The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis Part 4

The accusations implied in the mildest form that the att.i.tude of the Swedish government had caused the break down in the negotiations. To this it must be first pointed out, that the side which first formulated its demands as an ultimatum formally bears the responsibility. Formally, therfore, the Norwegian government is unquestionably the responsible party, so much the more so, that not even after the Norwegian Ultimatum, did the Swedish government maintain its standpoint as being absolutely inflexible. It must also be observed that the first Norwegian proposition in May 1904, in fact, propounded the essentials contained in the Ultimatum. It was certainly held to be only the grounds for further negotiations, but it was proclaimed afterwards on the Norwegian side, that the Norwegian Cabinet had found it possible that divergencies in the form and contents of the law, would be limited to a very slight number of points of minor importance.

The formal responsibility for the breaking off of the negotiations may now, on the whole, be considered of slight importance. It is interesting only on the grounds that it ill.u.s.trates the Norwegian method of negotiating, which all but commences with the ultimatum, for it explains to a great extent the difficulties of the opposite party in gaining their lawful rights.

The accusations on the Norwegian side, of course, imply, that the Swedish government, in making unreasonable conditions, had practically caused the breaking off of the negotiations, and even wished to bring about that result. As regards the former, an impartial examination of the Swedish final proposal is the best refutation. And as regards the latter, it may a.s.suredly be affirmed, that there was no want of good will, on the part of Sweden, to come to a good understanding on the point, the last letter on the question written by Sweden is a sufficient proof of this. But the government could not reasonably be expected to go further in granting concessions.

It was indisputably clear to the Norwegian government, that they could not make greater concessions. During the proceeding of the negotiations it had become intimately acquainted with the opinions in Norwegian political circles, and it knew that if it went further, it would risk a defeat in the Storthing. But with equal right, it behoved the Swedish government to take into consideration the prospects of getting the proposal approved of by the Swedish Diet, so much the more so, as the Swedish government, in respect to this question, occupied a more insecure position than the Norwegian. The Norwegian government was supported in the Storthing by a majority on the side of the negotiations. The Swedish government had no support at all. The Diet had certainly not insisted on the breaking off of the negotiations, but it firmly maintained its old standpoint, that the Consular question should be solved in conjunction with the Foreign Minister question. It must therefore be of importance to the Swedish government, to have the proposition worded in such a way that it would remove the doubts of the Diet regarding an isolated solution of the Consular question. In the matter of the immutability of the identical laws, it had sought an effectual guarantee that the independent Consular office would not disloyally--when the time was ripe for it--be provided by Norway with its own Minister for Foreign affairs. This question had been shirked by Norway. It was therefore necessary to cling to other guarantees, in order, if possible, to prevent the Norwegian Consular Office from drifting away from under the direction of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and thus, paving the way by degrees to its original goal--the breaking op of the joint administration for Foreign affairs. It is in this light that his Excellency BOSTRoM'S demands ought undoubtedly to be seen.

It may in short be said: If during the negotiations the Norwegian government was bound by Norwegian Union-political traditions, the Swedish government had the same right to refer to its attachment to Swedish Union-political traditions. And, it must be added: That if any of the Swedish conditions, which the Norwegian government pointed out, were an expression for a suspicion of Norway's implicit loyalty in conducting its own Consular affairs, _it was Norwegian traditional Radical Policy from the beginning of 1890 which cast its shadow before it_. And that the old Norwegian Radical traditions had to be taken into account was prowed by the number and length of the discussions in the Storthing, which were dinned into the ears of the negotiators, during the whole period of the negotiations. That even Mr MICHELSEN, one of the parties to the negotiations on the Norwegian government side, in a debate at the Storthing, during the Spring 1904, cast friendly glances on the old lines, showed plainly how little they had forgotten the old talk of taking matters into their own hands.

[Sidenote: _The question as to whether the Swedish government had broken the covenant of the Communique._]

But the Norwegian accusations were not limited to the negotiators'

(especially Mr BOSTRoM'S) bringing about the breaking off of the negotiations by their unreasonable demands. They went further; it was loudly proclaimed that the Swedish government had not kept their word, had broken their agreement etc. etc., and, when all of a sudden Sweden became identical with the government of Sweden she was pathetically pointed at as untrustworthy etc. etc. The amount of moral indignation contained in these Norwegian accusations has plainly been made manifest by late events. Their object--to throw on Sweden the responsibility of plans that were designed to be executed in Norway--was too transparent, but just on that account they must be explained, in order that the responsibility of Sweden for what happened in Norway, may appear in its true light.

The most naive accusations of having broken their agreement, are based on the supposition that the Swedish government was bound by the Communique to bring the negotiations to a definite conclusion, which means about the same as, that Sweden had beforehand promised to accept the Norwegian demands which in future would be presented by the Norwegian side. This supposition requires no serious reflection, the Communique naturally implying only a promise _to try_ to come to a conclusion that would be satisfactory to both parties. This system of reasoning is, however, typical of Norwegian politics all through. It is ill.u.s.trated in one way by the Norwegian government's peculiar way of practically commencing negotiations with an Ultimatum, and it has been characterised, in a very amusing manner, by professor TRYGGER in a debate in the First Chamber of the Swedish Diet, immediately after the publishing of the Communique.

Norwegians, he said, are very fond of negotiations. I have sat with them in the Union Committee, for three years, and they have always taken great pleasure in negotiating with us, so long as we acceded to their demands.

Far more serious is the accusation that the Swedish government had violated the grounds of the negotiations by exceeding the terms of the Communique[41:1]. It has evidently been privately expressed by the negotiating party in Norway, during the latter stage of the negotiations, and it was indirectly referred to by Prime Minister HAGERUP when he announced in the Storthing, that the negotiations were broken off. The Swedish government contradicted it, however, in their last letter, and offered to modify their proposition if it were proved that it exceeded the terms of the Communique. But the Norwegian government failed to produce the proofs, they preferring to cut off negotiations.

What the Norwegians point out over and over again is the provision of the Communique that the Consuls of each Kingdom shall be under the authority of the country to which they belong, which matter the country concerned shall decide. Against this, it has been mentioned, is opposed the Swedish government's evident plans to arrange a hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This decision, in itself, undoubtedly seems to speak for the Norwegian notion of the affair. But an honest method of interpretation tries to see individual particles in the light of their relation to the whole matter.

Now, on the contents of the identical laws, the Communique confirms among other things that they shall give guarantee that the Consuls do not exceed the proper limits of their occupation. What guarantee? The Norwegian negotiators, who scarcely paid any attention to this provision in their proposition, are said to have maintained verbally, that the best guarantee was the control exercised over the Consuls by the Norwegian Consular Office. But to this the Swedish government may justly object: that was not the kind of guarantee intended by the Communique, as this had nothing to do with the internal relations between the Norwegian consuls and the Norwegian Consular service. The guarantee which the Communique mentions, can refer to nothing but the control to be exercised by the Foreign Minister and Amba.s.sadors over the Consuls.

If this interpretation is acknowledged as correct--and it is difficult to find any other--it is plain that the presupposition cited by the Norwegians only referred to _normal_ conditions and that it did not exclude in exceptional cases--as for instance, when Consular affairs were in any way connected with the Diplomatic Office--a hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Consuls. Conclusive for the correctness of this interpretation, as represented by the Swedish government, _is the approval the Norwegian government itself gave this interpretation_ by conceding that the Foreign Minister might give direct orders to the Norwegian Consuls, which, in certain cases, implied a hierarchal relationship between the Foreign Minister and the Norwegian Consuls. This admission on the Norwegian side must not be regarded as a concession _beyond_ the demands of the Communique. It had already been made before the Communique was compiled, and must therefore absolutely be included in the frame of the Communique. The so much-disputed claims of Sweden imply nothing but an extension of the above hierarchal exceptional conditions, especially in an disciplinary sense, and are therefore within the frame of the Communique.

In close connection with the Norwegian accusations against Sweden for breach of faith, are the Norwegian governments insinuations that the Swedish government, by its later shaped demands, had strayed from the agreement which had previously been decided on, both by the Swedish and Norwegian sides. The Norwegian government especially refers to the preliminary agreements, which, under necessary reservations, had been made in the negotiations between the delegates of the two Cabinets, before the Communique existed.

It is clear that these accusations especially touched matters in the negotiations, of which outsiders cannot, of course, form a quite distinct opinion. Meanwhile it would not be impossible to gain an idea of the breadth of the case on the grounds of the statements of the Cabinets, the references in the papers, and the debates in the Swedish Diet and the Norwegian Storthing.

The matter that first demands our attention is the communication of the Swedish Cabinet dated Jan. 30:th 1905, in which it is distinctly declared that, when the Norwegian Cabinet had a.s.sumed that its proposition of the 28:th May 1904 would, without any alteration worth mentioning, be accepted by the Swedish Cabinet it would find no support from admissions either of the Swedish Cabinet or its delegates. Now, there were hardly any negotiations between the governments concerning the contents of the Consular laws till the time when the first definite Norwegian proposition was presented. The agreements which the Norwegian Cabinet considers would more nearly refer to the negotiations before the origin of the Communique, to the feigned conclusions of which the Norwegian government tried to attach the greatest importance. What was the character of these negotiations in relation to the contents of the proposed laws? They were in reality free discussions, during which the contents of the deliberations of the Consular Committee were inquired into. They were regarded by the negotiators themselves as a preliminary, as the first preparatory step to negotiations, and that the results of many points were indistinct, is evident, as the Swedish Cabinet gave to understand that, on one or two occasions before the origin of the Communique, fresh negotiations were proposed, but in vain.

The preliminary act of agreement to which the Norwegian Council referred, seems to have involved one or two particular points to which they firmly adhered, especially the one concerning the power of the Foreign Minister to give direct orders to the Consuls: in all the rest, they confined themselves to a general impression that there was a prospect of their agreeing. According to the authenticated a.s.sertion of the Swedish Cabinet with respect to the protocol, the materially new claims as the Norwegian Cabinet styled them, had been touched upon in their debates, though not even a preliminary agreement had been decided on, either with respect to them or any of the other points of the question. It is a generally understood fact, not even disputed on the Norwegian side, that his Excellency BOSTRoM brought forward casually several of the questions which afterwards raised so many disputes, and reserved to himself the right, later on, to shape his opinion on points to which be made objections. After first dealing with the deliberations of the Consular Committee, they proceeded to debate on the terms of the agreement, and during this last stage of the negotiations the contents of the intended laws were discussed only by special delegates from the two Cabinets[45:1].

Mr LAGERHEIM was uncontradicted by the Norwegian side when he explained in the Swedish Diet that in all these preliminary negotiations respecting the contents of the laws, matters concerning them, must be subjected to further examination of a very minute and exhaustive nature.

According to just reasoning, it is therefore rather audacious of the Norwegian side to cite these preliminary negotiations, to which they also add a decided admission on the part of Sweden, and on which they build the accusations against the Swedish government, and especially Mr BOSTRoM of breach of agreement[45:2].

With reference to the connection of these negotiations with the Communique and its interpretation, it is firstly clear that neither the Swedish nor the Norwegian government had from the first intended by the Communique to cut off the possibility of pursuing, from different quarters, the points on which they had not expressed themselves to be in unity. And secondly, it is plain that by the same Communique it was not intended to cut off the possibility of advancing claims which during these very formless negotiations had not been brought forward, so long as the general decisions of the Communique, sensibly interpreted, were observed.

To this may be added one important circ.u.mstance. It is manifest that if it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before the existence of the Communique, it was on account of the binding nature of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view, that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communique, these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was ent.i.tled to exact too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points.

Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin air.

FOOTNOTES:

[41:1] NANSEN (page 76): The Swedish draft contained a number of demands quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and object of the negotiations.

[45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as quite preliminary.

[45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C.

BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing.

VI.

[Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular negotiations._]

The breaking off of the Consular negotiations undoubtedly put Norwegian politicians into a very difficult situation. Thanks to the close connection between the Union policy and the internal party disputes in Norway, a popular interest has arisen for Union Politics which in comparison with the realities disputed over, may be regarded as extremely abnormal[47:1]. With the lack of consideration which in critical moments distinguishes a similarly excited state on the people's part, it was to be expected that the issue of the negotiations on the Consular question would rouse their pa.s.sions

It can hardly be said that Norwegian politics stood the trial in the situation. To a Norwegian, that which followed may appear as a powerful and magnificent achievement. Outsiders can content themselves by stating that _the high-flown Radical politics of the last 20 years now bear their fruit_.

In these days much is said of necessity in the development of events.

Necessity, it is said, has been stronger than the wishes of individuals. To those who in any degree believe in personal influence and personal responsibility, and not only the _needs_ in the progress of history, it may be of interest to observe how those who now advance to the front in Norway--MICHELSEN, LoVLAND, BERNER, ARCTANDER--belong to the old ranks of radicals from the beginning of 1890. Scarcely any leading men have more strongly emphasized the importance of _creating_ public opinion than the Norwegian radical leaders, and few, with regard to this, have better conformed their conduct to their views. The road to do so these men pointed out was now followed at an unchecked pace. The Norwegian radical policy had reached a climax.

The following events in Norway point decidedly to an energetic and designing leadership organised from the beginning. It may be left unsaid how far back the plans that where brought to light after the foundering of the Consular question, were in existence. That they had already been discussed long before that period can hardly be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that just in reference to these plans, strong efforts had been set at work on the Norwegian side to get the Consular negotiations broken off[47:2]. And it is an indisputable fact that those men of action in Norway had scarcely dared to take the step, if the ever threatening danger in the east had not been allayed for a time; the real importance of the Union to which they had for some years been alive, could be laid to rest.

That the old traditions of the radicals now took the most prominent place became manifest in innumerable ways. One symtom of this, was the systematic labour of exciting opinions against Sweden. The orgies of Swedish hatred and national persecution, which in Christiania were held in the Spring of 1905, far outstepped the limits of decency which even a Norwegian ought to feel. The coa.r.s.est invectives were flung against the government and people of Sweden. All Europe rang with accusations of breach of agreement, ambitions for the supremacy spread from Christiania.

A few sensible and intelligent Norwegians, who really comprehended that the Swedish government's claims had legal grounds, and were not meant as an insult to Norway, made themselves heard[48:1] in the beginning, but their voices were soon silenced in the tumultuons confusion that reigned.

In Norway feelings were excited, which more than ever gave Norwegian opinion a tone of unreasonableness.

Another symptom was the distinctness with which the Union separation shone as the goal. This was shown in the Cabinet meeting by the very tactless, but very Norwegian expressions when the break-down of the negotiations was officially announced. The old King was pleased to express his hearty wishes, that the two Kingdoms which could soon celebrate the centenary of their Union, would never let any differences of opinion break their bonds, as it was the safest security for the independency, safety and happiness of the Scandinavian country and its two peoples. To this, the Norwegian Cabinet replied that they had taken the liberty in all humble submission to dissuade His Majesty from making this speech[48:2].

A third symptom, and the one most significant of the spirit that now dominated Norwegian politics was the road that they were soon unanimous on taking. One cannot help feeling that it is a punishment for old sins, that when Norway has to take a decisive step, and goes from words to actions, it is not done openly and with honest intent. Norway does not choose the straight road, it chooses winding crooked paths, which the peculiar advocacy of Norwegian politicians long ago staked out. Norway's breaking out of the Union is not a manly act committed under a sense of personal responsibility, it is a miserable judicial process, in which Norway, at the same time party to and self made judge in the case, artfully tries to establish the guilt of their opponents--Sweden and the Union King--in order to throw the burden of responsibility on them.

[Sidenote: _The question of resuming negotiations._]

In the Cabinet meeting held on Feb. 7:th 1905[49:1] the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs, Count GYLDENSTOLPE, pointed out that the chief cause of the wrecking of the negotiations was, that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs was supposed still to be at the head of the Foreign policy of the Union, and he advocated the desirability of resuming negotiations on this phase of the Union problem. The Minister for Foreign affairs only expressed what had in fact been the wish of the Swedish side all along, and what especially the Swedish negotiators during the first stage of the negotiations, had urgently insisted on. The opinion that the break down of the Consular negotiations ought to be immediate cause of the renewal of negotiations which were also to include the question of Foreign Administration, seemed at first to be regarded with favour from the Norwegian side. The majority of the Norwegian government led by Mr HAGERUP shared this opinion, though with one reservation. Evidently under the influence of the general feelings in Norway, Mr HAGERUP considered that if fresh negotiations respecting a revision of the Act of Union led to no results, the old state of things could not possibly be allowed to continue, but by voluntary agreements they must instead try to obtain more independent bases for the Co-operation of the two Nations, in other words, prepare for the disssolution of the Union. In this way, said he, it will be possible to establish a peaceful and honorable Union Treaty. This was the programme he proposed in the Storting when he announced the termination of the negotiations, and he further developed it when he resigned in March.

A policy on those lines would at least have been open and honest, and even if the results had brought about the rupture of the Union, it would not have roused strong ill-will; it would, in fact, have preserved the possibility of establishing conditions of Co-operation on more independent lines. Though Sweden which, in the eyes of all Europe, was responsible for the Union, could never take the _initiative_ in the matter of dissolving the Union, a Norwegian proposal in the terms presented by Mr HAGERUP had certainly not been refused without further consideration[50:1].

But it soon appeared that Mr HAGERUP'S programme was not likely to be favourably received in Norway. Immediately after the announcement of the termination of the negotiations, the Storthing had summoned a so called Special Committee to examine the conditions of the Union. The members of this Committee soon went against the majority of the government, and therefore, when the State Secretaries MICHELSEN and SCHoNING at the end of February protested against Mr HAGERUP'S proceeding, in sending in his resignation, a complete crisis within the Cabinet was reached.

The king had, meanwhile, immediately after the termination of the negotiations, resigned the government to the Crown Prince in the capacity of Regent. After the Crown Prince Regent had conferred with the leading politicians in Christiania, he made known his personal opinion on the matter in a doc.u.ment adressed to the President of the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing[50:2] He earnestly expresses his conviction that the strength and prosperity of the two Kingdoms lies in the preservation of the Union. He emphatically declared that the Union was not the chief object for the _dynasty_, but it ought to be so to _the two peoples_ concerned. He expressed warnings against the dissolution of the Union, and urged that fresh negotiations, on a broader basis, should be entered into for the settlement of all matters concerning the Union.

The persuasive tone of this doc.u.ment could not fail to make an effect, but the Norwegian press tried hard to explain away the contents by informing the public of their wonderful discovery, that the doc.u.ment was of no Const.i.tutional importance, and shrewdly trying to prove that the Crown Prince had no legal right to make known his opinion in that manner[51:1].

Those who now held the reins in Norway, had to carry out their plans before the worked up excitement cooled down. Therfore the way of the negotiations was so dangerous. The Crown Prince found it necessary to consent to a change of Ministry. Mr MICHELSEN, who was pointed out as the man equal to the situation, was summoned, also a so called mixed Cabinet consisting of Ministers of different parties; the two Prime Ministers, however, Mr MICHELSEN und Mr LoVLAND, were rank radicals. In the beginning of March the Special Committee appointed by the Storthing were able preliminarily to communicate the plan to be followed; it was not a novel one, it was the old method from the beginning of the nineties to take matters, especially those relating to the Consular service, into their own hands.

In the middle of March the Crown Prince returned to Stockholm, and here twelve members of the Diet were immediately summoned, according to decrees in the government regulations, in order to confer with the Crown Prince Regent on the matter.

On the 5th April the Crown Prince, as Regent, dictated a proposal in the joint Cabinet[51:2] that the two governments should immediately open negotiations in view of the settlement of all matters concerning the Union on the basis of the programme for a mutual Minister for Foreign affairs and separate Consular services. He, at the same time, declared himself willing to accept other proposals for the settlement of the matter so long as the joint control of Foreign affairs was allowed to remain undisturbed, as that was an indispensable guarantee for the continuance of the Union[52:1].

On the publication of the Crown Prince-Regent's proposal, the Prime Minister BOSTRoM, against whom the wrath of the Norwegians had especially been directed, resigned his office, which was immediately placed in the hands of State Secretary RAMSTEDT. The Crown Prince's proposal was immediately unanimously adopted on motions from the leading men in both Chambers of the Diet[52:2].

_In this we thus find a clear and unevasive offer from Sweden to Norway, for the establisment of full equality within the Union, and that too in terms to which Sweden would never have consented but a few years back_[52:3].