The Story of the "9th King's" in France Part 5

Up on the slope was a line hard pressed By bullets and sh.e.l.ls and relentless strain, An enemy ma.s.sing behind the crest And a trench that crumbled in fire and rain.

Sleepless, shelterless, night and day, Drenched and weary and sniped and sh.e.l.led, The word was given that come what may The line must hold, and the line was held.

But all who pa.s.s to the crumbling trench Must go in the spirit that games with fate, With feet that stumble and teeth that clench Over the valley of h.e.l.l and hate.

Over the knees in water and mud, Up to the waist if you miss the track, You shall know your path by the trail of blood, And silent figures shall guide you back.

Down in the valley the waters flow, You may jump the brook with an easy stride, They cross it in silence, they who know What happened that day upon either side.

In the voice of the brook are their comrades' tones, In the summer's breeze they shall feel their breath, For under the gra.s.s we have laid their bones, Here in the Vale of the Shadow of Death.[A]

[Footnote A: Copied by permission from "Dawn and Other Poems" by Lieut.-Colonel E. G.o.dfrey h.o.a.re, D.S.O. Publishers: Erskine Macdonald, Limited.]

The Battalion was relieved on the night of the second-third, and the men drifted down in small parties through the mud to Potijze. Some hours were spent here, during which several casualties took place, as the enemy subjected the area to the fire of 8-inch sh.e.l.ls. Towards evening the men were told to rendezvous at Vlamertinghe. There was no need to pay much attention to the means of getting there. That could be left to the men themselves. Everyone was ready to give them a lift, for their muddy appearance showed that they had just been in the fight, and consequently practically all arrived in motor lorries. At Vlamertinghe, rum was issued and later all embussed for the Watou area, which they reached shortly after midnight. After debussing there was a short march to billets. For some even this was too much, and about thirty were unable to walk, and had to be sent to hospital. The remaining men were put into billets, and at 4-30 a.m. the officers sat down to dinner, the first proper meal they had had for several days. Afterwards they lay down to sleep for six or seven hours.

What had been done by the Battalion during the last few days, at the commencement of the struggle for Pa.s.schendaele, was then perhaps the greatest achievement the Battalion had accomplished. Undoubtedly it had done well, and the following message was received from the Brigade Commander:--

To Officer Commanding, 9th King's Liverpool Regt.

Will you please congratulate all ranks of your Battalion on the great gallantry they displayed during the recent operations? They not only captured all their objectives, but also helped other troops to capture theirs. The magnificent way in which they captured the position and held it against all counter-attacks makes me very proud to have such a Battalion in my Brigade.

L. BOYD MOSS, Brigadier General, 165th Brigade.

4th August, 1917.

On the 6th August the Battalion was taken by train to Audruicq, and billeted near by in a hamlet called Blanc Pignon, where the next six weeks were spent. The troops were well housed in this place, which was very clean in comparison with the other villages in which the Battalion sojourned from time to time. Each man was given a new suit, deficiencies in kit were made up, and the companies soon began to resume their normal appearance. Leave opened, and it was possible for those who wished to have day trips to Calais, and one or two of the more fortunate managed to get seaside leave at Paris Plage or Wimereux. The time spent at Blanc Pignon pa.s.sed without special incident, except that one night there was a bombing raid by which the Germans obviously hoped to blow up the ammunition dump which was in close proximity to the billets. Fortunately, although many were dropped, not one of the bombs was effective enough to explode the ammunition. During the raid a large Gotha aeroplane was caught in the beam of one of the searchlights, and this was the first occasion the men saw this particular type of machine.

Despite the training the men had undergone before the battle, there was a good deal of time devoted to field work, as in view of the experience gained and the lessons learned in the recent attack new tactics had to be evolved. Until the Third Battle of Ypres, the chief obstacles to the advance of the British had been the German wire entanglements. The fuses on the British sh.e.l.ls had always permitted the sh.e.l.ls to bury themselves to some extent before exploding. This meant that a crater was formed, and though the enemy wire in the immediate vicinity of the crater would be destroyed, the obstacle effect of the whole entanglement remained almost in its entirety. A new fuse which was known as No. 106 was introduced in 1917, by means of which the sh.e.l.ls would explode instantaneously on impact, and the splinters would destroy the wire over a much bigger area than had formerly been the case. The artillery could now ensure the proper cutting of the enemy wire entanglements, and it had been antic.i.p.ated that in the attack of the 31st July the troops would not encounter serious obstacles in the way of wire entanglements, particularly as they were to be supported by tanks. It is true the artillery had cut the wire, but several units had nevertheless been held up. The Germans had antic.i.p.ated to some extent the British methods of attack and invented a system of defence to meet it.

The Commander of the Fourth German Army which was defending the Ypres sector, Infantry General Sixt von Arnim, was a commander of high standing, inasmuch as the British Higher Command had thought fit to publish some observations of his on the Somme Battle. In the Ypres sector he had adopted the plan of holding the forward zone with few troops well disposed in depth, with strong reserves in rear which could be used for an immediate counter-attack before the British could consolidate any positions they had won. His advanced troops were carefully echeloned in fortified farms, each strongly concreted and armed with several machine guns. The advantage of this scheme was that it afforded few definite targets to the British artillery, and gave every opportunity to the Germans to ambush and enfilade advancing British infantry. Tanks were of little avail against these block-houses, which in reality formed a belt of small fortresses which could only be overpowered one by one. At any rate they could easily break up the force of an attack, and inflict a large number of casualties at a small loss. The reserves could then be used to counter-attack the British before they had properly put the positions won into a state of defence. Such a method of defence was indeed a difficult obstacle to the advance, and its efficacy had been learnt at great cost in the last fight. This system of defence meant that new tactics had to be evolved to combat such a scheme. The German method of defence was explained in printed sheets and the explanations were retailed to the men.

In the numerous tactical schemes and attack practices that took place the men were taught to encircle enemy strong points rapidly and close in on them. These exercises were supervised by the Divisional Commander in person.

While in this area another Divisional horse show took place, the third to which the Battalion had sent entries. It was rather a good show, and there was some very fine jumping, in which Belgian cavalry officers took part.

The Battalion secured two first prizes for a water cart and limbered wagon, two second prizes and two third prizes. It obtained the third place in the Division for the total number of marks gained.

All good times come to an end and the 14th September was the Battalion's last day at Blanc Pignon. The occasion was marked by great festivities, and most of the men apparently consumed large quant.i.ties of beer. For this they could not be blamed as they were going into action, and might never survive to indulge so freely again. The next day the Battalion moved by train to Vlamertinghe, where the men bivouacked in the open, having for shelter large bivouac sheets.

The orders were that surplus personnel had to be left here, and all the officers who had taken part in the Battle of the 31st July were, with one exception, left behind. On the 17th the Battalion moved up from Vlamertinghe to Ypres, turned left at the Water Tower, skirted the Plaine d'Amour and proceeded along No. 5 Track to the neighbourhood of Warwick Farm. The next day the Battalion headquarters and two companies moved up to Bank Farm and took over the front sh.e.l.l crater position. Though two big attacks had taken place since the Battalion was last in this area, the front line was approximately in the same place as when the Battalion had left it in the early days of August. A fortified farm called Somme had been captured, and that was about all. Hill 35 was still in possession of the enemy. The Battalion with its sister regiments in the Brigade was to succeed where others had failed.

The Battalion held the sh.e.l.l crater position from the evening of the 18th, and it was obvious that the enemy expected an attack as he searched the whole area with heavy artillery fire at dawn on the 19th.

The two remaining companies moved up after nightfall on the 19th. It commenced to rain and the difficulties of placing the men in their proper places were great. The night was black and there was nothing by which one could locate oneself. After several hours a tape was placed along the line of sh.e.l.l craters to serve as a jumping off mark along which the men were duly aligned.

The _role_ of the Battalion was to capture Hill 35 and Gallipoli, which was a strongly fortified centre of resistance in such a position, situated on rising ground, that it commanded a large area to the north. After its capture other units in the Brigade were to pa.s.s through the Battalion and continue the attack. The distance of the attack by the Battalion was from four to five hundred yards, and it was to be made in four waves, a company to each wave. It was antic.i.p.ated that though the position might be fairly easily captured the enemy would make a desperate effort to dislodge the attackers.

The attack was evidently antic.i.p.ated, as the enemy sh.e.l.l fire for a few minutes before zero was particularly heavy. Meanwhile the British artillery maintained a silence in which the gunners were able to prepare for the impending barrage. Zero was at 5-40 a.m., and at that time suddenly there opened an enormous crescendo of fire from the British guns, together with a machine gun barrage, which latter some attributed erroneously to the enemy. At this time it was fairly light, and one could see from a hundred and fifty to two hundred yards, quite light enough to enable the German machine gunners to inflict many casualties.

Owing to the fact that the men had to jump off from sh.e.l.l craters, and many were anxious to advance quickly so as to evade the enemy sh.e.l.l fire, and that there was some mixing of units, the waves were somewhat confused.

The German artillery was ready and intensified its fire. The enemy machine gunners opened fire at once and the attackers began to fall almost as soon as the attack was commenced.

On the right of Hill 35 the Germans had manned a derelict tank and could not be dislodged. Even though surrounded they did not surrender for some time. The men, however, pressed gallantly forward and eventually got as far as Gallipoli Farm. The Germans here were very stout hearted and refused to surrender. One had a machine gun on top of a concrete dugout and, for some reason or other, perhaps excitement, the men could not bring him down. Following the brilliant example of one of the company commanders, the men eventually closed in and after a fierce hand to hand encounter, in which bomb and bayonet were freely used, the place fell.

On Hill 35 a 90 m.m. field gun of an old pattern manufactured by Krupps was captured, and altogether eight heavy and light machine guns fell into the hands of the Battalion. About forty prisoners were taken belonging chiefly to the 2nd Reserve Division of the Prussian Guards. The enemy machine guns were soon turned round and got into action against the Germans by those of the men who understood their use.

Towards 5-30 p.m. in the evening the enemy opened fire with a heavy barrage of all calibres. The fire was particularly intense at Gallipoli Farm, where the company commander had himself relieved the sentry on look-out at his headquarters, until he was blown almost senseless by the violence of the concussion of a sh.e.l.l which burst almost on top of him.

Afterwards the Germans advanced, but they were seen by the men and repulsed by machine gun fire. A party of Germans was observed carrying a stretcher and a white flag. It was a favourite device of the enemy to pretend that they were carrying a stretcher when they were actually carrying a machine gun, and in consequence this particular party was soon dispersed.

Towards dark on the 21st the enemy put down another heavy barrage on the line of Somme Farm. He was apparently delivering another counter-attack.

After it had been kept up some time great consternation prevailed at Battalion headquarters. No word had been received from the troops in front. Perhaps the enemy had captured the front positions, and that the line was lost. The barrage was still intense, and anyone who should dare to advance through it would expect to meet with almost certain death. Yet some one had to go to ascertain if all was well or ill. The Commanding Officer made arrangements to burn all papers and told everyone they must fight to the last where they stood. The Second in Command ultimately managed to get to Somme Farm and came back with the information that all was well, which was of inestimable worth, for had the British barrage lines been withdrawn, as had been suggested, the troops in front would all have been sacrificed.

On the 22nd September the Battalion was relieved. The greatest care was taken to get the captured machine guns that were not needed for the defence back to the transport lines. They were collected at Battalion headquarters and carefully escorted to the neighbourhood of the old British front line near Potijze, where they were met by the transport officer, and duly delivered to Divisional headquarters.

Having been relieved the men made their way back in small parties to Vlamertinghe, where the night was spent. The next day the Battalion moved by train to a camp by Watou. Two or three days were spent here, and then the Battalion detrained to go down south to join General Byng's Third Army.

LEMPIRE.

The train journey lasted all day and the Battalion detrained at Bapaume, and by a night march on a bright moonlight night marched to a Nissen hut camp between Barastre and Haplincourt, where it sojourned for a few days.

During this time a few of the non-commissioned officers were able to visit the Somme battlefield, and locate a few of the graves of the men who had fallen a little over twelve months ago. A day's march on the 1st October brought the Battalion to Aizecourt-le-Bas, and after a night's rest it proceeded to St. Emilie, where the men were billeted amid the ruins of what had formerly been a sugar factory. During the march it was made plainly evident to all with what thoroughness the work of destruction had been carried out by the Germans. The villages were not merely in ruins.

Every house and every room had been rendered useless as a billet or shelter of any kind. The cellars had been filled with stones or refuse, so that even these were of no use. The trees had all been wantonly destroyed. Even small fruit trees of only a few years' growth did not escape the axe. The wells had all been blown in, and in many cases they were poisoned as well. The churches were treated exactly the same as the houses. The whole region was desolate. There were no civilian inhabitants, and soldiers were the only occupants of this wilderness.

After a few days in the Sugar Factory the Battalion moved to the forward positions at Lempire. This sector was very different from any sector the Battalion had occupied. There was no trench system comprising front and support trenches. The front was held by means of isolated posts occupied by a platoon or a company as the case might be, and these posts were linked up by means of communication trenches, so that they could be visited. There being little artillery on either side, the whole sector was very quiet, and as the lines were far apart there was little sniping.

The Battalion did one tour in Cat, Fleeceall and Grafton Posts in front of Lempire, and then moved up to the Ossus sector. Though the Germans had destroyed all buildings behind the British line, the buildings behind the German lines were intact, and the men experienced the unpleasant sight of the comfortable chateaux and houses in which the German troops were billeted when they themselves were very badly off in this respect.

Three companies had been in the front in the Lempire position, and as three companies were necessary to take over the Ossus sector, one company had to do two successive tours. It was a poor relief to have to move from one portion of the front line to another, especially as this company had only one subaltern. The sector held by the Battalion was roughly 2,000 yards, and consequently the three front companies each had from six to seven hundred yards. The trench strength of the companies was somewhere between eighty and ninety, the numbers not having been made up after the Ypres casualties, and consequently there was a great amount of work for everyone to do.

On the 18th the Battalion moved to reserve at Vaughan's Bank by Epehy, from whence on the 22nd it moved into reserve at Tincourt. The American Railway Engineers had constructed a light railway from Epehy to Tincourt, and they expressed their readiness to convey the Battalion there by rail.

Their offer was gladly accepted, and the Battalion duly arrived at the station and entrained. There was a slight incline to commence and the numbers that arrived exceeded the haulage capacity of the only serviceable locomotive at the station, and consequently no progress was made. As there was no telegraph a message had to be sent on foot for another engine, which came along after a long wait, and eventually a start was made. The couplings were bad and the train soon broke into three portions. As the way was downhill the various sections glided down to the next station independently. Here there was another train and a loop line, and it also happened that one train was too long for the loop. Nothing daunted, the railway engineers indulged in a considerable amount of shunting, and decided to take a portion of the waiting train back with the troop train.

All went well until the next incline was reached. There was a great strain on the engine, but eventually after charging the hill three or four times, accompanied by much racing of engines and skidding of wheels, the top was reached, and the Battalion got to Tincourt having taken on the journey twice the time it would have taken to march the distance.

At Tincourt a pleasant week was spent, after which the Battalion returned to the Birdcage sector, the portion of which immediately in front of Eagle Quarry was the scene of much minenwerfer activity.

THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI.

No particularly arduous duty was a.s.signed to the Battalion in connection with the operations on the 20th November. To divert the attention of the enemy from other troops who were attacking the Knoll, a few hundred yards on the right, the Battalion was ordered to place a dummy tank and dummy men out in no man's land in front of the vicinity of the Birdcage, and shortly after zero these were put in operation by means of wires.

Naturally the Battalion came in for a good deal of the retaliatory fire of the enemy, but few casualties took place. Incidentally the enemy claimed to have repulsed an attack on this front, from which it follows that the dummies had been efficacious.

The Germans had been driven back by the surprise attack of the British, and Cambrai was nearly reached. The fighting died down in a few days, but on the 30th Cavalry General von der Marwitz delivered his counter-attack.

He selected not the apex of the salient that had been driven into the German line, but the portion of the line to the south of it, which was so weakly held. On the morning of the 30th the Battalion was in support to the 165th Brigade in some dugouts in Lempire.

A warning had been received during the course of the night that an enemy attack was imminent, and the order was given to "stand to" well before dawn. At "stand to" all was perfectly quiet. The expected attack had not developed. The men stood down and a normal day was antic.i.p.ated. At breakfast time there sounded a heavy barrage a mile or two to the north, and afterwards sh.e.l.ls began to fall in the village. Large gas sh.e.l.ls were creating a cloud near by, and a rumour came that the Germans had broken through at the Birdcage. The troops had such confidence in the other battalions in the Brigade that the rumour was not believed. Later a message came from Headquarters that the line further north had broken.

Lempire must be held at all costs, and the Battalion was ordered to dig a line running east and west on the high ground to the north of the village, so as to command the ground as far as Holt's Bank. This was then in the possession of the Germans, who were within a few hundred yards of Epehy, and if this latter place had fallen the Battalion would have been in great danger of being surrounded. The men dug in under sh.e.l.l fire, and in full view of the enemy, while a large squadron of enemy aeroplanes circled overhead, and turned their machine guns on the men as they were digging.

Fortunately few casualties were incurred. In the afternoon one company was sent to form a defensive flank at Priel Bank, and another to reinforce the 6th Liverpool Rifles at Cruciform Post. On the 2nd December the Battalion took over from the 6th Liverpools, and had the task of putting the line from Heythrop Post, Cruciform Post, to Priel Bank in a state of defence.

These places were almost isolated during the day, and it was only at great risk that they could be visited. The post at Catelet Copse was almost a bait to the enemy, one of whom walked up to it. Even the Battalion headquarters at F.4. Central were under close rifle fire. In fact there were no troops in front of Headquarters, and it can be said that on this occasion the Battalion headquarters were in the front line.

On the 5th December the Battalion was relieved by a battalion from Brigadier-General Ramsay's 48th Brigade, and he visited his former command next morning at St. Emilie. Of the officers that had served under him in the 1st Division, only two then remained, and they were pleased to see their former commanding officer once more. That day the Battalion went by motor lorry to billets in Peronne, where four days were spent. A few civilians had returned to this ruined town, and had opened shops at which fish and vegetables could be bought. These civilians were much impressed by the nightly retreat sounded by the bugles and drums which had attained a high pitch of efficiency. A long tedious railway journey on the 10th brought the Battalion to Maroeuil. The night was spent in "Y" hutments, and it then entered General Horne's First Army.

It left Maroeuil on the 12th and marched to Bailleul-aux-Cornailles, a village it was to visit later in August, 1918. The next day Eps was reached, and on the following day the Battalion arrived at its destination at Lisbourg, where it was to remain until the end of January, which meant a six week's rest.

Here the men were billeted in the peasants' byres, which were in rather a dilapidated condition. The training was chiefly devoted to musketry. The bomb had gone out of fashion, and it was realised that the princ.i.p.al weapon of the infantryman was the rifle. According to the orders of the Divisional Commander each company built a thirty yards' range for itself, and a two hundred yards' range was allotted to the Battalion. Snow fell but that made no difference to the training programme. The men had to lie on the frozen snow to fire the various practices, and bearing in mind that the rifles were very cold to handle, the results attained were excellent.