The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis Part 5

But the course of Norwegian politics could not be obstructed. The goal was already in sight. In a communication from the Norwegian government of the 17th April the reasons for the refusal are set forth. They are typically Norwegian. It refers to preceding negotiations, the failure of which is solely accountable to the circ.u.mstance that on the part of Sweden it has been found impossible to accede to all the Norwegian demands. The termination of the Consular negotiations had especially given ground for great disappointment, and if increased by a renewal of similar unfortunate experiments, will threaten the gravest danger to the good relations existent between the two peoples. The Norwegian government knows what means to employ to produce these good relations, namely, establishing its own Consular Service in the way prognosticated in the past. This accomplished, that confidence, which is the mainspring of every friendly and fruitful inquiry into difficult and delicate relations in a Union, will have revived. Norway is thus always the injured one, and there is never a thought that Sweden on her part might have or possibly _could find_ cause for displeausure over Norwegian Union Policy[53:1].

In a joint Cabinet in Stockholm on April 23rd the aforementioned statements were carried[53:2]. The Swedish Cabinet found it impossible, for the present, to resume negotiations. The Norwegian Cabinet stated imperatively--to those who would believe it--that it is not the object of Norwegian action to have the present Union dissolved(!), but they were in unity with the Swedish Cabinet. The Crown Prince deeply deplored being forced to let these decisions remain final.

In the beginning of May the Swedish Diet resolved, on the basis of the above mentioned motions, to address the King respecting the support they had given the Crown Prince's resolution[54:1]. The Diet deeply deplored the refusal already given by the Norwegians, but considered it possible that their unanimous support of the Crown Prince's programme would lead eventually to more favourable results.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian agitation._]

While these efforts on the part of the Regent and Sweden were being made to bring Norway to reason, an energetic and designing agitation was being carried on from Christiania. The press went over almost entirely to the side of the programme; from Trondhjem alone, where union partisanship was not altogether inclined to submit to the dictates from Christiania, were heard hesitations.

Strong efforts were made in the Storthing to win over the doubting and unwilling ones, and they were in the main successful. Then followed a most energetic propaganda in order to win European opinion on Norway's side. The European press was well supplied with materials for forming an opinion of the situation, and with articles in German and English newspapers, it became possible to persuade the doubting ones at home, that Norway's cause was a righteous one,--all Europe saw that.

[Sidenote: _Proposal from the Special Committee of the Storthing._]

When the ground was thus well prepared the Special Committee of the Storthing presented their proposals.

This recommends as before mentioned the old well-known tactics of the first days of the Consular dispute. The modifications which were added were only designed to hasten events, so that agitated minds should not have time to reflect, and reason in some way be restored. In the beginning of the 90's the so-called State subsidy line was followed, that is, a certain sum of money was voted for the purpose of establishing a separate Consular Service within a given time. This measure had meanwhile shown that a delay would occur which would under present circ.u.mstances be exceedingly inconvenient. Therefore the so-called legal measure was adopted. The Resolution on the Norwegian Consular Service should be presented to the King in the form of a law, the advantage in this being that according to the Norwegian Const.i.tution, a law shall be laid before the King immediately after the resolution pa.s.sed by the Storthing. But there was an obstacle to this: the King's right of veto! On the ground of the fundamental law, that if the King refuses his sanction to a bill three successive times after it has been pa.s.sed by the unaltered resolution of the Storting, it becomes the law of the land without his a.s.sent, the personal wishes of the king with regard to legal matters had of recent times been to a certain extent respected. Thus so recently as 1900 the law applying to Consular Fees had been refused sanction by the Crown Prince-Regent against the decision of the Ministry, and the Prime Minister had countersigned the decision. But now the last vestige of Sovereign power was refused. By a resolution that the law should commence to act on April 1st 1906 all possibility of the King p.r.o.nouncing his veto was cut off beforehand. The settlement of affairs should immediately be brought to a climax.

The proposed law made no provisions as to the relations of the Consuls to the Minister of Foreign affairs. That matter was to be settled by a Norwegian State Ordinance, dictated by the Ministry. It is easy to imagine its intended basis by the Special Committee emphatically declaring it to be their opinion that the Norwegian Cabinet had made too many concessions in the last Consular negotiations. To begin with, it was intimated in the Norwegian papers, that the matter referring to the Consular Service and Diplomatic Department would be settled by treaty with Sweden, a most illusive moderation, considering Norway, as previously mentioned[55:1], by fixing the date when the laws would first be in force, had alone the power of considering the basis of the possible agreement. But this intimation was very soon contradicted; Norway would take matters entirely into her own hands. And it was openly hinted, that if the King found that he ought to sanction the law, they would then proceed further with the question of their own Minister for Foreign affairs.

[Sidenote: _The revolutionary basis of the proposal._]

The tactics in the whole of the procedings are characterised as being revolutionary against the Union, its object being by one sided Norwegian resolutions to dissolve the joint Foreign Administration. And as regards the Consular question it has been explained that to withdraw without consulting Sweden a part of the Foreign affairs from the Minister of Foreign affairs who was mainly responsible for them, was utterly unreasonable.

To what then did the Storthing invite the King? Simply this, _to take a revolutionary step against the Union, to an initiatory dissolution of the Union, to a protracted undermining of the foundation of the Union_, far more dangerous than severing it at one blow. And the ugly thought in the background was this: If the King did not submit to this, it would be shouted out all over the world, that the King was faithless to the interests of Norway, and had denied Norway's Sovereign rights; then he should bear the blame for what would happen, the revolutionary rupture of the bonds of Union. But not alone on him would the blame be thrown. The King in the first place should be put to the proof. But, if the King said 'No', it cannot, Mr NANSEN says, be the result of Norwegian influence, _but on account of Swedish pressure_[56:1]. Here we are met by the dishonourable train of thought that has formed the foundation on which the Norwegian Radicals have built the whole of their work for undermining the Union, that is, never to acknowledge the true motive--piety towards the Union--when the King opposed the one-sided disloyal demands of Norway, but instead always point to Swedish interests as the ruling motive. And nevertheless, it is certain, that no Swedish-Norwegian King has kept in view the Union, and _all it implied on all sides_, more faithfully than King OSCAR II.

_They closed all roads by which the King would be able to decide the Consular Question in a manner acceptable from a Union point of view; by this means, they forced the King to exercise his veto--and then they cast the responsibility of the revolution on him and Sweden._ This is the basis of the tactics of the Norwegian Revolution. The characteristicness of this is sufficiently evident.

[Sidenote: _The decision in the Storthing._]

The debate on the proposal of the Special Committee in the Storthing was fixed for the day after the National Anniversary, May 17th. National revelries were to precede to encourage and excite. In Christiania, especially, the day was celebrated in such a manner, that there could be no doubt as to what was in the wind. NANSEN used big words about Norway, and big words against Sweden, and in the presence of several thousand persons, a memorial wreath was laid--as on several previous years--on a Colonel KREBS' grave; during the short strife between Sweden and Norway in 1814, the man had succeeded in repulsing a Swedish regiment!

These imposing preparations were followed by the decision of the Storthing. It was first proposed to decide unanimously without any debate. But there were a few members in the Storthing who ventured to protest in words--in actions no one dared to protest.

With a frankness evidently embarra.s.sing to all present, Mr HAGERUP pointed out the two only possible alternatives with reference to the decision; to retract, or to rupture. The latter alternative he evidently found most acceptable, and in Norway's real interest, he warned them as to what the issue might be. He proposed that the decision with respect to these eventualities--which might exceed both the Const.i.tution and the Act of Union--should be deferred till after the new elections, as the Const.i.tution with an almost torturing emphasis insists on caution when a change in the government system is contemplated. Even the rest of the few in the minority made known their different views, and among them the Shipowner JoRGEN KNUDSEN openly confessed that he saw no forcible reasons for dissolving the joint Consular Service.

But the issue was plain. After Mr HAGERUP'S proposal for an adjournment was voted against with a minority of few the Consular law was pa.s.sed unanimously.

[Sidenote: _King Oscar's position in regard to the Consular law._]

Nothing remained now but to continue. The uncertainty in various quarters as to how king OSCAR would express himself, simply implied ignorance of the political situation in an historical light. No Norwegian acquainted with the real facts of the case, could be in doubts as to the King's reply. Norway herself had dictated it and the innocent distrust of NANSEN[58:1] and Norwegian newspapers, that the King, as they said, would really refuse Norway her right seemed rather unnatural.

[Sidenote: _The Cabinet meeting. 27th May 1905_]

On the 27th May a Cabinet meeting was held at the Royal Palace in Stockholm[58:2]. To the Norwegian Cabinet's appeal for sanction to the Consular law, the King replied that the present regulations for the joint Consular service as resolved in a joint Cabinet according to the Act of the Union -- 5, also under the same conditions, that is to say, by treaty with Sweden, must be dissolved, and refused his sanction. The Cabinet raised the strongest objections to this, and referred to Norway's loyal(!) endeavours to advance the cause. The King's decree implied a violation of Norway's independence and Sovereign right, and would undoubtedly lead to the dissolution of the Union. The Cabinet thereupon, sent in their resignations[58:3], which the King, meanwhile, refused to allow, as he had _at present_ no prospect of forming a new Ministry. Then ensued a discussion between the King and the Ministers. The King maintained his right based on the Const.i.tutional law, to exercise his veto according to his own judgment and maintained the duty of the Minister of State to countersign his decision. The Cabinet sought, on their side, to defend the interpretation given in later years to the fundamental law, that it presupposed the right of refusing countersignature, but could, as a precedent, for present circ.u.mstances, only quote the not altogether applicable opinion--after full consideration--of the Norwegian Cabinet in 1847[58:4].

[Sidenote: _The situation after the 27nd May._]

Now the situation was as follows: The King had been forced to the extremity of exercising his undoubted right, according to Const.i.tutional law, to form his decision according to his own judgment. It was furthermore the Prime Minister's undoubted duty to countersign his decree, the Cabinet, by raising protestations, were released from const.i.tutional responsibility for the royal decree according to the rules of the fundamental law. But the Cabinet maintained another interpretation of the fundamental law, and sent in their resignations, which the King, meanwhile, refused to grant as he could not _for the present_--now-- form a new Ministry.

This word 'now' in the King's refusal to the Cabinets appeal to resign, undoubtedly implies a reminder of earlier similar situations in the beginning of 1890, when the Ministry--on one or two occasions _Radical_ --had remained in office some time after they had tendered their appeals to resign, as the King was unable to form a new ministry. It was also without doubt the legislative duty of the Ministry to remain at their post till the King released them. For, according to the general const.i.tutional and administrative ideas of justice, it is the King who releases his Ministers; they have no legal right to retire of themselves.

It is not Norway's _King_ who has transgressed the law, in spite of all the accusations to that effect from Norway's government[59:1]. _The law was transgressed on June 6th by the Norwegian Cabinet, when they informed the King that they resigned office_[59:2].

[Sidenote: _The Norwegian Revolution._]

Their chief reason for this proceeding they declared to be their inability to be a party to the King's policy, which according to their opinion, was not in accordance with the Norwegian Const.i.tution, and declared themselves to be 'free men' ent.i.tled to the right to resign office[60:1]. King OSCAR immediately sent protestations against this proceeding on the part of the Ministers, both to the Storthing and the Premier[60:2]. But before these came to hand, the next act was played out.

On the 7th June the Cabinet informed the Storthing of their resignation[60:3]. The Storthing forgetful of the very important little word _now_ categorically recorded the fact that the King had declared himself incapable of forming a new government, and came to the conclusion that the Const.i.tutional Royal Power was no longer effectual, on which the late Ministers were admonished to take up the reins of government, which, according to Const.i.tutional law, was the King's prerogative alone.

The King was therefore deposed. But Norwegian logic went boldly further.

King OSCAR having ceased to act as Norway's King, the declaration followed, that the Union with Sweden was dissolved[60:4]. This was all communicated in an address which the Storthing prayed to be allowed to deliver to King OSCAR by a deputation[60:5]. The King of course replied that he would not receive any deputation from the revolutionary Storthing[60:6].

It is now these resolutions which are not called revolutionary in Norway.

They are, on the contrary, perfectly legal[60:7]!

The King was dethroned, because, supported by rights given by the Const.i.tution, he refused to sanction a resolution in conflict with the principles of the Union, to which Norway, according to the first paragraph of her Const.i.tution, is bound.

The Union with Sweden was declared dissolved without reference to Sweden, or observation of the terms in which the slightest change in the Const.i.tution and the Act of Union must be carried out[61:1]. And this last resolution was carried in spite of the Const.i.tutional prescription that changes in the same must not come in strife with the principles of State law, to which, if ever, the Union with Sweden belongs; as the freedom and independence of Norway, according to the first paragraph of the Const.i.tution, are inseparably connected with this Union[61:2].

As aforementioned, all this is not revolution in Norway. Conceptions of laws and rights have long shown themselves in strange lights in that country.

[Sidenote: _Protestations of Sweden and the Union King._]

On June 9th Sweden declared her protest against the Norwegian revolution.

In the Cabinet Council to which the Swedish Chambers were summoned to meet in on Extraordinary session[61:3], the Prime Minister strongly emphasised the fact that the Norwegian Storthing's proceedings had deeply violated Sweden's rights.

The following day, June 10th, King OSCAR issued his protest in an address to the Norwegian Storthing[62:1]. In clear and convincing terms the King maintains his formal legal right to form his resolution in opposition to the Cabinet's opinion. And he, as forcibly, maintains that it was in the capacity of the chief representative of the _Union_ that he had considered it his duty to refuse his sanction to the Consular law. As Union-King, he emphasizes his right and prerogative, even in opposition to Norwegian public opinion in general, to maintain the principles of the Union, and he finally refers to the decisions of himself and Sweden if Norway's attack on the existing Union should lead to its _legal_ dissolution.

[Sidenote: _Address of the Storthing 19th June 1905._]

The reply to this address of the King was an address[62:2] from the Storthing on June 19th formally to His Majesty the King, but in reality to the Swedish nation. In this it is explained that the Norwegian people entertain no feelings of dislike or ill-will to the Swedish people, and appeals to the Swedish State powers to promote a peaceful agreement on both sides. The Storthing addressed this appeal to the people who by their magnanimity and chivalry had won such a prominent place in the ranks of Nations.

The Swedish nation had good cause for thinking that it might have received this compliment _a little sooner_, instead of the overwhelming ma.s.s of infamous accusations which it had formerly had to accept with a good grace. And above all, it is their opinion that if Norway had formerly adjusted its actions in accordance with their present ideas of the Swedish nation, the present situation would now have been different in all respects.

The doc.u.ment of the 19:th June contains also one detail, which has since, step by step, been forced to the front by the Norwegian agitation, and therefore deserves its separate explanation. This said that the Swedish government on the 25:th April had emphatically refused to resume negotiations, with the dissolution of the union as an alternative, in case unity on the new forms of the union could not be arrived at, and on this account, from Norway's side they have tried to cast the blame on Sweden for the revolution of June 7:th under the pretext that Sweden had already refused settlement by negotiation. What are the real conditions?

In the Norwegian Government's proposal of the 17:th April negotiations are firmly _refused_, before the Consular question has been settled.

Therefore Norway has never proposed negotiations respecting the situation which followed upon the 27:th May, when the King exercised his veto against the Consular law. Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the Norwegian government's wording of the _presuppositions_ for an eventual negotiation. It should be carried on _on an entirely free basis with full recognition of the Sovereignty of each country without any reservation or restriction whatever_, and among other matters, it was stipulated, that, if the negotiations fell through, each Kingdom should be able to decide, of its own accord, the future form of its national existence. Thus the Swedish government was to accept in advance the Norwegian Radicals legal conception of the Union, driven, to it by the contingency that if Norway did not get her will in the matter, she would break out, on her own accord, of the Union. It is manifestly against this _method_ of negotiating matters, with its legal grounds and its premature threat to rupture the Union on Norway's side, that the Swedish Prime Minister appeals, when he speaks of a presupposition for negotiations on the Norwegian side as incompatible with the Union and the Act of Union.

The Prime Minister can never have intended to contest the absurdity, that the Union cannot legally be dissolved, so that it was not on that account that he refused to negotiate.

But the Norwegian Cabinet hastened, craftily, to construe the contents af the Prime Minister's speech, by maintaining that there was a possibility for dissolving the Union[63:1]. Of all the cunning devices, the object of which has been, on Norway's side, cowardly to cast the blame on Sweden, this has been one of the most disgusting, so much the more so as the majority of the Storthing itself opposed Mr HAGERUP'S proposal, and this was certainly not previous to, nor after the Council of the 25:th April, when it was seriously proposed, that a treaty for the dissolution of the Union should be drawn up, in the event of the King exercising his veto; the tactics that were adopted on 7:th June were made up a long time beforehand.--

On the 20:th June the Diet a.s.sembled.

FOOTNOTES:

[47:1] It must be remembered that in reality Norway had an almost entirely equal influence in the joint Consular service, as questions refering to Consular matters were decided in a joint Cabinet, and a Norwegian government department conducted the mercantile part of affairs.