The Teaching of Epictetus Part 10

END OF BOOK II.

_BOOK III._

CHAPTER I.

OBLIGATIONS.

1. Obligations are universally defined by the bonds of relation. Is such a man your father? Then it is implied that you are to take care of him, to give place to him in all things, to bear his rebukes, his chastis.e.m.e.nt. _But if he be a bad father?_ Were you then related by any law of Nature to a good father? Nay, but simply to a father. Your brother does you wrong. Then guard your own place towards him, nor scrutinize what he is doing, but what you may do to keep your will in accord with Nature. For none other shall hurt you, if yourself choose it not, but you shall be hurt then when you conceive yourself to be so.

2. Thus shall you discover your obligations from the offices of a neighbor, a citizen, a general, if you will accustom yourself to watch the relationships.

CHAPTER II.

AGAINST EPICURUS.

1. Even Epicurus is conscious that we are by nature social, but having once placed the Good in the husk,[1] he cannot thereafter speak anything but what agrees with this; for again he affirms, and rightly affirms, that nothing is to be admired or received that is separated from the nature of the Good. How, then, Epicurus, do you suspect that we are social, if Nature had given us no affection for our offspring?[2]

Wherefore do you counsel the sage against bringing up children? Why do you fear lest he fall into sorrow by so doing? Doth he fall into sorrow for the mouse that lives in his house? What careth he if a little mouse complain to him at home. But he knows well that if a little child be born, it is no longer in our power not to love it and be anxious for it.

2. Thus, too, he saith that no man of sense will take part in affairs of the state, for he knows what he who takes part in them must do; but what should hinder one to take part, if he may behave among men as in a swarm of flies? But Epicurus, knowing these things, dares to say that we should not rear up our children. But even a sheep will not desert its young, nor a wolf; and shall a man? _What! will you have us to be silly creatures, like the sheep?_ Yet they desert not their young. _Or savage, like wolves?_ Yet even they desert them not. Come, then, who would obey you if he saw his little child fall on the ground and cry? For my part, I suppose that had it been prophesied to your mother and your father that you would say these things, not even so would they have cast you out.

3. _But how can it be said of these outward things_[3] _that they are according to Nature, or contrary to Nature?_ That is to speak as if we were solitary and disunited from others. For to the foot I shall say it is according to Nature that it be clean; but if you take it as a foot, and not as a solitary thing, it shall beseem it to go into the mud, and to tread on thorns, and perchance to be cut off, for the sake of the whole; otherwise it is no longer a foot.

4. And some such thing we should suppose about ourselves also. What art thou? A man. Look at thyself as a solitary creature, and it is according to Nature to live to old age, to grow rich, to keep good health. But if thou look at thyself as a man, and as a part of a certain Whole, for the sake of that Whole it may become thee now to have sickness, now to sail the seas and run into peril, now to suffer need, and perchance to die before thy time.

5. Why, then, dost thou bear it hard? Knowest thou not, that as the foot alone is not a foot, so thou alone art not a man? For what is a man? A part of a polity, first of that which is made up of G.o.ds and men; then of that which is said to be next to the other, which is a small copy of the Universal Polity.

6. _Then must I now be brought to trial, and now must another have a fever, and another sail the seas, another die, another be sentenced?_ Yea, for with such a body, in the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of inhabitants, it cannot be but that different things of this nature should fall on different persons. This is thy task, then, having come into the world, to speak what thou shouldst, and to order these things as it is fitting.

7. Then some one saith, _I charge you with wrong-doing_. Much good may it do thee! I have done my part-look to it thyself if thou have done thine, for of this too there is some danger, lest it escape thee.

CHAPTER III.

AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS.

1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation-that there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this-for what is this but to say that if there is anything universal it is falsehood?

2. Again, if one should come and say, _Know that nothing can be known, but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man_; or again, another, _Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou wilt_-now wherein do such men differ from those-whom shall I say?-those who call themselves Academics? _a.s.sent, O men, that no man can a.s.sent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one._

3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? _Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken-there is no natural fellowship among reasoning beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms._ What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay-but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the G.o.ds, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest any one should take the essence of the Good to be anything else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit; eat and drink and cohabit and ease thyself and snore. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us? With sheep hast thou some concern, for that they serve us when they are shorn, and when they are milked, and at last when they have their throats cut. Were it not, then, to be desired, if men could be lulled and charmed to slumber by the Stoics, and give themselves to thee and the like of thee, to be shorn and milked? These things shouldst thou say to thy brother Epicureans; but shouldst thou not keep them hidden from other men, and seek in every way to persuade them above all things that we are by nature social, and that temperance is good; in order that everything may be kept for thee? Or should we preserve this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom, then, should we preserve it? With those who also preserve it towards us, or with those who transgress it? And who transgress it more than ye, who set forth such doctrines?

4. What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will. _For_, saith she, _since it seems to thee that there is no fellowship among men, write this down, and deliver it to others, and watch and wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed the accuser of thine own opinions_. Shall we, then, say that Orestes was driven by the Furies and aroused from sleep, and did not crueller Furies and Avengers rouse this man as he slumbered, and suffered him not to rest, but compelled him, as madness and wine the priests of Cybele,[1] to proclaim his own evils? So mighty and invincible a thing is man's nature.

5. For how can a vine be affected, and not in the manner of a vine, but of an olive? Or how, again, can an olive be affected not in the manner of an olive but of a vine? It is impossible, it cannot be conceived.

Neither, then, is it possible for a man wholly to lose the affections of humanity, for even eunuchs cannot cut away for themselves the desires of men. And thus Epicurus has cut away all that belongs to a man as father of a family, and as citizen, and as friend; but the desires of humanity he hath not cut away, for he could not; no more than these pitiful Academics are able to cast away or to blind their own perceptions, although this is the thing that they have striven with all their zeal to do.

6. How shameful is this! that a man having received from Nature measures and canons for the recognition of truth, should study not to add to them and perfect them where they are wanting, but the very contrary of this; if there be anything that may lead us to the knowledge of the truth, they strive to abolish and destroy it.

7. What sayest thou, philosopher? religion and holiness, what dost thou take them for?[2]

--"If thou wilt, I shall prove that they are good."

So be it; prove it then, in order that our citizens may be converted and honor the Divinity, and be no longer neglectful of the greatest things.

--"Now hast thou received the proofs?"

I have, and am thankful therefor.

8.--"Now since thou art exceedingly well pleased with these things, hear the contrary: There are no G.o.ds, or if there be, they have no care for men, nor have we any communion with them; and this religion and holiness, whereof the mult.i.tude babble, is the lying of impostors and sophists, or of legislators, by Zeus! for the frighting and restraining of evil-doers."

Well said, philosopher! the citizens shall have much profit of thee!

thou hast already brought back all our youths to the contempt of sacred things.

--"What now? are these doctrines not pleasing to thee? Learn, then, that Righteousness is nothing, that Reverence is folly, that a father is nothing, a son nothing."

Well said, philosopher! proceed, persuade the young, that we may multiply the number of those who believe and speak with thee. From these teachings have grown our well-governed States, from these did Sparta spring, and these beliefs, by his laws and discipline, did Lycurgus plant among his people:-That slavery is no more base than honorable, nor to be free men more honorable than base. Through these opinions died those who fell at Thermopylae, and through what others did the Athenians forsake their city?[8]

9. Then those who speak such things marry, and beget children, and take part in public affairs, and make themselves priests and augurs-of what?

Of beings that do not exist! and they question the Pythian oracle that they may learn falsehoods; and they declare the oracles to others. O monstrous impudence and imposture!

CHAPTER IV

ON SLAVERY.

1. A certain man having inquired how one may make his meals in a manner pleasing to the G.o.ds, If he do it uprightly, said Epictetus, and considerately, and equably, and temperately, and orderly, shall it not also be thus pleasing to the G.o.ds? But when you ask for hot water, and the boy does not hear, or, hearing, brings it only luke-warm; or if he is not even to be found in the house, then is it not pleasing to the G.o.ds if you refrain from indignation, and do not burst with pa.s.sion?

_How shall one endure such fellows?_ Wretch, wilt thou not bear with thine own brother, who is of the progeny of Zeus, like a son sprung of the same seed as thyself, and of the same heavenly descent, but thou must straightway make thyself a tyrant, for the place of command in which thou art set? Wilt thou not remember who thou art, and whom thou rulest-that they are kinsmen, brethren by nature, the progeny of Zeus?

_But I have bought them, and they have not bought me!_ Seest thou, then, whither thou art looking-towards the earth, towards the pit of perdition, towards these miserable laws of dead men? but towards the laws of the G.o.ds thou dost not look.

2. That which thou wouldst not suffer thyself, seek not to lay upon others. Thou wouldst not be a slave-look to it that others be not slaves to thee. For if thou endure to have slaves, it seems that thou thyself art first of all a slave. For virtue hath no communion with vice nor freedom with slavery.