The Philippines: Past and Present Volume I Part 33

We felt an especial interest in this island, as General Otis had asked us carefully to study and to criticise a scheme for its government which had been drafted by General James F. Smith, who afterward became justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, secretary of public instruction and governor-general of the islands, and was then in command of the troops in Negros.

General Lawton arrived in the Philippines during our stay. His coming had been eagerly looked forward to by the army. He had sailed with the understanding that he was to be put in charge of field operations. While he was at sea, influences were brought to bear which changed this plan.

It is my firm conviction that if Lawton had been put in command, the war would have ended promptly. He was a wonderful man in the field. He possessed the faculty of instilling his own tremendous energy into his officers and men, whose privations and dangers he shared, thereby arousing an unfaltering loyalty which stood him in good stead in time of need. If there was fighting to be done, he promptly and thoroughly whipped everything in sight. He punished looting and disorder with a heavy hand, treated prisoners and noncombatants with the utmost kindness, and won the good-will of all Filipinos with whom he came in contact.

General MacArthur was always declaring that the Filipinos were a unit against us and that he could never get information from them. General Lawton never lacked for such information as he needed, and constantly and successfully used the Filipinos themselves as messengers and for other purposes. I came to know him intimately, and learned to admire and love him as did all those who had that great privilege.

For some time I had charge of his spies. Never have men taken longer chances than did the faithful few who at this time furnished us with information as to events in Insurgent territory. Discovery meant prompt and cruel death. For a long time Major F. S. Bourns had performed the uncongenial task of directing the spies. He was then the chief health officer of Manila, and as all sorts of people were compelled to consult him on sanitary matters, visits to his office aroused no suspicion. He spoke Spanish, and this was imperatively necessary. Our spies simply would not communicate results through interpreters. The facts revealed by the Insurgent records show how right they were in refusing to do so.

Major Bourns eventually returned to the United States. His work was taken over by an army officer, with the result that two of our best men died very suddenly in that gentleman's back yard. As I spoke Spanish, and as all sorts of people came to see the commission, I was the logical candidate for this job, which I thereupon inherited.

Each morning, if there was news, I myself laboriously thumped out my notes on the typewriter, making an original and one copy. The copy I took at once to General Lawton. The original I took, later, to General Otis.

General Lawton was firmly convinced that most army officers were unfitted by their training to perform civil functions. He organized munic.i.p.al governments with all possible promptness in the towns occupied by his troops, and in this work he requested my a.s.sistance, which I was of course glad to give. Sr. Felipe Calderon drafted a simple provisional scheme of munic.i.p.al government which I submitted for criticism to that most distinguished and able of Filipinos, Sr. Cayetano Arellano. [453] When the final changes in it had been made, I accompanied General Lawton on a trip to try putting it into effect. We held elections and established munic.i.p.al governments in a number of the towns just south of Manila, and in some of those along the Pasig River.

General Otis watched our operations and their results narrowly, and was sufficiently well pleased with the latter to order General Kobbe to follow a similar course in various towns on or near the railroad north of Manila. Kobbe did not profess to know much about munic.i.p.al government, and asked me to go with him and help until he got the hang of the thing, which I did.

Thus it happened that the first Philippine Commission had a sort of left-handed interest in the first munic.i.p.al governments established in the islands under American rule.

In his endeavour to show that the Commission interfered with military operations, Blount has ascribed certain statements to Major Starr. He says: " ... at San Isidro on or about November 8, Major Starr said: 'We took this town last spring,' stating how much our loss had been in so doing, 'but partly as a result of the Schurman commission parleying with the Insurgents, General Otis had us fall back. We have just had to take it again.'" [454]

If Major Starr ever made such a statement he was sadly misinformed. General Lawton was the best friend I ever had in the United States Army. I saw him almost daily when he was in Manila, and he showed me the whole telegraphic correspondence which pa.s.sed between him and General Otis on the subject of the withdrawal from San Isidro and Nueva Ecija, which was certainly one of the most ill advised moves that any military commander was ever compelled to make. General Lawton's unremitting attacks had absolutely demoralized the Insurgent force, and my information is that when he finally turned back, Aguinaldo and several members of his cabinet were waiting, ten miles away, to surrender to him when he next advanced, believing that they could never escape from him. I have not the telegraphic correspondence before me, but I remember its salient features. Otis ordered Lawton to withdraw, and Lawton, convinced of the inadvisability of the measure, objected. Otis replied that, with the rainy season coming on, he could neither provision him nor furnish him ammunition. Lawton answered that he had provisions enough to last three weeks and ammunition enough to finish the war, whereupon Otis peremptorily ordered him to withdraw. The Philippine Commission had no more to do with this matter than they had to do with the similar order against advancing which Otis sent Lawton on the day the latter won the Zapote River fight, when the Insurgents were running all over the Province of Cavite. Lawton wanted to push forward and clean the whole place up. The reply to his request to be allowed to do so ran, if memory serves me well, as follows:--

"Do nothing. You have accomplished all that was expected of you."

Later on, Lawton and his devoted officers and men had to duplicate the fierce campaign which had resulted in the taking of San Isidro. This made possible the movement that Lawton had had in mind in the first instance, which was made with the result that organized armed resistance to the authority of the United States promptly ceased in northern Luzon.

While on this subject I wish to record the fact that shortly after his return from the San Isidro campaign General Lawton asked me to accompany him on a visit to General Otis and act as a witness. I did so. In my presence Lawton said to Otis that if the latter would give him two regiments, would allow him to arm, equip and provision them to suit himself, and would turn him loose, he would stake his reputation as a soldier, and his position in the United States Army, on the claim that within sixty days he would end the insurrection and would deliver to General Otis one Emilio Aguinaldo, dead or alive. The general laughed at his offer. General Lawton asked me some day to make these facts public. As life is an uncertain thing, I deem it proper to do so now. Personally I am convinced that if his offer had been accepted he would have kept his promise.

On September 15, 1899, Colonel Denby and I sailed for the United States, having been recalled to Washington. Shortly after our arrival there the commission issued a brief preliminary report. The winter was spent in the preparation of our final report, which const.i.tuted a full and authoritative treatise on the islands, the people and their resources. Father Jose Algue, the distinguished head of the Philippine Weather Bureau, was called to Washington to help us, and gave us invaluable a.s.sistance.

Our preliminary report, dated November 2, 1899, and the first volume of our final report, published on January 31, 1900, contained our observations and recommendations relative to political matters.

Mr. Schurman has been credited with saying in an address made on January 11, 1902: "Any decent kind of government of Filipinos by Filipinos is better than the best possible government of Filipinos by Americans." [455]

On November 2, 1900, he signed the following statement: [456]--

"Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the commission believe that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing, and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable. And the indispensable need from the Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago is recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate. The latter, it is true, would take the revenues and leave us the responsibilities. Nevertheless, they recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone. Thus the welfare of the Filipinos coincides with the dictates of national honour in forbidding our abandonment of the archipelago. We cannot from any point of view escape the responsibilities of government which our sovereignty entails; and the commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippine Islands."

More than fourteen years' experience in governmental work in the Philippines has profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundness of these conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Every statement then made still holds true.

CHAPTER XII

The Establishment of Civil Government

The first Philippine Commission did not complete its work until March, 1900. By this time conditions had so far improved in the archipelago that President McKinley was prepared to initiate a movement looking toward the establishment of civil government there. With this end in view he appointed the following commission of five civilians; William H. Taft of Ohio, Dean C. Worcester of Michigan, Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Bernard Moses of California. Our appointments were dated March 16, 1900. Our instructions which were full, are given in the appendix. [457] I was the only member of the first commission to be reappointed. Neither General Otis nor Admiral Dewey cared to serve, and indeed the professional duties of each of them rendered his appointment to the new commission difficult, if not impossible. Mr. Schurman had at one time expressed himself as vigorously opposed to the idea of a new commission, maintaining that the best results could be obtained by the appointment of a civil governor with wide powers. It was therefore taken for granted that he would not desire reappointment. Colonel Denby was keenly interested in the work and would have been glad to continue it, but he was past seventy and with his good wife had then spent some fifteen years in the Far East. He doubted whether his strength would be adequate to bear the strain of the arduous task which obviously lay before the new commission, and Mrs. Denby desired to remain in the United States where she could be near her children from whom she had been long separated, so her husband felt constrained to say that he did not wish to return to the Philippines.

I separated from him with the keenest regret. He was an amiable, tactful man of commanding ability and unimpeachable integrity, actuated by the best of motives and loyal to the highest ideals. He constantly sought to avoid not only evil but the appearance of evil. I count it one of the great privileges of my life to have been a.s.sociated with him. The one thing in the book written by James H. Blount which aroused my ire was his characterization of Colonel Denby as a hypocrite. No falser, meaner, more utterly contemptible statement was ever made, and when I read it the temptation rose hot within me to make public Blount's personal Philippine record, but after the first heat of anger had pa.s.sed I remembered what the good old Colonel would have wished me to do in such a case, and forbore.

The second Philippine commission, hereinafter referred to as "the commission," received its instructions on April 7, 1900.

They covered a most delicate and complicated subject, namely, the gradual transfer of control from military to civil authority in a country extensive regions of which were still in open rebellion.

In the opinion of President McKinley there was no reason why steps should not be taken, from time to time, to inaugurate governments essentially popular in their form as fast as territory came under the permanent control of our troops, and indeed, as we have seen, this had already been done by the army. It was provided that we should continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil governments already commenced by the military authorities. In doing this we were to act as a board of which Mr. Taft was designated president. It was contemplated that the transfer of authority from military commanders to civil officers would be gradual, and full and complete cooperation between these authorities was enjoined. Having familiarized ourselves with the conditions then prevailing in the islands, we were to devote our attention first to the establishment of munic.i.p.al governments, in which the natives should be given the opportunity to manage their local affairs to the fullest extent and with the least supervision and control found to be practicable. We were then to consider the organization of larger administrative divisions, and when of the opinion that the condition of affairs in the islands was such that the central administration could safely be transferred from military to civil control were to report this conclusion to the secretary of war with our recommendations as to the form of central government which should be established.

Beginning with September 1, 1900, we were authorized to exercise, subject to the approval of the President and the secretary of war, the legislative power, which was then to be transferred from the military governor to us until the establishment of civil central government, or until Congress should otherwise provide. We were authorized during a like period to appoint to office such officers under the judicial, educational, and civil service systems, and in the munic.i.p.al and departmental governments, as were duly provided for. Until the complete transfer of control the military governor was to remain the chief executive head of the government and to exercise the executive authority previously possessed by him and not expressly a.s.signed to the commission by the president in his instructions. In establishing munic.i.p.al governments we were to take as the basis of our work those established by the military governor, under the order of August 8, 1899, which I had helped to set up, as well as those established under the report of a board const.i.tuted by the military governor by his order of January 29, 1900, of which Senor Cayetano Arellano was the president.

In the establishment of departmental or provincial governments we were to give special attention to the then-existing government of the island of Negros, established with the approval of the people of that island under the order of the military governor of July 22, 1899.

We were instructed to investigate troubles growing out of large land holdings, including those of the religious orders, and to promote, extend and improve the system of education already inaugurated by the military authorities, giving first importance to the extension of a system of primary education free to all, which would tend to fit the people for the duties of citizenship and the ordinary avocations of a civilized community. Instruction was to be given at first in the native dialects, but full opportunity for all of the people to acquire English was to be provided as soon as possible. If necessity demanded, we were authorized to make changes in the existing system of taxation and in the body of the laws under which the people were governed, although such changes were to be relegated to the civil government which we were to establish later, so far as might be. Our instructions contained the following important pa.s.sages:--

"In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.

"At the same time the commission should bear in mind, and the people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have, unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and that these principles and these rules of government must be established and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they are familiar.

"It is evident that the most enlightened thought of the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal a.s.sent. Upon every division and branch of the government of the Philippines, therefore, must be imposed these inviolable rules:--

"That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the a.s.sistance of counsel for his defence; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offence, or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be pa.s.sed; that no law shall be pa.s.sed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the rights of the people to peaceably a.s.semble and pet.i.tion the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."

It has been the fashion in some quarters to sneer at the last of these paragraphs, and to insinuate, if not to charge, that President McKinley in his policy toward the Philippine Islands was actuated by unworthy motives. Nothing could be further from the truth. From the beginning to the end the real good of the several peoples of the archipelago came first with him, and no one who had the privilege of knowing him well doubts it. Thoroughly imbued with the lofty sentiments expressed by him in our instructions, we set forth on our long pilgrimage to a country where we were to undertake a heavy task essentially different from that which had ever before fallen to the lot of any five citizens of the United States.

On April 17, 1900, we sailed from San Francisco on the United States army transport _Hanc.o.c.k_. We were forty-five strong. Of this goodly company only four remain in the Philippines to-day, [458]--Mr. and Mrs. Branagan, Mrs. Worcester and myself. Singularly enough, with two exceptions, all of the others are still alive and at work. Arthur W. Ferguson, prince of interpreters, who was later appointed Executive Secretary, died in the service after more than six years of extraordinarily faithful and efficient work. James A. LeRoy, my faithful, able and efficient private secretary, contracted tuberculosis, and fell a victim to it after a long and gallant fight.

At Honolulu we met with a severe disappointment. It was of course our duty to call on Governor Dole. We were advised that silk hats and frock coats must be donned for this visit, and it was perishing hot. We reached the palace in a reeking perspiration and had a long wait in a suffocating room. When Mr. Dole appeared, he was closely followed by an attendant bearing a large and most attractive-looking bottle carefully wrapped in a napkin, and our spirits rose. But, alas! It contained Poland water.

At Tokio we had an audience with the Emperor and were received by the Empress as well. In the high official who had charge of the palace where these events took place, I discovered an old University of Michigan graduate who made the occasion especially pleasant for me.

We finally reached Manila on the morning of June 3. Although the thermometer was in the nineties, a certain frigidity pervaded the atmosphere on our arrival, which General MacArthur, the military governor, seemed to regard in the light of an intrusion.

He had been directed to provide suitable office quarters for us. To our amazement and amus.e.m.e.nt we found desks for five commissioners and five private secretaries placed in one little room in the Ayuntamiento. [459] While it was possible to get through the room without scrambling over them, it would have been equally possible to circle it, walking on them, without stepping on the floor. In the course of our first long official interview with the General, he informed us that we were "an injection into an otherwise normal situation."

He added that we had already mediatized the volume of work that flowed over his desk. At the moment none of us were quite sure what he meant, but we found the word in the dictionary. How often in the weary years that were to follow I wished that some one would materially mediatize the task which fell to my lot! It was General MacArthur's honestly held and frankly expressed opinion that what the Filipinos needed was "military government pinned to their backs for ten years with bayonets." He later changed that view very radically, and when civil provincial governments were finally established it was with his approval, and, in many instances, upon his specific recommendation.

At the outset some effort was made to keep the public away from us. Word was pa.s.sed that we had no authority, which was true enough, as our legislative activities were not to begin until September 1. The ninety days which intervened were very advantageously spent in gaining familiarity with the situation, which we had no difficulty in doing. Plenty of people were already weary of military rule and flocked to us. None of my companions had ever before set foot in the Philippines, and although I had spent more than four years there, I still had plenty to learn.

In this connection I am reminded of an event which occurred somewhat later. While the commission was en route from Iloilo to Catbalogan when we were establishing civil provincial governments, General Hughes and Mr. Taft became involved in a somewhat animated discussion. The General displayed an accurate knowledge of facts which were of such a nature that one would hardly have expected an army officer to be familiar with them. Mr. Taft said: "General, how do you do it? You have always been a busy man, devoted to your profession. How have you managed to acc.u.mulate such a remarkable fund of information?" The General smiled his rare smile and replied: "Governor, I will tell you. I always try to go to bed at night knowing a little more than I did when I got up in the morning." It is a wise plan to follow.

On September 1 we a.s.sumed the legislative power, our first official act being to appropriate $2,000,000 Mexican for the construction and repair of highways and bridges.

We were impressed with the fundamental necessity of promptly opening up lines of land communication in a country which almost completely lacked them, and there were many poor people in dire need of employment who would be relieved by the opportunity to earn an honest living which the inauguration of road construction would afford them.

Our second act appropriated $5000 Mexican for the purpose of making a survey to ascertain the most advantageous route for a railroad into the mountains of Benguet, where we wished to establish a much-needed health resort for the people of the archipelago.