The United States and Latin America Part 22

V. Every nation ent.i.tled to a right by the law of nations is ent.i.tled to have that right respected and protected by all other nations, for right and duty are correlative, and the right of one is the duty of all to observe.

VI. International law is at one and the same time both national and international; national in the sense that it is the law of the land and applicable as such to the decision of all questions involving its principles; international in the sense that it is the law of the society of nations and applicable as such to all questions between and among the members of the society of nations involving its principles.[282]

This Declaration has been criticized as being too altruistic for a world in which diplomacy has been occupied with selfish aims.

On the same day that the above Declaration was made public, President Wilson delivered a notable address before the Second Pan American Scientific Conference then in session at Washington. In the course of this address he said:

The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility. But the Monroe Doctrine demanded merely that European governments should not attempt to extend their political systems to this side of the Atlantic. It did not disclose the use which the United States intended to make of her power on this side of the Atlantic. It was a hand held up in warning, but there was no promise in it of what America was going to do with the implied and partial protectorate which she apparently was trying to set up on this side of the water, and I believe you will sustain me in the statement that it has been fears and suspicions on this score which have hitherto prevented the greater intimacy and confidence and trust between the Americas. The states of America have not been certain what the United States would do with her power. That doubt must be removed. And latterly there has been a very frank interchange of views between the authorities in Washington and those who represent the other states of this hemisphere, an interchange of views charming and hopeful, because based upon an increasingly sure appreciation of the spirit in which they were undertaken. These gentlemen have seen that, if America is to come into her own, into her legitimate own, in a world of peace and order, she must establish the foundations of amity, so that no one will hereafter doubt them. I hope and I believe that this can be accomplished. These conferences have enabled me to foresee how it will be accomplished. It will be accomplished, in the first place, by the states of America uniting in guaranteeing to each other absolute political independence and territorial integrity. In the second place, and as a necessary corollary to that, guaranteeing the agreement to settle all pending boundary disputes as soon as possible and by amicable process; by agreeing that all disputes among themselves, should they unhappily arise, will be handled by patient, impartial investigation and settled by arbitration; and the agreement necessary to the peace of the Americas, that no state of either continent will permit revolutionary expeditions against another state to be fitted out in its territory, and that they will prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments.

President Wilson's Pan Americanism went further than some of the Latin-American states were willing to go. A treaty embodying the above proposals was actually drafted, but some of the states held back through the fear that, though equal in terms, it would in fact give the United States a plausible pretext for supervising the affairs of weaker states.[283]

President Wilson has not hesitated to depart from many of the fundamental ideas which have hitherto guided so-called practical statesmen. His handling of the Mexican situation, although denounced as weak and vacillating, has been in full accord with his new Latin-American policy. On February 18, 1913, Francisco Madero was seized and imprisoned as the result of a conspiracy formed by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta, who forthwith proclaimed himself dictator.

Four days later Madero was murdered while in the custody of Huerta's troops. Henry Lane Wilson, the American amba.s.sador, promptly urged his government to recognize Huerta, but President Taft, whose term was rapidly drawing to a close, took no action and left the question to his successor.

President Wilson thus had a very disagreeable situation to face when he a.s.sumed control of affairs at Washington. He refused to recognize Huerta whose authority was contested by insurrectionary chiefs in various parts of the country. It was claimed by the critics of the administration that the refusal to recognize Huerta was a direct violation of the well known American policy of recognizing _de facto_ governments without undertaking to pa.s.s upon the rights involved. It is perfectly true that the United States has consistently followed the policy of recognizing _de facto_ governments as soon as it is evident in each case that the new government rests on popular approval and is likely to be permanent.

This doctrine of recognition is distinctively an American doctrine. It was first laid down by Thomas Jefferson when he was secretary of state as an offset to the European doctrine of divine right, and it was the natural outgrowth of that other Jeffersonian doctrine that all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Huerta could lay no claim to authority derived from a majority or anything like a majority of the Mexican people. He was a self-const.i.tuted dictator, whose authority rested solely on military force. President Wilson and Secretary Bryan were fully justified in refusing to recognize his usurpation of power, though they probably made a mistake in announcing that they would never recognize him and in demanding his elimination from the presidential contest. This announcement made him deaf to advice from Washington and utterly indifferent to the destruction of American life and property.

The next step in the President's course with reference to Mexico was the occupation of Vera Cruz. On April 20, 1914, the President asked Congress for authority to employ the armed forces of the United States in demanding redress for the arbitrary arrest of American marines at Vera Cruz, and the next day Admiral Fletcher was ordered to seize the custom house at that port. This he did after a sharp fight with Huerta's troops in which nineteen Americans were killed and seventy wounded. The American charge d'affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, was at once handed his pa.s.sports, and all diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico were severed.

A few days later the representatives of the so-called A B C powers, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, tendered their good offices for a peaceful settlement of the conflict and President Wilson promptly accepted their mediation. The resulting conference at Niagara, May 20, was not successful in its immediate object, but it resulted in the elimination of Huerta who resigned July 15, 1914. On August 20, General Venustiano Carranza, head of one of the revolutionary factions, a.s.sumed control of affairs at the capital, but his authority was disputed by General Francisco Villa, another insurrectionary chief. On Carranza's promise to respect the lives and property of American citizens the United States forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz in November, 1914.

In August, 1915, at the request of President Wilson the six ranking representatives of Latin America at Washington made an unsuccessful effort to reconcile the contending factions of Mexico. On their advice, however, President Wilson decided in October to recognize the government of Carranza, who now controlled three-fourths of the territory of Mexico. As a result of this action Villa began a series of attacks on American citizens and raids across the border, which in March, 1916, compelled the President to send a punitive expedition into Mexico and later to dispatch most of the regular army and large bodies of militia to the border.[284]

The raids of Villa created a very awkward situation. Carranza not only made no real effort to suppress Villa, but he vigorously opposed the steps taken by the United States to protect its own citizens along the border, and even a.s.sumed a threatening att.i.tude. There was a loud and persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico. American investments in land, mines, rubber plantations, and other enterprises were very large, and these financial interests were particularly outraged at the President's policy of "watchful waiting." The President remained deaf to this clamor. No country had been so shamelessly exploited by foreign capital as Mexico. Furthermore it was suspected and very generally believed that the recent revolutions had been financed by American capital. President Wilson was determined to give the Mexican people an opportunity to reorganize their national life on a better basis and to lend them every a.s.sistance in the task. War with Mexico would have been a very serious undertaking and even a successful war would have meant the military occupation of Mexico for an indefinite period. President Wilson's refusal to become involved in war with Mexico convinced the world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during the Great War such as no political leader of any nation ever before commanded.

It has been charged that there was a lack of consistency between the President's Mexican policy and his Haitian policy. The difference between the two cases, however, was that the Haitian situation, if taken in time, could be handled without bloodshed, while the same method applied to Mexico would have led to a long and b.l.o.o.d.y conflict. It would be easy enough to go into Mexico, but exceedingly difficult to get out.

The most novel feature of the President's Mexican policy was his acceptance of the mediation of the A B C powers and his subsequent consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America. This action has brought the Pan American ideal to the point of realization.

It has been received with enthusiasm and it has placed our relations with Latin America on a better footing than they have been for years.

It has been suggested by more than one critic of American foreign policy that if we are to undertake to set the world right, we must come before the bar of public opinion with clean hands, that before we denounce the imperialistic policies of Europe, we must abandon imperialistic policies at home. The main features of President Wilson's Latin-American policy, if we may draw a general conclusion, have been to pledge the weaker American republics not to do anything which would invite European intervention, and to secure by treaty the right of the United States to intervene for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and for the establishment of self-government. The test of such a policy is the degree of unselfishness with which it is carried out.

The loyalty of the Latin-American states to the principles of Pan Americanism was put to a severe test when the United States entered the Great War. When President Wilson announced to Congress the severance of relations with Germany and declared his intention of protecting our commerce on the high seas, he expressed the confident hope that all neutral governments would pursue the same course. He probably had especially in mind our Latin-American neighbors, but if so, his expectation was not fully realized. Only eight of the twenty Latin-American republics eventually entered the war: Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Five others broke off relations with Germany: Bolivia, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Seven remained neutral: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay.[285]

Only two Latin-American states, Brazil and Cuba, took an active part in the war. At the request of the British government in December, 1917, Brazil sent two cruisers and four destroyers to European waters to cooperate with the British navy, and a few months later a group of Brazilian aviators took their place on the Western front. A number of physicians and several Red Cross units from Brazil also cooperated with the Allies. Cuba turned over to the United States several German steamships interned in her waters. A compulsory military service law was pa.s.sed and a number of training camps established. In October, 1918, the Cuban government announced that it had 25,000 troops ready to send to France, but the armistice was signed before arrangements could be made for their transportation. The only active service rendered by Cubans was in the field of aviation, where several individuals won high distinction.

Of the A B C powers Argentina and Chile remained neutral. So also did Mexico. Brazil was thus the only one of the larger states that actually entered the war. The relations between Brazil and the United States have almost always been peculiarly close and friendly. From the outbreak of the European war strong sympathy for the allied cause was manifested in Brazil, and a league for aiding the Allies through the agency of the Red Cross was organized under the presidency of Ruy Barbosa, the most distinguished statesman of Brazil and one of the most brilliant orators of Latin America. Brazil's experience during the period of neutrality was very similar to that of the United States. Her commerce was interfered with and her ships were sunk by German submarines. A few weeks after the United States entered the war, Brazil severed relations with Germany and seized the forty-six German ships interned in Brazilian harbors. In a circular note of June 2 the Brazilian government declared to the world that it had taken this step because the Republic of Brazil was bound to the United States "by a traditional friendship and by a similarity of political opinion in the defense of the vital interests of America and the principles accepted by international law," and because it wished to give to its foreign policy, in this critical moment of the world's history, "a practical form of continental solidarity--a policy indeed which was that of the old regime on every occasion on which any of the other friendly sister nations of the American continent were in jeopardy." President Wilson's reply to this note expressed the deep appreciation of the United States and the hope that the act of the Brazilian Congress was "the forerunner of the att.i.tude to be a.s.sumed by the rest of the American states." On October 26, 1917, on the receipt of the news of the torpedoing of another Brazilian ship by a German submarine, a resolution recognizing "the state of war initiated by the German Empire against Brazil" was adopted by the unanimous vote of the Brazilian Senate and by a vote of 149 to 1 in the Chamber of Deputies.[286] Brazil's enthusiastic support of the United States and of the allied cause has been recognized by those powers in giving her representation on the Council of the League of Nations. In fact at the first meeting of the Council in London in February, 1920, Brazil was the sole American power represented.

Argentina, the largest and most important of the states of Spanish origin, remained neutral throughout the war, notwithstanding the fact that a large part of the population and some of the leading newspapers were strongly pro-Ally. When the United States declared war, Senor Drago, the former minister of foreign affairs and author of the doctrine that bears his name, issued a statement in which he said:

The war between Germany and America is a struggle of democracy _versus_ absolutism, and no American nation can remain neutral without denying its past and compromising its future.

About the same time a note was sent through Amba.s.sador Naon stating that "in view of the causes which have prompted the United States to declare war against the government of the German Empire," the Argentine government recognizes "the justice of that decision." But German propaganda, which had its headquarters in Buenos Aires, and the att.i.tude of President Irrigoyen kept the country out of the war. Popular indignation was aroused by the Luxburg disclosures, which revealed the fact that the German representative, after coming to an understanding with the President, had advised his government that two Argentine ships then approaching the French coast "be spared if possible, or else sunk without a trace being left" (_spurlos versenkt_). The Senate and Chamber of Deputies pa.s.sed by large majorities a resolution severing relations with Germany, but to the surprise of everybody President Irrigoyen expressed himself as satisfied with Germany's disavowal of Luxburg's conduct and continued his policy of neutrality.

Chile was so far removed from the scene of the war in Europe and had so few ships engaged in European trade that her government did not have the same provocation that others had. Furthermore, German propaganda had made great headway in Chile and the Chilean army, trained by German officers, was strongly pro-German. In the navy, on the other hand, sentiment was strongly in favor of the Allies. This was a matter of tradition, for since the days of Lord Cochrane, whose exploits have been described in an earlier chapter of this book, the Chilean navy has followed English ideals. Under these circ.u.mstances Chile remained neutral, though before the end of the war public sentiment had shifted to the side of the Allies.[287]

Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Uruguay in severing relations with Germany proclaimed their adherence to the principle of American solidarity.

Paraguay's neutrality was due to her isolation. Colombia, still smarting under the loss of the Isthmus, was not disposed to take sides with the United States. In Venezuela most of the government officials were under German influence. Panama and four of the five Central American republics declared war on Germany, Salvador alone remaining neutral. Cuba and Haiti also declared war on Germany, while the Dominican Republic severed consular relations. Mexico proclaimed its neutrality, but permitted its soil to become a hot-bed of German intrigue and President Carranza exhibited at times a spirit of hostility to the United States which tended to increase the tension that already existed between the two countries.

In an article on "The European War and Pan Americanism"[288] Amba.s.sador Naon of the Argentine Republic draws the following interesting conclusions, conclusions that are all the more interesting because his country was not one of those that took the course to which he gives his approval. He says: "The political action developed by the different governments of the continent in the presence of the European conflict, especially since the breaking out of hostilities between the United States and Germany, has not been either the best advised or the most propitious for achieving the consolidation of Pan Americanism." The situation created by the European war, he continues, "affected the entire continent in the same manner and with the same political and economic intensity as the United States, and both self-interest and moral obligations ought to have counseled the consummating of solidarity, here and now, by making common cause and endorsing the att.i.tude of the United States to the extreme limit, until the disturbing force should be overcome. The political action of America did not take this direction, however. Some of the most important governments of the continent, going counter to the political aspirations and doubtless to the political interests of their own countries, adhered to the policy of neutrality. In America this was equivalent to a policy of isolation, and thus the solidarity of the continent was broken, with consequent prejudice to Pan Americanism. Yet even if in those countries, the action of the governments could not be counted upon, nevertheless, the sentiment, expressed in eloquent manifestations of public opinion and in complete disagreement with that att.i.tude of the governments, persisted throughout the crisis. Thus the _spirit_ of Pan Americanism was saved, and we are justified in believing that there will come a reaction which will restore the disturbed equilibrium and save the mighty interests involved."

Amba.s.sador Naon believes, however, that Pan Americanism has many obstacles in the way of its complete realization. Among them he mentions "the recognition of politico-intellectual inferiorities" by the peace conference at Paris in the cla.s.sification of nations as great powers and small powers. The fundamental principle of Pan Americanism he believes to be the doctrine of equality. He further points out that as long as American states remain, whether as the result of their own shortcomings or not, in these conditions of inferiority in world politics, "there will continue to exist for the United States the causes that gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine and consequently all its objections will continue to exist." Finally he says that "the idea of solidarity is being weakened or thwarted by another idea, the unwholesome one of Latin Americanism, which is a Teutonic idea in its tendencies, and which is trying to replace it, basing itself upon supposed antagonisms of interests and ideals between the other countries of America and the United States. This purpose, which is anarchical, might cause American solidarity to fail if, in virtue of neglecting to foster this tendency, it should succeed, by pandering to paltry prejudices and flattering national vanities, in gaining a footing in the thought of the other governments of the continent to the extent of const.i.tuting itself a political force, capable of replacing the system of solidarity which Pan Americanism seeks, by a system of a continental equilibrium: a system which has just failed in the European conflict."

This summary of the views of the distinguished Argentine statesman is sufficient to show that his a.n.a.lysis of the situation is correct. The weakness and backwardness of certain states, specifically those in the zone of the Caribbean, lies at the heart of the difficulty. As long as they remain in their present condition the United States must continue to protect them against European intervention and, when occasion arises, supervise their affairs in order to prevent them from provoking such intervention. As long as it is necessary to pursue this course the United States will have to rest under the suspicion of having imperialistic designs on its weaker neighbors, and it is this suspicion which perpetuates the spirit of Latin Americanism which in turn must be overcome before we can fully realize the ideal of Pan Americanism.

FOOTNOTES:

[273] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), p. 122. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890.

[274] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), p. 202.

[275] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix) p. 208.

[276] Moore, "Digest of International Law," Vol. VII, pp. 9-10.

[277] International American Conference, Vol. IV (Historical Appendix), p. 217.

[278] _Ibid._, p. 255.

[279] Second International American Conference, English text (Mexico, Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 309.

[280] Third International American Conference, Minutes, Resolutions, Doc.u.ments (Rio de Janeiro, Imprensa Nacional. 1907), P. 605.

[281] Bulletin of the Pan American Union, Vol. 31, p. 796.

[282] _Am. Journal of International Law_, Vol. 10, p. 212.

[283] John Ba.s.sett Moore, "Principles of American Diplomacy," pp.

407-408.

[284] "Affairs in Mexico," Sixty-fourth Cong., First Sess., Sen. Doc.

No. 324. The World Peace Foundation has issued two pamphlets containing doc.u.ments on Mexico under the t.i.tle of "The New Pan Americanism," Parts I and II (February and April, 1916).

[285] Percy A. Martin, "Latin America and the War" (issued by the World Peace Foundation, August, 1919).

[286] Martin, "Latin America and the War," pp. 13-15.

[287] Enrique Rocuant, "The Neutrality of Chile and the Grounds that Prompted and Justified It," (Valparaiso, 1919).

[288] Reprinted in International Conciliation, Inter-American Division, Bulletin No. 20 (April, 1919).

CHAPTER IX

THE MONROE DOCTRINE