The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy Part 29

I.

Rupis Achaemeniae scopulis ubi uersa sequentum Pectoribus figit spicula pugna fugax, Tigris et Euphrates uno se fonte resoluunt Et mox abiunctis dissociantur aquis.

Si coeant cursumque iterum reuocentur in unum, 5 Confluat alterni quod trahit unda uadi; Conuenient puppes et uulsi flumine trunci Mixtaque fortuitos implicet unda modos, Quos tamen ipsa uagos terrae decliuia casus Gurgitis et lapsi defluus ordo regit. 10 Sic quae permissis fluitare uidetur habenis Fors pat.i.tur frenos ipsaque lege meat."

I.

In the Achaemenian rocks, where Parthians with their darts In their dissembled flight do wound their enemies, Tigris from the same head doth with Euphrates rise, And forthwith they themselves divide in several parts; But if they join again, and them one channel bound, Bringing together all that both their waves do bear; The ships and trees, whose roots they from the bank do tear, Will meet, and they their floods will mingle and confound, Yet run this wandering course in places which are low, And in these sliding streams a settled law remains.[167]

So fortune, though it seems to run with careless reins, Yet hath it certain rule, and doth in order flow."

[167] Lit. "Yet all these (apparently) random happenings are governed by the shelving ground and the flowing course of the stream as it runs."

II.

"Animaduerto," inquam, "idque, uti tu dicis, ita esse consentio. Sed in hac haerentium sibi serie causarum estne ulla nostri arbitrii libertas an ipsos quoque humanorum motus animorum fatalis catena constringit?" "Est," inquit, "neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit arbitrii. Nam quod ratione uti naturaliter potest id habet iudicium quo quidque discernat; per se igitur fugienda optandaue dinoscit. Quod uero quis optandum esse iudicat pet.i.t; refugit uero quod aestimat esse fugiendum. Quare quibus in ipsis inest ratio, inest etiam uolendi nolendique libertas. Sed hanc non in omnibus aequam esse const.i.tuo. Nam supernis diuinisque substantiis et perspicax iudicium et incorrupta uoluntas et efficax optatorum praesto est potestas. Humanas uero animas liberiores quidem esse necesse est c.u.m se in mentis diuinae speculatione conseruant, minus uero c.u.m dilabuntur ad corpora, minusque etiam, c.u.m terrenis artubus colligantur. Extrema uero est seruitus, c.u.m uitiis deditae rationis propriae possessione ceciderunt. Nam ubi oculos a summae luce ueritatis ad inferiora et tenebrosa deiecerint, mox inscitiae nube caligant, perniciosis turbantur affectibus quibus accedendo consentiendoque quam inuexere sibi adiuuant seruitutem et sunt quodam modo propria libertate captiuae. Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens prouidentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis praedestinata disponit.

II.

"I observe it," quoth I, "and I acknowledge it to be as thou sayest. But in this rank of coherent causes, have we any free-will, or doth the fatal chain fasten also the motions of men's minds?" "We have," quoth she, "for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it be endued with free-will. For that which naturally hath the use of reason hath also judgment by which it can discern of everything by itself, wherefore of itself it distinguished betwixt those things which are to be avoided, and those which are to be desired. Now every one seeketh for that which he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his judgment is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in themselves have freedom to will and nill. But yet I consider not this equal in all. For the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgment and an uncorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtain their desires. But the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves in the contemplation of G.o.d, and less when they come to their bodies, and yet less when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their greatest bondage is when, giving themselves to vices, they lose possession of their own reason. For, having cast their eyes from the light of the sovereign truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtful affections, by yielding and consenting to which they increase the bondage which they laid upon themselves, and are, after a certain manner, captives by their own freedom. Which notwithstanding that foresight of Providence which beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeth, and by predestination disposeth of everything by their merits.

II.

[Greek: Pant' ephoran kai pant' epakouein][168]

Puro clarum lumine Phoeb.u.m Melliflui canit oris Homerus: Qui tamen intima uiscera terrae Non ualet aut pelagi radiorum 5 Infirma perrumpere luce.

Haud sic magni conditor orbis; Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti Nulla terrae mole resistunt, Non nox atris nubibus obstat. 10 Quae sint, quae fuerint ueniantque Vno mentis cernit in ictu; Quem, quia respicit omnia solus, Verum possis dicere solem."

[168] disponit [Greek: Pant' ephoron kai pant' epakogon] _sic Peiper et similiter editores priores. Versum in r.e.c.t.u.m loc.u.m Engelbrecht rest.i.tuit, quam quidem emendationem noster interpres uidetur praesensisse._

II.

Sweet Homer[169] sings the praise Of Phoebus clear and bright, And yet his strongest rays Cannot with feeble light Cast through the secret ways Of earth and seas his sight, Though 'all lies open to his eyes.'[170]

But He who did this world devise--

The earth's vast depths unseen From his sight are not free, No clouds can stand between, He at one time doth see What are, and what have been, And what shall after be.

Whom, since he only vieweth all, You rightly the true Sun may call."

[169] Cf. _Il._ iv. 277, _Od._ xii. 323.

[170] This line renders the Greek with which Boethius begins the poem, adapting Homer's phrase "all surveying, all o'erhearing." See the critical note on p. 372.

III.

Tum ego: "En," inquam, "difficiliore rursus ambiguitate confundor."

"Quaenam," inquit, "ista est? Iam enim quibus perturbere coniecto."

"Nimium," inquam, "aduersari ac repugnare uidetur praenoscere uniuersa deum et esse ullum libertatis arbitrium. Nam si cuncta prospicit deus neque falli ullo modo potest, euenire necesse est quod prouidentia futurum esse praeuiderit. Quare si ab aeterno non facta hominum modo sed etiam consilia uoluntatesque praenoscit, nulla erit arbitrii libertas; neque enim uel factum aliud ullum uel quaelibet exsistere poterit uoluntas nisi quam nescia falli prouidentia diuina praesenserit. Nam si aliorsum quam prouisae sunt detorqueri ualent, non iam erit futuri firma praescientia, sed opinio potius incerta, quod de deo credere nefas iudico. Neque enim illam probo rationem qua se quidam credunt hunc quaestionis nodum posse dissoluere.

Aiunt enim non ideo quid esse euenturum, quoniam id prouidentia futurum esse prospexerit, sed e contrario potius, quoniam quid futurum est, id diuinam prouidentiam latere non posse eoque modo necessarium hoc in contrariam relabi partem, neque enim necesse esse contingere quae prouidentur, sed necesse esse quae futura sunt prouideri--quasi uero quae cuius rei causa sit praescientiane futurorum necessitatis an futurorum necessitas prouidentiae laboretur, ac non illud demonstrare nitamur, quoquo modo sese habeat ordo causarum, necessarium esse euentum praescitarum rerum, etiam si praescientia futuris rebus eueniendi necessitatem non uideatur inferre. Etenim si quispiam sedeat, opinionem quae eum sedere coniectat ueram esse necesse est; atque e conuerso rursus, si de quopiam uera sit opinio quoniam sedet, eum sedere necesse est. In utroque igitur necessitas inest, in hoc quidem sedendi, at uero in altero ueritatis. Sed non idcirco quisque sedet quoniam uera est opinio, sed haec potius uera est quoniam quempiam sedere praecessit. Ita c.u.m causa ueritatis ex altera parte procedat, inest tamen communis in utraque necessitas.

Similia de prouidentia futurisque rebus ratiocinari patet. Nam etiam si idcirco quoniam futura sunt, prouidentur, non uero ideo quoniam prouidentur eueniunt, nihilo minus tamen ab deo uel uentura prouideri uel prouisa necesse est euenire,[171] quod ad perimendam arbitrii libertatem solum satis est. Iam uero quam praeposterum est ut aeternae praescientiae temporalium rerum euentus causa esse dicatur! Quid est autem aliud arbitrari ideo deum futura quoniam sunt euentura prouidere, quam putare quae olim acciderunt causam summae illius esse prouidentiae? Ad haec sicuti c.u.m quid esse scio, id ipsum esse necesse est, ita c.u.m quid futurum noui, id ipsum futurum esse necesse est. Sic fit igitur ut euentus praescitae rei nequeat euitari. Postremo si quid aliquis aliorsum atque sese res habet existimet, id non modo scientia non est, sed est opinio fallax ab scientiae ueritate longe diuersa. Quare si quid ita futurum est ut eius certus ac necessarius non sit euentus, id euenturum esse praesciri qui poterit? Sicut enim scientia ipsa impermixta est falsitati, ita id quod ab ea concipitur esse aliter atque concipitur nequit. Ea namque causa est cur mendacio scientia careat, quod se ita rem quamque habere necesse est uti eam sese habere scientia comprehendit. Quid igitur? Quonam modo deus haec incerta futura praenoscit? Nam si ineuitabiliter euentura censet quae etiam non euenire possibile est, fallitur; quod non sentire modo nefas est, sed etiam uoce proferre. At si ita uti sunt, ita ea futura esse decernit, ut aeque uel fieri ea uel non fieri posse cognoscat, quae est haec praescientia quae nihil certum nihil stabile comprehendit? Aut quid hoc refert uaticinio illo ridiculo Tiresiae?

Quidquid dicam, aut erit aut non.

Quid etiam diuina prouidentia humana opinione praest.i.terit; si uti homines incerta iudicat quorum est incertus euentus? Quod si apud illum rerum omnium certissimum fontem nihil incerti esse potest, certus eorum est euentus quae futura firmiter ille praescierit. Quare nulla est humanis consiliis actionibusque libertas quas diuina mens sine falsitatis errore cuncta prospiciens ad unum alligat et constringit euentum. Quo semel recepto quantus occasus humanarum rerum consequatur liquet. Frustra enim bonis malisque praemia poenaeue proponuntur quae nullus meruit liber ac uoluntarius motus animorum. Idque omnium uidebitur iniquissimum quod nunc aequissimum iudicatur uel puniri improbos uel remunerari probos quos ad alterutrum non propria mitt.i.t uoluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas.

Nec uitia igitur nec uirtutes quidquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum potius mixta atque indiscreta confusio. Quoque nihil sceleratius excogitari potest, c.u.m ex prouidentia rerum omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis liceat humanis, fit ut uitia quoque nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur auctorem. Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est. Quid enim uel speret quisque uel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series indeflexa conect.i.t? Auferetur igitur unic.u.m illud inter homines deumque commercium sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi. Si quidem iustae humilitatis pretio inaestimabilem uicem diuinae gratiae promeremur, qui solus modus est quo c.u.m deo colloqui homines posse uideantur illique inaccessae luci prius quoque quam impetrent ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si recepta futurorum necessitate nihil uirium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo illi rerum principi conecti atque adhaerere possimus? Quare necesse erit humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo fonte fatiscere.

[171] euenire prouisa _codd. meliores._

III.

Then I complained that I was now in a greater confusion and more doubtful difficulty than before. "What is that?" quoth she, "for I already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee." "It seemeth," quoth I, "to be altogether impossible and repugnant that G.o.d foreseeth all things, and that there should be any free-will. For if G.o.d beholdeth all things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow which His providence foreseeth to be to come. Wherefore, if from eternity he doth not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills, there can be no free-will; for there is not any other deed or will, but those which the divine providence, that cannot be deceived, hath foreseen. For if things can be drawn aside to any other end than was foreknown, there will not be any firm knowledge of that which is to come, but rather an uncertain opinion, which in my opinion were impious to believe of G.o.d. Neither do I allow of that reason with which some suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they say that nothing is therefore to come to pa.s.s because Providence did foresee it, but rather contrariwise, because it shall be, it could not be unknown to Providence, and in this manner the necessity pa.s.ses over to the other side. For it is not necessary, they argue, that those things should happen which are foreseen, but it is necessary that those things should be foreseen that are to come--as though our problem were this, which of them is the cause of a thing, the foreknowledge of the necessity of things to come, or the necessity of the foreknowledge of things to come, and we were not trying to prove that, howsoever these causes be ordered, the event of the things which are foreknown is necessary, even though the foreknowledge seemeth not to confer necessity of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion which thinketh so must needs be true, and again on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true, he must needs sit. Wherefore, there is necessity in both, in the one of sitting and in the other of truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this is true because one hath taken his seat. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both.

And the like is to be inferred of Providence and future things. For even though they be foreseen because they shall be, yet they do not come to pa.s.s because they are foreseen, notwithstanding it is necessary that either things to come be foreseen by G.o.d, or that things foreseen do fall out, which alone is sufficient to overthrow free-will. But see how preposterous it is that the event of temporal things should be said to be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge! And what else is it to think that G.o.d doth therefore foresee future things, because they are to happen, than to affirm that those things which happened long since, are the cause of that sovereign providence? Furthermore, as when I know anything to be, it must needs be; so when I know that anything shall be, it must needs be to come. And so it followeth that the event of a thing foreknown cannot be avoided. Finally, if any man thinketh otherwise than the thing is, that is not only no knowledge, but it is a deceitful opinion far from the truth of knowledge; wherefore, if anything is to be in such sort that the event of it is not certain or necessary, how can that be foreknown that it shall happen? For as knowledge is without mixture of falsity, so that which is conceived by it cannot be otherwise than it is conceived. For this is the cause why knowledge is without deceit, because everything must needs be so as the knowledge apprehendeth it to be. What then? How doth G.o.d foreknow that these uncertain things shall be? For if He judgeth that those things shall happen inevitably, which it is possible shall not happen, He is deceived, which is not only impious to think, but also to speak. But if He supposeth that they shall happen in such sort as they are, so that He knoweth that they may equally be done and not be done, what foreknowledge is this which comprehendeth no certain or stable thing? Or in what is this better than that ridiculous prophecy of Tiresias "Whatsoever I say shall either be or not be"[172]? or in what shall the divine providence exceed human opinion, if, as men, G.o.d judgeth those things to be uncertain the event of which is doubtful? But if nothing can be uncertain to that most certain fountain of all things, the occurrence of those things is certain, which He doth certainly know shall be. Wherefore there is no freedom in human counsels and actions, which the divine mind, foreseeing all things without error or falsehood, tieth and bindeth to one event. Which once admitted, it is evident what ruin of human affairs will ensue. For in vain are rewards and punishments proposed to good and evil, which no free and voluntary motion of their minds hath deserved. And that will seem most unjust which is now judged most just, that either the wicked should be punished or the good rewarded, since their own will leadeth them to neither, but they are compelled by the certain necessity of that which is to come. By which means virtues and vices shall be nothing, but rather there will follow a mixed confusion of all deserts. And--than which there can be nothing invented more impious--since that all order of things proceedeth from Providence, and human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that our vices also shall be referred to the author of goodness. Wherefore there is no means left to hope or pray for anything, since an unflexible course connecteth all things that can be desired! Wherefore that only traffic betwixt G.o.d and men of hope and prayer shall be taken away: if indeed by the price of just humility we deserve the unestimable benefit of G.o.d's grace; for this is the only manner by which it seemeth that men may talk with G.o.d, and by the very manner of supplication be joined to that inaccessible light before they obtain anything; which if by the admitting the necessity of future things, they be thought to have no force, by what shall we be united and cleave to that Sovereign Prince of all things? Wherefore mankind must needs (as thou saidest in thy verse a little before), being separated and severed from its source, fail and fall away.

[172] Hor. _Sat._ ii. 5. 59.

III.

Quaenam discors foedera rerum Causa resoluit? Quis tanta deus Veris statuit bella duobus, Vt quae carptim singula constent Eadem nolint mixta iugari? 5 An nulla est discordia ueris Semperque sibi certa cohaerent?

Sed mens caecis obruta membris Nequit oppressi luminis igne Rerum tenues noscere nexus. 10 Sed cur tanto flagrat amore Veri tectas reperire notas?

Scitne quod appet.i.t anxia nosse?

Sed quis nota scire laborat?