:

[77] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Thomas Jefferson," Vol. V, p. 443.

[78] "Madison's Works," Vol. II, p. 488.

[79] Niles's "Register," under date November 8, 1817.

[80] For a full discussion of the question see the pamphlet by J.

Freeman Rattenbury, ent.i.tled, "The Cession of the Floridas to the United States of America and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by Great Britain." London, 1819.

[81] Niles's "Register," March and April, 1823.

[82] H. Ex. Doc. No. 121, Thirty-second Cong., First Sess.; also Brit.

and For. St. Pap., Vol. XLIV, pp. 114-236.

[83] H. A. Washington, "Writings of Jefferson," Vol. VII, p. 288.

[84] "Official Corresp. of Canning," Vol. I, p. 265.

[85] _Ibid._, Vol. I, p. 275.

[86] Am. St. Pap., For. Rel., Vol. V, p. 855. Also "Wharton's Digest,"

Sec. 60.

[87] Stapleton, "Political Life of Canning," Vol. III, p. 154.