The Record of a Regiment of the Line Part 10

The force halted at Amersfoort on the following day, owing firstly to the fog which enveloped everything, and secondly to allow of the baggage train coming up. This began to arrive at 10 a.m., having been detained at the drift the whole night.

During the fog a few Boers came down from the high ground above the river and fired into the horses watering, at very close range. They failed, however, to do any damage.

On August 9th the army continued its advance. On leaving Amersfoort, a bad drift with a steep climb of half a mile on the further side was met with, and the baggage was formed into two columns. This was a.s.sisted up the hill by two companies of the Regiment, Sir Redvers Buller personally superintending. Klippaal Drift was reached late in the afternoon after a difficult march of ten miles.

General Buller's army was now on the high veldt in winter time. The cold was intense, especially at night, when there were several degrees of frost. Owing to the intense cold, two men of the Rifle Brigade died from exposure during the night.

[Ill.u.s.tration: The Baggage of General Buller's Army Crossing Beginderlyn Bridge]

On the following day the force continued its march to Beginderlyn Bridge. This was found intact, and there was no opposition, and the march was resumed on the 11th as far as Kleinfontein. On August 12th Ermelo was occupied, and a few of the leading Boers belonging to the place surrendered.

So far, and until Twyfelaar was reached, Buller's army received little or no opposition from the Boers. Chris. Botha, who had occupied Amersfoort, had retired east after evacuating that place, and was marching parallel to the British force and at a distance of about ten miles on its right flank. They were evidently watching Buller, probably thinking that he would turn east towards Piet Retief, where almost all their stock, sheep, and cattle had been driven, the mountainous and difficult country there being suitable for its concealment and protection.

The main body of the Boers was concentrated between Belfast and Machadodorp, north-east of Twyfelaar, in a country eminently suited for what was considered their final effort. The valley of the Komati River was exceedingly difficult country for the British army to operate over.

The Boers to the end of the war were very fond of this country, and it was there, or in the vicinity towards Lake Chrissie, that several engagements took place later on, during the guerilla stage of the war, not always in favour of the British.

The town of Ermelo, which the Regiment was destined to see again on several future occasions, was left on August 13th, on the evening of which day the force reached Klipfontein. The Regiment, being rear-guard, did not reach its bivouac till after dark. Witbank was reached the following day, and communication was opened up with General French's column, fifteen miles to the north-west. Carolina could be seen eight miles away to the north-east.

The force marched next day to Twyfelaar, and here a halt was made till August 21st, in order to allow of Lord Roberts's army, which was advancing east from Pretoria along the Lorenzo Marques railway, joining hands with General Buller's army.

The rear-guard of the force was attacked by the Boers on August 21st on its march from Twyfelaar to Van Wycks Vlei. The Gordon Highlanders lost nine killed and eight wounded, and the Liverpool Mounted Infantry eight killed.

On the following morning a force consisting of Devons, Manchesters, Gordons, South African Light Horse, one field battery, and the howitzers, advanced from Van Wycks Vlei under General W. Kitchener, for the purpose of reconnoitring and driving some Boers off the hills east of General Buller's camp, so that the road for the next day's march might be cleared of the enemy. A large number of Boers was seen in the direction of Carolina, and it was supposed that Chris. Botha's force was opposed to the column. The Manchester Regiment led the advance, supported by the Devon Regiment. The former, on crossing a nek to a low underlying hill, came under a heavy rifle fire from the Boers below and across the valley, and lost two killed and nine wounded. The force returned to camp at 6 p.m.

On the following day Buller's army advanced to Geluk, some five or six miles, the battalion with the Gordons and mounted troops of Dundonald's Brigade, acting as rear-guard. A very difficult spruit, with steep sides, was crossed, and the high hills on the further side occupied.

These had been held by the Boers in strength, but they had retired on Buller's approach. As soon as the infantry of the rear-guard had arrived in camp, the mounted troops of the rear-guard were attacked rather sharply, but they managed to hold their own and to beat off the Boers.

Two companies of the Liverpool Regiment, who formed part of the advance guard, fell into an ambush and lost considerably, leaving, it was reported, some eighty men either killed, wounded, or prisoners in the hands of the Boers. Shortly after arrival in camp, five companies of the Regiment were sent out on outpost duty, taking up a short line and entrenching--two companies were entrenched in front and furnished sentries, with three companies entrenched in rear in support.

On August 24th and 25th the force stood fast, exchanging occasional big gun and musketry fire with the Boers. Information was received that Lord Roberts had entered Belfast on the 24th, thus practically joining hands with Sir Redvers Buller.

The position taken up by the Boers already referred to, an immensely powerful one, straddled the Pretoria-Lorenzo railway east of Belfast and west of Machadodorp. Botha had taken up a front of some fifty miles in length, and his force numbered about 5000 men. His right rested on the broken mountainous country of Elandskloof to the north, and his left on the mountains overlooking the Komati to the south. His centre was at Bergendal Farm and the rugged and precipitous hills in the rear of the farm, through which wound the railway and road, his line of retreat, quite concealed from the fire and view of the British force. On the extreme left a big gun with two or three smaller pieces were mounted, but these were useless to give much support to the centre, as they were too distant. The line of retreat to Komati Poort, which, from the nature of the country, could not be threatened except by an extended movement round the north or south, lay along the Belfast-Machadodorp road and the railway line.

Briefly, the course of the two days' battle may be described as follows:--

While Pole Carew threatened the centre at Belfast and the position north of the railway, French was sent with his cavalry division still further north to threaten the Boer line of retreat towards Pilgrim's Rest, and their right flank. Buller attacked the Boers' left with the intention of driving it in and getting behind their centre on their line of retreat.

He on the first day, however, could make no impression on them, and the two forces held on to the position they were in for the night. On the morning of the second day Buller, leaving a brigade of infantry and Dundonald's mounted brigade to watch the Boers' left, moved across their front under cover of the undulating slopes of ground, and made an attack at Bergendal Farm and Kopje. After a sharp fight this was carried, and the Boers retired all along their line in the direction of Machadodorp.

It is necessary to state in detail the part played by the Regiment.

On the morning of Sunday, August 26th, Buller's force was put in motion.

The Regiment was advance guard to the division. When about half a mile from the camp, the four advanced and extended companies under Captain Jacson came under fire from some high ground on their right flank, losing two men. Major Davies, proceeding along this ridge of high ground with the remainder of the Regiment, forced the Boers posted there off the hills. The advance guard companies then continued their march with orders to make Bergendal Farm their point, but not to go beyond it.

When these companies had proceeded some four or five miles, it was found that General Buller's main body had changed direction to the right and had gone east. On retracing their steps, the companies with great difficulty ascertained the whereabouts of Buller's force. Sir Redvers was now attacking the Boer left within a mile or two of his former camping ground. A message was then received stating that the Regiment was at that time a left flank guard to Buller's army, and that the former advance guard companies were to join the remainder of the Regiment.

The Boers, opposed to Buller in very considerable numbers, were sangared on some low hills about 800 yards distant from and in front of and below the high ridge over which his force had to advance. Buller made his dispositions behind this high ridge. The reverse slope was completely raked by the Boer fire, and no cover except that afforded by some ant-hills was obtainable. The dropping bullets followed the form and slope of the hill, so that neither front nor rear was secure.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Trekking with General Buller; 5-Inch Guns on the March]

As soon as the Regiment was formed up, an order was sent to advance.

Captain Emerson with fifteen men extended, rushed down the forward slope under a heavy fire, and took cover behind some ant-hills. The moment the men showed over the crest line they were met by a hail of bullets, and further advance was impossible.

Later, another order was sent to advance, but owing to the want of cover it was found impossible for the line to make headway in the face of the fire brought to bear upon it. It was not until the Howitzer Battery was brought into action late in the day, to cover the retirement of the advanced companies, that Captain Emerson and his men were able to get back. This they did under a very heavy fire from rifles and machine guns.

One company under Lieutenant Harris, which had been moved off to the right, had advanced and got into an exposed place. The men took cover behind ant-hills, and remained there for the rest of the day. Three companies had been moved to the neighbourhood of the guns. These came under sh.e.l.l fire from the Boer guns and had some casualties, amongst whom was Colour-Sergeant Burch.e.l.l, who was shot through the shoulder.

Under General Buller's direct supervision one company was ordered forward. Immediately their four scouts showed over the crest line a storm of bullets met them, and they were all hit. The four scouts were found dead on the second day afterwards by the Liverpool Mounted Infantry.

Dusk found the companies posted as under: Three companies extended on the ridge on the left, with two companies extended in support on the rear side of the hill. One company was extended on the ridge in the centre, whilst three companies were near the guns, three-quarters of a mile away on the right. One man was killed and one wounded just at dark by unaimed fire and by the last shots fired. The companies on the ridge retired to the crest of the hill after dark and took up an entrenched outpost line for the night. Rations were then issued for the following day. It was a pitch-black night, and two cooks' orderlies who had gone to fetch their company's tea and sugar rations from their wagon, missed their way in the dark when returning, and walked into the Boer position, distant only a few hundred yards, and were made prisoners. These two men were the first prisoners of war lost to the battalion up to this date; and with the exception of one other prisoner, who was temporarily in the hands of the Boers in the Badfontein valley in the following year, they were the only men of the battalion taken prisoners during the war. The casualties of the battalion for the day were 6 killed, 15 wounded, and 2 prisoners.

Early the following morning the 7th Brigade, with the exception of the Manchester Regiment, moved off to the left, the Rifle Brigade, whose turn it was to lead, being in front. The guns accompanied the brigade.

There was little or no opposition till the scouts came under fire from Bergendal Kopje, or Drie Kraal as it was otherwise known. This rocky kopje was strongly fortified and held by the Boers. A Field Battery opened fire on to the kopje at about 3000 yards' range from some rising ground. Shortly afterwards the remaining guns--5-inch, 4.7's, naval 12-pounders, in all to the number of about thirty-nine--commenced pouring sh.e.l.ls on to this one spot in the Boer position. This sh.e.l.ling continued for about three hours.

Very early in the morning a train had been seen coming out from Machadodorp with reinforcements. These, it was ascertained, were the Johannesburg Police, to the number of about eighty, and they formed the garrison of the kopje, about a hundred more being in the farm behind the kopje. This kopje was a small hill covered with large boulders. The rocks had been connected with large stones to form sangars, behind which the garrison found cover. A pompom was included in the armament of the position, which measured about eighty yards by forty yards only. It fell away abruptly in the rear, the farm and outbuildings lying very close under the steep rear side of the hill.

The English sh.e.l.ls fell with terrible accuracy into the sangars, and there was an almost continuous explosion on the hill. Yet the Boers kept up their fire till the Rifle Brigade were within ten yards of them, and their pompom was in action, although partly jammed and firing single shots, till the very end. This pompom was bravely served by one man, the remainder of the gun team having been either killed or wounded. It is not known whether this plucky fellow survived or not.

General Walter Kitchener, who was commanding the infantry attack, decided to attack with the Rifle Brigade along the ridge which ended in the kopje, which was slightly above the level of the ridge. At the same time he ordered the Inniskilling Fusiliers to attack over the low ground on the Rifle Brigade's right, whilst the Gordon Highlanders and the Devonshire Regiment were held in support.

The Rifle Brigade started from the foot of the hills under which they had taken cover, and which was about 1200 yards from the Boer position, and almost immediately came under heavy musketry fire, being much exposed on the high open ridge.

They, however, continued their advance in perfect order and eventually rushed the kopje, the British sh.e.l.ls dropping and the Boers firing till the a.s.sault had been delivered. The Inniskillings advanced across the low ground underneath the Rifle Brigade. Their advance was slightly delayed, and their delivery of the a.s.sault was consequently later than that of the Rifle Brigade. Captain Emerson with one company of the Regiment which had been told off as escort to the Maxim guns, advanced with the leading company of the Inniskillings.

The whole Boer position was evacuated as soon as their line had been penetrated by the capture of the Bergendal Kopje.

The casualties amongst the Rifle Brigade were severe, owing to the much exposed ground over which it was necessary for the attack to be delivered, and to the fact that, as the extended lines converged on to the small kopje, the men naturally became crowded and formed a better mark for the Boer rifles. They lost two officers and fourteen men killed and five officers and fifty men wounded, of whom two officers died of their wounds the following day. The Regiment had one man wounded.

The position was soon made good, although the Boers held on tenaciously to a long rocky ridge in their rear to which they had retired, till nightfall. The force bivouacked for the night near the farm.

This action was known officially as the battle of Belfast.

A quiet night was pa.s.sed, and next morning, August 28th, the force occupied Machadodorp with slight opposition. The Boers were seen retreating up the road leading to Lydenburg, and on the high ground above the town they brought two big guns into action.

The Gordon Highlanders, in support of Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, were sent on through the town and occupied the high ground on the far side, and the Boers retired before them.

The Boers had made a very hurried retirement. In Machadodorp on the evening of the day of the fight, guns and cartloads of ammunition were parked in the big open s.p.a.ce in the centre of the town. These were moved off very hurriedly on the approach of the British force, and the guns had only reached the top of the hills on the further side of Machadodorp when General Buller's infantry came in view. General Buller brought some long-range guns into action and sh.e.l.led them as they ascended the hill, but without result.

From lack of efficient pursuit after the battle the evening before, and a too cautious advance in the morning, an opportunity to do the Boer forces considerable damage was apparently lost. A wagon containing pompom ammunition was captured by Dundonald's Mounted Brigade, but the pompom itself got away, notwithstanding the very slight opposition offered by the Boers.

The following day General Buller's forces reached Helvetia Farm, where General French's column and General Pole Carew's division joined up.

With the object of releasing the prisoners who had been sent by the Boers from Pretoria to Noitgedacht down the railway line towards Komati Poort, General Buller's force now turned eastwards and marched along the heights on the north side of the railway. On the first day out from Helvetia his cavalry saw some 2000 released English prisoners marching up the line towards Waterval Onder from the direction of Noitgedacht, and having been unable to obtain touch with the Boers, the force retraced their steps, and encamped some six miles from Helvetia at Vluchtfontein, and at this place a halt was made on the following day.

From here General Buller turned north, and on September 1st, advancing up the Lydenburg road, reached Badfontein on the Crocodile River. Here the army bivouacked for the night, and an advance was made up the Badfontein valley next morning, but coming into contact with the Boers who were holding the northern end of the valley, his further progress was checked. The Boer position extended along the high hills which straddled the road in a semicircular position some eight miles from Badfontein.

The Regiment formed the infantry advance guard of the army, and on reaching what was then named Redvers' Kopje and afterwards known as Devon Kopje, came under sh.e.l.l fire from three big guns which the Boers had brought into action on the hills above. At this place the Regiment stopped for the day, taking cover from sh.e.l.l fire behind the large boulders of rocks of which the kopje was composed. The remainder of Sir Redvers Buller's force returned to its old encampment of the previous night.

The two mounted brigades and one battery R.H.A., which had advanced to the foot of the hills occupied by the Boers, returned to camp at dusk.

As soon as it was dark, four companies of the Regiment were left on Devon Kopje as an advanced post, whilst the remainder of the Regiment retired to the rear of the hill and bivouacked. The kopje was entrenched and everything made comfortable for the following day. All the baggage wagons were sent back to the main camp during the night.