The Unconstitutionality of Slavery Part 9

acquires an increased and irresistible force, when it is considered that these different cla.s.ses of persons const.i.tute also different bases for taxation, as well as representation. The requirement of the const.i.tution is, that "representatives and _direct taxes_ shall be apportioned," &c., according to the number of "free persons" and "all other persons." In reference to so important a subject as taxation, _accurate_ and _legal_ knowledge of the persons and numbers belonging to the different cla.s.ses, becomes indispensable. Yet under the slave construction this legal knowledge becomes impossible. Under the other construction it is as perfectly and entirely within the power of congress, as, in the nature of things, such a subject can be--for naturalization is a legal process; and legal records, prescribed by congress, may be, and actually are, preserved of all the persons naturalized or made "free" by their laws.

If we adopt that meaning of the word "free," which is consistent with freedom--that meaning which is consistent with natural right--the meaning given to it by the Articles of Confederation, by the then existing state const.i.tutions, by the colonial charters, and by the English law ever since our ancestors enjoyed the name of freemen, all these difficulties, inconsistencies, contradictions and absurdities, that must otherwise arise, vanish. The word "free" then describes the native and naturalized citizens of the United States, and the words "all other persons" describe resident aliens, "Indians not taxed," and possibly some others. The representation is then placed upon the best, most just, and most rational basis that the words used can be made to describe. The representation also becomes equal and uniform throughout the country. The principle of distinction between the two bases, becomes also a stable, rational and intelligible one--one too necessarily growing out of the exercise of one of the powers granted to congress;--one, too, whose operation could have been foreseen and judged of by the people who adopted the const.i.tution--instead of one fluctuating with the ever changing and arbitrary legislation of the various states, whose mode and motives of action could not have been antic.i.p.ated. Adopt this definition of the word "free," and the same legislature, (that is, the national one,) that is required by the const.i.tution to apportion the representation according to certain principles, becomes invested--as it evidently ought to be, and as it necessarily must be, to be efficient--with the power of determining, by their own (naturalization) laws, who are the persons composing the different bases on which its apportionment is to be made; instead of being, as they otherwise would be, obliged to seek for these persons through all the statute books of all the different states of the union, and through all the evidences of private property, under which one of these cla.s.ses might be held. Adopt this definition of the word "free,"

and the United States government becomes, so far at least as its popular representation--which is its most important feature--is concerned, an independent government, subsisting by its own vigor, and pervaded throughout by one uniform principle. Reject this definition, and the popular national representation, loses at once its nationality, and becomes a mere dependency on the will of local corporations--a mere shuttlec.o.c.k to be driven hither and thither by the arbitrary and conflicting legislation of an indefinite number of separate states.

Adopt this meaning of the word "free," and the national government becomes capable of knowing its own bases of representation and power, and its own subjects of taxation. Reject this definition, and the government knows not whom it represents, or on whom to levy taxes for its support. Adopt this meaning of the word "free," and some three millions of native born, but now crushed human beings, become, with their posterity, men and citizens. Adopt this meaning--this _legal_ meaning--this _only_ meaning that can, in this clause, be _legally_ given to the word "free," and our const.i.tution becomes, instead of a nefarious compact of conspirators against the rights of man, a consistent and impartial contract of government between _all_ "the people of the United States," for securing "to themselves and their posterity the blessings of liberty" and "justice."

Again. We cannot unnecessarily place upon the const.i.tution a meaning directly destructive of the government it was designed to establish. By giving to the word "free" the meaning universally given to it by our political papers of a similar character up to the time the const.i.tution was adopted, we give to the government three millions of citizens, ready to fight and be taxed for its support. By giving to the word "free" a meaning correlative with slavery, we locate in our midst three millions of enemies; thus making a difference of six millions, (one third of our whole number,) in the physical strength of the nation. Certainly a meaning so suicidal towards the government, cannot be given to any part of the const.i.tution, except the language be irresistibly explicit; much less can it be done, (as in this case it would be,) wantonly, unnecessarily, gratuitously, wickedly, and in violation of all previous usage.

Again. If we look into the const.i.tution itself for the meaning of the word "free," we find it to result from the distinction there recognized between citizens and aliens. If we look into the contemporary state const.i.tutions, we still find the word "free" to express the political relation of the individual to the state, and not any property relation of one individual to another. If we look into the law of nature for the meaning of the word "free," we find that by that law all mankind are free. Whether, therefore, we look to the const.i.tution itself, to the contemporary state const.i.tutions, or to the law of nature, for the meaning of this word "free," the only meaning we shall find is one consistent with the personal liberty of all. On the other hand, if we are resolved to give the word a meaning correlative with slavery, we must go to the lawless code of the kidnapper to find such a meaning.

Does it need any argument to prove to which of these different codes our judicial tribunals are bound to go, to find the meaning of the words used in a const.i.tution, that is established professedly to secure liberty and justice?

Once more. It is altogether a false, absurd, violent, unnatural and preposterous proceeding, in construing a political paper, which purports to establish men's relations to the state, and especially in construing the clause in it which fixes the basis of representation and taxation, to give to the words, which describe the persons to be represented and taxed, and which appropriately indicate those relations of men to the state which make them proper subjects of taxation and representation--to give to such words a meaning, which, instead of describing men's relations to the state, would describe merely a personal or property relation of one individual to another, which the state has nowhere else recognized, and which, if admitted to exist, would absolve the persons described from all allegiance to the state, would deny them all right to be represented, and discharge them from all liability to be taxed.

But it is unnecessary to follow out this slave argument into all its ramifications. It sets out with nothing but a.s.sumptions, that are gratuitous, absurd, improbable, irrelevant, contrary to all previous usage, contrary to natural right, and therefore inadmissible. It conducts to nothing but contradictions, absurdities, impossibilities, indiscriminate slavery, anarchy, and the destruction of the very government which the const.i.tution was designed to establish.

The other clause relied on as a recognition and sanction, both of slavery and the slave trade, is the following:

"The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person."--(Art. 1, Sec. 9.)

The slave argument, drawn from this clause, is, that the word "importation" applies only to property, and that it therefore implies, in this clause, that the persons to be imported are necessarily to be imported as property--that is, as slaves.

But the idea that the word "importation" applies only to property, is erroneous. It applies correctly both to persons and things. The definition of the verb "import" is simply "to bring from a foreign country, or jurisdiction, or from another state, into one's own country, jurisdiction or state."--When we speak of "importing" things, it is true that we mentally a.s.sociate with them the idea of property. But that is simply because _things_ are property, and not because the word "import"

has any control, in that particular, over the character of the things imported. When we speak of importing "persons," we do not a.s.sociate with them the idea of property, simply because "persons" are not property.

We speak daily of the "importation of foreigners into the country;" but no one infers therefrom that they are brought in as slaves, but as pa.s.sengers. A vessel imports, or brings in, five hundred pa.s.sengers.

Every vessel, or master of a vessel, that "brings in" pa.s.sengers, "imports" them. But such pa.s.sengers are not therefore slaves. A man imports his wife and children--but they are not therefore his slaves, or capable of being owned or sold as his property. A man imports a gang of laborers, to clear lands, cut ca.n.a.ls, or construct railroads; but not therefore to be held as slaves. An innocent meaning must be given to the word, if it will bear one. Such is the legal rule.

Even the popular understanding of the word "import," when applied to "persons," does not convey the idea of property. It is only when it is applied distinctly to "slaves," that any such idea is conveyed; and then it is the word "slaves," and not the word "import," that suggests the idea of property. Even slave traders and slave holders attach no such meaning to the word "import," when it is connected with the word "persons;" but only when it is connected with the word "slaves."

In the case of Ogden _vs._ Saunders, (12 Wheaton, 332,) Chief Justice Marshall said, that in construing the const.i.tution, "the intention of the instrument must prevail; that this intention must be collected from its words; that its words are to be understood in that sense in which they are _generally used_ by those for whom the instrument was intended." On this principle of construction, there is not the least authority for saying that this provision for "the importation of persons," authorized the importation of them as slaves. To give it this meaning, requires the same stretching of words _towards the wrong_, that is applied, by the advocates of slavery, to the words "service or labor," and the words "free" and "all other persons."

Another reason, which makes it necessary that this construction should be placed upon the word "_importation_," is, that the clause contains no other word that describes the immigration of foreigners. Yet that the clause related to the immigration of foreigners _generally_, and that it restrained congress, (up to the year 1808,) from prohibiting the immigration of foreigners generally, there can be no doubt.

The object, and the only _legal_ object, of the clause was to restrain congress from so exercising their "power of regulating commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes"--(which power has been decided by the supreme court of the United States, to include a power over navigation and the transportation of pa.s.sengers in boats and vessels[21])--as to obstruct the introduction of new population into such of the states as were desirous of increasing their population in that manner. The clause does not imply at all, that the population, which the states were thus to "admit," was to be a slave population.

The word "importation," (I repeat,) is the only word in the clause, that applies to persons that were to _come into_ the country from foreign nations. The word "_migration_" applies only to those who were to _go out from_ one of our own states or territories into another.

"_Migration_" is the act of _going out_ from a state or country; and differs from immigration in this, that immigration is the act of _coming into_ a state or country. It is obvious, therefore, that the "_migration_," which congress are here forbidden to prohibit, is simply the _going out_ of persons from one of our own states or territories into another--(for that is the only "_migration_" that could come within the jurisdiction of congress)--and that it has no reference to persons _coming in_ from foreign countries to our own.

If, then, "migration," as here used, has reference only to persons _going out_ from one state into another, the word "_importation_" is the only one in the clause that is applicable to foreigners coming into our country. This word "importation," then, being the only word that can apply to persons coming into the country, it must be considered as substantially synonymous with immigration, and must apply equally to _all_ "persons," that are "imported," or brought into the country as pa.s.sengers. And if it applies equally to all persons, that are brought in as pa.s.sengers, it does not _imply_ that any of those persons are slaves; for no one will pretend that this clause ever authorized the state governments to treat as slaves _all_ persons that were brought into the country as pa.s.sengers. And if it did not authorize them to treat all such pa.s.sengers as slaves, it did not authorize them to treat any of them as such; for it makes no discrimination between the different "persons" that should be thus imported.

Again. The argument, that the allowance of the "importation" of "persons," implies the allowance of property in such persons, would imply a recognition of the validity of the slave laws of other countries; for unless slaves were obtained by valid purchase abroad--which purchase implies the existence and validity of foreign slave laws--the importer certainly could not claim to import his slaves as property; but he would appear, at the custom-house, as a mere pirate, claiming to have his captures legalized. So that, _according to the slave argument_, the simple use of the word "importation," in the const.i.tution, as applied to "persons," bound our government, not only to the sanction and toleration of slavery in our own country, but to the recognition of the validity of the slave laws of other countries.

But farther. The allowance of the "importation" of slaves, as such, under this clause of the const.i.tution, would imply that congress must take actual, and even the most critical cognizance of the slave laws of other countries; and that they should allow neither the mere word of the person calling himself the owner, nor any thing short of the fullest and clearest legal proof, according to the laws of those countries, to be sufficient to enable him to enter his slaves, as property, at the custom-house; otherwise any masters of vessels, from England or France, as well as from Africa, might, on their arrival here, claim their pa.s.sengers as slaves. Did the const.i.tution, in this clause, by simply using the word "importation," instead of immigration, intend to throw upon the national government--at the hazard of making it a party to the illegal enslavement of human beings--the responsibility of investigating and deciding upon the legality and credibility of all the evidence that might be offered by the piratical masters of slave ships, to prove their valid purchase of, and their right of property in their human cargoes, according to the slave laws of the countries from which they should bring them? Such must have been the intention of the const.i.tution, if it intended, (as it must, if it intended any thing of this kind,) that the fact of "importation" under the commercial regulations of congress, should be thereafter a sufficient authority for holding in slavery the persons imported.

But perhaps it will be said that it was not the intention of the const.i.tution, that congress should take any responsibility at all in the matter; that it was merely intended that whoever came into the country with a cargo of men, whom he called his slaves, should be permitted to bring them in on his own responsibility, and sell them as slaves for life to our people; and that congress were prohibited only from interfering, or asking any questions as to how he obtained them, or how they became his slaves. Suppose such were the intention of the const.i.tution--what follows? Why, that the national government, the only government that was to be known to foreign nations, the only government that was to be permitted to regulate our commerce, or make treaties with foreign nations, the government on whom alone was to rest the responsibility of war with foreign nations, was bound to permit, (until 1808,) all masters, both of our own ships and of the ships of other nations, to turn pirates, and make slaves of their pa.s.sengers, whether Englishmen, Frenchmen, or any other civilized people, (for the const.i.tution makes no distinction of "persons" on this point,) bring them into this country, sell them as slaves for life to our people, and thus make our country a rendezvous and harbor for pirates, involve us inevitably in war with every civilized nation in the world, cause ourselves to be outlawed as a people, and bring certain and swift destruction upon the whole nation; and yet this government, that had the sole responsibility of all our foreign relations, was const.i.tutionally prohibited from interfering in the matter, or from doing any thing but lifting its hands in prayer to G.o.d and these pirates, that the former would so far depart, and the latter so far desist from their usual courses, as might be necessary to save us, until 1808, (after which time we would take the matter into our own hands, and, by prohibiting the causes of the danger, save ourselves,) from the just vengeance, which the rest of mankind were taking upon us.

This is the kind of const.i.tution, under which, (according to the slave argument,) we lived until 1808.

But is such the real character of the const.i.tution? By it, did we thus really avow to the world that we were a nation of pirates? that our territory should be a harbor for pirates? that our people were const.i.tutionally licensed to enslave the people of all other nations, without discrimination, (for the instrument makes no discrimination,) whom they could either kidnap in their own countries, or capture on the high seas? and that we had even prohibited our only government that could make treaties with foreign nations, from making any treaty, until 1808, with any particular nation, to exempt the people of that nation from their liability to be enslaved by the people of our own? The slave argument says that we did avow all this. If we really did, perhaps all that can be said of it now is, that it is very fortunate for us that other nations did not take us at our word. For if they had taken us at our word, we should, before 1808, have been among the nations that were.

Suppose that, on the organization of our government, we had been charged by foreign nations, with having established a piratical government--how could we have reb.u.t.ted the charge otherwise than by denying that the words "importation of persons" legally implied that the persons imported were slaves? Suppose that European amba.s.sadors had represented to president Washington that their governments considered our const.i.tution as licensing our people to kidnap the people of other nations, without discrimination, and bring them to the United States as slaves. Would he not have denied that the legal meaning of the clause did any thing more than secure the free introduction of foreigners as pa.s.sengers and freemen? Or would he--_he_, the world-renowned champion of human rights--have indeed stooped to the acknowledgment that in truth he was the head of a nation of pirates, whose const.i.tution did guarantee the freedom of kidnapping men abroad, and importing them as slaves? And would he, in the event of this acknowledgment, have sought to avert the destruction, which such an avowal would be likely to bring upon the nation, by pleading that, although such was the legal meaning of the words of our const.i.tution, we yet had an understanding, (an honorable understanding!) among ourselves, that we would not take advantage of the license to kidnap or make slaves of any of the citizens of those civilized and powerful nations of Europe, that kept ships of war, and knew the use of gunpowder and cannon; but only the people of poor, weak, barbarous and ignorant nations, who were incapable of resistance and retaliation?

Again. Even the allowance of the simple "_importation_" of slaves--(and that is the most that is _literally_ provided for--and the word "importation" must be construed to the letter,) would not, of itself, give any authority for the continuance of the slavery _after_ "importation." If a man bring either property or persons into this country, he brings them in to abide the const.i.tutional laws of the country; and not to be held according to the customs of the country from which they were brought. Were it not so, the Turk might import a harem of Georgian slaves, and, at his option, either hold them as his own property, or sell them as slaves to our own people, in defiance of any principles of freedom that should prevail amongst us. To allow this kind of "importation," would be to allow not merely the importation of foreign "persons," but also of foreign laws to take precedence of our own.

Finally. The conclusion, that congress were restrained, by this clause, only from prohibiting the immigration of a foreign population, and not from prohibiting the importation of slaves, to be held as slaves after their importation--is the more inevitable, from the fact that the power given to congress of naturalizing foreigners, is entirely unlimited--except that their laws must be uniform throughout the United States. They have perfect power to pa.s.s laws that shall naturalize every foreigner without distinction, the moment he sets foot on our soil. And they had this power as perfectly prior to 1808, as since. And it is a power entirely inconsistent with the idea that they were bound to admit, and forever after to acknowledge as slaves, all or any who might be attempted to be brought into the country as such.

One other provision of the const.i.tution, viz: the one that "the United States shall protect each of the States against domestic violence"--has sometimes been claimed as a special pledge of impunity and succor to that kind of "violence," which consists in one portion of the people's standing constantly upon the necks of another portion, and robbing them of all civil privileges, and trampling upon all their personal rights.

The argument seems to take it for granted, that the only proper way of protecting a "_republican_" state (for the states are all to be "republican,") against "domestic violence," is to plant men firmly upon one another's necks, (about in the proportion of two upon one,) arm the two with whip and spur, and then keep an armed force standing by to cut down those that are ridden, if they dare attempt to throw the riders.

When the ridden portion shall, by this process, have been so far subdued as to bear the burdens, lashings and spurrings of the other portion without resistance, then the state will have been secured against "domestic violence," and the "republican form of government" will be completely successful.

This version of this provision of the const.i.tution presents a fair ill.u.s.tration of those new ideas of law and language, that have been invented for the special purpose of bringing slavery within the pale of the const.i.tution.

We have thus examined all those clauses of the const.i.tution, that have been relied on to prove that the instrument recognizes and sanctions slavery. No one would have ever dreamed that either of these clauses alone, or that all of them together, contained so much as an allusion to slavery, had it not been for circ.u.mstances extraneous to the const.i.tution itself. And what are these extraneous circ.u.mstances? They are the existence and toleration, in one portion of the country, of a crime that embodies within itself nearly all the other crimes, which it is the princ.i.p.al object of all our governments to punish and suppress; a crime which we have therefore no more right to presume that the const.i.tution of the United States intended to sanction, than we have to presume that it intended to sanction all the separate crimes which slavery embodies, and our governments prohibit. Yet we have _gratuitously_ presumed that the const.i.tution intended to sanction all these separate crimes, as they are comprehended in the general crime of slavery. And acting upon this gratuitous presumption, we have sought, in the words of the const.i.tution, for some hidden meaning, which we could imagine to have been understood, by the initiated, as referring to slavery; or rather we have presumed its words to have been used as a kind of cypher, which, among confederates in crime, (as we presume its authors to have been,) was meant to stand for slavery. In this way, and in this way only, we pretend to have discovered, in the clauses that have been examined, a hidden, yet legal sanction of slavery. In the name of all that is legal, who of us are safe, if our government, instead of searching our const.i.tution to find authorities for maintaining justice, are to continue to busy themselves in such prying and microscopic investigations, after such disguised and enigmatical authorities for such wrongs as that of slavery, and their pretended discoveries are to be adopted as law, which they are sworn to carry into execution?

The clauses mentioned, taken either separately or collectively, neither a.s.sert, imply, sanction, recognize nor acknowledge any such thing as slavery. They do not even speak of it. They make no allusion to it whatever. They do not suggest, and, of themselves, never would have suggested the idea of slavery. There is, in the whole instrument, no such word as slave or slavery; nor any language that can legally be made to a.s.sert or imply the existence of slavery. There is in it nothing about color; nothing from which a liability to slavery can be predicated of one person more than another; or from which such a liability can be predicated of any person whatever. The clauses, that have been claimed for slavery, are all, in themselves, honest in their language, honest in their legal meaning; and they can be made otherwise only by such gratuitous a.s.sumptions against natural right, and such straining of words in favor of the wrong, as, if applied to other clauses, would utterly destroy every principle of liberty and justice, and allow the whole instrument to be perverted to every conceivable purpose of tyranny and crime.

Let us now look at the _positive_ provisions of the const.i.tution, _in favor of liberty_, and see whether they are not only inconsistent with any legal sanction of slavery, but also whether they must not, of themselves, have necessarily extinguished slavery, if it had had any const.i.tutional existence to be extinguished.

And, first, the const.i.tution made all "the people of the United States"

_citizens_ under the government to be established by it; for all of those, by whose authority the const.i.tution declares itself to be established, must of course be presumed to have been made citizens under it. And whether they were ent.i.tled or not to the right of suffrage, they were at least ent.i.tled to all the personal liberty and protection, which the const.i.tution professes to secure to "the people" generally.

Who, then, established the const.i.tution?

The preamble to the const.i.tution has told us in the plainest possible terms, to wit, that "We, _the people_ of the United States" "do ordain and establish this const.i.tution," &c.

By "the people of the United States," here mentioned, the const.i.tution intends _all_ "the people" then permanently inhabiting the United States. If it does not intend all, who were intended by "the people of the United States?"--The const.i.tution itself gives no answer to such a question.--It does not declare that "we, the _white_ people," or "we, the _free_ people," or "we, a _part_ of the people"--but that "we, _the_ people"--that is, we the _whole_ people--of the United States, "do ordain and establish this const.i.tution."

If the _whole_ people of the United States were not recognized as citizens by the const.i.tution, then the const.i.tution gives no information as to what portion of the people were to be citizens under it. And the consequence would then follow that the const.i.tution established a government that could not know its own citizens.

We cannot go out of the const.i.tution for evidence to prove who were to be citizens under it. We cannot go out of a written instrument for evidence to prove the parties to it, nor to explain its meaning, except the language of the instrument on that point be ambiguous. In this case there is no ambiguity. The language of the instrument is perfectly explicit and intelligible.

Because the whole people of the country were not allowed to vote on the ratification of the const.i.tution, it does not follow that they were not made citizens under it; for women and children did not vote on its adoption; yet they are made citizens by it, and are ent.i.tled as citizens to its protection; and the state governments cannot enslave them. The national const.i.tution does not limit the right of citizenship and protection by the right of suffrage, any more than do the state const.i.tutions. Under the most, probably under all the state const.i.tutions, there are persons who are denied the right of suffrage--but they are not therefore liable to be enslaved.

Those who did take part in the actual ratification of the const.i.tution, acted in behalf of, and, _in theory_, represented the authority of the whole people. Such is the theory in this country wherever suffrage is confined to a few; and such is the virtual declaration of the const.i.tution itself. The declaration that "we _the people_ of the United States do ordain and establish this const.i.tution," is equivalent to a declaration that those who actually partic.i.p.ated in its adoption, acted in behalf of all others, as well as for themselves.

Any private intentions or understandings, on the part of one portion of the people, as to who should be citizens, cannot be admitted to prove that such portion only were intended by the const.i.tution, to be citizens; for the intentions of the other portion would be equally admissible to exclude the exclusives. The ma.s.s of the people can claim citizenship under the const.i.tution, on no other ground than as being a part of "the people of the United States;" and such claim necessarily admits that all other "people of the United States" are equally citizens.

That the designation, "We the people of the United States," included the whole people that properly belonged to the United States, is also proved by the fact that no exception is made in any other part of the instrument.

If the const.i.tution had intended that any portion of "the people of the United States" should be excepted from its benefits, disfranchised, outlawed, enslaved, it would of course have designated these exceptions with such particularity as to make it sure that none but the true persons intended would be liable to be subjected to such wrongs. Yet, instead of such particular designation of the exceptions, we find no designation whatever of the kind. But on the contrary, we _do_ find, in the preamble itself, a sweeping declaration to the effect that there are no such exceptions; that the whole people of the United States are citizens, and ent.i.tled to liberty, protection, and the dispensation of justice under the const.i.tution.

If it be admitted that the const.i.tution designated its own citizens, then there is no escape from the conclusion that it designated the whole people of the United States as such. On the other hand, if it be denied that the const.i.tution designated its own citizens, one of these two conclusions must follow, viz., 1st, that it has no citizens; or, 2d, that it has left an unrestrained power in the _state_ governments to determine who may, and who may not, be citizens of the _United States_ government. If the first of these conclusions be adopted, viz., that the const.i.tution has no citizens, then it follows that there is really no United States government, except on paper--for there would be as much reason in talking of an army without men, as of a government without citizens. If the second conclusion be adopted, viz., that the state governments have the right of determining who may, and who may not be citizens of the United States government, then it follows that the state governments may at pleasure destroy the government of the United States, by enacting that none of their respective inhabitants shall be citizens of the United States.

This latter is really the doctrine of some of the slave states--the "state-rights" doctrine, so called. That doctrine holds that the general government is merely a confederacy or league of the several states, _as states_; not a government established by the people, _as people_. This "state-rights" doctrine has been declared unconst.i.tutional by reiterated opinions of the supreme court of the United States;[22] and, what is of more consequence, it is denied also by the preamble to the const.i.tution itself, which declares that it is "the people," (and not the state governments,) that ordain and establish it. It is true also that the const.i.tution was ratified by conventions of the people, and not by the legislatures of the states. Yet because the const.i.tution was ratified by conventions of the states _separately_, (as it naturally would be for convenience, and as it necessarily must have been for the reason that none but the people of the respective states could recall any portion of the authority they had, delegated to their state governments, so as to grant it to the United States government,)--yet because it was thus ratified, I say, some of the slave states have claimed that the general government was a league of states, instead of a government formed by "the people." The true reason why the slave states have held this theory, probably is, because it would give, or appear to give, to the states the right of determining who should, and who should not, be citizens of the United States. They probably saw that if it were admitted that the const.i.tution of the United States had designated its own citizens, it had undeniably designated the whole people of the then United States as such; and that, as a state could not enslave a citizen of the United States, (on account of the supremacy of the const.i.tution of the United States,) it would follow that there could be no const.i.tutional slavery in the United States.

Again. If the const.i.tution was established by authority of all "the people of the United States," they were all legally parties to it, and citizens under it. And if they were parties to it, and citizens under it, it follows that neither they, _nor their posterity_, nor any nor either of them, can ever be legally enslaved within the territory of the United States; for the const.i.tution declares its object to be, among other things, "to secure the blessings of liberty to _ourselves, and our posterity_." This purpose of the national const.i.tution is a law paramount to all state const.i.tutions; for it is declared that "this const.i.tution, and the laws of the United States that shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges _in every state_ shall be bound thereby, any thing in the const.i.tution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding."

No one, I suppose, doubts that if the state governments were to abolish slavery, the slaves would then, without further legislation, become citizens of the United States. Yet, in reality, if they would become citizens then, they are equally citizens now--else it would follow that the state governments had an arbitrary power of making citizens of the United States; or--what is equally absurd--it would follow that disabilities, arbitrarily imposed by the state governments, upon native inhabitants of the country, were, of themselves, sufficient to deprive such inhabitants of their citizenship, which would otherwise have been conferred upon them by the const.i.tution of the United States. To suppose that the state governments are thus able, arbitrarily, to keep in abeyance, or arbitrarily to withhold from any of the inhabitants of the country, any of the benefits or rights which the national const.i.tution intended to confer upon them, would be to suppose that the state const.i.tutions were paramount to the national one. The conclusion, therefore, is inevitable, that the state governments have no power to withhold the rights of citizenship from any who are otherwise competent to become citizens. And as all the native born inhabitants of the country are at least competent to become citizens of the United States, (if they are not already such,) the state governments have no power, by slave laws or any other, to withhold the rights of citizenship from them.

But however clear it may be, that the const.i.tution, in reality, made citizens of all "the people of the United States," yet it is not necessary to maintain that point, in order to prove that the const.i.tution gave no guaranty or sanction to slavery--for if it had not already given citizenship to all, it nevertheless gave to the government of the United States unlimited power of offering citizenship to all. The power given to the government of pa.s.sing naturalization laws, is entirely unrestricted, except that the laws must be uniform throughout the country. And the government have undoubted power to offer naturalization and citizenship to every person in the country, whether foreigner or native, who is not already a citizen. To suppose that we have in the country three millions of native born inhabitants, not citizens, and whom the national government has no power to make citizens, when its power of naturalization is entirely unrestricted, is a palpable contradiction.