The Schemes of the Kaiser Part 21

Certain misguided people, moved by their extravagant feelings either of hatred towards England or of fear, seized the opportunity of the hour of danger under cover of the well-worn word (which leads so many worthy folk to lose their heads, even when it represents just the opposite of what it means) pleading our _interests_, I say, seized the opportunity to lower France by making overtures to the Kaiser and to Prussia. Our interest, our twofold interest, was not to have a war with England, and to let Germany see that it was to her interest that we should not be deprived of our maritime power which _protects_ the free development of German expansion.

We possess at this moment a third of Africa, a portion of Asia and Madagascar; before trying to add to these possessions, let us endeavour to make the most of their wealth.

To sum up: our position has never been better, if we _know how to wait_ and not to make ourselves cheap. As the faithful Allies of Russia, either England or Germany will have need of us.

And so, the German Emperor, King of Prussia, has added another chapter, and not the least astounding, to the volume of his swift changes and contradictions. The author of the telegram to President Kruger has received at Berlin Mr. Cecil Rhodes, the instigator of Jameson, invader of the Transvaal! William II has been negotiating with him in the matter of the telegraph line and the railway. If any one had foretold, on the day that he sent his famous telegram concerning the rights of the South African Republic, that the paladin who signed this chivalrous message would come to discuss "business" with Sir [_sic_] Cecil Rhodes, or that the latter would have dared to present himself, in a check suit, before the Kaiser wearing his winged helmet--such a prophet would have been regarded as a dangerous lunatic. Nevertheless, so it is.

Mr. Rhodes entered the Imperial Palace quite simply and naturally, conveying to the Emperor the affectionate regards of Queen Victoria. I do not know whether they shook hands. Between business men, shopkeepers ready for a deal, etiquette is superfluous and a ready understanding easy. Shake!

Herr von Bulow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs communicated the news to the Reichstag, promising further information on the subject before long. And now, what becomes of the hope of a rupture with England, antic.i.p.ated by our worthy apostles of the Franco-German Alliance against perfidious Albion? Not only does William II flirt with old England and give her pledges, but he opens his arms to the most dangerous, the most enterprising, the most compromised of Englishmen, the Napoleon of the Cape!

April 27, 1899. [3]

Were it not for Alsace-Lorraine, we should be the ally of colonial Germany. Were it not for Alsace-Lorraine, we should be the most ardent disciples of the n.o.ble, truly humane, and admirable work of disarmament undertaken by the Emperor Nicholas II. Alsace-Lorraine has made us the irreconcilable enemies of Germanism and at the same time the faithful, devoted and ever loyal friends of every Slav cause.

Familiar with the work of these causes, attached to the greatness of our allies, those of us who were the first to seek that mighty alliance, will ever labour to strengthen and extend it by all the resources which can add to its glory, but at the same time we are anxious that nothing should be said or done to diminish our own first claims to rest.i.tution. An article in the _Novae Vremya_ contains a protest against the idea (disseminated by the German Press) that Russia is working to bring about a reconciliation between Germany and France.

The Russian organ declares that such a _rapprochement_ would deprive France of all the advantages of her alliance with Russia. The St.

Petersburg newspaper adds a sentence which appeals to us, because we can adapt it to our own case. "A Franco-German _entente_," says the _Novae Vremya_, "would erect a cross on the Franco-Russian _entente_."

A Russo-German _entente_ would erect a cross on the Franco-Russian _entente_.

Needless to say, the _Kolnische Zeitung_ informs us that the _Novae Vremya_ only represents middle-cla.s.s opinion in Russia. Well, that isn't so bad, considering that we are sure of the antipathy of the whole Russian people for the Germans. The _Kleine Zeitung_, already reckoning on the conclusion of the _rapprochement_ between Germany and France, adds that it will be received with sympathy throughout the whole German Empire. I believe you, _O Kleine Zeitung_! And the more so when, with a mixture of haughtiness and careless indifference, you add "with the exception of the question of Alsace-Lorraine, _which for us does not exist_, there is no difference which should separate Germany from France!"

O most generous _Kleine Zeitung_! it is sweet to differ. On condition that we do not ask you to give us back the flesh that you have torn from our side, you are willing to extend to us your mild greetings of disinterested friendship, and I have no doubt that you are ready to forgive us the crime you have committed against us!

May 23, 1899. [4]

Amongst the most definite impressions produced by the general proceedings of the Peace Conference there are two which stand out: one, that the diplomats invariably a.s.sert that it will not lead to any practical result, either as regards disarmament or the creation of an arbitration tribunal; the other, that all patriots who are enemies of Germany are filled with anguish at the sight of Germany endeavouring to direct its discussions. In its practical results, the Conference will not go further than the splendidly magnanimous proposal of Nicholas II, having for its object the humanising of war, the development of arbitration as a remedial measure, and the possibility of conditional and partial disarmament. All that will be accomplished might have been attained by the Tzar alone in case of war, in the event of proposals for arbitration, or by way of leading the Powers to recognise the economic dangers to which they expose their peoples by ever-increasing armaments.

June 27, 1899. [5]

We know what a struggle William II had to face on the subject of the ca.n.a.l from the Elbe to the Rhine, and what concessions he was compelled to make to the Prussian Chamber. Moreover he had a stiff fight in the Parliament of the Empire with regard to the new relations with [Transcriber's note: which?] he proposes to establish between Germany and England and her colonies. The agrarians of the Right and the Socialists found themselves united in violent opposition. Herr von Bulow required genuine skill to avert the storm.

The Kaiser met with a very decided rebuff in the matter of what is called in Germany the "convicts' law." It will be remembered that last autumn, in Westphalia, the Emperor had threatened the socialists that those who incited to strikes would be condemned to hard labour. Such a threat is easily uttered, but difficult to enforce by process of law.

Under the conditions existing nowadays it does not do to speak of forced labour in connection with trades unions and strikes; nevertheless, in order to make good the word of the German Emperor, his Ministers tried to s.n.a.t.c.h a vote for a fight with the workers. Baron Stumm, a factory king possessed of great influence with the Kaiser, had inspired him with hatred against industrial workers, just as others had inspired him with love for them at the beginning of his reign. With all his swagger and bl.u.s.ter, William II is more a creature of impulse than of constancy. All parties united to oppose his scheme, except those who are known in every Parliament as Mamelukes. The former "Father" of the working cla.s.ses, suddenly become their enemy, has experienced a personal defeat in this matter which is all the greater for the fact that the Socialists, while they rejoice at seeing it inflicted upon him by the Reichstag, will not forgive him for his "convicts' law."

July 8, 1899. [6]

The wretched policy, which sent French ships to Kiel to salute the flag of the King of Prussia, continues to be honoured--no, dishonoured--by the Government of the Republic of to-day. For this Government, the least of William's wishes is an order.

So the Emperor William II has set foot upon the soil of France by paying a visit aboard of the _Iphigenie_ (for every one of our ships is a bit of the mother-country). The Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet, the ideal of M. Urbain Gohier, has allowed this monstrous thing to be done almost immediately after William II had laid the first stone of his fortresses on the Moselle, fortresses intended (to use his own aggressive words) to hold _the enemy_ under Germany's guns. So we are the enemy for Germany and yet, oh shame! even while she slashes us with this word, we seek to show her that she is our friend.

It certainly looks as if the present Prussian Ministry has neither the prestige nor the strength of will to control successfully the conduct of the ex-Mamelukes. Its failure at the last session of Parliament was complete. It is amongst the strongest supporters of the monarchy that the most determined opposition was offered to the proposed law for the construction of the ca.n.a.l from the Elbe to the Rhine, an enterprise dear to the heart of the Emperor, once the father of his working men and now the father of German manufacturers.

Where the political impediments block his path William II cuts and hacks away as it may please him. There is proof of this in the feverish haste with which he is lowering the age of officers in the army. On the 10th of June, six Prussian generals were allowed to retire; on the 15th, ten more were placed on the unattached list, and a further movement in the same direction is expected to take place after the great Imperial manoeuvres.

July 25, 1899. [7]

THE HAGUE CONFERENCE

I desire to convince my readers by indisputable facts--

(1) That the pacifist agitation in Europe, in all its various forms, is inspired and sustained by the most uncompromising military Power on this Continent, that is to say, by Germany;

(2) That if the magnanimous humanitarian idea, so sincerely conceived by Nicholas II, has not been fulfilled, its failure is entirely due to the treachery of Germany.

For that matter, Germany has been providentially punished for her machiavellian ways. Firstly, because she has been unable to conceal the fact that she is primarily responsible for this failure; and secondly (the fact is important in other ways and has proved in a most striking manner), because the Hague Conference has clearly demonstrated, that which the initiated have long suspected, that Germany is completely isolated in Europe!

As a matter of fact neither Austria nor Italy were with her, only one Power voted solidly with Germany--the Power which is not content with war and supplements it by ma.s.sacres--the Turkey of Abdul Hamid. This isolation (an indirect result of the Franco-Russian alliance, which has compelled Austria to come to a complete understanding with Russia in regard to affairs in the Balkans, and led Italy to draw closer to France), this isolation is a great and inestimable victory, whose benefit must be frankly recognised by every honest mind in the two allied countries, a victory for those who, like myself, have worked heart and soul for the Franco-Russian alliance.

And it is now, now that these things are clearly proved, now, when Germany finds but one servile nation in Europe--Turkey--that the French Government thinks fit to seek to draw closer to Germany! The thing is unthinkable, unbelievable!

_For years, acting upon an evil policy which I propose to elucidate hereafter, the Government of the Republic first set itself to oppose the alliance with Russia, preferring an alliance with Germany; later, this Government saw in the Russian alliance nothing but a means to gain public applause, to acquire popularity. Now that the strength and worth of this alliance have been revealed in all their truth by the isolation of Germany, this same Government of the Republic compels our sailors to suffer the courtesy of William II and prepares us, by diplomatic communiques, for an entente with Germany_.

Only super-simpletons can believe in William II's sham bl.u.s.ter against England on behalf of the Transvaal and of that Africa concerning which he has just concluded a binding treaty with Albion. One must either be hopelessly ignorant or wilfully blind not to see through the game of William II and to be fooled by his ingratiating ways.

His only object is to compel England to throw herself into his arms and to bring about a great common alliance of the Anglo-Saxon races. Will not the cynical supporters of the "policy of interest" experience a revulsion of conscience if they know whither they are leading us, or a sudden enlightenment, if they do not know? If not, then to those who, through cowardice or treachery, have lightly ruined the n.o.blest of all causes, I shall say, "I wash my hands" of this crime of ignorance or base surrender. Weary, sick at heart and indignant I shall say it, in my own name and in the name of those who have died, suddenly or mysteriously, for the Franco-Russian cause.

Any one who followed carefully the successive events of the performance given under the direction of M. de Staal, any one familiar with the secret manoeuvres that led to the convening of the Peace Conference, could have had no difficulty in predicting what its end would be. From some of these secret manoeuvres in the wings, I propose to lift the veil; my readers will then be in a position to understand more clearly why it is that the truly Christian act of the Tzar (apart from certain unimportant improvements of the Brussels Convention) did not attain the result which might have been expected from the initiative of a powerful and generous sovereign.

For the past year we have repeatedly been told, in more or less sensational revelations, that the influence which chiefly determined Nicholas II in his action, was his reading of a famous book on war by M. de Bloch. This is no doubt true and the fact may be admitted. Much moved by the eloquent description, given by the great financial writer of Warsaw, of the heavy burdens imposed on the nations by the extravagant armaments of the Continent, and terrified at the thought of the calamities which the next war would let loose upon all Europe, Nicholas II, full of Christian pity for the sufferings of humanity, directed Count Mouravieff to send the famous circular to the Powers, which resulted in the convening of the Hague Conference.

But I would ask, how are we to reconcile the hostile att.i.tude of William II's delegates to the Russian proposals with his solemn declaration that he was absolutely in agreement with his friend Nicholas II? Why did the German Emperor first give his approval to De Bloch's campaign in favour of disarmament and then make Von Schwartzkopf publicly repudiate the most important arguments of that writer's book? Was it that William II was in the first instance seduced by the lamentable picture which De Bloch gives of France and the organisation of her army, or (and this seems far more likely) did he simply approve of the intrigue set on foot by the author of this work on war, an intrigue which aimed at casting a shadow over the patriotic hopes that France placed on the Russian alliance, by inciting Nicholas II to call for a general disarmament?

It must be confessed that the Franco-Russian alliance struck a bitter blow at the hopes of Polish patriots. The contempt and hostility towards France which inspire M. de Bloch's book are proof sufficient of the grudge its author bears us. It is perfectly evident that they must have been delighted in Berlin at the chief object of his work. But there were other objects in view.

For years William II has unceasingly laboured to persuade England that she has every interest to join the Triple Alliance. His perseverance in this direction is quite natural. But if Germany succeeded last year in concluding an agreement with England on a few special questions, the Hague Conference has proved that it does not involve an agreement in matters of general policy.

Nevertheless, William II counted on this Congress to produce closer relations with Great Britain. He hoped that the Congress would result in sharp antagonism between England and Russia and he reckoned on this antagonism to help him to inflict a severe defeat on Russia, which in its turn would have enabled him to draw one or other of these two Powers into the orbit of his policy. Great then was the disappointment of the German Emperor _when, from the very outset of the Conference, England, performing a most unexpected volte-face, made proposals on the subject of arbitration, which went a great deal farther than the Russian proposals laid before, the Congress. This master-stroke of British diplomacy compelled Germany to come out into the open and to reveal herself in her true light: that is to say, as the only obstacle to the fulfilment of the Tzar's humanitarian designs_.

The Stengels, Zorns and Schwartzkopfs completed the success of British diplomacy by the brutal violence of their opposition and the cynicism of their proposals. It was not only on the two committees that dealt with arbitration and disarmament that German opposition (always supported by Turkey alone) wrecked the magnanimous attempt of Nicholas II to minimise the horrors of war. The committee presided over by M.

de Martens succeeded in effecting certain improvements in the terms of the Brussels Convention; if the labours of its President and members were not successful in doing more to lessen the evils of war upon land, the fact is again due to the opposition of the German representatives.

Thus, for instance, the humane measures proposed in forbidding the bombardment of open towns and private dwellings unoccupied by troops, or the destruction of unfortified villages, were not adopted because the German delegate insisted on the impossibility of limiting the powers of a commander-in-chief, who must remain the sole judge of the utility of such destruction in the general interest of military operations. It was the same in the case of the article whereby it was proposed that provinces occupied by enemy forces should be guaranteed in the maintenance of their autonomous administration and in certain rights against the demands of invasions, Germany declared her unwillingness to fetter in any way the decision of her army commanders.

I would ask those amongst us who rejoice at the idea of seeing William II take part in the Exhibition of 1900, to let their thoughts dwell a little on the att.i.tude of the Prussian delegates at the Peace Conference. William I took part in the Exhibition of 1867 and we know what that visit cost France three years later.